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Introductory Note

The Proceedings of the Institute for European Studies, Tallinn University of Technology is an international, peer-reviewed semiannual academic journal that reports on the wide range of economic, social, political, legal, cultural and other aspects of the European Union related developments in Estonia and other European countries. During the last couple of years, the proceedings have gone through a phase of rapid change. In 2007—2008, it appeared once a year as a peer-reviewed collection open for the contribution of both to the faculty members of the former International University Audentes, Tallinn, Estonia and the university's international cooperation partners. Since 2009, it is a recognised international journal with an international editorial board and editorial office, and available in EBSCO databases. Currently, the journal meets all criteria to be classified as a 1.2 publication according to the Estonian Scientific Information System ETIS (http://www.etis.ee) classification. Our next goal is to be included into the ISI Web of Knowledge and to become the highest rated academic publication.

The issues of our peer-reviewed semiannual journal of 2009 (No. 5 and No. 6) were special issues, bearing special titles. Since 2010, the editorial office has decided to temporarily waive from special issues, however, retaining the traditional structure, worked out for those very special issues. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that some issues of the proceedings may be still published as special issues in the future. During the last couple of years, we have managed to build up an extensive international editorial board, attract foreign editors and establish good working relations with many scientific institutions in foreign countries (i.e. Hungary, Spain, Finland, Lithuania, Germany, Slovenia, United States, New Zealand, etc.). We would like to express our special gratitude to the foreign members of the editorial office: Prof András Inotai, Prof Joan Lofgren and Vlad Vernygora. The Department of International Relations of the Tallinn University of Technology has so far mostly financed our publication. Since 2010, we receive additional support from the School of Economics and Business Administration of the Tallinn University of Technology. We have clear intention to widen and deepen international cooperation, which has begun so well. Our journal is open for contributions from Estonia and other countries. The only decisive factor is the actual quality of the paper.

We sincerely hope that the readers of our journal find it both academically solid and full of thought provoking fresh ideas that could have positive impact on their own way of thinking.

Peeter Müürsepp and Aksel Kirch (Editors-in-chief)

Notes on the Contributors

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The European Union and the Belarus Dilemma: Between Conditionality and Constructive Engagement

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Abstract

This paper analyses different steps in the development of EU-Belarus relations. The dilemmas Belarus presents to the EU in terms of conditionality and constructive engagement are discussed in order to draw certain conclusions about the EU's leverage to spark democratic reform in an authoritarian regime. It is argued that domestic evolutions in Belarus essentially depend on regional factors rather than on the effectiveness of the EU's political conditionality. Recent initiatives of constructive engagement can, therefore, only be successful when embedded in a comprehensive strategy for the entire region.

Keywords: *Belarus, conditionality, Eastern Partnership, European Union, Russia*

Introduction

The democratisation of Belarus, notorious as the 'last dictatorship of Europe' (Marples, 2002), is a key objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This was clearly expressed in the European Commission's Strategy Paper of 12 May 2004:

> "*The EU's long-term goal for Belarus is to be a democratic, stable, reliable, and increasingly prosperous partner with which the enlarged EU will share not only common borders, but also a common agenda driven by shared values. Through the ENP, the EU will reinforce its lasting commitments to supporting democratic development in Belarus.*" (European Commission, 2004)

At the same time, however, the Commission also observed that it is not possible to offer Belarus the full benefits of the ENP as long as an authoritarian regime is in place. The half-hearted position of Belarus within the ENP is also reflected in the framework of the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP). Whereas there is no doubt that Belarus is an important target country of this new initiative to intensify the EU's relations with its East European neighbours, the Commission observed that "the level of participation of Belarus in the EaP will depend on the overall development of EU-Belarus relations." (European Commission, 2008).

The precarious state of Belarusian democracy obviously presents the EU with an important policy dilemma. On the one hand, the acceptance of the authoritarian regime of President Lukashenka as an equal partner affects the EU's credibility as a promoter of democracy and human rights. On the other hand, the long-standing isolation of Belarus is not in the self-interest of the EU. Combating soft security issues in Europe, such as organised crime, pollution and illegal immigration implies the commitment of all European states, not only those that are a member of the Union. Moreover, Belarus is an important transit country for oil and gas and thus plays an important role for the security of energy supply to the EU. Hence, the question arises how the EU can incorporate Belarus into its framework for external relations without compromising its commitment to common democratic values?

The development of EU-Belarus relations cannot be disconnected from the bilateral relationship between Belarus and Russia. Under the Lukashenka regime, Belarus has beco me linked with Russia through a multitude of bilateral treaties and agreements covering virtually all areas of inter-state action (Danilovich, 2006). However, despite far-reaching ambitions of further integration, the honeymoon between Russia and Belarus is not without obstacles. The end of gas supplies at Russian domestic prices, in response to Belarusian intransigence regarding the sale of its national gas company *Beltransgaz*, illustrates the growing political disagreement between Moscow and Minsk (Balmaceda, 2009). Within this complex geopolitical and geostrategic level playing field, the EU aims to find an appropriate strategy towards Belarus.

In order to overcome the dilemma between values and interests, Belarus has been formally included within the geographical scope of the ENP/EaP whereas the full implementation of this policy depends upon the establishment of a democratic form of government (European Commission, 2004). This approach essentially implies the offer of normalised relations in return for democratic reforms. In addition, there is a growing understanding that, irrespective the state of official relations, there is a need for strengthened support to civil society

development. This two-track approach, based upon a conditional engagement at the official level in combination with increased assistance for other actors in civil society, is the result of an incremental process. The aim of this paper is first to analyse the different steps in the development of an EU strategy for Belarus. Secondly, the limits of the EU's political conditionality are explored. Finally, the paper concludes with an assessment of the current state of play in EU-Belarus relations and points at the impact of the wider regional context on the further development of this relationship.

1. The development of EU-Belarus relations: from ignorance to conditional engagement

The EU's relations with Belarus are characterised by a constant adaptation to changing political circumstances. From 1991 until 1996, Belarus was dealt with in the context of the general EU policy towards the Newly Independent States. The relations between the EU and Belarus worsened during 1996 due to human rights violations under the Lukashenka regime and further deteriorated in the wake of the referendum that virtually abolished the democratic state system. The European Union initiated a policy of isolation but this policy began to change in the course of 1999 when the EU decided that to apply further pressure on Lukashenka would be counterproductive. Despite the president's essentially anti-Western attitude, the EU and some of its members have endeavoured to bring Belarus closer to respect for European values by developing a step-by-step policy depending on the progress of democratisation and human rights. The accession of new Member States with a particular interest in Eastern Europe (e.g. Poland, Lithuania), together with the framing of the ENP, added a new dimension to this approach. The inclusion of Belarus in the recently established Eastern Partnership, including a renewed attempt of constructive engagement with the official Belarusian leadership, forms the final stage in the development of the difficult EU-Belarus relationship. This chapter presents a brief overview of the different phases in this incremental process.

(i) 1991–1996: The European Union on the sidelines

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the European Community laid down its 'guidelines on the recognition of new States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union' (Council of the EU, 1991). This process of recognition was not unconditional and required respect for the rule of law, guarantees for the rights of minorities, the inviolability of frontiers and acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to

disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It can be argued that the policy of the EU and its Member States was somewhat reduced to the final condition. Right from the start the question of nuclear disarmaments and the transport of Belarusian SS-20 and tactical nuclear weapons to Russia turned out to be of fundamental importance (Lebedko and Mildner, 2001, p. 87). After Belarus was congratulated for becoming a non-nuclear weapons state, it slipped out of the focus of the EU's policy towards the region.

EU activities concentrated in the first place on the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Whereas with those countries far-reaching association agreements were concluded, the EU suggested the conclusion of less ambitious Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with the former Soviet Republics. Due to the slow pace of reforms, Belarus was the last East European country to sign a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the European Community (European Commission, 1995). The agreement never entered into force as a result of domestic developments in Belarus.

Confronted with the election of President Lukashenka and his decision to suppress the rights of the opposition and the freedom of expression, the EU decided that no further steps would be taken towards the ratification of the PCA until clear signals had been given by the Belarus authorities of their intention to respect democratic and human rights (European Parliament, 1996). This first application of EU conditionality turned out to be ineffective. Lukashenka continued with the consolidation of his authoritarian regime. A referendum, held in November 1996, abolished the democratic system established under the 1994 constitution. Lukashenka eliminated Parliament and the Constitutional Court as independent powers and thus established the foundations for his personal dictatorship (Hill, 2005).

(ii) 1996–1999: The period of isolation

In response to the worsening democratic situation in Belarus, the EU decided to impose several harsh sanctions. On 15 September 1997 the General Affairs Council decided to halt the implementation of Community assistance programmes, except in the case of humanitarian or regional projects that supported the democratisation process. In addition, neither the PCA nor an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters would be concluded and the EU Member States would not support Belarus' membership of the Council of Europe (Council of the EU, 1997). These measures led to the *de facto* isolation of the country. Belarus became the only European state to have no formal treaty relations with the EU and to be refused membership of the Council of Europe.

Despite the 'pariah status' of Belarus (Pridham, 2001), Lukashenka never showed any commitment towards EU critics. He rather preferred to keep his country out of ongoing developments in Western Europe to reorient Belarusian foreign policy almost exclusively towards Russia. It seems, therefore, not surprising that the period of EU sanctions coincides with intensified efforts of Russian-Belarusian integration, including the signature of a Treaty on the creation of a Union between both countries in April 1997 (Dalinovich, 2006, p. 72). Arguably, the ongoing preparations for the eastward NATO and EU enlargement rounds stimulated the Kremlin to actively support the Lukashenka regime. In this context, the relations between the EU and Belarus worsened further, particularly after Lukashenka ordered construction and repair works that made any use of the diplomatic residences of several EU ambassadors impossible. In a common reaction, the EU Member States decided to recall their ambassadors from Minsk for consultations, requested Belarusian ambassadors in EU capitals to return to Minsk for reporting, and imposed a visa ban on members of the Belarusian government. The *de facto* isolation, therefore, turned into an isolation *de jure*.

(iii) 1999–2003: The introduction of a 'step-by-step approach'

As the policy of isolation did not bring about the expected change, the Commission and the EU Member States redirected their policy towards Belarus in the course of 1999 (Van Elsuwege, 2002). Rather than focusing on the implementation of sanctions, the EU offered the prospect of closer relations as leverage to the gradual improvement of democratic standards. This so-called 'step-by-step' or 'benchmarks' approach implied that clearly identified steps towards democratization by Belarus would be paralleled at each stage by a gradual resumption of dialogue with the Belarusian government and broader assistance, ending with full normalization of relations (European Commission, 2007).

The parliamentary elections of October 2000 were the first test for the success of this new strategy. The EU, together with the OSCE and the Council of Europe, set four criteria by which to evaluate the situation: establishment of a political truce with the opposition, liberty and freedom of access to the media for all political groupings, substantial reform of the electoral code with a view to guaranteeing fair elections and review of the role of Parliament in order to give it meaningful powers. Unfortunately, the European Parliament and the other institutions had to conclude that the parliamentary elections could not be considered as free and fair (European Parliament, 2001). A similar scenario took place in the context of all subsequent elections. In its 2007 Country Strategy Paper on Belarus, the European Commission could therefore only observe that

"*the 'benchmarks approach' has not yielded results, although it remains as such on the table*" (European Commission, 2007).

Obviously, the offer of normalised relations turned out insufficient to promote the democratisation of Belarus. Proceeding from this premise and taking into account the new geopolitical context after the enlargement of the European Union, the 2003 European Security Strategy concluded that "*we need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there*" (European Council, 2003). The European Commission translated this broadly formulated objective into an ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy, which essentially aims to increase the promotion of democracy and human rights in the neighbouring countries of the enlarged EU (Tocci, 2006).

(iv) 2004–2007: The consolidation of a 'Belarus strategy' within the ENP framework

Significantly, the initiation of a European Neighbourhood Policy did not change the fundamental principles of the EU's approach *vis-à-vis* Belarus but rather envisages a reinforcement of existing policies. At the core of the ENP remains the principle of political conditionality: "*Belarus will be able to develop contractual links when Belarus has established a democratic form of government, following free and fair elections*" (European Commission, 2004).

In addition, the EU also announced increased support to civil society promotion. Proceeding from the understanding that only the force of the Belarusian people can put real pressure on Lukshenka's regime, the aim is "*to communicate and demonstrate the benefits of the ENP to the Belarusian population at large*" (Council of the EU, 2004). Accordingly, the broad lines of a 'Belarus strategy', based upon a 'two-track policy', gradually take shape. At the official level, the EU applies a rather traditional 'carrot and stick approach'. This implies frequent critical statements on the regime's actions, restricted contacts with the authorities and the offer of normalised relations in case of democratic reforms. At the informal level, on the other hand, the EU increased contacts with opposition figures and actively supports civil society initiatives where government approval is not required. In this respect, it is noteworthy that a specific financial instrument, called the *European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights* (EIDHR), has been developed which is more flexible than the old TACIS programme and allows to provide assistance to Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that are not legally registered in Belarus.

