XVI OPEN SOCIETY FORUM

COSMOPOLITAN COMMUNICATIONS: CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

Avatud Eesti Fond
Open Estonia Foundation

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OPENING REMARKS

MALL HELLAM
DIRECTOR OF OPEN ESTONIA FOUNDATION

Dear friends, ladies and gentlemen! Another year has passed and on the behalf of the Open Estonia Foundation it is my great pleasure to welcome you all to the XVI Open Society Forum. We will talk today about cosmopolitan communications, cultural diversity, the globalized world and so on and so forth.

A well-known Estonian poet, Gustav Suits, said at the beginning of the 20th century, "Let us remain Estonians, but let us also become Europeans!" These words have been immortalized in the Estonian national collective memory ever since. But more than a hundred years later we still deal with almost the same dilemma. Building an open society has been a difficult task to undergo for Estonia. How open can you be when you have felt almost forever like you are under constant threat? And what are these threats? In the past, very often, a threat meant war. Nowadays, in a postmodern information society, the threats are very different. However, is it possible to have it all – to be a modern open society, to borrow from other cultures, to enrich your own, or will it lead to the dissolution of your own national identity, culture, language, and eventually to their disappearance? Because of all those questions, I am sure that our audience today will be more than eager to hear our distinguished keynote speaker – professor Pippa Norris. Just a few days ago, together with

Ronald Inglehart, she was awarded one of the most desired awards in social sciences – the Johan Skytte prize. Our second panelist is our beloved professor Marju Lauristin and, if I can say so, the mother of Estonian social sciences. The forum will be moderated by Priit Hõbemägi. Priit is a well-known journalist who has previously been the editor-in-chief of one of the biggest daily newspapers in Estonia, *Eesti Päevaleht*, and the weekly newspaper *Eesti Ekspress*. At the moment, Priit is trying to integrate the concept of the multi-integrated newsroom in the publishing house of Ekspress Grupp.

In conclusion, let me wish us all an inspiring Wednesday evening and I hope that the debate on today's topic extends over a longer time frame and to wider audiences. Thank you all for your attention and enjoy the evening.

KEYNOTE SPEECH AND PANEL DISCUSSION: "COSMOPOLITAN COMMUNICATIONS: CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD"

GUEST SPEAKER: PROFESSOR PIPPA NORRIS

PANEL DISCUSSION LED BY PRIIT HÕBEMÄGI

PRIIT HÕBEMÄGI: Dear guests, I am very honored to be here with you today. I would like to introduce to you our special guest – Pippa Norris. The keynote speaker at our forum is a well-known political scientist, researcher of political culture, communication and democracy, professor of Harvard University and the recent Johan Skytte award laureate – Pippa Norris. Between 2006 and 2007 Norris served as the director of the Democratic Governance Group at the United Nations Development Programme in New York. Since 2011 she has worked as the visiting professor in Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney. Previously she has held visiting appointments at Columbia University, the University of California-Berkeley, the University of East Anglia, the University of Oslo, the University of Cape Town, Otago University and the Australian National University. Prior to Harvard she taught at Edinburgh University. Her honors include the 2011 Johan Skytte award, which she shared with Ronald Inglehart of the University of Michigan. They share the prize for contributing innovative ideas about the relevance and roots of political culture in a global context, transcending previous mainstream approaches of research. The Skytte award, known informally as the Nobel prize for the political sciences, includes previous winners such

as Robert A. Dahl, Sidney Verba, Robert Putnam and Rein Taagepera. The research compares processes of democracy and democratization, elections, culture and public opinion, political communications and gender politics in countries world wide.

As a well-known public speaker and a prize-winning author, she has published almost forty books and her work has been translated into more than a dozen languages. She has served as an expert consultant for many international bodies, including the UN, UNESCO, OSCE, the Council of Europe, the World Bank, the National Endowment for Democracy and the UK Electoral Commission. Her most recent books are: *Cosmopolitan Communications: National Diversity in a Globalized World*, with Ronald Inglehart, 2009; and an edited volume for the World Bank – *The Role of the News media in the Governance Reform Agenda*, 2010; and *Democratic Deficits: Critical Citizens Revisited*, 2011. Her next book is *Why Democratic Governance? Prosperity, Welfare and Peace*.

After Pippa Norris's presentation we ask professor Marju Lauristin to join us here and have a discussion on Pippa Norris's book. But now, dear guests – Pippa Norris, the floor is yours.

PIPPA NORRIS: Friends and colleagues! This is a topic that is of concern in many countries around the world. I hope I am going to provoke you tonight, I hope we are going to have a good discussion and I would like us to think through some of the issues. Very much as Mall Hellam said – on one hand we want to be cosmopolitans, we want different cultures, different places to travel, different types of food, different types of movies, different types of books – we want a multicultural world. But does it mean that we lose some of our identity as the result – who we are, what we feel, who our community is, who we belong to? These are some of the questions and I am going to review some of the evidence and hopefully provide some answers that might challenge some of the conventional wisdom.

First, I am going to set out some theories and some arguments, and I am going to set out three views of how globalization and cosmopolitanism is affecting us. They are divergent views, which have been around for many years. They are nothing new. But we are going to think what they imply and then going to set out what we call a firewall model. This basically says that many of these arguments have been exaggerated and there are tremendous barriers between the impact of the world in globalization and how we actually take those values – whether it changes our attitudes, our opinions, whether it changes us as identities. So, I set out the theory that we will start with. Then I am going to talk briefly about the evidence and what you will quickly find, when you are engaged in this debate, is that there is a tremendous amount of hot air – all sorts of opinions all around the place and very little evidence that systematically tries to work out the impacts. I am going to give you an innovative way, where we can look at people in a wide variety of different countries through the World Values Survey and start to work out whether those who actually pay attention to the media in the most cosmopolitan societies have different types of values and different types of identities compared to those who do not. I am going to bring out some of the results and I know that we have a mixed audience, so for those who like something more illustrative, I'll give you that, and those who might like some numbers, I'll give you that too. The conclusion, the argument that I am going to give you, is essentially that the news media use – those who pay the most attention to newspapers, to television, to the internet and to a wide variety of other information sources in the most cosmopolitan societies – strengthens trust in outsiders – people from different countries, different religions, different values – and it also weakens our sense of nationalism. Normatively, whether that is good or bad, I am going to leave as an open question for us to think about.

Do we want to see us here in this room as Estonians with a strong national identity, or do we want to see us here as Europeans, or do you want to see yourselves as cosmopolitans? Then we are going to briefly think about the implications for public policy and the European Union when it seeks to protect the media, and whether an open society is actually the better alternative. Let's start with a little bit from the book. The book itself was published by Cambridge University Press. I obviously cannot go through the whole book, so I

will just give you chapter six, which is about citizenship. We will start with the theory because the theory sets out the stage, sets out the arguments and our assumptions.

What is the theory about? There are some things that we can all agree upon. Firstly, we are currently experiencing a modern age of globalization. Globalization is not something that is new. Think back, for example, to the world of the Greeks, think back to the world of the Roman Empire. Think back to the 1880s, when the world was connected to a number of different channels of communication. But what has changed in the modern world, which in this particular pattern, as I will show, we can start by documenting from the early 1970s onwards, has been a speeding up of our interconnectedness. The way that we define it is all those interdependent networks. So the housing market goes down in Chicago and suddenly people in Britain are out of work, people in Ireland find their house values plummeting and people in Iceland find that the banks are insecure. It is the movement across borders of ideas, of economies, of money, of goods, of services, of trade, of culture, of ecology and environmental threats like climate change. You cannot escape it in any one country, it is going to go around the world. Of course refugees and the movement of people across borders, the growth of immigration – such a profound change, in particular for the European Union.

I wanted to get out of the idea of globalization *per se*, because globalization often provokes an immediate reaction. People have assumed they either like it or they don't like it. I think the word "cosmopolitanism" actually frames it in an older tradition. Think about the 18th century, when people would go on a grand tour, in order to be educated, in order to know the world. You could not just live in Paris, or Berlin, or London. You had to travel, you had to know different languages, different literatures, different peoples, different foods. So "cosmopolitanism" we are defining as essentially the way we learn about and interact with people and places beyond the borders of our nation state. Partly that is obviously the direct transfer of people – more and more people are mobile nowadays. You might be born in one country, but you work in another. I personally was born in Britain. I then moved up to Scotland to teach in Edinburgh, I then moved west, across to Harvard. After twenty years I then took

out American citizenship, although I also have my British passport, though we must not tell people. Of course, I have now been transferred for a year to Sydney, so I am also taking on some of the Australian culture, or the Asian–Pacific culture. So, the way that we move about gives us new identities. We are no longer British and indeed, when you ask "what am I?", it depends very much on who you are, as to who I say I am. If you are from Europe, I might say I am an American, but that is kind of strange in some ways. If I am in Australia, I might say I am British, because that makes some connections. I might say that I am European – I mean I can be all those things and any of them, depending on who I am speaking to. It also is obviously involved in interpersonal communications. To go to Australia, for example in the early period of the 19th century, it took six months. Can you imagine getting on the boat for six months now? Still, going today takes forever – 35 hours, if you are going to get back home from Sydney – but nevertheless, it is very doable. And of course the interconnection across societies through mass communication.

Pippa Norris

Now, we all know that stuff. The question is, what is the impact? And what is the impact on our persons and our cultural diversities? There are really a number of different views. In the 1970s it was very common to talk about cultural imperialism. Imperialism was the word of the day when countries were

gaining independence in Africa and Asia. Schiller and McPhail would talk about electronic colonialism. The argument was that, essentially, electronic mass communications were produced as the product of the West by and large and they would be exported to the developing countries, who did not necessarily have their own industry. So it was a one way flow. Essentially, it was an attempt to eliminate cultures in many countries around the world and to have a predominant western perspective, fueling capitalism and trade and fueling an economic area as well. That, of course, was highly controversial at the time. UNESCO was deeply divided. But also we have another wave of this in the 1990s, and it is no accident that it came about in the 1990s. It was not just that there were political changes in the air, it was not just that the internet was born in 1994, but also there was the sense that the American culture was dominant. Not just western culture, it was not France, Germany or Britain. It was Americanization and people felt that was a threat. So people talked about Coca–Colonization and McDonaldization. In fact, a lot of accusations were in the air. You might have thought that this has disappeared by now, but if we look at a range of things, including UNESCO's work and the work of the European Union, you can see fear of a threat of these new global ways of interaction emerging again.

So, cultural protectionism is far from dead, and there are many people who feel again that all of these new changes are a threat, very much as you suggested. People are losing out, particularly the smaller countries. Particularly those at the periphery, not those at the centre. Particularly those who don't speak English. Particularly those who have minority languages and particularly those who are poor and are not necessarily a part of the information grid. We do not dispute in the book that globalization has been expanding and that it has really been a changing force. Just to show you a simple illustration – this is a very nice graph, that looks at some of the trends in globalization (ref. *Rising trends in globalization, 1972-2004*, slide no. 6). It has been developed by a Swiss institute – KOF. They define globalization in terms of economics, for example trade patterns. They focus on political globalization and on social globalization. Social includes a lot of communications. You can see the trends very clearly – it starts being documented in the early 1970s, and it slowly rises in the 1980s, but then look at what happens in the early 1990s. All of a sudden

all of these trends go up a lot. I think, absolutely, that globalization is affecting us, and it is affecting us through a wide variety of different cultural goods and services. This is again a work from UNESCO (ref. *Cultural goods,* slide no. 7). It is not simply television, or not simply the news, nor the internet. All of these ways in which we can see connections and interchanges, whether it is in publishing, in new media, in music, whether it is in traditional performance arts, like opera and theatre. All of these are a part of things that are increasingly crossing national borders.

We accept that there is Western dominance in the producer countries. Actually, documenting this is quite difficult, but we went to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and they keep a record of audio-visual trade (ref. *Figure 3.3: Western predominance in audio-visual trade* slide no. 8). Audio-visual trade is not exactly all of the elements of the cultural exchange we are talking about, but it is a pretty good proxy. You can see here the trade in audio-visual services and goods and what we have got there is those who export and those who import as a logged pattern, by different types of economies. Which are the countries at the top? Well, what would you expect – the United States, exporting, right up there in its own little place. Importing as well – it does bring in masterpiece theatre, it does bring in occasional English language productions. Murder is always very popular in America, as much as it is here on television, I have noticed. By and large, it is more of an exporter, than an importer and way off up there. Who else is exporting? As you can see again – Britain, Germany, France. In other words, many of the old colonial powers. Why? Because they offer each other market, cultural links that they connect to. So France sells films, sells television to its own [linguistic] region, in particular for example in Francophone Africa. Germany and Canada are up there as well. As you can see these are all high-income societies. If you go down the list, immediately you can see some. And there are some regional markets which are very important. For example Indian movies, Bollywood as it is known within its own area, is a very big exporter. We all know about tele-novellas in Brazil, in Mexico – soap operas that are sold throughout Latin America.

So, there are regional markets, but also look at the countries down at the bottom. These are the countries that have not got the production base, that are not

exporting and they might be importing a great deal. As you can see, countries like Cyprus, Venezuela and right down at the bottom all the poor countries. And where is Estonia? Estonia is down at the bottom, just a little bit above Macedonia, Lithuania, Armenia, but basically in that cluster. Is it importing? Yes. Is it exporting? Not so much. And not only that – American trade is not simply dominant, it is expanding as the share of the market. Again, this shows you the major companies and how they have changed over time, from the WTO figures, in all these audio–visual exports, like movies, television and music (ref. *Figure 3.4: The growing predominance of American audio-visual trade,* slide no. 9). Can you see this dark line up there? It is the US, shooting up ahead, and other countries staying flat in their own particular market.

This is the familiar model of what has been changing (ref. *Figure 1.1: Theories about the globalization of cultural markets*, slide no. 10). Big changes in the production process – in how we make television, in how we sell newspapers, in how we receive internet information. A growth of cultural world trade, which is being produced partly by the falling of the barriers – the protectionist barriers that were there. The opening of all those forms of communication and the growing imbalance, where the west predominates, not only, but especially America, in terms of the imports. But so what? There are four ways to interpret the impact. The first one says that what is happening is a convergence. This is a very popular view and the convergence view essentially says that a lot of cultures are learning from one other. The West is still predominant, but other countries are starting to adapt Western norms, values and ideas. This is particularly important in countries where the traditional culture might have been very strong. Think of what is being exported. I am sure that none of you really watch American popular television, am I right? But we all know the sort of content. So think about the values there in terms of the family, think about the values in terms of violence, think about the images in terms of crime. If you live in a very traditional society, say you live in Mali, and access to television is expanding and this is what you are watching. Or you live in Algeria, or you live in any of the other traditional cultures. It might well be that this is eroding some traditional values of marriage, of family, of the role of women and really changing it in important ways.

But there is a second alternative. Far from the world adopting Western values, it could be that instead there is polarization. A number of people who have looked at events in the Middle East, in particular of course the 9/11 and the dramatic polarization of attitudes, have said, "People are seeing in other countries these Western values. Far from accepting and absorbing them, they are saying, 'that is very alien, that is not our culture.'" They watch it, they are entertained by it, but they do not necessarily become influenced by it. Indeed, it might be that a greater misunderstanding is the result around the world. It could be that we are polarized – people see it, but they reject it.

The third view is fusion. Just like you get fusion cuisine. Has fusion cuisine come to Estonia? You go there and there is a restaurant that has a little bit of sushi rice and a little bit of McDonald's' burgers and a little bit of spaghetti and Italian food. Basically Californian cuisine – a little bit of everything. Here the idea is that you take a little bit from lots of cultures and it is not simply the West influencing the poorer countries, it is everybody influencing everybody. The number one dish in Britain right now is chicken tikka masala. Why? Because people like Indian food. Why? Because British food, it has to be said, is just not that good. A fusion culture is one in which we can enrich and think again about things like ethnic art and ethnic furniture, which is often being brought in as a way of enriching the traditional European way of doing things.

Convergence, polarization and fusion are all out there and people have argued for them. We think, however, that they are all a bit exaggerated. Rather what we give you, is a firewall model, which says that in many countries around the world there is far less impact, despite the growing of globalization, than you might expect. What is this firewall model we want to propose to you? Here is the basic way to think about it (ref. *Firewall model*, slide no. 11). Namely – yes, cultural exports are now available more widely than ever before. Yes, there have been all those changes from north to south. But, in order to actually impact on cultures… First some cultures have very little trade integration. Yes, it is true that Europe in particular has been exporting and importing these cultural products, but many poorer countries have not. Many poorer countries do not have a very strong television sector, nor that many people in terms of the share of a movie audience, nor necessarily access through a variety of globalized media. So firstly, many countries are not actually trading.

Secondly, even if they are, a very large number of countries still have very real problems regarding media freedom. We only have to think about how China has been responding to the Arab Spring. We know that they have been learning their lessons and where there are dissidents, even minor dissidents online, there are very strict and draconian punishments, which have been meted out. Political freedom remains very limited in many countries – North Korea, Burma, we do not need to go through the whole list. Even if these products are out there, the political messages are not getting through to particular countries.

Thirdly, even if the country is an open democracy, but not developed, there are high levels of poverty, and we often exaggerate how far the information society is affecting all sections of the population. It often affects the central capital, the middle class, the educated. But it has not necessarily gone out to the rural population, to the tribal villages. Lastly, even if you overcome these three hurdles, we still have to learn, and we learn from many different sources. You learn your values from your family and your parents and your schools and your community, not just television. All of those are limits on how far this global trend is going to affect your national culture.