The parallel application of the EU's two-track policy became obvious in the context of the 2006 presidential elections. The EU not only repeated its traditional requests for free and fair elections but also financed independent TV and radio broadcasting programmes in an attempt to directly approach the Belarusian people (European Commission, 2006a). Also after the fraudulent elections and the re-election of President Lukashenka, the EU continued its combined policy of restricted official contacts and active engagement with the Belarusian civil society. The introduction of a visa ban (Council of the EU, 2006a) and asset freeze (Council of the EU, 2006b) applicable to the entire Belarusian leadership in combination with the granting of the Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought to opposition leader Alexander Milinkevich clearly revealed this double message.

In November 2006, the European Commission clarified "what the European Union could bring to Belarus." (European Commission, 2006b). This so-called non-paper reflects the two tracks of the EU's Belarus strategy, including not only a message to the Belarusian government but also directly to the Belarusian people.

Table I: "What the EU could bring to Belarus" (European Commission, 2006b)

Message to the Belarusian Government *Aim: clarifying conditions for normalisation of relations and increased EU assistance*	**Message to the Belarusian People** *Aim: clarifying benefits of full ENP participation*
- organisation of free and fair elections - respect to freedom of expression - respect existence of independent NGOs - release of all political prisoners - proper investigation of disappeared persons - independent and impartial judicial system - end arbitrary arrest and detention - respect to minority rights - respect to rights of workers, trade unions and entrepreneurs - abolition of death penalty	- easier travel to EU countries - increased cross-border cooperation - economic growth and increased welfare - improved healthcare and education - more efficient public administration - equal rights to all - better protection of the environment - more scholarships to study in the EU

The publication of this non-paper illustrates the EU's more active engagement with Belarus in the context of the ENP. It brings more clarity in terms of what reform measures are requested and what kind of benefits can be expected. Moreover, the direct appeal to the Belarusian people forms an interesting innovation in comparison to previous policy papers.

The EU's ambition to involve the Belarusian population and civil society in the difficult process of democratisation includes a number of policy challenges. For instance, the objective to facilitate people-to-people contacts and cross-border cooperation between Belarusian and EU citizens (e.g. through student and scientific exchanges, scholarships, youth travel, contacts between small and medium-sized enterprises, …), contradicts with the EU's strict migration policy and the increase of Schengen visa fees to € 60, i.e. a third of a an average monthly wage in Belarus (Jarabik and Rabagliati, 2007, p.7). The option of a visa facilitation agreement, which has been concluded with Russia and Ukraine, is not an evident option due to the limited contacts with the Belarusian authorities.

Another clear example of the difficult balancing act between a strict policy *vis-à-vis* the official regime, on the one hand, and supporting the Belarusian people, on the other hand, concerns the exclusion of Belarus from the EU's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Already in May 2006, the European Commission recommended the withdrawal of Belarusian trade preferences if no measures would be adopted to comply with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) obligations relating to freedom of association of workers within the following six months. This suggestion faced severe criticism from Belarus' neighbouring EU Member States – Poland, Lithuania and Latvia – because this measure would hurt ordinary Belarusian people rather than the government. Moreover, it could affect small, cross-border traders.

Whereas the opponents managed to block a first initiative to impose the trade sanctions, the EU Council finally voted in favour of a regulation temporarily withdrawing access to the generalised tariff preferences from 21 June 2007 onwards (Council of the EU, 2006). As a result, the standard duty rates apply to Belarusian exports to the EU, representing a difference of 3% in comparison to GSP tariffs. It is estimated that approximately 10 % of the country's export is affected. (Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007). Apart from its economic consequences, the withdrawal of trade preferences also has an important symbolic dimension. Belarus is only the second country in history to lose its GSP privileges, after Burma in 1997, which illustrates the exceptional nature of the sanctions. Accordingly, due to the introduction of the 2006 sanctions, the regime of Lukashenka was more than ever an isolated

pariah in Europe. In combination with the increased support for opposition leaders in the built-up to the 2008 parliamentary elections, the EU's strategy apparently aimed at a regime change with the coloured revolutions in other former Soviet republics as a source of inspiration. Yet, it soon became clear that the preconditions for a home-gown democratic breakthrough were not fulfilled (Raik, 2006). In addition, domestic developments in Georgia and Ukraine increasingly raised doubts about the viability of the new governments. In this context, the EU's strategy towards Belarus gradually developed in the direction of an open diplomacy with the official leaders aiming at an incremental democratisation of the existing regime rather than at a revolutionary change of the situation (Fischer, 2009).

(v) 2008–2010: The Eastern Partnership: a policy of constructive engagement with the Belarus authorities

The release of political prisoners as well as some minor improvements in the organisation of the parliamentary elections in 2008 – which, however, still did not meet the democratic criteria of the OSCE – inspired the Council of the EU to restore contacts with the Belarusian authorities. In a gesture of goodwill, the Council cancelled the travel restrictions on certain leading political figures for a period of six months while at the same time extending the other restrictive measures for a period of one year (Council, 2008). This decision allowed the creation of a high-level EU-Belarus political dialogue, the establishment of a human rights dialogue, intensified technical cooperation in the fields of energy, transport, phytosanitary regulations and agriculture as well as the invitation of Belarus to take part in the Eastern Partnership (EaP). At the same time, the further improvement of relations remains dependent upon the fulfilment of additional criteria. In a resolution of 15 January 2009, the European Parliament (2009) laid down five concrete conditions to be fulfilled:

(1) Belarus needs to remain a country without political prisoners;
(2) Freedom of expression for the media needs to be guaranteed;
(3) The authorities need to cooperate with the OSCE on reform of the electoral law;
(4) The conditions for the work of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) need to be improved;
(5) The freedom of assembly and political association has to be guaranteed.

Unfortunately, recent developments in Belarus go in another direction. The crackdown on peaceful political actions, the continued denial of registration of many political parties, non-governmental organisations and independent

media as well as the lack of respect for ethnic (mainly Polish) minorities places the EU again for the difficult choice between applying a policy of sanctions or continuing on the course of constructive engagement. On 17 November 2009 the Council decided to give the Belarus authorities a second chance. The suspension of the application of the travel restrictions on certain officials of Belarus is extended until October 2010 whereas the other restrictive measures provided for by Common Position 2006/267 CFSP remain in place. In the meantime, the EU – once again – reconfirmed "its readiness to deepen its relations with Belarus in light of further developments in Belarus towards democracy, human rights and the rule of law and to assist the country in attaining these objectives" (Council of the EU, 2009). It is, however, questionable whether the prospect of visa facilitation, upgraded contractual relations and "a joint interim plan to set priorities for reform, inspired by the Action Plans developed in the framework of the ENP" will be sufficient to trigger any genuine democratic change in Belarus.

2. The limits of the EU's influence on domestic developments in Belarus

Over the last decade, the EU's policy *vis-à-vis* Belarus has been characterised by the application of different forms of conditionality. The EU's policy constantly oscillated between the "stick" of economic sanctions, travel restrictions and political isolation, on the one hand, and the "carrot" of normalised relations and closer cooperation, on the other hand. The launch of the EaP only confirms this trend. The question is, however, to what extent the EU's initiatives have a direct impact on the domestic situation in Belarus. A look at the evolution of the Freedom House ratings, an often-used instrument for measuring the democratisation of transition countries (Schimmelfennig, 2005), reveals a bleak picture:

Table II: Belarus Democracy Score according to Freedom House (Silitski, 2009a)

YEAR	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
SCORE	6.25	6.38	6.38	6.45	6.54	6.64	6.71	6.68	6.71	6.57

Note: The ratings are based on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings in different categories such as freedom of the electoral process, civil society, independent media, corruption, etc.

Despite some minor improvement in 2009, this table seems to suggest that the EU's efforts did not have any tangible effect on the democratisation of Belarus.

Arguably, the effectiveness of the EU's conditionality depends upon a number of factors, including the attractiveness of the offered rewards and the domestic adaptation costs in case of compliance (Schimmelfennig, 2005). The problem regarding Belarus is clearly the absence of sufficiently attractive incentives, on the one hand, and the high political power costs of complying with democratic and human rights rules, on the other hand. Full compliance with the EU demands opens the gates to a potential change of power, a most unattractive option in a repressive and totalitarian regime. It has, therefore, been concluded that "*regardless the level of support to the opposition and the level of isolation of the regime, the extremely unfavourable conditions in Belarus are likely to frustrate any western policy aimed at domestic change in this country*" (Schimmelfennig, 2005).

Whereas the direct impact of EU conditionality is very limited, the development of EU-Belarus relations essentially depends on the wider regional context and, in particular on the relationship with Russia. Arguably, the sudden *rapprochement* between the Lukashenka regime and the EU in the framework of the EaP has less to do with the offer made by the Union than with a (gas) crisis between Moscow and Minsk. In the wake of Lukashenka's re-election as president in 2006, Russia's state-owned gas supplier *Gazprom* announced higher prices for the year 2007. When Lukashenka opposed this price hike, *Gazprom* threatened to cut gas supplies to Belarus. Both parties finally agreed on a compromise in January 2007 providing for a gradual increase of gas prices and, most importantly, the transfer of fifty per cent of *Beltransgaz*, the Belarusian national gas network, to *Gazprom*. Few months later, on 1 August 2007, the Russia-Belarus gas row continued after the Belarus side failed to pay for past supplies. This energy conflict with Russia can be regarded as a "wake-up call" for the ruling elite in Belarus, which triggered the Lukashenka regime to look for closer relations with the EU in order to balance its dependence on Russian subsidies (Silitski, 2009b). As was also observed by Grzegorz Gromazki (2009):

> *"Change in Belarus' attitudes and policy towards the EU – whether for better or for worse – have always been triggered by changes in relations with Russia. One could say that Belarus' policy towards the EU is a card that Lukashenka has been playing in his relations with Russia. Increasing tensions in relations with Russia are followed by signs of openness towards the EU – and the other way around."*

Proceeding from this perspective, it appears very difficult if not impossible to change anything in Belarus without the involvement of Russia, whether one likes this or not. The main challenge, of course, is to convince Moscow about the

importance of a more democratic state system in Belarus. When the Russian Foreign Ministry declared the 2006 presidential elections to be "free and fair" – in contravention to the conclusions of the OSCE election observers – and President Putin openly congratulated Lukashenka with his re-election, the European Parliament bluntly concluded that "the effectiveness of EU policies towards Belarus is undermined by the irresponsible attitude of the Moscow authorities, who are lending decisive support to the last dictatorship of Europe." (European Parliament, 2006). Bridging the fundamentally different visions between the EU and Russia on the desirable evolution of Belarus will not be easy.

Without subjugating the EU's relations with Belarus to Russian control, it seems recommendable to look for ways to engage with Belarus and Russia at the same time (Fischer, 2009). In this respect, it is of upmost importance for the EU to overcome Russia's negative attitude to the EaP. Russia, not being a target country of the EaP, perceives this new policy initiative of the EU as a threat to its traditional sphere of interest (Steward, 2009). In order to accommodate to Russia's frustrations, the EaP provides for opportunities to engage third countries "on a case-by-case basis in concrete projects, activities and meetings of thematic platforms, where it contributes to the objectives of particular activities and the general objectives of the Eastern Partnership" (Council of the EU, 2009). At least for the multilateral EaP platform on "democracy, good governance and stability", it seems to be a good idea to have both Belarus and Russia on board.

Conclusion

For more than a decade, the EU is trying to bring Belarus on the path of democratisation. The problem is, however, that the autocratic Belarusian leadership never showed any genuine interest in close relations with the European Union. Lukashenka has demonstrated an unwavering reluctance to change his policy because of EU critics, sanctions or the promise of normalised relations. In this context, a policy of political conditionality, including the stick of economic and political isolation as well as the carrot of normalised relations and increased financial assistance, did not produce any effect. The Eastern Partnership presents the EU's most recent attempt to deal with the Belarus dilemma. This policy aims at a constructive engagement with the Belarusian authorities. The release of political prisoners in 2008, the establishment of a human rights dialogue and the start of technical cooperation at many levels created the impression that something really changed. However, upon closer inspection, it appears that these measures might be nothing more than window-dressing in an attempt of the Belarusian elite to find a new geopolitical balance between Moscow and Brussels.

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Lithuania in the European Union: Public Opinion Research Results

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Abstract:

On 10–11 May 2003, the absolute majority of the population voted for Lithuania's membership in the European Union, and in a year Lithuania became a member of the Union. Lithuania's membership in the European Union, one of the greatest projects in independent Lithuania, has its own political, economic, and legal dimensions. The state of public opinion is also a very important factor here: Lithuania would not have joined the European Union without public opinion support; moreover, today the euro-integration process avoids taking any steps that will not receive approval of public opinion, as it attempts to provide information to the society about the ongoing process. This article aims at showing the transformation of public opinion in Lithuania regarding the integration process, highlighting major factors that have an impact on opinion alternations, and showing some of the problems associated with euro-integration in Lithuania. First, changes in the citizens' opinion towards the EU before, during, and after the euro referendum are presented in the article. Later, public discourse about EU-related aspects such as the awareness level about EU issues, emigration, identity, and introduction of the euro is discussed. Attitudes towards EU membership are presented not only from inside, analysing the opinions of Lithuanian citizens towards the EU, but also the opinions of some other EU Member States towards Lithuania are included in the article. The main source of empirical information is representative surveys conducted by Public Opinion and Market Research Centre Vilmorus for the Lithuanian Government and the European Commission Representation in Lithuania.

Keywords: *emigration, euro, European Union, image of Lithuania abroad, Lithuania, public opinion surveys*

1. Lithuania's accession to the EU

1.1. Situation before euro referendum

The question of Lithuania's possibility to be in one union together with other European countries was first formulated in June 1992: 'Are you in favour or not of Lithuania becoming part of the European Community in the near future?' (*European Integration Survey*, 1992; N=1,164). The majority of respondents – 64% – expressed their favour towards membership, and only 4% were against it. At that time, European countries had an image of something ideal in terms of economy and social environment. Later, concrete requirements and conditions of membership came to the fore in public discussions, and the initial mood started to change. This was tracked later on a regular basis: for instance, in 1997, around 50% of Lithuanian residents supported the membership idea at that time, 10% were against it (Fig. 1), while the remaining part of the citizens had no opinion on the issue (*Vilmorus survey*, 1997, N=1,000).

Figure 1. Attitudes towards Lithuania's membership in the EU: 1997–2003, % (surveys carried out by Vilmorus in 1997–2003)



In fact, the negotiations between Lithuania and the EU had not been started yet at that time and awareness of the residents towards the European Union and its institutions was low; that is why public opinion was not firm, not settled yet. Starting with the beginning of 1998, the support for EU membership continually decreased. This came as a consequence of privatisation of large economic objects by Western companies, for example, Telecom, which twice caused an increase in service costs for customers in 1998 (*Department of Statistics*, 1999, p. 196), due to a requirement to close the Ignalina nuclear power station (people felt a

threat to energy independence in the future) and in the context of some other demands. An especially difficult economic situation in 1999 formed a negative background for public opinion: a high unemployment rate and a diminishing rate of gross domestic product – that year it hardly reached 66% of the 1990 year level (Rose, 2005, p. 34). During that period, different indicators of subjective estimation were among the lowest in Europe. In such a context, the answer 'I am against European Union membership' might have been interpreted even as a social protest against "authority", which was not trusted and which was seeking to join the European Union (Gaidys, 2002, p. 131).

By the end of 1999, antagonism towards European Union membership reached its culmination during the privatisation process of the oil refinery Mažeikių Nafta. At that time proponents of membership made up only 29%, and the opponents – 35% (*Vilmorus survey*, 1999; N=1,002), while the remaining part had no opinion on the issue. At that time particularly, trust in state institutions was at its lowest point and disappointment in different spheres at its highest.

In 2000, a favourable attitude towards Lithuania's accession to the European Union started to increase significantly. This phenomenon could be explained in the light of at least two circumstances. First, an information campaign was started at approximately that time, and it gained an increasing pace up to the referendum. Not everybody might have read articles on that topic or have watched corresponding TV programmes; however, no one could offer a reproach that the EU accession problems were concealed. Second, political leaders started a distinct activity on the political scene of 2000 – they shared the electorate with lower educational background, lower income, that is, the group which had a greater number of euro-sceptics. Those political leaders were the President of Lithuania in 1993–1998, leader of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party Algirdas Brazauskas; attorney-general in 1990–1995, leader of the New Union Party Artūras Paulauskas; and president Rolandas Paksas (resigned in protest against the sale of an oil refinery company to the American company Williams International). They rather clearly and without ambiguity supported Lithuania's membership in the European Union, thus diminishing the euro-scepticism of their wide electorate.

In April 2000, already 44% of the respondents were 'pro' membership and 25% were 'contra' (*Vilmorus survey*, 2000; N=1,016). Thus, the situation changed radically within a very short period of time. Major motives determining 'pro' and 'contra' were economic: a majority of people expected a recovery of the economy with the emergence of a huge common market, as well as financial and technological support; however, some people feared that the weak local agriculture and industry would not be able to compete in the European Union.

So the period before 2003 could be divided into two parts: a period of growing euro-scepticism till 1999 and a period of rising euro-optimism during 2000–2003. Common for both periods was that economy-related expectations were the main cause for a changing attitude towards membership.

1.2. Euro referendum

For Lithuania's joining the EU, a referendum had to be held. The success of the referendum raised two main concerns. The first one was related to the level of activity of citizens in the referendum, since the majority of previous Lithuanian referendums had failed for this reason. For example, in a referendum of 20 October 1996, asking whether 'more than half national budget income has to be devoted for healthcare, medicine, education, science' 52.1% of voters participated and 38.98% of all registered voters voted 'yes', when the required minimum was 50%+1 of all registered voters (Krupavičius, 1998, p. 333).

The second one was connected to the changing nature of attitudes towards membership. In order to manage these two issues, actions were taken to increase activity and to monitor public opinion.
At the beginning of 2003, and until the referendum, there were no doubts that the majority of Lithuanian citizens supported Lithuania's accession to the European Union. Representative face-to-face surveys of Lithuania's population showed that the number of euro-supporters amounted to 81–83% of those who expressed their opinion (*Vilmorus surveys*, 2003a). In February 2003, an unprecedented telephone survey was carried out and 10,000 respondents were polled. In that survey as many as 86% of the respondents supported Lithuania's accession to the EU (*Vilmorus survey*, 2003b; N=10,000). The next telephone survey in March (10,000 again polled) revealed 90% support.

A higher EU support rate in telephone surveys might be explained by the fact that in Lithuania citizens with higher income have fixed telephone lines (a bigger part of euro-supporters was namely among them), while some among the poorer portion of citizens gave up the service due to increased telephone service rates. Great numbers of respondents in the above-mentioned telephone surveys enabled to estimate opinions of smaller socio-demographic groups. It became clear, for example, that Poles and Russians also were going to vote in support of membership. The surveys showed that no social or demographic group would object to Lithuania's euro-integration.

Hence, there were no doubts regarding the outcome of the referendum. Euro-supporters had a different concern: the problem of political activeness of

residents. For the referendum to be acknowledged as realised, participation should be no less than 50% of voters registered in the electoral commission lists (compiled according to the Residents' Register). There were many indications that the turnout might be low.

In fact, on the first day of the referendum, May 10th, by 2 p.m. only 14% of the voters had come to the polling booths; by 6 p.m. the number had increased to 20%, while by 9 p.m., to only 23%. Addresses to the nation were transmitted on television (among others, by the President) with the request to come and vote. Despite that, only 28% of the residents had voted by 10 a.m. the next day. It seemed that the referendum failed. Many public organisations and private persons tried to do everything within their capacity to encourage people to participate in the voting: they made telephone calls, offered a lift to polling stations, etc. That was a distinct manifestation of political activeness after a period of many years. By 2 p.m. the turnout rate had already reached 42%; by 6 p.m., 52%; while by the end of voting, 56%. After adding the absentees' ballot results, the turnout indicator reached 63% (as seen from data of the *Central Electoral Commission*, 2003).

Consequently, the referendum succeeded with 91% of votes in favour of Lithuania's membership in the European Union; however, the question remained open in the face of such a low turnout. There are objective and subjective reasons for the passivity of the voters. Objective reasons mainly include a discrepancy between the official register of voters and actual residents, caused by emigration, the mobility of youth inside the country, etc. (Matonytė & Gaidys, 2005, p. 89). Subjective reasons include a stereotypical personal belief that 'my vote will impact nothing'. Besides, residents did not expect fast changes; they did not expect personal benefit. People were greatly concerned about agriculture, increasing prices, and the overall economy. People supported Lithuania's membership in the EU, but this support was not expressed very intensively; they did not live in hopes of essential positive changes in the near future.

1.3. Support for membership after Lithuania's accession to the European Union

If public opinion towards Lithuania's membership was very dynamic before the referendum, then afterwards the situation stabilized – the support level remained high (Fig. 2).

*Figure 2. Attitudes towards Lithuania's membership in the EU: 2004–2009, %**



* *Source: Surveys carried out by Vilmorus in 2000–2002, 2005–2006, 2008–2009 and by TNS Gallup in 2003, 2004, 2007*

In spite of distrust of state institutions, dissatisfaction in different spheres of life, and other critical manifestations of public opinion in Lithuania during that period, we can state that a major part of Lithuanians were not disappointed in EU membership and EU institutions (52% respondents trust in the European Parliament, and 22% distrust. 49% respondents trust in the European Commission, and 21% distrust (*Standard Eurobarometer Report*, 2009b, no. 72).

One reason is that most people did not expect fast changes and personal benefit. In February 2004, when talking about the reasons influencing their support to the membership, 53% mentioned that their children will have a better life in the EU, 43% stated that membership will increase welfare in Lithuania, while a much smaller part, 26% (*Vilmorus survey*, 2004, N=1,080), expected improvement in personal welfare (Gaidys, 2006, p. 138). Thus, the absence of big expectations led to lack of disappointment. Besides, the major fear among people before the accession was that a weak agricultural sector might collapse due to inability to compete. On the contrary, the agricultural sector in particular has received the greatest support from European Union funds.

The survey completed in August 2008 showed (in answers to open-ended questions) that residents appreciated most the possibility to work abroad – 38%; 22% stated that life had become better; 21% mentioned EU structural funds' support, 7% indicated increased security of the country (*Vilmorus survey*, 2008b, N=1,002). One year later (September 2009), during the period

of the economic crisis, few people mentioned an improved life. In the list of advantages of membership, in the first place, as before, was the possibility to work abroad – 36%; in the second place was EU support – 29%; and in the third place were positive changes in the agricultural sector – 10% (*Vilmorus survey*, 2009, N=1,004).

A minor portion of residents was dissatisfied with membership and pointed out negative problems. In September 2009, the most common complaint was a deteriorating quality of life (apparently due to the economic crisis and not particularly due to membership), and that the European Union imposed many requirements (for example, closing the Ignalina nuclear power station).

During the membership period, Lithuania has been among the countries that most appreciate membership benefits, one of the most trusting of its institutions (*Standard Eurobarometer Report*, 2007, no. 68). In 2009, positive estimations prevail; however, Lithuania is no longer among the pacemakers in this respect. We can only guess that this is an indirect outcome of the economic crisis. For example, in Latvia, which was hit by the economic crisis earlier, support for membership is extremely low, with just 25%, (Summer 2009); this is the lowest among European member states (*Standard Eurobarometer Report*, 2009a, no. 71).

In Lithuania, support for membership has remained at a high level since joining the EU. Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that societal support depends on different factors. The level of societal awareness about EU issues, along with membership conditions and requirements, is one of them. For example, lack of information was one of the reasons why the referendum on the EU Constitution failed in Ireland in May 2008 (*Flash Eurobarometer Report*, 2008, no. 245). The relation between EU awareness and membership support in Lithuania is discussed in the next chapter.

2. Awareness level of European Union membership

First, it should be mentioned that information about EU institutions, their functions, and the processes taking place within them is rather complicated, and it is difficult to provide such information in an attractive and accessible way. Few people take interest in such information or seek it. On the other hand, residents consider the lack of information a serious flaw; that is, information should be 'provided at a glance'. In 1999, the number of euro-sceptics in Lithuania exceeded the number of euro-supporters (Fig. 1).

Analysis of changes in Lithuanians' attitudes towards membership and the sufficiency of information on membership at the same time reveals that one of the reasons for a low number of euro-supporters was a lack of information on the membership's after-effects. In 2000, negotiations about Lithuania's membership began; simultaneously an information campaign regarding the EU membership became a part of public discourse. Together with the swelling flow of information, the number of euro-sceptics started decreasing, while the number of people receiving sufficient information was increasing. For example, in 2000, 32% of respondents declared getting sufficient information (Fig. 3), and 33% (Fig. 1) expressed their support for membership; and in 2003 these numbers increased to 60% and 66%, respectively.