Just to illustrate, this graph shows you the rise of the internet (ref. *The global gap in access to the internet, 1990-2004,* slide no. 12). But what I am showing you here is a very familiar digital divide. Some people think it has gone away now, that it has disappeared – everybody has access through mobile phones. These are the latest figures which are available from the International Telecommunication Union, when it estimates access to the internet. Yes, in the most affluent countries, it is clear to see that the line goes up a lot, although even there only fifty percent have access on average. If we look at the middle, it is much lower. And look at the poorest – they are almost flat. So, in most developing societies, there is very little access outside the major capitals and the high–income groups. And I know everybody says, that does not matter because everyone has access through mobile phones. Well, have a look at the global gap in telephone access (ref. *The global gap in telephone access, including cellular, 1975-1999,* slide no. 13). I am sure that everyone in this room is sitting with one, maybe even two mobile phones in their pocket. We can see the high-income countries – they are at one hundred percent. In a number of

countries we have more mobile phones than we have people. I do not know what they are doing but look at the gap between those and the medium–income countries. And look at the poorer countries around the world – the difference is enormous. These figures only go as far as 1999, so maybe it has changed in the last decade, but nevertheless, the gap has been big. The same is true in access to television in the years for which we have data. UNESCO is updating its figures but we really do not have very good figures. But anyway, you can say that high income countries have good access, medium and low income, not so good.

So what is the impact? – this is at the heart of the book, this is the challenge. We know these trends have happened, but does it matter? How do you start to test the impact? The interesting thing is that despite forty years or so of debate at UNESCO and elsewhere, we have had very little evidence to test the impact. So what we do is that we call on the World Values Survey (ref. *World Values Survey 1981-2007,* slide no. 17). This is the biggest survey in the world, it covers over ninety countries, it covers over ninety percent of the population. The countries in dark are the ones which are included over successive waves. It started in 1981, we are right now in the sixth wave, which is 2010–2012, and it is still in the field for that. For the first time, in the fifth wave we included some questions about media use. By the way, as you can see, there are some gaps in the coverage, in sub-Saharan Africa it is very bad, in Arab states it is not particularly good either. But we are gradually starting to plug these up and try to get more support. So we really expand the coverage of Africa. It is very critical to know about public opinion in many of these countries and also to build up marketing and marketing capacity in these countries.

What do we ask? We have a question, which is all about media use in the World Values Survey. In lots of countries, whether it is Burkina Faso or Ghana, whether it is Sweden or Estonia, we can see what media people are using. It is a simple question, but it is the one you can ask across different countries. People use different sources for their information, to find out about their country and the world. Can you tell me, if you have used any of these during the last week (ref. *News media users,* slide no. 18)? Obviously, it is limited – any communication scholar in the room would say, "let's have ten questions, not

just one; let's measure the frequency of use; let's measure what people do when they go online." So it is very simple in the World Values Survey, but it is a start in many countries. Still, we have no information about media content.

Pippa Norris

First, what we can do is that we look at individuals, what they are looking at, what they are reading on a regular basis, what they are using and so on. Then we can also classify societies by how open they are to this process – globalization. In other words, we can classify societies into cosmopolitan and parochial. How do we do that? Well, we can create an index, and it is worth thinking how you create this index (ref. *Cosmopolitanism Index,* slide no. 19). Basically, what we do is that we put in the globalization index from the Swiss institute that I have already told you about. Then we also think that a country is going to be more globalized if it is more affluent because that way they are going to have more access to, for example, all sorts of mass media. Then we also put in media freedom because if a country has restrictions on what people can see, hear and do, that is going to limit it as well. So the most cosmopolitan countries in my classification are highly globalized, more affluent and also the ones with media freedom.

I am going to show you something that is too small in this room. We created an index which looks like this (ref. *Cosmopolitanism Index, 2005,* slide no. 20). What it basically shows... Which are the countries at the top – the most cosmopolitan in the world? Luxembourg, absolutely. You know – when you blink in Luxembourg, you miss it, right? Obviously, people are working in different places and they are getting all the communication from France and from Germany and so on. Which other countries are going to be high up in the cosmopolitanism index table? Highly globalized, affluent and with political freedoms. Have a guess. Switzerland and Norway, Sweden – the small world first states in Europe are highly globalized. Switzerland has four languages. When you turn on television you can watch French, German, Italian. It is in the middle of everything. It is highly internet-connected and of course it has got the imports of all the movies and films and everything else. There are high levels of media freedom in Switzerland, very little restrictions Also it is highly globalized because of its trade pattern as well. It is the smaller first world states of Europe that are some of the most globalized around the world, not the United States. That needs to be emphasized, because it is often assumed that the US is the most globalized for a variety of reasons. It has a very diverse population and many national cultures but it does not have an index outcome as high as Switzerland.

Can you spot Estonia on this map, on this line? We had a look and it is basically in the top third. It is too small, I cannot even point it out. Can you just about spot Estonia up there, it is near Poland? Not near Australia, you go down from there to France, and then down to Estonia. So it really is a highly globalized society. Which country is at the very bottom according to the cosmopolitanism index? Yemen, Burma. North Korea – where you get imprisoned if you listen to BBC on the radio, the most cut-off in terms of poverty and the most isolated from all the messages around the world. Also many poorer countries in Africa are fairly parochial in our pattern. They are not importing a lot of these products because they do not have the market, they do not necessarily have the linguistic skills and they are isolated in terms of economic development, in terms of new technology.

So the bottom line – what is the impact? Let me just give you some of the illustrative impacts. I cannot give them all to you, let us just focus on nationalism, the sense of identity. What we do here is that we measure identity (ref. *National identities and trust,* slide no. 23). We ask people these questions: "How far do you see yourself as the citizen of X – your country, i.e. France, Germany, Estonia, etc.?, How far do you see yourself as part of the local community?, How far do you express national pride?, How far are you willing to fight for your country?" All of those questions are seen to come together and they basically define how far you have a sense of national identity. Then we also have a question about trust in outsiders, the opposite. This is about trust in people from another nationality and religion.

Here is your basic pattern (ref. *Trust in outsiders,* slide no. 24). The book itself uses all sorts of controls for people's education, for their income, for their location, for the type of their society, etc. Just to illustrate what we have got here (ref. *Trust in outsiders,* slide no. 25). This is the basic question – "How far do you trust a person from another country or another religion?" We have divided countries up into types – on the one hand we have the countries which are more parochial and isolated, on the other hand countries which are more globalized and cosmopolitan. Then I have divided up whether they use lots of media or just a few, so we can see what the pattern is. The pattern is really quite remarkable. It is very much what we would predict. Who trusts people outside of their country the most? It is those who are high media users, not those who are low media users. It is because you are exposed to lots of other messages, lots of other information. And the more you know, the more you trust – that is one of the basic assumptions of some of the trust literature. People who do not know anything about other countries are much more likely to be xenophobic, intolerant and untrusting of people because they do not know anything about them.

What also matters is the type of society you live in. If you are in a country like Mali or Ghana, with far less access to the global information, then you are less likely to trust people. As you can see it is a perfect stepped pattern. Somebody who uses very little media in an open society is more trusting than somebody who uses a lot of media in a closed society. Indeed this echoes – the whole

mission, in some ways, of the open society is to answer the question, How do we start to trust people from other places, how do we start to prevent conflicts, how do we start to prevent interstate wars? The more open the borders, the more globalized the society, the more open freedom of the media, the more people trust each other as well.

This just shows it in more detail but I will not go into it in depth (ref. *Trust in outsiders*, slide no. 25). It just shows you some of the patterns – who is more trusting? Of course, it is Norway, and Sweden – they are always at the top of nearly all my charts in terms of social tolerance. But also the US, Britain, Finland, Australia are up there. But we can see some of the countries in the moderate area, some of the countries down at the bottom. Ghana for example is highly democratic now, but without this sort of influence it is very mistrusting of people from other countries. Zimbabwe is very mistrusting, also Thailand, Morocco, Mexico, Turkey, Malaysia. Will just show you the nationalism scale, then I will sit down and we will have a chance to talk about all of theses issues and I will skip to the conclusions.

On the nationalism scale, again, we can see, that the pattern is quite a good fit (ref. *Nationalism scale,* slide no. 26) – when asked how nationalistic, universalistic or pacifistic you feel. What we have here is our nationalism scale, which runs from low to high, and then we have our cosmopolitanism index. So, who are the most nationalistic countries, most nationalistic societies? Again, it is Ghana, Jordan, Mali, Turkey, Trinidad and Tobago, Rwanda – countries which we know have also had a high level of conflict over some of these issues. The most pacifistic, the ones that feel the least on the nationalism scale – they are Germany, Japan, Switzerland. Some of the most globalized countries, along with some of the middle countries as well – Sweden is up there, also USA.