Figure 3. Do you receive sufficient information on Lithuania's membership in the European Union?, %



From then till the present time the number of people interested in the European Union, its institutions, and Lithuania's membership in the EU has been significantly lower in comparison with the situation before the referendum. Young and well-educated people take a greater interest in this. However, the most important thing is that the number of those dissatisfied with information has not increased (Fig. 3). The number of those who do not support Lithuania's membership in the EU also remained the same (Fig. 2).

The rate of dissatisfied respondents is 16% (euro-sceptics – 15%). There is an increasing number of those who do not find such information topical in the context of the crisis but are interested in everyday problems associated with work and daily needs, though the number of the euro-supporters remains stable.

Regarding the actual information on Lithuania's situation after joining the EU, three main issues could be distinguished as the main topics in public discourse: emigration, identity, and the introduction of the euro.

3. EU membership-related public discourse

3.1. Emigration

Historically, Lithuania has long-established emigration traditions. Many people emigrated during the interwar period (to the U.S.A., Latin America) and after World War II (mainly to the U.S.A.); a huge emigration wave formed in the present independent Lithuania after accession to the EU. A new aspect appeared in that the most numerous emigration streams were directed towards the European countries and not to the U.S.A. In fact, prevalent here are not classical emigrants who leave the country with their families and their wealth, but, rather, those who go abroad to work: sometimes for a short period of time, but sometimes for a period of many years, in order to earn money and start their own business in Lithuania or buy a home in Lithuania. A part of such emigrants simply do not know whether they are going to return to Lithuania or not; they just make use of the exceptionally good opportunities which have opened for working abroad. The main target countries for emigration now are Ireland and the United Kingdom, while Spain and Sweden are popular for seasonal jobs.

Lithuania is in the forefront according to migration rates in the European Union. However, there are no specific statistics on this issue. According to certain estimations, approximately 12–15% of adult Lithuanian citizens have departed to work abroad (Sipavičiene, Gaidys & Dobrynina, 2009, p. 17).

A representative survey of Lithuanian respondents carried out in June 2008 even showed that 30% of respondents have family members and 74% have friends or acquaintances that have left the country to work abroad. There are one million family units in Lithuania; therefore, 30% should indicate at least approximately 300,000 persons. The majority (74%) of respondents gave a favourable evaluation to people who travel to work abroad, especially those who are not able to find a job in Lithuania (*Vilmorus survey*, 2008a, N=1,000). A negative evaluation was expressed towards those emigrants who leave small children in Lithuania, also in regard to doctors, scientists, and other highly qualified professionals leaving Lithuania. It should be emphasised that only a temporary departure received a favourable evaluation, not a factual emigration.

Unemployment and a low salary are among the most popular reasons related to a temporary departure or emigration. Hypothetically, one could indicate the domination of large scale businesses in Lithuania; Lithuania takes next-to-last place in regard to the share of micro-enterprises in the economy (Schmiemann 2006, p. 2). Whereas small-sized enterprises, and micro-enterprises in particular, form a proprietor's feeling, create bonds to one's social and economic environment, one big supermarket brings frustration to a number of small proprietors.

In 2005–2009, the number of people planning to leave to work in other EU countries does not decrease (Fig. 4). There is an especially big share of young people who plan to travel to work abroad, 34% (see Fig. 5), in September 2009 (*Vilmorus survey*, 2009, N=1,004).

*Figure 4. The share of people who plan to travel to other EU countries to work, %**



* *Source: Representative surveys carried out by Vilmorus in 2005–2006, 2008–2009 and by TNS Gallup in 2007*

Figure 5. Age distribution of people who plan to travel abroad to work (September 2009), %



In the first part of the year 2008, plans were made at the governmental level on how to recover at least a part of the people who left to the West. The reason was a wish to recover the most efficient part of the nation, as well as the lack of work force in Lithuania. The economic crisis and the high rate of unemployment that followed later pushed those plans aside.

Emigration and Lithuania's joining the joint economic and cultural space prompted actual discussions about Lithuanians' identity.

3.2. Identity

Before the euro referendum, much public concern was related to the future of the economy, Lithuania's ability to face competition, and whether people with low qualification would find their way in the modern European Union. Intellectuals of Lithuania, however, were more concerned not with the future of economy, but with the future of Lithuanian culture and identity. They were alarmed that Lithuanians would gradually "dissolve" within the cultural space of the European Union, especially those who would emigrate. Since 2004, representative surveys of residents included a question about the fear of losing identity (Fig. 6).

*Figure 6. Will Lithuania retain its national identity and Lithuanian culture as a member of the European Union? Will we become less "Lithuanian" or will we remain the same?, %**



* *Source: Surveys carried out by Vilmorus in 2004, 2006, 2008–2009, and by TNS Gallup in 2007*

There are more optimists than pessimists regarding the future of Lithuanian identity. The share of both has decreased during the period of economic crisis; instead, the number of people indifferent to this issue has increased.

An open question was also provided regarding the reasons for pessimism and optimism. Pessimists indicated the large-scale emigration of Lithuanians, while optimists stated that in Lithuania's 1,000 years of history with its share of difficult periods, Lithuanians managed to preserve their identity. At present

Lithuanians have a large diaspora in the USA, where Lithuanian culture and language have been particularly cherished.
One of the threats for the national identity was related to loss of the national currency, though researches revealed that a fear of introduction of the euro was related not only to identity, but also to many other perceived threats, which are presented in the next chapter.

*Figure 7. Should Lithuania introduce the Euro?, %**



* *Source: Surveys carried out by Vilmorus in 2004–2006 and survey carried out by TNS Gallup in 2007*

3.3. Introduction of the euro

One of the major euro-integration topics between 2004 and 2007 was the introduction of the euro in Lithuania. Low inflation indicators of that period seemed to indicate the introduction of the euro in Lithuania on 1 January 2007. That was the dream of the Lithuanian political élite. Joining the euro-zone meant becoming a "true" member of the EU, meant joining the "club of the rich", meant strengthening political and economic security. Ordinary people, on the other hand, did not seem to share that optimism (Fig. 7).

We can see that at the beginning of the discussions about the euro in 2004, there was a larger share of people who supported the introduction of the euro. After detailed discussions, more than half the residents were against the introduction of the euro. In 2006, after it became clear that in January 2007 the euro would not be introduced, the number of supporters increased again.

The main reason against the introduction of the euro was a fear over rising prices. Regarding this fear, 91% of residents were sure that prices would

increase; 22% of respondents forecast the growth of prices up to 10%; 58% of respondents expected a 11–50% price growth, 12% supposed a 51–100% increase, while 8% of residents expected an even bigger growth (*Vilmorus survey*, 2005, N=1,004). Other obvious drawbacks of the euro's introduction could be defined as well: a difficulty to understand prices when purchasing something – 55%, loss of the Lithuanian litas, a symbol of statehood – 69%, residents not being used to the euro and thus becoming victims of fraud – 69%, savings might depreciate – 83% (*Vilmorus survey*, 2006, N=1,009).

Despite the reservations, Lithuanians, at that time, were not emphatic protesters against the euro. It seemed that Lithuania was not ready yet, that the difference between prices and earnings were too big in comparison with other Western countries. The euro should be introduced when Lithuania's economy approaches Western economies.

The euro was not introduced in Lithuania on 1 January 2007 (as a result of a too high inflation rate). Later the economic situation underwent critical changes: the crisis started. It seems that public opinion regarding the euro should have changed: rumours about a devaluation of the Lithuanian litas spread, and the euro has always had a stable currency image. However, the situation has hardly changed, just 15% wish for the introduction of the euro as soon as possible, 15% of respondents approve of the introduction in 2011–2012, 27% would want it later; there are 19% of radical euro-opponents; others have no opinion (*Vilmorus survey*, 2009, N=1,004).

Obviously, the reasons for scepticism towards the introduction of the euro are similar to those expressed earlier: the fear over rising prices, devaluation of deposits, fraud, and inconvenience when calculating prices.

4. The image of Lithuania in the European Union and neighbouring countries

Usually, issues related to Lithuania's membership in the EU were discussed based on Lithuania's needs, expectations, and threats. From June to August 2006, an attempt was made to look at Lithuania from the perspective of other European countries. Representative surveys (coordinated by Public Opinion and Market Research Centre Vilmorus) commissioned by the Office of the Lithuanian Government were carried out in all the European Union Member States as well as in Belarus and the Kaliningrad Oblast. Respondents were asked to give a favourable or unfavourable evaluation of Lithuania, and to evaluate

the following statements: 'people in Lithuania are good and friendly', 'rich culture', 'good relations with the country where the survey was carried out', 'attractive for tourism', 'fast-growing economy', 'has good athletes', 'attractive for investment', 'it is a modern country', 'politically stable', 'small-scale corruption'. These indicators at least partly reflect Lithuania's image, which has been formed (or has not been formed yet) in different countries. Before the start of surveys abroad, the hypothesis of the survey authors was rather pessimistic: it was assumed that Lithuania would receive a negative evaluation in most of the countries due to the improper behaviour of some Lithuanians working abroad and that nobody would know virtually anything about Lithuania.

Survey results are provided below and are based on the main overall question: 'What is your evaluation of Lithuania: favourable or unfavourable?' (Fig. 8) The hypothesis of an unfavourable evaluation of Lithuania was proven wrong. Estonia (85%) and Finland (84%), along with Latvia, Belarus, and Poland, gave the highest evaluation of Lithuania.

None of the countries gave more unfavourable evaluations than favourable ones. The share of favourable and unfavourable evaluations was equal in Spain (19% each). However, extremely distinct regional variations have been noticed in this country. The eastern region (Valencia, Alicante) provided just 11% positive and even 44% negative evaluations, whereas the central region (Madrid, etc.) showed more positive evaluations. The rate of unfavourable evaluations was greater in countries where a larger number of Lithuanians are employed for seasonal jobs.

On the other hand, although there are many Lithuanians working in Ireland, only 6% of unfavourable evaluations were recorded there. A majority of respondents (41%) agreed that Lithuanians are good and friendly people (negative share of evaluations – 5%). Lithuania has a favourable image also in the United Kingdom (48% favourable and 15% unfavourable evaluations). We may suppose that in comparison with Spain, Lithuanians in Ireland and the United Kingdom have higher qualification and made a better impression on the locals.

Concern about the lack of awareness of Lithuania was partly proved: residents in a majority of countries replied 'difficult to say' to the question on favourable or unfavourable Lithuania's evaluation: Italy – 73%, Germany – 70%, the Czech Republic – 65%, Slovakia – 62%, Spain and Ireland, where expectations could be higher regarding awareness of Lithuania, counted 62% and 60%, respectively. However, the lack of information may become an advantage: new purposive information may be easily entrenched there.

Figure 8. What is your evaluation of Lithuania: favourable or unfavourable?, %



It should be acknowledged that the indicators used in this survey as well as the results of the survey may be justly criticised. For example, a part of the respondents may have confused Lithuania and Latvia. A part of the respondents might have chosen positive answers just because they did not want to show they knew nothing about Lithuania. These doubts will be proved or disproved by future surveys. However, it is hard to argue the fact that had a strongly negative image of Lithuania prevailed in a given country, respondents would have communicated this during the survey.

Conclusions

One of the greatest projects – Lithuania's accession to the EU – succeeded, although the road to a common European space was not very straight or easy.

The highest level of antagonism towards Lithuania's accession to the European Union was reached in 1999 when the number of euro-sceptics exceeded the number of euro-supporters. This was determined by many factors, among the most important ones was lack of information and complicated privatisation processes of large companies during that period. Later, support towards Lithuania's accession to the European Union increased due to a consistent information campaign and support of almost all public and political parties. In 2003, over 90% of the referendum attendees gave their votes in support of membership. Lithuania has now been a member of the European Union for five years, and the support level remains high: approximately 70% approve of membership, around 15% do not. Thus, in spite of dissatisfaction in many spheres of life, Lithuanian residents have not been disappointed in the membership so far. One of the reasons is the opportunity to work abroad. Otherwise, work abroad and emigration will always cause problems; around 30% of family units have family members working abroad at present.

Lithuanians trust in the European Union institutions; their support for various initiatives of the European Union remains stable. However, there is an exception – the introduction of the euro. This issue has more opponents than proponents because of a fear over rising prices and devaluation of deposits.

The results of surveys show that public opinion towards EU issues and membership support is currently steady. Of course, the flexible and changing nature of public opinion based on changes in the economic and political environment, should be kept in mind.