In conclusion – what have we said? (ref. *IV: Conclusions*, slide no. 31) Firstly, there is often the belief that use of media might polarize people. It might be that the things we see on the television give us the negative view of the world. That we start to dislike other countries. In fact, the more you use the media the more you trust people from other places. That is a very positive message. It says that information is what gives us the bridges which allow people to live and work together in an increasingly complex and interdependent world. Also, it helps

us to trust people from different countries and from different religions. When we think about levels of ethnic conflict in the countries around the world, then it is really important that the media can play a part in this bridging role. If for example in Nigeria those who are of Muslim faith can learn more about those who are of Christian faith, then there is going to be more interaction. If those in Israel who are Jewish and those who are Palestinian can learn more about each other, then there should be more mutual trust. That is the basis of being able to live and work together. It is news media use, particularly in the most open societies, which creates these patterns and weakens feelings of nationalism. You might well think that it is bad. You might well think that I want to be Estonian, to be patriotic and have my own identity, that I do not want to be a part of this cosmopolitan world. But that is a normative judgement. In a way my own heart, my values are much more towards the cosmopolitan.

In some ways nationalism is a modern phenomenon. It started in the 17th and 18th centuries, it has not always been there. I go back to an earlier period of the Greeks or the Romans, when people were essentially citizens of the world and identifiable by lots of places in terms of community and where they belonged. But there are qualifications to this. Many other factors are going to contribute to these attitudes. I am not saying it is only the media or only globalization. We have to understand a lot more about how this process works. We all know some television stations, some newspapers that spread messages of hate, nationalism, messages which divide us rather than bring us together. We need to understand that, as well as the more positive side. All of this is only looked at in the news media, not entertainment. I cannot tell you what the impact is of watching television drama or movies from different countries. It might be the same, it might be different. That is another, bigger research agenda which still has to be done. By the way, it is a wonderful research agenda for any graduate students who simply want to sit there and watch all sorts of drama, movies and the like.

Lastly, what are the policy implications? As I said, both UNESCO and the European Union (EU) have been moving towards something of a protectionist policy. The EU in particular has suggested as part of its communication, telecommunication and audio-visual trade, that there should be a certain pro-

portion of trade of all the broadcasting from within the EU – 50%. The real attempt, especially from the French, has been a worry that the European culture would be decimated and certainly weakened, if there were too many imports from other places. Similarly, UNESCO quite rightly says in its new convention on cultural pluralism that we need to protect threatened languages, indigenous groups, particular arts and crafts and a wide range of different types of cultural artifacts, which exist in the world. I could not dispute that – in many ways it is important. We are losing languages all the time. On the other hand, I must ask, is it good or bad? Well, it is a mixed bag. Cultural protectionism can be used to keep out information, communication and ways of learning about places around the world that we could not otherwise. Think back in the history of Estonia, how the people felt about the world thirty years ago, twenty years ago and today. There has been a loss, perhaps, of some forms of identity. But haven't there also been gains during that period? I would like to finish on that note. The evidence is all available, anybody can test all these things. The book is available if you would like to look further at any of the evidence. We would really appreciate your ideas, thoughts and comments on the ideas that we have put over. Thank you all very much!

PRIIT HÕBEMÄGI: Thank you! It has been very inspiring to find out from your presentation that there are other ways for smaller nations that are not so gloomy, such as convergence and polarization. The theory of firewalls is of special interest because we Estonians are the champions of firewalling. We have been doing it ourselves for a very long time. Estonia has its own firewall system and those are commonly seen as the main tool for the survival of Estonian culture and language. Polarization was also a very handy tool to counteract oppressive foreign culture. Now, you say that Estonia has very cosmopolitan communications. We could not have had cosmopolitan communications twenty five years ago. It seems to me that Estonia has been living a strange process – on one hand living under oppressive foreign culture pressure, which tried to diminish the importance of Estonian culture by establishing a two language system and promoting foreign culture. It resulted in heavy polarization. But the pressure actually fed the fight for the survival of Estonian culture and traditions. On the other hand, Estonia has been in the reach of mass media and communications through Finnish television, the Voice of America

and the BBC World Service. All of them represent quality news journalism, which then according to your theory could have made Estonia more open to democracy, liberal values and tolerance. And here we are now. So it seems to me that it is possible to go both ways at the same time. To polarize on a large scale within one cultural sphere, constantly firewalling there, and at the same time trying to be a part of cosmopolitan communications.

Thank you for the presentation and now I will invite our honored professor Marju Lauristin.

Priit Hõbemägi

MARJU LAURISTIN: Thank you very much. I want to thank you for this very marvelous opportunity to sit here with Pippa Norris and discuss things which are of very great interest to both of us, I think. I have to say that Pippa Norris is one of the favorite authors in the reading list for our students. This new book also was met with great interest. I had a very short time to go through it on the internet, but what is a very good thing is that when you go to Pippa Norris's homepage, there are the full texts of all her books. That is a very rare occasion – she is not greedy, she is sharing with all of us the ideas that she has and that is one very practical step towards globalization. She is not only a theorist but also a practitioner of globalized communications. But

nevertheless, as it is with everything we read, after reading the text we produce our own interpretation. We have our own questions and these questions come from our own experiences. In our case here, as Priit described, they are experiences of history, but also, some say, more sophisticated experiences based on research. Estonia is one of the most researched countries, I suppose, because we have one of the smallest countries and a lot of data. If we can count the amount of bites per capita, then I suppose we really have produced one of the biggest amounts of data.

After going through the text of your book on the internet – I really did not have time to read it word by word – I made my own small exercises of regression analysis at three o'clock last night. I did it to test your main hypothesis about the relationships between national identity, trust, globalization, media usage and so on. My hypothesis was that it really is not so simple and that we have to take into account not only media *in corpore*. Because, when you showed your media index slide there was overwhelmingly the old media and the internet was given only under one point. But we have to take into account that the character of the globalization in terms of producing certain kind of knowledge and understanding of the world very much depends on what we have as a medium. For example, I suppose that we should not deny that globalization is much older than our lifetime. There are theoreticians who say that Christianity was the first wave of globalization – through the church. There was a comparatively smaller world then. If we take television, then television gave us an absolutely different way to globalize compared to the church and Christianity because of the different amount and also type of text. Visualization or CNN–ization of our world view – I suppose it is very different compared to all people attending the Christian church.

But now the internet is creating a different kind of globalization. It is globalization through social networks, it is not globalization through similar images any more. As we very well know, small children, not to talk about more grown-up people, can very well draw from the internet their very own small worlds and live in those. They are globalized in terms of having friends on different continents but not in terms of sharing views that were common, let's say, a hundred years ago. I suppose this is the first thing in going further from

this very interesting hypothesis –to go in depth in globalization, in concerning different kinds of media and in different kinds of knowledge, which is really the phenomenon of globalization. We produce similar world views, common networks and so on.

Marju Lauristin

What was the result of my small regression analysis? Firstly, I took trust as the independent medium because you also had trust as a very important thing. Looking at trust and using all sorts of demographic indicators in the regression analysis – age, education, income, which you also had. Then I took different kinds of media that we have on our surveys. We produce different indexes – an index of broadcasting consumption, one of print and press consumption, an index of internet consumption – not one index of media, but three different ones. Then we also have a lot of data on culture consumption, diversity of culture consumption. Then we have these kind of global attitudes, identity, tolerance concerning other cultures and so on. What came out in the regression analysis was that the first thing that influences trust is internet usage, but not just the amount, also the diversity of internet usage. That is one thing that we have to take into account – that it is not only the amount, but the activity itself. Here we come to the difference with the creative usage, not just consumer usage. The second place in this regression model was stratification. Self-stratification – it is people themselves who create their own more happy positions in society, above the average. They reveal more trust. Then television – you had the news-broadcasting television as positive, but here it was negative. Because, as we took away the internet, television in itself did not produce more trust, but more distrust. That is very interesting.

Then, when I took the other indicator – tolerance itself, not just trust, but understanding of different cultures, this kind of cosmopolitanism in a more strict sense – then media did not have any role at all. The first place belonged to the diversity of cultural activities. People who read more books, go to theatre more often, maybe participate in choirs, dance and so on – they have much more of this open attitude towards other cultures and people. The second place belonged to the same general index of trust – as the psychological general attitude of trust. In third place came consumerism, where we look at the theories (you remember Sassen and Sandikov) of the global world as the world we enter through the door of the department store or a supermarket, where we really meet global brands and actively insert them into our own small life or world. Here we have the same because our index of consumerism is namely the index of diversity of branding, the kind of ability to differentiate the brands. This culture is connected to globalization because if there are people who make a

very clear difference between different global brands they are more included in this kind of global cultural disposition. It is a very modest test but I suppose it gives us ideas of how to go in depth, as I mentioned earlier. And when we go in depth we can also see a different typology of the kinds of globalization – I suppose that you are well acquainted with Scott Lash's theory concerning the critique of information. He said that we can even divide up those countries which are highly globalized and all on the internet. Also, there are countries which are in bright light but are at the same time creative/innovative and countries that are also in bright light having lots of information gathered from the whole world, but which are adaptive and do not create. The other side, the dark side of global world, there you can also have these, but creative countries, which are not so cosmopolitan. I suppose you can find very creative countries there. Then there are those poor countries that are dark and non-creative. They are really suppressed and repressed, and in this sense unhappy. It gives a better understanding of how globalization, like information, can be as bad as it can be good.

The third thing, which we cannot avoid here in Estonia, is the problem of nationalism. I do not know if anybody warned you that Estonians have an allergy concerning the usage of the word nationalism. It is also really connected to our historic experiences because in those very, very hard and cruel times of Stalinism people got arrested and got sentenced 25+5 years "for nationalism". So for Estonians nationalism is something which is intertwined with these memories of Stalinism. To be accused of nationalism in this sense is not very well received. I suppose that now we are becoming more and more free of those memories and we are starting to discuss nationalism and different understandings of nationalism. Here I just jumped from history to the present day because now that we have all recently gone through, or actually, are all inside of this financial economic global crisis. And here, I just raise this issue, the role of national pride – a part of your index, feeling yourself related to your country – identity and so on – they could be for some countries a kind of moral strength that helps to overcome the crisis. To withstand all those global waves. In a small country you always feel like you are in a small boat on a big global ocean. I suppose the passengers of all the big ships and ferries have a very different feeling compared to people who travel on oceans in small boats. In this

small boat on the ocean you have to have a very good team, a very good sense of cooperation and teamwork. It also means that you have to have a strong local identity and local in our case means national culture and all that. I think that this global crisis is testing some of our notions and some of the ideas that we have brought with us from these glorious decades of modernization and postmodernization. So, this post-postmodernism will give us the stimulus to rethink and reanalyze the effects of globalization versus nationalism or localism and so on.

I have to confess that I really like Anthony Giddens's term cosmopolitan nationalism. That is a kind of paradox but our time is a time of paradoxes. I think that there is a relationship between cosmopolitanist structure – of trade and openness – and this kind of cultural or mental cosmopolitanism, which cannot be disembedded from the culture roots of any nation, which is embedded in language, in memory and so on. That is the most interesting thing to develop further. I think that this value survey and the world value maps – they provide a perfect background knowledge for that. I am very happy that you and Ronald Inglehart have now come in this direction. What you have written about democracy is very inspiring, especially now when we are addressing to all these officials, it can be very inspiring. Thank you.

PIPPA NORRIS: It is so marvelous that you can basically go around the globe and find that there are other sources of data and we can take similar ideas and test them. This could be very much the spirit of social science. I can very well believe that in Estonia there are different types of data and media and that they might well have different effects. Our world values unfortunately cannot get to that depth because we only ask these very, very simple measures. We can certainly differentiate those who say they use television, radio, newspapers and the internet. This is incredibly crude. And when we say "use the internet" – what does that mean any more? Does it really mean that you spend 24/7 as some of my colleagues do? Does it mean an occasional check-in to see your email? Does it mean finding some things in your Blackberry and so on?

Our measures in some ways of communication have become so much more complex. In the 1970s you could say, "How many hours of television do you watch?" And we kind of got it. And we knew what they were watching because

there were two channels, or there were three major newspapers, or whatever it was. Nowadays we must have all sorts of in-depth understandings of how people are using communications. The main point of our book was to say that the difference is as much between the societies as between the types of media. So, by only looking at one country we cannot test whether or not cosmopolitan society brings these sort of impacts. But I very much welcome the idea of bringing in different types of media. And testing it for ourselves and seeing if it works and what dimensions of attitudes might make a difference.

On the last question I would love to open it up as well – the kind of cultural context. Is nationalism and national pride a source of strength or a source of weakness in terms of the financial crisis? I think it can go both ways normatively. It can be a weakness in the sense that if the Germans are going to bail out the rest of Europe and they basically say that "we are Germans, we do not care about the Greeks, or the Italians, the Irish, the Spanish – all the others groups who are in trouble". Then of course that is a disaster for the European project. A disaster because it means that national interest or pride is going to drive a broader set of collaborations. On the other hand, you could say that national pride could be an important way to improve your economy, so long as it does not lead to protectionism. If it does lead to protectionism, then in some ways...

MARJU LAURISTIN: I have to say that the word is the same but the meaning is different when you use the word "protectionism" in the context of culture and in the context of economy. These are very different meanings.

PIPPA NORRIS: That is right. Some countries can have very open trade policies and yet very closed in terms of culture.

MARJU LAURISTIN: Like Estonia, or Finland.

PIPPA NORRIS: Oh no, you are not closed in culture. I am really thinking of countries which are so protectionist of their own culture they are really trying to keep out all messages, political messages, messages of dissent and things like that.

MARJU LAURISTIN: There is one thing about the European Union. We have made a kind of research on this issue also. Take European Union broadcasting policy, it is actually very much favors commercial broadcasting. When we compare for example public broadcasting content with commercial channels, then we see that this kind of consumer production of US based, not very deep films and all that, really dominates on commercial channels. I am not speaking about news. News also in the USA is very different – from CNN versus from Fox. But on non-commercial channels, in public broadcasting, the culture related content, again I am not talking about the news, is mainly from EU countries. This means from the UK, more French and German, not so much American. I am saying that in this context cultural protectionism is enriching, cultural diversity is being protected, not one culture. I think that kind of policy of cultural protection is similar to protecting the diversity of nature.

PIPPA NORRIS: It is always the question of how much you are protecting and how rigid the barriers are. In other cultures, which are much more rigid in terms of trying to keep out all the messages, it is more problematic – freedom of expression, democracy and all sorts of other things as well. One thinks of linguistic broadcasting for example. When I was in Scotland there was, for example, always a certain amount of coverage just in Gaelic. Absolutely, if you are going to save that language, then you must have a certain specialty time allocated for that, in Welsh as well. So, I am not saying "no protection at all!" But if it goes too far, then it can be a problem, because it is basically saying that there is a fear of the other – a fear of American, British, German, whatever it is – French products. In fact, the type of exposure can have positive impacts as well as negative impacts.

PRIIT HÕBEMÄGI: I would like to ask a question. Your study said that the diffusion of information on democracy and human rights can encourage cynical activism towards these values around the world. So what do you think, did the Arabian users of Facebook and Twitter really ignite the Arabian spring?

PIPPA NORRIS: This is all our previous talk at the ICEGOV. Basically, there I gave a presentation where I said that it was the Twitter revolution. It has the Arab spring being very much influenced by Facebook and the social media. Clearly the media sector has been saying that yes it was – that all of this has

really changed the pace at which the messages of dissent and protest are being broadcasted. They have helped to mobilize and organize and they have had a really big impact on for example Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as well. In fact, if you look at the data, the access to most of this media is grossly exaggerated. One percent of those in Libya was estimated to be on Facebook for example, less than five percent on Twitter. Even internet access, the most general question you can ask, was still very limited in a quite a few of these countries. It often seems to me that since the journalists are using Twitter all the time, they kind of say, "everybody else must be using Twitter all the time as well." So this is a kind of hall of mirrors we are going through. But it can have some impact, I think on the broadest level, what you call the diffuse level. It is not the specific messages, but in terms of the television images people have of the West, of democratic countries, of stable states, of countries where you have effective public services. That image is very powerful and has been part of the broader sense. When you ask around the world, "Do you want to have democracy?", eight out of ten people say, "yes". In all the countries, even in the most unexpected places – even in Saudi Arabia, China, countries with no strong democratic past. Why? Because they see these images, images of successful states, of countries that seem to work, of growing economies. That is often what people see when we ask them if they want democracy. They do not necessarily think about elections or human rights, they just think, "yes, I would like to have something like that for my society as well."

MARJU LAURISTIN: Continuing this topic of values and the effect of values, I really like in Inglehart's writings, in his book with Welzel, the idea of having a really effective democracy, which is not just the institutional side of life, but which is coming from the mentality and soul of people, the love for democracy. It is actually connected with the level of individualization, the level of value of self-expression. The same we find when we read Burke – his idea that in this society of risk the individualization, autonomous individual is becoming really the crucial value. Now, coming to these Arab revolutions. Coming to the cultures, which are very far from this kind of emancipation, value of self-expression. Self-expression in collective terms – mobilization, shooting, being on the street and so on – it is not the same as in the post-materialist values on a very high level. So, what do you think of the prospective of

democracy in those kind of countries, which have got this image you said – of the efficient, happy countries – and want to have something like that. And then come to the streets hoping that they will have.