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Unemployment and Vacancies Matching Efficiency During Transition: the Czech Republic in 1992–2000

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Abstract:

Using the matching function and the monthly and yearly data from 1992 to 2000 of 76 Czech districts, this paper studies district specific characteristics affecting matching efficiency, and shows the usefulness of studying transition times. Among the conclusions, it was found that the higher the educational level of the labour force and the higher the number of firms in new sectors, except in the commercial one, the more efficient the matching process. The results give evidence supporting the idea that employed workers participate in the matching process and, therefore, they are one of the sources of increasing returns to scale in the Czech matching function. Small new enterprises in the commercial sector are also a source of increasing returns.

Introduction

Knowledge of labour market flows is important for political decisions on labour market regulations. Within the context of a transforming economy, inflow into unemployment, coming from shrinking sectors, is assumed to increase. Therefore, it is important to study outflow from unemployment determinants, the process by which unemployment and vacancies and unemployment match each other and whether government intervention is justified in the process. In order to study and quantify the matching process, economists use a function known as the matching function. The transformation undergone during the 1990s in Central Eastern Europe gave rise to a large amount of matching literature that increased knowledge about how to estimate the matching function and what can be learnt from it. Most of the literature has focused on the Czech Republic (Pedraza 2007). Focusing on

* *This paper was elaborated during a research stay at CERGE-EI Prague.*

the Czech example allows us to increase our knowledge of the matching process, which in turn can be used to study other economies. This paper, using Czech data, provides evidence and new results on how transforming labour markets operate, on whether intervention is justified and on where such an intervention should focus by estimating matching efficiency determinants. The conclusions are useful in the current context of crisis and high unemployment levels, especially in countries where recovery has to be led by new sectors and where an increase of vacancies and unemployment in mismatch is taking place. Although the current global crisis and its impact on labour markets are different from the specific features of the transformation crisis, some lessons seem to be universal. The current situation could be studied using recent examples from history such as this, following the methodology described below, together with the rich Czech matching literature, in order to shed light on government intervention and labour market regulations.

The Czech transition was characterised by the restructuring process and two aggregate activity crises, the initial one that ended in 1994 and the 1997 crisis. The evolution of unemployment during the Czech transition is characterised by a period of very low unemployment before 1997 followed by a period of unemployment levels around 10% and increasing differences across districts in terms of unemployment levels, LTU incidence, and declining differences regarding the v/u ratio. The relationship between unemployment and vacancies shows declining matching efficiency and increasing differences in matching efficiency across districts coinciding with the speed-up of restructuring after 1997. The paper is divided into four sections. The first consists of a literature review. In section two, the matching function is estimated in two stages. Section three shows estimations results, and section four concludes and offers policy recommendations.

1. Review of the literature

The increase in matching literature is a direct consequence of the importance of outflow from unemployment in transforming economies. There are three kinds of studies regarding the matching function and outflow from unemployment. Firstly, there are studies that estimate hazard functions aiming to identify individual determinants of leaving unemployment. Secondly, studies that, using aggregate data on vacancies, unemployment, and outflow, estimate aggregated matching functions aiming to disentangle its characteristics. Finally, the matching function is also used as a modelling device for equilibrium unemployment theories.

In the first set of research, most studies have used Czech data: Ham et al. (1998), Ham et al. (1999), Sorm and Terrel (1997), Finta and Terrel (1997), Lubyova and

van Ours (1997), Sorm and Terrel (1998). Unemployment duration models have also been applied to other Central Eastern Europe (CEE) countries; Bellman et al. (1995) use data from East Germany, Abraham and Vodopivec (1993) from Slovenia, Micklewright and Nagy (1995 and 1997) from Hungary, Jones and Kato (1997) from Bulgaria, Dushi (1997) from Albania, and Foley (1997) from Russia. Although the results obtained by hazard literature differ among the above studies, most of them coincide as regards the following aspects. Firstly, the probability of leaving unemployment varies across regions, increases with the level of education, and decreases with the duration of unemployment spells. Secondly, the Czech Unemployment Compensation System (UCS) does not seem to have a strong negative impact on reducing the efficiency of the labour market by lengthening unemployment spells. Finally, there has been a significant movement from old to new sectors. In this respect, Sorm and Terrel (1999 a, b) do not focus on re-employment probabilities but on the importance of labour mobility. They show that there has been a significant movement into finance, trade and tourism and out of the agricultural and industrial sectors. They also find that over half of the people who change jobs have changed employment sector and that change in sector occurred more among people who found a job out of unemployment or out of the labour force than among job-to-job movers. They conclude that there was a significant shift in the structure of employment and that the Czech labour market has demonstrated a high degree of flexibility and efficiency.

Regarding the second set of studies, according to Petrongolo (2001, p. 414) *micro studies control for a number of characteristics which can be aggregated to give shift variables in the aggregate matching function besides U and V.* In this respect, the literature has also approached outflow from unemployment at an aggregate level, using the matching function. It is assumed that outflow to employment (*O*) is a function of the number of unemployed (*U*) and the number of posted vacancies (*V*), in the same way that in a production function output is a function of labour and capital.

$$O=f(U,V) \tag{1}$$

The matching process is seen as a technological search process where searching firms and workers try to find the best match given exogenous factors that influence matching efficiency such as availability of information, skills mismatch, and spatial mismatch. When using panel data, *the most frequently used functional form is a Cobb Douglas like*

$$\log O_{i,t} = c + \beta_u \log U_{i,t-1} + \beta_v \log V_{i,t-1} + \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{2}$$

Where $U_{i,t-1}$, *and* $V_{i,t-1}$ *represent the number of unemployed and vacancies at the end of period t-1;* $O_{i,t}$ *represents outflow to jobs, the number of successful matches between vacancies and unemployment; constant c captures the efficiency of the matching and* α_i, λ_t*; and* $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ *represent the district-specific and time-specific and overall unexplained stochastic part of the matching process* (Svejnar 1999, p.2847).

Aggregated matching function literature goals are two. On the one hand, it aims to calculate whether the matching functions display Constant or Increasing Returns to Scale. On the other hand, it aims to capture the different dimensions of mismatch by estimating aggregated matching efficiency determinants. According to modelling literature (Pissarides 2000), the existence of constant or increasing returns to scale has political implications because the existence of constant returns to scale (CRTS)[1] would imply a unique, stable and optimal equilibrium. On the contrary, the existence of increasing returns to scale (IRTS) may imply multiple equilibriums. Therefore, increasing returns to scale are considered to be an argument in favour of government intervention to bring the economy to low unemployment equilibrium. Such an intervention should focus on increasing the efficiency of the matching process.

Burda (1993) estimated by OLS simple static matching functions for the Czech and Slovak Republics and found that the matching function displayed CRTS. He states that the existence of a stable matching function can provide policy guidance in transforming economies because the growth of the private sector would depend on the efficiency with which workers and jobs can be brought together and on how quickly vacancies can be created. He focuses on the optimal speed of transition (OST) implied by the estimated matching function and found that neither a "big bang" nor a "go slow" are optimal; instead, a "mixed bang" is more appropriate. Boeri (1994) found that vacancies have a small effect and that the impact of long term unemployment on outflow is lower than the impact of short term unemployment. Svejnar et al. (1995) introduced more explanatory variables apart from vacancies and unemployment, they found, for example, that an increase of 1% in expenditure per capita increases outflow by 0.17%.

Burda and Lubyova (1995) and Boeri and Burda (1996) also found a significant positive effect of ALMP on outflow. Burda and Lubyova (1995) turned their attention to the wide and increasing dispersion of unemployment rates across

[1] In a matching function like $M = A V^{\beta} U^{\alpha}$
there are constant returns to scale if $\alpha + \beta = 1$ and increasing returns to scale if $\alpha + \beta > 1$.

regions while the vacancy rate coefficient of variation decreased in the Czech Republic. They considered that development as evidence for the emergence of decentralized small enterprises and for the emergence of mismatch. They also pointed out the importance of industrial structures inherited from the CPE by some districts: *the matching process is affected by the industry mix inherited from the centrally planned system* (Burda and Profit, 1996, p.263). The speed of transition ("big bang" vs. "go slow") does not depend only on the behaviour of labour markets. It was clear that economic structure has to play a fundamental role in defining/identifying the best ("mixed bang") package.

Many of the above works accept the hypothesis of CRTS. However, Profit (1996) focused on instruments to solve autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and showed that when taking them into account increasing returns to scale (IRTS) are found. Munich et al. (1998) also rejected the hypothesis of CRTS and found that the unemployed play a very important role. As explanatory variables of the technological factor of the Czech matching function they introduced the educational levels of unemployed, long term unemployed, expenditure on ALMPs, distance to the European Union (15) border, and density of population. Profit, using data from 1991 to 1994, found that *a properly specified and consistently estimated matching function which accounts for autocorrelation in unemployment to-job-exits, the presence of heteroscedasticity, and validity of instruments renders elasticities of outflows to jobs with respect to unemployment and vacancies which imply increasing returns to matching. Early studies have failed to find this effect* (Profit 1999, p.27).

He interprets IRTS as the result of competition between state-owned enterprises and the emerging private sector for skilled labour which gives rise to larger job-to-job movements. Such a search intensity of employed job seekers produces IRTS. This interpretation is at odds with Burda's (1993) assumption that on-job-search is not important during transition. It is also at odds with the Munich et al. (1998) finding regarding the important role played by the unemployed. Unfortunately, there is no direct information on employed job-searchers available for the Czech Republic; therefore, *the effect of on-the-job-search is difficult to infer directly* (Profit 1999, p.24).

In the estimations below, it is found that both the employed and the unemployed play a role in the matching process and that the emergence of small decentralized enterprises identified by Boeri and Burda (1996) is one of the sources of high estimated coefficients for the unemployed. Finally, Profit and Sperlich explores the properties and the developments of matching technology in the Czech Republic during the transition to a market economy. They point out that *further research*

could entail a finer disintegration of matching factors such as the educational composition of the unemployment pool (Profit and Sperlich 2004, p.710).

From the existing literature, it can be concluded that government intervention might be justified in the presence of IRTS and that such an intervention should focus on increasing the efficiency of the matching function. For that propose, in the following section the matching function is estimated and, after accepting the IRTS hypothesis, I concentrate on searching for unemployment and vacancies matching efficiency determinants.

2. The estimation of the matching function and the efficiency factor

The estimations below are divided into two stages. The first one aims to efficiently estimate Czech matching function parameters taking into consideration unobserved heterogeneity, correlation of the error term and varying district size following the aforementioned findings of Profit (1996, 1999, 2004) and Munich et al. (1998). The estimated matching function is an augmented one, including as explanatory variables lagged outflow and the newly unemployed in the current period. The second stage aims to estimate factors affecting matching efficiency.

2.1. The first stage: The estimation of the matching function parameters

The matching function estimated below displays IRTS, like other studies that take into account correlation and unobserved heterogeneity.

Early studies used a Cobb-Douglas specification of the matching function like equation (2). However, the matching function has been augmented by the introduction of two more explanatory variables. On the one hand, it has been made dynamic by introducing the lagged value of outflow ($O_{i,t-1}$) as another explanatory variable. Lagged value of outflow allows for partial adjustment of the matching process. *Partial adjustment of the matching function may occur for two reasons. Firstly, the fact that the acceptance of a job offer precedes the reported date of the match and secondly, that the information about newly posted vacancies is not diffused instantly to all job searchers* (Munich et al. 1998, p. 8). On the other hand, to account for the Coles and Smith (1998)[2]

[2] Coles and Smith found that the newly unemployed, those entering unemployment in the current period, interact in a different manner with posted vacancies than those already unemployed. The reason is to be found in search intensity and human capital.

finding, the number of people entering unemployment in the current period has also been included separately from those already unemployed. The data support the existence of partial adjustment of the matching function and that the newly unemployed interact with vacancies in a different manner to those already unemployed.

In this first stage, the matching function has been estimated using a panel data set of 76 districts over 12 months that were to be estimated for every year from 1992 to 2000: nine panel estimations where N=76 and T=12 of a model like this

$$y_{i,t} = \beta' x_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{i,t} + \alpha_t \qquad (3)$$

Where *y* is the dependent variable, general outflow from unemployment (O_t). $x \equiv (x_1, x_2, ..., x_k)$ refers to outflow from unemployment explanatory variables: the lagged value of unemployment ($U_{i,t-1}$), the lagged value of vacancies ($V_{i,t-1}$), lagged value of outflow ($O_{i,t-1}$), and the newly unemployed in the current period ($N_{i,t}$). Therefore, the estimated matching function is the augmented one below:

$$\ln O_{i,t} = \beta_o + \beta_{o_{t-1}} \ln O_{i,t-1} + \beta_n \ln N_{i,t} + \beta_u \ln U_{i,t-1} + \beta_v \ln V_{i,t-1} + v_{i,t} \qquad (4)$$

The composite error is divided into three components

$$v_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \qquad (5)^3$$

[3] α_i refers to the unobserved time constant factors called unobserved heterogeneity. These individual time invariant variables are the same for a given cross-sectional unit through time but vary across cross-sectional units (districts). For example, the distance from the district capital to the national one, the density of population, agricultural and industrial production at the beginning of the transition, and district location in the southern part of the country. These variables are not available at district level with monthly frequency and therefore are not included in this first stage. Assuming that they affect the technology factor of the matching function, I introduce them in the second stage. They are included in the first stage error term. If unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with any of the explanatory variables, putting it into the error term can cause serious problems: we cannot consistently estimate βs because the pooled OLS would be biased and inconsistent. This problem can be solved by first differences.
α_t refers to factors that vary over time but not across districts. These are variables that are the same for all cross-sectional units at a given point in time but vary through time.

Table 1. First stage estimation coefficientsData: Czech Districts Labour Offices

	1992			1993			1994		
Explanatory variables	Coef.	t	sig. lvl.	Coef.	t	sig. lvl.	Coef.	t	sig. lvl.
Ot-1	-0.041*	-0.99	0.320	-0.081	-2.61	0.009	-0.078	-2.50	0.013
Ut-1	1.579	14.26	0.000	1,727	18.15	0.000	2.446	17.08	0.000
Vt-1	0.177	3.19	0.001	0.229	4.69	0.000	0.330	6.94	0.000
Nt	0.266	7.01	0.000	0.406	16.16	0.000	0.490	17.44	0.000
R^2	0.282			0.409			0.453		
Chi^2	0.000			0.000			0.000		
	1995			1996			1997		
Explanatory variables	Coef.	t	sig. lvl.	Coef.	t	sig. lvl.	Coef.	t	sig. lvl.
Ot-1	0.203	6.75	0.000	0.003*	0.10	0.920	-0.085	-3.07	0.002
Ut-1	2.727	19.87	0.000	2.397	15.78	0.000	2.142	16.21	0.000
Vt-1	0.157	2.69	0.007	0.147	2.61	0.009	0.222	3.93	0.000
Nt	0.613	22.34	0.000	0.599	20.67	0.000	0.521	22.59	0.000
R^2	0.455			0.465			0.508		
Chi^2	0.000			0.000			0.000		
	1998			1999			2000		
Explanatory variables	Coef.	t	sig.lvl.	Coef.	t	sig. lvl.	Coef.	t	sig. lvl.
Ot-1	0.022*	0.74	0.462	-0.000*	-0.01	0.988	0.076	2.23	0.026
Ut-1	2.115	14.53	0.000	3.048	16.98	0.000	3.627	17.86	0.000
Vt-1	0.143	4.50	0.000	0.031*	0.84	0.402	0.171	4.11	0.000
Nt	0.615	22.95	0.000	0.593	17.83	0.000	0.492	13.90	0.000
R^2	0.498			0.459			0.374		
Chi^2	0.000			0.000			0.000		

Regarding serial correlation, it can be easily identified that the idiosyncratic error term, $\varepsilon_{i,t}$, is correlated with the explanatory variables[4]. It has been solved by first differences and the Prais-Winsten transformation (See Profit (1996) and Munich et al., 1998). First stage results are reported in table 1. Two conclusions can be obtained: that the Czech matching function displays IRTS and that estimated parameters for the unemployed are larger than those for vacancies.

2.2. Second stage: The efficiency factor and district specific characteristics

The usefulness of identifying district specific characteristics that affect the matching efficiency is to learn what the focus of government policies regarding flows[5] in the labour market should be. Using matching function estimated parameters, this second stage analyzes whether aggregated district-specific characteristics explain inter-district matching efficiency differences.

Therefore, it is estimated

$$\ln O_{i,t} = \beta_o + \beta_{o_{t-1}} \ln O_{i,t-1} + \beta_n \ln N_{i,t} + \beta_u \ln U_{i,t-1} + \beta_v \ln V_{i,t-1} + \delta' W_i + v_{i,t}$$
$$v_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \qquad (9)$$

[4] We are working on a matching function like

$$O_{i,t} = f(U_{i,t-1}, V_{i,t-1}) + \varepsilon_{t,i} \qquad (6)$$

The OLS procedure assumes that the explanatory variables are not correlated with the error term. However, that assumption does not hold in a matching function because

$$U_{i,t-1} = U_{i,t-2} + I_{i,t-1} - O_{i,t-1} \qquad (7)$$

The number of unemployed at the end of period t-1 is equal to the number of unemployed at the end of period t-2 plus those entering unemployment in period t-1 ($I_{i,t-1}$) minus those leaving unemployment . At the same time

$$O_{i,t-1} = (U_{i,t-2}, V_{i,t-2}) + \varepsilon_{i,t-1} \qquad (8)$$

Therefore, U_{t-1} and $\varepsilon_{i,t-1}$ are correlated. As a consequence, in the original model the OLS assumptions are not completed even if α_i is uncorrelated with the rest of the explanatory variables.

[5] Regarding both outflow from unemployment and, to a certain extent, inflow into unemployment especially in a context of a huge economic transformation as shown in Burda (1993). For example, according to the literature, long term unemployment has a negative effect on outflow; so it should be taken into account regarding the speed of the transformations that produce inflow into unemployment. If a certain district specific characteristic is proved to have a negative effect on outflow, a priori measures can be taken to offset its effect. In this respect, the conclusions may exceed the limits of labour economics and give information on how discipline and encouragement can be coordinated to avoid long term unemployment.

where W_i is a $K_1 \times 1$ vector of time invariant and district specific variables and is a vector of associated parameters. The term $v_{i,t}$ represents the unexplained stochastic part of the matching process.

Using first stage estimated βs, δs are estimated, which reflects the impact of district specific variables W_i on the efficiency of matching, given unemployment, newly unemployed (inflow into unemployment) and vacancies. Unexplained first stage residuals are computed and used on the left hand side of the following cross-section OLS regression which was estimated for each year from 1993 to 2000:

$$\overline{\ln O_i} - \hat{\beta}_{o_{t-1}} \overline{\ln O_{-1,i}} - \hat{\beta}_n \overline{\ln N_i} - \hat{\beta}_u \overline{\ln U_{-1,i}} - \hat{\beta}_v \overline{\ln V_{-1,i}} = \beta_o + \delta' W_i + \alpha_i \quad (10)$$

There are many variables apart from those introduced here that may affect efficiency. However, the disadvantage of working with district level data is that many variables are not available at district level. The advantage is that, working with districts of the same country narrows the number of matching efficiency explanatory variables because they are all subject to the same labour market institutions and policies.

It is tested whether the following district characteristics are able to explain district differences in matching efficiency: Educational levels of the labour force, proportion of long term unemployed, self-employment, expenditure in ALMPs, distance to EU border, density of population, Sudeten Lands, ratio of agricultural to industrial production in 1990, and number of enterprises in new sectors of activity. Some of these have already been tested by Munich et al. (1998) for the period between 1992 and 1996. However, they used educational levels of the unemployment pool and I use educational levels of the labour force. Likewise, they did not take into account the effect of self-employment and the number of firms in new sectors of activity. Two models are reported below: Model 1 using almost the same variables as Munich et al. (1998) and Model 2 adding new variables.

2.2.1. Educational levels of the labour force (edu1, edu2, edu3)

Both the labour force structure by educational levels and the educational structure of the unemployed pool should have an impact on district matching efficiency. In the latter case, the results would be interpretable in terms of search theory. According to search theory and much of the hazard functions literature, the higher the educational level of a job seeker, the more easily he/she will find a vacant position because he/she is more attractive to firms. Educational levels

are also used as a proxy to capture the impact of other personal characteristics, such as innate skills and job-related behaviour such as endurance, cooperative mentality, and flexibility, about which it is very difficult to obtain information. At an aggregate district level, it would mean that a larger proportion of the unemployed with a university education would have a positive impact on matching technology. However, the reservation wage of the university educated is higher. They are more likely not to accept a job offer because they might prefer to wait for a better chance, another offer with higher salary and better conditions. Therefore, a bigger proportion of the university educated unemployed would have a negative impact on matching technology. However, in the context of the hard times of transition, the first positive effect is likely to be stronger than the second negative one. I used the 1991 proportion of the labour force that had completed university education (edu3) and the proportion of the labour force that had completed secondary education (edu2), and measured their effect on matching efficiency with respect to the proportion of the labour force with lower educational levels (edu1: primary education and no education).

Table 2. Czech districts proportion of the labour force that have completed Primary, Secondary and University education 1991[6].

	Mean	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
Primary education (edu1)	19.9%	2.4%	17%	30.5%
Secondary education (edu2)	73%	4.3%	53%	78.5%
University education (edu3)	7.1%	2.1%	3.4%	16%

Source: Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)

Labour force proportions have been introduced instead of unemployed proportions for two reasons. Firstly, the goal was to test whether the total labour force, employed and unemployed, play a role in the matching process. If these two variables (edu3 and edu2) are able to explain matching efficiency differences across districts, it would support the idea of the importance of on-the-job search highlighted by Profit (1999, 2004). Recall that he found evidence of searching

[6] The maximum share of the labour force that had completed University education is in Prague, and the second maximum is in Brnó, the capital of Moravia. Divergences in the educational composition across districts increased as transition evolved. The numbers reported here are only comparable to numbers from 2001; there are no figures for the years in between. See Jurajda S. (2005).

employed workers as a source of increasing returns to scale of the Czech matching function. The hypothesis is that the higher the educational composition of the labour force, the lower the skill and educational mismatch, and the more efficient the matching process is. Secondly, long term unemployment has also been introduced, and most of the long-term unemployed have low educational levels. I avoid collinearity problems coming from two correlated explanatory variables by introducing proportions of the labour force as a proxy of proportions of the unemployed pool. In this respect, these variables can also be interpreted as a proxy of educational levels of the unemployed pool, in terms of search theory. If more educated individuals are in a better position to find jobs than their less educated counterparts and if this effect is not offset at an aggregate level by the reservation wage effect, edu2 and edu3 should have a positive effect. Therefore the hypothesis is that both variables (edu3 and edu2) should have a positive impact on matching technology. However, it is difficult to hypothesise which one has a stronger impact because although the university educated might be more attractive to firms, the secondary educated are also very attractive but have lower reservation wages. It has been proven that a high share of the secondary educated labour force provides *workers with a few of the flexible skills required for success in the changing labour market* (Munich et al. 1999, p.viii).

It is also important to bear in mind that the proportions refer to 1991 district labour forces. They should be able to capture the concentration of skilled workers and an educational endowment inherited from communist times. However, they are not able to capture the concentration of skills in certain districts during transition, before 1991. As pointed out by Jurajda, there is *a tendency of skill-intense production to locate in areas relatively abundant in skills.* He also showed that *the districts' inequality in the endowment of different levels of education is responsible for about half of the overall district variation in current unemployment rates (…) while unemployment rates of the college educated vary little across labour market areas* (Jurajda 2005, p.1). Labour mobility across districts moves highly educated workers to more dynamic districts where there are more opportunities. In this sense, as the "new economic geography" literature argues, spatial concentration of production factors reinforces divergence. District human capital concentration may be detected through the matching function. This variable only captures movements before 1991 and although educational composition inequality between districts can be traced to communist times (see CERGE-EI Economic Review 2005, p.51 and Jurajda 2005) and several districts had a better starting position, divergences across the districts' educational composition increased very much as transition evolved. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the ability of these variables to explain differences in matching efficiency across districts decreases as transition evolves.

Summarising, it is hypothesised that the variables edu2 and edu3 have a positive effect on matching efficiency and that their effect decreases as transition evolves. Their ability to explain matching efficiency in the early stages of transition would support the idea that the whole labour force is taking part in the matching process and therefore the importance of on-the-job search.

2.2.2. Long Term Unemployment (LTU)

Table 3 shows the increasing importance of LTU as transition evolved. It also shows that differences across districts with respect to LTU also increased.

According to hazard models, the longer the unemployment spells of an individual, the lower his/her probabilities of finding a job. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the share of long term unemployment (LTU), those with spells longer than twelve months, has a negative impact on matching efficiency. This causal relationship also holds in the opposite direction: low matching efficiency implies lower outflow which increases LTU.

Table 3. Unemployment rate and LTU.