PIPPA NORRIS: It is such a simplification to assume that regime transition equals democracy. It is just nonsense, as we all know. What we often have is the division of the elite, the army is not supporting the particular president, then there is the regime turn-over, so far away from the actual process of moving towards a really consolidated democracy in these countries. In the first instance, I cannot help thinking that there will be a tremendous amount of dissent, instability and lack of governance because the government's capacity declines in these cases, rather than increases. There is going to be a lot of disappointment. People on the streets do genuinely seem to be saying that they want to have more freedom. We want to have more openness to express ourselves, we are very unhappy with corruption, we really want a change. But whether they realize that the transition towards democracy has a really long period of consolidation and cultural change, as you say, I am not sure.

MARJU LAURISTIN: There is the eternal question, should culture come first and politics after that?

PIPPA NORRIS: This is funny. There is my new book, which has just been finished – *The Impact of Democratic Governance*. It is about the impact on economic growth and on welfare in terms of human development, MDGs, also in terms of peace and lack of conflict. It tries to pull it all together – what it says is that you cannot just have democracy by itself. You cannot have elections, effective civil society, effective parliaments. You have to have governance. Governance is something which is being somewhat underestimated in these kind of transitions, but you have to have both. By governance I mean you have to have an effective state – you have got to have civil services, a level of impartiality, organizations, the rule of law. When you bring these two things together, then you are much more likely to achieve broad objectives. But you have many countries in the world today that have gone through competitive elections and they have had a shift from the opposition to the government, they are building up some elements of civic society but the state cannot do much. It is so weak. It lacks capacity, civil services and standards which are beyond

patronage to what I would term a bureaucratic state. Those countries can as easily go backwards as go forwards.

MARJU LAURISTIN: The state is still something that is very far above the people. Now, when we come back to values – I have really started to think about the value of work in this connection. The value of work in this materialist–postmaterialist division. It is as if it belongs to the first, the survival values. But if you take this Protestant vision, if you take Webber, then really the value of work is very spiritual. When we now take this problem of democracy – when we look at the situation in Russia, the Arab countries, in Iraq, in Estonia or this part of the post-communist world, or compare it with other countries which have not been so successful, then I have really started to think about polishing the notion of work as value. If you look at the work of building a state, of building democracy, of building relationships, even between people and family, then I suppose this notion of work is much larger. It cannot be restricted to this fear of survival or this kind of limited fight for food and wealth.

PIPPA NORRIS: In a sense Inglehart's whole vision is that you can just work for the wage, or you can work for self-actualization. When we are writing books we are not writing them for money, we are writing them for love – it is creative and fun. It is something that is worth doing for its own sake. It is actually a part of post materialism, in the sense it is kind of artistic. So work can be divided into two – we all have to have money and we also want to have rewards for our work. In some countries you cannot choose both. In some countries you can and we are very lucky when we can.

MARJU LAURISTIN: Still, coming back to values, in these countries that we are speaking about. This work for democracy – how to work for democracy, for the building up the democratic state? That is something which has not been mentioned or discussed a lot. We are learning from our own experiences – it is one thing to come to the streets, to come to the Song Festival Grounds, to sing nice songs and to have nice slogans – democracy, democracy. Then we have this real reality of democracy, which is sometimes quite dull, even ugly, absolutely not inspiring, not giving any happiness to anybody. You just have to understand then, that it is work that has to be done.

Priit Hõbemägi, Marju Lauristin, Pippa Norris

PIPPA NORRIS: This draws upon my experience in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), because I came up against it in the Democratic Governance Group for a while. There they were trying to do all of this basic work. Often what happened was that there was lots of publicity for the election. Then all the media went home, some of the donors went home and then the real work of democracy happened. It was building up the courts, making sure the judges were professional. It was building up public administration and public sector management. It was decentralizing governments, so there were local public offices for people, schools, hospitals and so on. It was focusing on anti-corruption, on parliaments. Again, we set people up for elections but often what happens is that we do not invest in their capacity and their skill. Then the people in Afghanistan get very disillusioned by what these officials can do. And all of these things are going on and the international community is investing in them. It is just that we often think that democracy happens overnight with the election, then bye-bye, we can go home and that is it. But no – it is an incredibly long-term process. By the way, it is also true that every single established democracy – they are still developing. It is not something like them and us, it is everybody trying to deepen it. Look at America – it is ridiculous in its democracy right now.

PRIIT HÕBEMÄGI: You write in your book that the news media is an important agency of cultural values, reinforcing more liberal sexual morals, more cosmopolitan tolerance of other peoples, support for free markets and strengthening civic engagement. Now, as for news media itself, the times are changing. Times are very hard for the traditional news media and the quality media. There are new models arriving, technology is getting faster than ever and it is very difficult to foresee what comes out of that technology. As news media is so important in your theory as a carrier of values, how do you see the future of mass media and quality journalism in general?

PIPPA NORRIS: Well, that last question was a big one, which we can think about. Obviously the merger of all different platforms is making life very complicated for traditional journalists like yourself. How exactly are you making a buck, when you are giving away your services and everybody is tuned in 24/7, all the time, as we all are. So we know what the headlines are, and what is the role of the newspaper when you get it delivered the next day? On the one hand, for traditional journalists it is somewhat challenging. On the other hand, we also know that the market itself is incredibly diversified and some media are doing incredibly well by adapting to this. Again, we can take the example of the BBC, which 20 years ago was not so important for example in the US. Now it is all over the place and people are turning to it as an increasingly useful source of reputable news. I think the best of the old journalists will adapt through new technologies. You can get the BBC through every kind of device you can imagine – podcast, Twitter, Facebook, traditional television, public sector television values as well. It clearly is a big sorting out, because lots of journalists and newspapers are going by the wall, including quite a lot which have been high-quality in the past. It is a challenge. It is all about adapt and survive.

PRIIT HÕBEMÄGI: In your new book you put much hope in public media. So you do not trust commercial media to survive?

PIPPA NORRIS: Well, that is a slightly different argument. We have looked at what people learn from public sector television versus commercial television, and it is really quite distinctive. If you ask people, "what do you know about politics?", we can build up some quite nice items and then look across

Europe at what people understand by civics and a whole range of political knowledge tests. People learn a lot more from public television than they do from commercial television. That being said, there are some commercial channels which are dedicated to news and minority news, which is great. There are some commercial channels which are dreadful. There are some public channels which are really so popular that you cannot tell the difference. There are some of very high quality. So it is not an absolute of public versus commercial, but certainly public seems to have the edge in many places. If we take my comparative experience of living in and watching all the media in Britain, Australia and the US. In the US it is incredibly difficult to find out anything about politics in a certain way. Everything is basically local news by and large. You turn it on – local news is "if it bleeds, it leads", to use the cliche – which is the latest shooting in Roxbury, the latest movie release and the weather. Politics in America is also so complicated, but you hardly ever encounter political news throughout the evening, unless you are really searching it out yourself. For the casual viewer it is very difficult. In Britain and Australia you bump into news all the time. Therefore it is much easier for people to become informed, aware and engaged on a regular basis. Those structural differences – where you get too commercial, if you have a public sector – it brings up the value and quality of lots of media as well.

MARJU LAURISTIN: There is another issue concerning this online journalism versus traditional journalism. We have compared the understanding of what is going on in the world. There are people who regularly read traditional newspapers and they can also read them online, but follow the same pattern of reading. There is also the reading pattern of very young people, who have not had this very structured content before. They are living from click to click. It occurred to me that it is an absolutely different world they are living in. In this world some very important political events do not exist at all. They have not heard, maybe, even about the financial crisis, maybe not even about the Arab revolution, but they discuss the details of the private life of some rock stars. It is a different kind of approach and different reading. Now we come to a very important thing, which is called learning. That was a very important filter in your scheme. What do you think about the future of the learning, future of the school? How can it help to bring this kind of knowledge to the education system so that it would help them master this new media.

PIPPA NORRIS: That is a very complex issue and a really important challenge for communication studies. What seems to be happening is that we have got more knowledge about less. We can specialize much more. If you are really interested in the events in Syria, you can get them "beep" on your mobile all the time about all the breaking news. That gives you some advantages – you are not just giving a synoptic overview. After all, when people watch the news at home they may actually be thinking of many other things, they may not pay that much attention, they may not be interested in many of the items. Let's take the newspaper – they may glance across the pages, but do they actually read them in depth. So, potentially the internet allows us to get more about quite specialized items, well beyond the kind of boundaries that we could have got twenty years ago. But it also means that if I am not interested, then I am more selective. Selectivity is going to drive all of our information. Where we are very narrowly defined, it is going to be problematic in all sorts of regards. It is a fragmentation, a fractionization.