	Unemployment %	Share of LTU regarding unemployment, %	Share of LTU regarding labour force, %	Std. Dev.*	Min.*	Max.*
1992	3.00	14.4	0.4	0.2	0.04	1.3
1993	2.99	17.4	0.5	0.3	0.01	1.4
1994	3.37	20.2	0.7	0.5	0.01	1.9
1995	3.07	23.4	0.7	0.5	0.01	2.2
1996	3.18	23.2	0.7	0.5	0.02	3.2
1997	4.36	23.6	1.0	0.7	0.04	4.5
1998	6.13	27.4	1.7	1	0.04	5.6
1999	8.62	32.4	2.8	1.4	0.15	8.1
2000	8.99	37.5	3.4	2	0.4	11
2001	8.54	38.6	3.3	-	-	-

Source: Columns 1, 2 and 3 CERGE-EI 2002 and 2005 economic surveys; Columns 4,5,6 District Labour Offices.

* *Of proportion of LTU with regard to the labour force of the 74 Czech Districts.*

The long term unemployed have been considered to be the losers of the transition. On the one hand, they have different characteristics to the short term unemployed

(see Jurajda and Munich 2002); they mainly have low levels of education. On the other hand, the longer a worker is unemployed, the more difficult it is for him/her to be attractive to a firm because his/her human capital is worn out. They suffer from discouragement, stigma, loss of skills, and skills mismatch.

Apart from the effect of unemployment on human capital, the literature has also pointed out the importance of the disincentive effect of social welfare transfer. *The welfare system may represent a floor preventing downward wage adjustment in districts with high unemployment rates and for the long term unemployed* (see Galusčak and Munich 2003, p.1). However, this study is not focused on finding out the relative importance of disincentive effects of welfare transfers with respect to skills, education, discouragement, and stigma effects.

2.2.3. New enterprises: Self employment and new start up firms

This variable has been introduced as the number self-employed persons and firms with fewer than 25 employees per member of the district labour force (e). Both self employment and small and medium size enterprises are a new phenomenon; during communist times state firms were huge conglomerates. *Almost all new job creation in the early transition occurred in small firms*[7]. Although this should have a positive effect on matching efficiency, there are factors that make it difficult to hypothesise the sign of the effect of this variable. At the same time, there are also problems regarding the identification, often made in the literature, of small firms with new firms[8].

It is known that new firms are always a source of dynamism and jobs, but new firms do not always survive, and opening a new firm always involves risk. Sometimes they are a phenomenon of districts with favourable local conditions, a consequence of Greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI) or are born as providers to multinationals. However, they are also the consequence of unfavourable local conditions. Therefore, they are also common in districts with poor infrastructure and low FDI where self-employment is the only alternative.

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[7] CERGE-EI Economic Review 2002, page 51. See also Jurajda and Terrell (2002 a and b), who consider these new enterprises as the engine of job creation.

[8] Although it has been commonly used by literature, the assumption that data for small enterprises can be used to approximate new enterprises might not be very accurate. See IBRD (2002) for a discussion on the hypothesis that small enterprises can be taken as approximating new enterprises. The terms "new enterprises" and "small enterprises" are often used interchangeably. See also Jurajda and Terrel (2002b), CERGE-IE Economic Review 2002, pages 49 to 52 and Kumar et al. (1999).

Figures 1 and 2 show that there is a positive relationship between the number of new enterprises and outflow from unemployment, but there is also a positive relationship between the number of new enterprises and the level of unemployment. Neither of these correlations is very strong, but the second one seems clearer. Looking at other transition economies, it can be observed that high unemployment countries like Poland have more self-employment[9]. The same can be observed in other European countries like Spain. This may be a two way street: high unemployment levels force people to self-employment and, as Hungarian examples show, the self-employed are at least as difficult to re-employ as the employed. At the same time, table 4 shows that standard deviation across Czech districts decreased as transition evolved while unemployment differences increased. Furthermore, the positive effect of this variable might have been absorbed by unemployment in the first stage estimations. In that case self-employment would be one of the reasons behind high unemployment elasticities and IRTS. In this respect, it is important to notice that Boeri and Terrel found that the Unemployment Compensation System (UCS) plays an important role, encouraging self-employment (see Boeri and Terrel, 2002, p.52) as a source for financing this type of business.

Figure 1. New enterprises rate and outflow to jobs.



[9] In 2003, the unemployment level in the Czech Republic was 8.9%, in Hungary 5.8%, and in Poland 19.3%. The respective proportions of self-employed workers were 15.3%, 14.6% and 28%. Source: Eurostat, Employment in Europe.

Figure 2. New enterprises rate and unemployment rate



Source: District Labour Offices, Ministry of Finance, CZSO

As a result, it is a hypothesis that this variable has no effect on matching efficiency, because it has been absorbed by unemployment in the first stage, or else it has a negative effect because it captures the negative conditions of high unemployment districts.

Table 4. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum of new enterprises as a proportion of the labour force in Czech districts.

Year	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min.	Max.
1993	0.22	0.054	0.13	0.53
1994	0.19	0.026	0.13	0.33
1995	0.20	0.044	0.14	0.42
1996	0.21	0.029	0.15	0.31
1997	0.23	0.036	0.17	0.35
1998	0.25	0.039	0.19	0.36
1999	0.25	0.037	0.20	0.39
2000	0.26	0.035	0.20	0.40

Source: Ministry of Finance, CZSO

2.2.4. Active labour market policies (ALMPs)[10]

The amount of government funds spent on active labour market policy programs per member of the labour force (ALMPs) captures the policies of district labour offices that aim to improve matching and hence reduce unemployment. If these programs are successful, this variable should have a positive impact on matching efficiency. A common explanation of low Czech unemployment rates *was the stance of ALMPs, in particular, their extensive use and an effective delivery system* (Boeri and Burda 1996, p.805). Boeri and Burda (1996) found that *estimates of an augmented matching function suggest a significant albeit small effect of ALMPs on flows from unemployment to jobs in the Czech Republic* (Boeri and Burda 1996, p.806). However, Munich et al. (1998) found that ALMPs have an insignificant role in matching.

ALMPs are distributed with a view towards the unemployment and vacancy situation in individual districts. As a result, districts with unfavourable labour market conditions and higher mismatch are likely to receive more funds. Therefore, this variable may absorb the effect of district characteristics that have a negative impact on matching efficiency but have not been included in this model. As a consequence, the estimated coefficient may be biased downwards (see OCDE (1995) chapter 3, appendix C, p. 100–101)[11]. Problems in measuring the effects of ALMPs also come from the crowding out phenomena and the dead weight loss. Through the crowding out phenomena, treatment may increase the job finding rate of "treated" workers but only at the expense of "non-treated" workers. Through dead weight loss, treated unemployed workers would have found a job even without treatment.

2.2.5. Distance to EU border

The logarithm of the distance from the district capital to the West German or Austrian border (ldis) aims to capture the ease with which the population can move to work in western countries. It was widely believed that low Czech

[10] Data on ALMP are available in three measures:

1. Total ALMPs expenditures, this is the measure used here.
2. Positions created with the assistance of PES (Public Employment Services
3. Person in ALMP programs. Either in public jobs financed by PES and local authorities (Publicly useful jobs –PUJ–) and beneficiaries of interest-free loans for new jobs creation (Social Purposeful Jobs –SPJ–).

Slovakia developed a similar programme, see van Ours (2000).
See Davia et al (2001) for a review of the effects of ALMPs in Spain.

[11] The appendix tackles different econometric estimates of the impact of labour market policies on job findings that corroborate this view.

unemployment until 1997 was due to the fact that Czech workers could participate in the German and Austrian labour markets. *In the border districts Cheb, Tachov, Domalice, Prachatice, Klatovy, and the Plzen region, legal cross border commuting accounted for up to 6% percent of employed residents in 1994* (see Burda and Profit 1996, p.80).[12] The Czech Republic seems to have benefited from the geographical proximity of the EU border in creating new employment opportunities. It is hypothesised that this variable has a negative effect on matching: The further the EU(15), the lower the matching efficiency.

2.2.6. Density of population

Density of population measures the average geographic proximity of agents in the labour market. The hypothesis is that geographic proximity has a positive effect on matching.

2.2.7 Sudeten Lands

A dummy variable is introduced to distinguish districts that fall into the Sudeten lands. They may have special characteristics in matching as they were depopulated after World War II when the German population was moved away from these regions to West Germany. During transition, property rights were less clearly established and labour market adjustment may differ in these regions.

2.2.8. Industry and agriculture

Industry and agriculture liberate resources, such as a labour force, that are to be implemented in new sectors. I use the ratio of the value of agricultural production to industrial production in 1990 (ia90). This variable is important for two reasons. On the one hand, it refers to initial conditions in the labour market. On the other hand, it can give evidence of whether having an agricultural background has a positive impact with respect to having an industrial one. A positive impact would mean that agricultural districts are more effective in matching than industrial ones.

Unemployment in transition countries is higher in rural than in urban areas. This is consistent with prevailing patterns of structural change in employment in Central and Eastern Europe: declining employment in agriculture and increasing employment in the private service sector concentrated in urban areas. The privatisation of state farms, the rationalisation of production in agricultural

[12] Erbenova (1995) suggests that up to ten percent of the total labour force in these districts works abroad.

co-operatives, which were largely overstaffed, and the collapse of trade with CMEA involve large-scale labour shedding in agriculture. However, agriculture has also been proved to be an alternative for the unemployed.

Regarding industry, due to the vertical concentration of economic activities, industry disguised service-type jobs, such as transport, distribution, repairs, and provision of food and services to workers (see Nesperova 1990 and Boeri and Keese 1992). The presence of disguised service employment in industry could have played a role in containing unemployment through job-to-job switches without unemployment experience in between. The hidden service sector may also increase the matching efficiency in industrial places with respect to agricultural ones due to the existence of workers with experience in the expanding service sector. However, most of the skills developed during communist times were useless for finding a job during transition. Indeed, changes within industry have been enormous. At the same time, the Czech Republic's rich industrial tradition, dating back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and concentrated in certain parts of Bohemia and Moravia, is likely to play an important role in the promotion of entrepreneurship (see OCDE 1994) and matching efficiency. However the backbone of this tradition was located in the aforementioned depopulated regions.

Apart from urban vs. rural areas, another important distinctive feature is one industry location vs. locations with different employment opportunities that very often, but not always, coincide with urban locations. Therefore, it is difficult to establish a hypothesis about the effect of the proportion of agricultural to industrial output in 1990 in district matching efficiency. Munich et al. (1998) introduced the same variable as I do here and found that during the period between 1992 and 1995 it had a negative but not significant effect on matching.

2.2.9. Sectors of activity

The geographical distribution of economic activities in the previous regime was based on highly specialised industrial sites. The lack of diversification of economic activities and the reliance on one or a few conglomerates, especially in small towns, was inherited from the past. Regional disparities were revealed during the transition and new ones were generated. Economic structure plays an important role in widening district differences and the resulting distribution of unemployment, vacancies, the number of unemployed persons per vacancy, and the way they interact in the matching function. Profit (1999) shows the importance of the industrial structures of Czech districts in increasing unemployment differences.

During the transition, the importance of each sector changed. In communist times the main one was heavy industry, which lost its importance, both as a percentage of national output and as a percentage of the labour force, as transition evolved. Industry and agriculture liberated resources and labour to be implemented in new sectors such as the service and new technology industries. *The sectors creating employment most rapidly were the ones that had not been considered important under communism: financial services, trade, and hotels and restaurants* (Sorm and Terrell, 1999a and 1999b, p. 1).

Data on output production or proportion of the labour force of each sector are not available at district level. To overcome the lack of data, I use the number of firms per member of the labour force of each of the following seven sectors: Industry, services 1[13], services 2, agriculture, transport, trade, construction. Variable ia90 has been omitted in the second specification to avoid collinearity.

As shown in Sorm and Terrell (1999), the Czech labour force has been very efficient in changing from old to new sectors, and, although many factors may have contributed to this positive labour market development, it is hypothesised that the effect of new sectors is positive: The more firms in new sectors, the more dynamic the district economy and the lower the mismatch. Most of these sectors are in private hands, are made up of new firms, and some have benefited from FDI. As a result, it is hypothesised that services, construction, transport, and trade have a positive effect on matching efficiency, agriculture has a negative one, and industry has an ambiguous effect because there are expanding and contracting sectors within industry. Manufacturing industry increased at the cost mainly of mining and quarrying. There have also been significant changes within manufacturing itself from raw materials and labour intensive industry to more sophisticated production. Foreign industries dominate technology driven industries. Regarding services, it is important to recall that banking and financial services, which increased their share of employment from 0.5% to 1.7% between 1991 and 1995 and continued increasing thereafter (see CERGE-EI Economic Review 1997, p. 51 and 2001, p.23), are included in services 2.[14]

[13] Services 1 includes: hotel, restaurants, and repair of vehicles and household goods. Services 2 includes: real estate, renting, finance, and other business activities.