MARJU LAURISTIN: That is very important but there is one other thing. This global world is not more simple than the non-global world. It is more complicated. People who are not used to reading longer and more complicated texts use Twitter and Facebook but they do not read books, not online, not elsewhere. Estonia is a very good example. In international tests children are on

the first places in terms of using the internet and getting information but they are lagging behind in reading long texts. What should we do with that?

PIPPA NORRIS: Yes, I know. In Harvard the students are doing exactly the same thing. Anything that has come out in the last nano-second, which looks that it might be relevant, with no preview, they will quote. But something that is a solid classic book in the library, they pay less attention to. It is a challenge for all teachers to really help them work out that there is quality out there. They have to distinguish, be selective, not only in where they look but also have some quality criteria. But actually, I found out that when you point it out to students, they get it quite fast. That all knowledge is not the same, some is dubious and some authoritative. They need indexes to actually meet these kind of measures but once you have told them that there are indexes out there, they pick it up real fast. This is part of our job as teachers to let people know that there are gradations of information. Just like it is the job of a journalist to say that there are some stories which have got really good verifications and facts.

PRIIT HÕBEMÄGI: How do you explain that the traditional gender gap that you expected was reversed by the type of economy, with women predominating in the news media audience in richer nations, but men predominating in low income societies?

PIPPA NORRIS: I think that this is a fairly standard pattern, in the sense that culture is more traditional in poorer countries, in all aspects of gender. We found in our book *Rising Tide* that attitudes towards home, work and education kind of went all in a bundle. The affluent societies changed. We argued that they changed in the pre-war period, before 1945, when attitudes towards women became far more egalitarian for women and men. In traditional societies they have not changed so much by gender or by generation. Women there have as traditional view of their role as men do in those societies. So, I think the news room and the jobs at high management professions and all other spheres reflect these cultural ideas.

MARJU LAURISTIN: Journalists have become the low-paid professionals in those more developed countries.

PIPPA NORRIS: I know, that is always depressing.

PRIIT HÕBEMÄGI: If we come back to the firewall theory, then in some ways it seems that it is another way to say that nature always finds its way. When there is a route from global north to south, then the culture itself erects firewalls inside a nation or language entity and starts to protect itself. Is it really so simple?

PIPPA NORRIS: It is rather that we are exaggerating the impact of globalization on a global culture. There are so many groups, pockets and sectors who are not part of this global society. Sitting in Estonia with our iPads and laptops we might think that everybody is online, but no. I wrote about it ten years ago but I still think that it is true that the gap between the ones who have and the ones who do not, the information-rich and the poor has been growing, not diminishing. Because of mobile phones and all sorts of other ways we assume everybody is now wired. They are really not, certainly not to the same extent. In places like Estonia the information curve is going upwards, leaving many other societies even further behind. So, the gap is persistent.

PRIIT HÕBEMÄGI: Now it is time to have questions from the floor

LIISA PAST: My name is Liisa Past and I feel that I have to qualify my question by saying that I am American educated, once a grad-student of Marju Lauristin and once the head of communications of the Open Estonia Foundation. I would really like to do something that no well-meaning social scientist would agree to and ask you for a prediction. Prediction of the backlash of the have-nots of the globalization within societies – whether we see nationalism growing out of the alienated members of the Estonian society for example, the less educated, the less media-conscious, perhaps the less read? Because that would really seem a logical step after cultural protectionism. Secondly, since you brought in the gender perspective, the studies in Estonia show the tendency, that women deal better with globalization. They adapt and adjust better. So will we see an increasing mass of young alienated, uneducated men across these modern globalized societies, that in a way will start to express their anti-globalization and focus on nationalism?

Pippa Norris

PIPPA NORRIS: The simplest evidence for that, I would point to, is the support for radical right parties throughout Europe. We all know there have been many parties taking off in recent years and achieving levels of support, whether they are in Antwerpen, in Britain, or the radical right-wing parties in many countries. When you look at their composition, they nearly all are young men. Women do not join radical right-wing parties nearly as much, nor the extreme right parties. It seems to me it is evidence of frustration and of some backlash. It is a backlash against multicultural communities that so many European countries have become, through patterns of refugees, immigration and patterns of globalization more generally as well. One can also understand that young men have serious problems with unemployment right now – high levels in many European countries. They are feeling that their own cultures are being threatened by these critical value changes which are going on in so many places. I do think there is backlash and that it is young men who have been expressing those forms. It is having political consequences as well in all the parties.

But I do not predict, I will leave that to journalists. They love to predict. Commentators do nothing but predict. There was this wonderful study in commu-

nications studies which looked at all the pundits in American television. Every Sunday you get nothing but pundits. They say things like "the economy is going to get better next year" or "Obama is going to get elected" etc, etc. They actually tallied them up over a five year period – who was right and who was wrong. Of course, fifty percent they were right, fifty percent they were wrong, suggesting that they could have all gone home and we could have had a much nicer Sunday. So, I do not predict.

MARJU LAURISTIN: As I mentioned before, we are approaching a new situation where we have to rethink some policies and values very soon. Two weeks ago I was at the European Sociological Congress. There was a plenary, where the sociologists tried to forecast. That is also not a very reasonable thing, but they simply tried. Their predictions were in this sense very, very gloomy. Concerning the feeling that some kind of era is coming to the end. The era of the belief in the development of progress, like it is in Inglehart's book, where the big arrow is coming from below to the heights of the post-materialist society. The material worries concerning energy, which is at first place. They are also creating more tensions between people, between groups in society, between generations, minorities and majorities, different regions in Europe even. Look at what is going on in Europe in terms of reactions to what is going on in Greece. Look at the debates. It is all connected to the feeling of the coming shortage – of resources, ideas, knowledge. It is becoming a reason to get increasingly nervous.

When I looked at Euronews yesterday there was news after news full of this kind of anxiety, aggressiveness, rising strife and so on. That is a challenge which needs knowledge. This knowledge cannot be acquired through Twitter and Facebook. This is knowledge which needs more philosophy, reasoning and reflection. Maybe we also have to come back to the reasoning of people who read books and people of an older age, who have gone through different crises in their lives, and try to understand where the solutions could be. Maybe some solutions have been just left behind as we thought that the problems were over, but they are not. If you look at countries where you have these kind of minority issues surfacing, not Estonia with old issues, but the new issues. Look at Norway, look at those very nice countries. I think it is time to turn

our minds back a little bit and look where things went wrong. Radical parties, these kind of voices are just expressing some kind of emotions but they are not giving solutions. They are just earning points and votes but they are not giving solutions. I think we must understand that the world is not becoming more simple or funny. It is becoming more complicated and serious. That will need a different style of politics, education, media. I think that this post-materialist versus materialist division, this big arrow, it should be reconsidered Maybe it is not an arrow, but a circle.

PIPPA NORRIS: Just to rescue Inglehart a little bit, I personally am not the person who has been arguing that. I have my reservations for all sorts of reasons. He very much admits that postmaterialism and materialism do not form an inevitable trajectory, it can go backwards and forwards. And he takes the case of the 1992 recession, which was very bad in Europe. What happened is, he says, that for a short term you get a bad period of the economy and people feel threatened. Materialism increases, postmaterialism goes down. His argument is that over time, because our values are drawn from our childhood and they are generational through processes of population replacement, the postmaterialists are essentially on the up, and the materialists are on the decline. For any crisis, things go up and down. You can have a terrorism crisis, an economic crisis, a natural disaster like in Japan, and then people start to worry about the basics of life because they do not have them. But it might not necessarily affect people's long term population values. The idea is that the kids are different to their parents, the parents are different to their grandparents and so on. So in a sense the tide is moving in one direction, even though it is not necessarily always uniform.

MARJU LAURISTIN: But that is also related to content, that we put into this notion of materialist–postmaterialist values. We can also put some non-materialist ideas into things which seem materialist. That is what I meant by this circle. Why I spoke about reconsidering the value of work, or about reconsidering the value of food by the way, which is changing in the whole world, about reconsidering the value of water. They are not only some material resources, they are resources for very deep values as well. So, we are going in this circle from the postmaterialist values to a deeper understanding of the spiritual values inside material things.

PIPPA NORRIS: Yes, absolutely, I buy some of that. The old idea of materialism–postmaterialism can be interpreted in lots of ways. Perhaps you should ask professor Inglehart over, he is visiting St. Petersburg right now, to set up an institute. I am sure he would be happy to come.

RAIVO VETIK: My name is Raivo Vetik, I am a professor in comparative politics in Tallinn University. I enjoyed your presentation very much and I have a question about your cosmopolitanism scale. It was very surprising to learn that Estonia scores so high in this scale, because we used to think of Estonia as a kind of organized data which contradicts for example the European Parliament in the used multiculturalism scale. Estonia scores highest in opposition to multiculturalism. So we have here the conceptual problem. How can we be at the same time cosmopolitan and anti-multicultural?

PIPPA NORRIS: Again, I think that is an interesting question. In our concepts we have not really thought through – multicultural can be many things. It can be tolerance of minority groups in the meaning that is understood for example in Canada. It can mean a broader understanding of the equality of cultures, if you like. We must think how multiculturalism operates with globalization. In some countries the two things should go hand in hand logically – the more we understand other cultures, the argument from the evidence suggests, the more we tend to trust them and therefore the more interactions we would have across a wide range of cultures, not just our own national culture. It could be that in different countries we see different types of tensions. And the threat, as it is perceived, from globalization might push people back towards their own culture and a rejection of multiculturalism. Again, I think we need to explore some of those challenges.

MARJU LAURISTIN: I think that there is one more problem here, one more dimension. It is the understanding of a multicultural society that is in the first place. If we say that multicultural is the same as multi-ethnic, then we really make a very big mistake. Multicultural means that there are different cultures that are in dialogue with each other. It does not simply mean that there are people with different ethnic background living in the same house. That means that it is the problem of intercultural dialogue which is not solved in these countries where we have this problem of intolerance. We both know very well,

we have been dealing with minority issues here in Estonia for a very long time. It is a problem very much of mutual willingness for dialogue. If you have this compartmentalized society, which seems multicultural, but it is really not. It is fragmented. If you take Angela Merkel, whom we both have quoted, saying that multiculturalism in Germany is dead, I can add that multiculturalism in Germany has not been born yet. If you look at the lives of the Turkish community and the German community in Germany, then there is not much dialogue. Just like between the Russian-language community in Estonia and the Estonian community in Estonia. There are just two different communities, each inhabiting their own space. I cannot say that multiculturalism is something that has really been in effect.

PIPPA NORRIS: Multiculturalism, if we take the immigration policy in France and in Britain – totally at odds with each other in terms of how they understand multiculturalism, the priority and value in multiculturalism and how we can get communities to work together.

HELLE TIIKMAA: I am Helle Tiikmaa. I am a doctoral student in the University of Tartu, in the same institute as Marju Lauristin. My question is about public service broadcasting and media. You said that it is very important as the source of information and values. But at the same time it is economically definitely not so useful. In liberal economies like ours it cannot survive, especially in small countries like Estonia. So, what should be done?

PIPPA NORRIS: I personally favor subsidies for public television on the grounds like many other cultural productions – you subsidize national theater and national opera for example, because you want a diversity of choice and cultural offerings. So public television plays a distinct role to commercial television. Often when you have only commercial television, the quality diminishes so badly, even when you have multiple channels and satellite. Five hundred stations and nothing to watch – that is the classic cliche of what we have in America right now. Public broadcasting plays a special role. It should be essentially safeguarded against some of the commercial pressures. For example, when it is providing programs for children. That is very important for culture, very educational and that is something that public television does in a way that commercial television just cannot. They put on cartoons, but that

is not public education. In the same way – the coverage of news, the extended documentaries, which public television has had such a strong tradition of. What happens on commercial television is that you often have public affairs programs, and they are very popular, but not serious about an extended hour, let's say, on the issue of the environment or jobs or international relations or something like that. This partly my own bias, I come from a BBC tradition, in which you know – to know the news, you turn on the BBC and there it is. I think that all my experiences of watching and observing commercial television, and then analyzing the effects of commercial television says the balance between the two is ideal. You do not just watch the state television only, that is also problematic, because you need diversity of channels and outlets. If you lose public television totally, by not using license fees or other forms of taxation to subsidize the public good, then you are losing out a whole dimension of what television can do and could do for the community.

PRIIT HÕBEMÄGI: This more or less sums up today's forum and I would like to thank you very much for the wisdom and knowledge you shared with us. I would like to thank all the guests for the very good questions and for the time we were sitting here together. I think it has been an inspiring evening. Thanks once more to everybody.



Rising trends in globalization, 1972-2004, slide no. 6

Slide no. 7. *Cultural goods*

Figure 3.3: Western predominance in audio-visual trade



Notes: Trade in audiovisual services and fees related to the production of **motion pictures, radio and television programs, and musical recordings**. This is calculated in the mean value of annual audio-visual exports from 1990-2006 as a proportion of GDP in Purchasing Power Parity measured in constant (2000) international dollars. Annual audio-visual imports were calculated using the same method. The type of economy is categorized from per capita Gross Domestic Product (in purchasing power parity) in constant (2000) international dollars. 'Low' =less than $1999. Medium =$2000-14,999. High=$15,000+. The scales are logged. The dotted diagonal line represents the balance of trade, with countries falling below the line with a negative trade balance, and countries above with a surplus.
Sources: Data on audio-visual trade was provided by the Statistical Office of the World Trade Organization. Data on trade in all goods and services was from Arthur S. Banks Cross-national Time-Series dataset (CNTS). GDP from World Development Indicators (World Bank).

Figure 3.3: Western predominance in audio-visual trade, slide no. 8

Figure 3.4: The growing predominance of American audio-visual trade



Notes: Trade in audiovisual services and fees related to the production of motion pictures, radio and television programs, and musical recordings. This is calculated in the mean value of annual audio-visual exports from 1990-2006 as a proportion of GDP in Purchasing Power Parity in constant (2000) international dollars. Annual audio-visual imports were calculated using the same method. This chart shows the top five trading nations.
Sources: Data on audio-visual trade was provided by the Statistical Office of the World Trade Organization.

Figure 3.4: The growing predominance of American audio-visual trade, slide no. 9



Figure 1.1: Theories about the globalization of cultural markets, slide no. 10



Firewall model, slide no. 11

The global gap in access to the internet, 1990-2004



Notes: Societies worldwide are classified by per capita GDP in constant international $ Purchasing Power Parity. Low income = less than $1999 per capita income. Medium income =$2000-14,999. High income = $15,000+.
Sources: International Telecommunications Union; The World Bank *World Development Indicators 2008*.

The global gap in access to the internet, 1990-2004, slide no. 12

The global gap in telephone access, including cellular, 1975-1999



Notes: Societies worldwide are classified by per capita GDP in constant international $ Purchasing Power Parity. Low income = less than $1999 per capita income. Medium income =$2000-14,999. High income = $15,000+.
Sources: Arthur S. Banks *Cross-national time-series dataset 1815-2007*;The World Bank *World Development Indicators 2008*.

The global gap in telephone access, including cellular, 1975-1999, slide no. 13

World Values Survey 1981-2007

World Values Survey 1981-2007, slide no. 17

News media users

- **Media Use Scale: newspaper, radio/TV, magazine, books, internet**

"People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and the world. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you used it last week (1) or did not use it last week (0) to obtain information." (*read out and code one answer for each*):

		Used it last week	Did not use it last week
V223.	Daily newspaper	1	0
V224.	News broadcasts on radio or TV	1	0
V225.	Printed magazines	1	0
V226.	In depth reports on radio or TV	1	0
V227.	Books	1	0
V228.	Internet, Email	1	0
V229.	Talk with friends or colleagues	1	0

- **Limitations**
  - Direction of causality? Uses and gratifications theory
  - Impact of other types of media (TV entertainment, movies, music etc)
  - Limited gauge of extent of media frequency and attention
  - No direct evidence of media contents

News media users, slide no. 18

Cosmopolitanism Index

	Cosmopolitanism Index
Globalization Index (KOF)	**.919**
Economic development (GDP in PPP, Constant $ international) (World Bank)	**.922**
Media Freedom (Freedom House)	**.799**

Note: All scales were first standardized around the mean. The principle component factor analysis with varimax rotation generated a single dimension that accounted, in total, for 77% of the variance in the composite index. For the definition and measurement of each item, see Appendix A.

Cosmopolitanism Index, slide no. 19



Cosmopolitanism Index, 2005, slide no. 20

National identities and trust

	Nationalist identities	Trust outsiders
V212 Sees self as a national citizen	.802	
V211 Sees self as part of a local community	.731	
V209 Expresses national pride	.646	
V75 Willingness to fight for country	.450	
V130 Trust in people of another nationality?		.930
V146 Trust in people of another religion		.929
Total variance	**30.3**	**28.5**

Notes: Factor analysis extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Coefficients of .40 or less were dropped from the analysis. See Appendix A for the specific items and the construction of the scales.
Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

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National identities and trust, slide no. 23

Trust in outsiders



Note: Q130 *"I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups ...People of another nationality ,/people of another religion. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely (coded 4), somewhat (3), not very much (2), or not at all (1)?"* The chart shows the combined response for each group, without any prior controls, standardized to a 100-pt scale. Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

24

Trust in outsiders, slide no. 24



Trust in outsiders, slide no. 25



Nationalism scale, slide no. 26

IV: Conclusions, slide no. 31