[14] It is important to bear in mind that structural change from heavy industry and agriculture to more dynamic and future oriented sectors was very much influenced by the speed of market privatisation. In addition, new technology industries were closely linked to openness to foreign direct investment. In neither of these two realms was the Czech Republic a forerunner.

3. Estimation Results

The estimated parameters can be found in the Appendix. The main conclusion is that the efficiency factor of the matching function can give information about the functioning of labour markets. Apart from being a *Black Box* (see Petrongolo 2001, p.1) and a modelling device, the aggregate matching function can be considered as an empirical tool to shed light on how the aggregate matching process operates. It has been corroborated that the hazard models can be used as aggregated matching function microfoundations. Finally, the matching function is a very useful device for studying transforming labour markets and to know if government intervention is justified and to identify where it should focus.

Variables like service 2 and long term unemployment have a very clear effect on matching efficiency; the results are in accordance with what was hypothesised. The estimated effect of some other variables, such as ALMPs, is not clear. The presence of contradictory forces operating together and the complexity of the matching process in a transition environment make obtaining conclusions from several of the estimated parameters, such as the number of trade firms in proportion to the labour force, a task in which the existing literature regarding a variety of topics has to be taken into account.

Regarding the labour force educational levels, in model 1, whenever edu2 and edu3 are significant they have a positive impact. Comparing edu2 and edu3, the proportion of university educated population is only significant during the early stage of transition (1992, 1993, and 1994), while the proportion of the secondary educated is significant throughout the sample period. Furthermore, edu3 was higher than edu2 only in 1992. In model 2, once districts' economic structures have been introduced, edu2 is also only significant until 1995. In the second specification, the edu3 estimated parameter is larger than edu2 not only in 1992 but whenever they are significant. These findings give evidence of the following:

(1) The higher the educational composition of the labour force, the lower the mismatch.

(2) Both variables show decreasing significance levels; the effect of the 1991 educational structure explains matching efficiency until 1994–1995 (model 2). The reason is that, as shown by Jurajda (2005), there was a process of labour mobility and concentration of skills during transition. According to Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, the higher the mismatch the lower the v/u rate because it is more expensive to post and fill a vacancy. Firms set up in districts where it is

cheaper to find a skilled worker. At the same time, highly educated people move to big cities and more dynamic districts[15]. This is one of the dynamics behind increasing district differences that go hand in hand with educational structures of the labour force.

(3) According to Munich et al. (1999), skills possessed by the secondary educated were very useful throughout the transition. The positive effect of the proportion of secondary educated and university educated with respect to the proportion of lower levels is very clear; however, differences between edu2 and edu3 are not – their aggregate effect in matching efficiency is very similar. Probably the effect of being eligible is compensated by the reservation wage effect. Edu2 have flexible skills that make them attractive for new sectors. Edu3 have higher reservation wages enhanced by the increasing demand for this kind of worker, which increases their expected distribution of wage offers. In fact, although higher educational composition reduces mismatch, misdeveloped educational systems may create labour supply that does not fit into the labour demand, which would have the opposite impact. Underdevelopment of university education may also be behind this result.

(4) The matching function was specified without search-on-the-job and educational structure using proportions of the labour force. Higher educated workers are more likely than lower educated workers to search on the job and move from one job to another, without experiencing unemployment. The capacity of this variable to explain matching efficiency is in accordance with Profit's study (1999), which pointed out the importance of search-on-the-job. However, it is at odds with the assumption made in the first stage estimations above and that of Burda (1993), according to which search-on-the-job is not important during transition. The estimations corroborate that labour force, employed and unemployed workers, and their educational characteristics play a role in matching efficiency. Further evidence of the importance of search-on-the-job of employed workers as a source of increasing returns to scale will be the subject of future research.

(5) In this respect, political intervention should focus both on programs for low educated people and on investment in low educated districts that inherited a low educational labour force from communist times or are losing human capital in favour of other districts.

[15] However, it is important to note that the literature has found that mobility across sectors has been much stronger than mobility across regions. See Sorm and Terrell (1999a, b).

As hypothesised above, the effect of the proportion of the long term unemployed is always strong, significant, and negative. Its effect increased at the beginning of transition and after the 1997 crisis. Therefore, government intervention in the matching process should focus on avoiding long term unemployment. The two ways of entering long term unemployment should be taken into account. On the one hand, it can be due to dependence duration; the probability that the unemployed worker will find a job declines over time because he/she has lost his/her skills. In this case policy should prevent workers from being unemployed for a long time and encourage them to accept a job early on. On the other hand, there is heterogeneity among workers; there are workers who, owing to their characteristics (education, age, skills…), are more likely to suffer long unemployment spells. It is known that low educated workers are an important part of the Czech long term unemployment pool. To overcome the heterogeneity effect, policy should focus on the lower educated. In the approach followed here, it is not possible to obtain conclusions regarding the relative importance of skill mismatch, stigma, loss of skills and the disincentive effects of the welfare system. This should be a matter of future research.

The effect of the number of self-employed persons and firms with less than 25 employees was not significant at the early stage of the transition. However, from 1996 to 2000, when unemployment started to increase, it was significant but its estimated parameter was close to zero. Again, these kinds of firms seem to be a phenomenon of adverse labour market conditions. As stated above, an important part of the effect of this variable might have been absorbed by unemployment in the first stage estimation because self-employment has been an important way of leaving unemployment. Therefore, self-employment is one of the reasons behind high unemployment elasticities and IRTS. At this point it is important to recall that the increase in unemployment rate dispersion across districts has been accompanied by a decrease in the vacancy rate coefficient of variation and a decrease in the v/u relation ship standard deviation. Burda and Profit (1996) considered that as evidence for the emergence of decentralised small enterprises, which is in accordance with the above interpretation of the results obtained here.

As for ALMPs, it is still difficult to measure their effect. Sorm and Terrell, using micro data, (1998) found that ALMPs shortened the spells of the groups that tended to have longer unemployment durations. Boeri and Burda (1996) and OCDE (1995) found a small but significant and positive effect. Munich et al. (1998), introducing more variables, found a non-significant positive effect. Finally, I found a negative and significant effect. As the amount of money spent by the government in each district depends on the unemployment level, districts

with higher expenditures in ALMPs may have characteristics, not introduced in this model, that have a negative effect on outflow.

The distance of the district capital from the West German or Austrian (ldis) border has a negative effect on matching efficiency. The further the district capital is from the EU border the lower the matching efficiency.

Density of population seems to have a very small (close to zero) and always significant effect on matching efficiency. This result supports the idea that it may have a quadratic form. The hypothesis was that geographic proximity has a positive effect on matching; however, above a certain level the positive effect may decrease. Even too high a density of population might have a negative impact.

The differences that the variable sud (being part of the Suddeten lands) was supposed to capture are far from clear. This variable is significant in the second specification but not in the first one.

The effect of agricultural with respect to industrial output was not significant at the beginning of transition; however, the significance level increased after the 1997 crisis. It has a positive sign but is close to zero; therefore former agricultural districts were more effective than former industrial ones, especially after the crisis, but the difference is very low. It can be considered as a consequence of the speed-up of industry restructuring during and after the 1997 crisis. In that case, workers losing their jobs in districts with old industries were having trouble finding a job in the new expanding sectors. Workers' mismatch between communist agriculture and transition agriculture is lower than the mismatch between communist heavy industry and transition industry. The difference, however, is very small.

Regarding the number of firms by sectors with respect to labour force, adjusted R^2 increases in model 2; it better explains district differences in matching efficiency than model 1. Therefore, district economic structures are important in matching efficiency. Most of them have the expected effect. Service 2 is always significant and positive, reflecting the increasing aforementioned importance of the financial sector. Service 1 is not significant most of the time. Although service1 is a new sector, it does not imply any effect in mismatch, either positive or negative. Construction and transport are always positive and significant. Industry is never significant; it is composed of declining and expanding sectors and the two effects may compensate each other. Agriculture is not significant at the beginning of the transition, but its level of significance increases from 1996

to 2000, and it has explanatory power and a positive sign. This is in accordance with the estimated parameters for ia90 in model 1. Both results are in line with the common idea that agriculture has been an escape for many unemployed workers. The higher the number of firms in new sectors with respect to the labour force, with the exception of trade, the more efficient the matching function. Trade displays a persistent negative effect. Considering that many new small firms created in high unemployment districts are concentrated in the trade sector, and that self employment is often a phenomenon linked to adverse conditions, this variable may capture district characteristics not included in the model that have a negative impact on matching.

According to Sorm and Terrel (1999), about half of the people that change jobs also change their sector of employment. Therefore, the Czech labour force has proved to be very flexible and efficient in changing from old to new sectors. It can be concluded that mismatch has more to do with education, unemployment spells, and LTU characteristics than with sectors.

4. Conclusions

The main conclusions obtained are the following. Firstly, the first stage shows that the matching function exists and that it displays IRTS that are a necessary condition for multiple equilibria that would support Pareto-improving government intervention in the search process. Strong positive externalities in the search process displayed by the unemployed, the fact that UCS do not have strong effects on lengthening unemployment, and Boeri and Terrell's (2002) finding regarding UCS as an important source encouraging self-employment are in accordance with the second stage conclusions: small firms in the trade sector are an alternative in districts with worse conditions and one of the sources of strong positive externalities of the unemployed in the search process.

Secondly, district characteristics regarding the educational composition of the labour force and economic structures, defined as the number of firms per member of the labour force in different sectors, are able to explain differences in matching efficiency across districts.

Thirdly, the duration of unemployment spells, especially long term unemployment, plays a very important role and should be avoided in reform processes. The special characteristics of LTU should be taken into account in Optimal Speed of Transition (OST) models. Looking at the Czech experience, it is clear that

the gradual phasing out of the state sector is not enough to avoid long term unemployment. Fourthly, apart from the speed of transition, the types of workers freed by the closure of the state sector should be taken into account, especially if the workers entering unemployment are low educated and live in districts where new sectors have not been developed. Whatever the speed of transition, it seems a very strong assumption to think that *at optimal speed of state sector demolition, significant LTU does not arise because jobs in the new sector are being created at a pace that balances the rate of decline of the old sector* (Jurajda and Terrell 2002, p. 1). This is true especially in the case of a low educated person searching for a job in a context where new sectors are posting vacancies in another district and there is *imperfect regulation in areas like housing markets, transportation infrastructure, capital market, corporate governance, legal framework, and business environment* (Svejnar 2002, p. 2).

Fifthly, the flow approach that has been followed here shows how the "*cleansing effects"* (Burda 1993, p. 106)[16] of transition transformation and recession operate. The process of restructuring, closing of factories, and the displacement of large numbers of workers produces a pool of workers that is far from homogeneous. Although some of them with flexible skills are able to find jobs in expanding sectors after changing occupations, industry, or location, some others are unable to find their place in the new environment. The aggregate effect is reflected in the matching efficiency through the negative impact of LTU and the low educated proportion of the labour force. A matter of further research should be to identify the relative importance of the aggregate disincentive effect of the welfare system, preventing a downward wage adjustment and increasing reservation wages of LTU, and the effect of educational mismatch and stigma. Hazard models have given evidence of the importance of education but not of the disincentive effect of unemployment benefits and the welfare system.

Finally, it is not clear whether ALMPs have been effective or not. Regional-district level programmes focusing on education and the development of new sectors could have a positive impact on matching efficiency and outflow from unemployment aiming to narrow the gap between developed and less favourable districts.

Other variables, which are not available at district level, may explain matching efficiency. For example, it is necessary to test whether FDI, which increases the demand for skilled workers, also increases wage inequality and that, although

[16] See Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) and Burda (1993) that stated that *after four decades of socialism, a severe bout of spring cleaning was sorely needed.*

it increases employment, it is not likely to contribute to the alleviation of structural unemployment present in certain regions as described in Driffield and Taylor (2000). In this context, government labour market and educational policies, supported by matching function estimations, in cooperation with FDI, may be decisive. In light of the results obtained above regarding economic structures, and considering that FDI is not likely to be placed in districts where it would be very costly to find skilled workers, it seems plausible to believe that FDI increases district differences. FDI consequences regarding within country inequality may be related to the aforementioned concentration of skills and resources.

However, FDI, aiming to hire "adequate" labour supply may also concentrate in less developed regions. Another variable could be the informal sector of the economy. It is an important characteristic of transition economies. According to Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, the availability of revenues coming from the informal sector may have an effect on search intensity. The Research Institute of the Ministry of Labour estimated that in 1994 between 200,000 and 350,000 persons were engaged in some kind of unrecorded activity. Finally, the OCDE (see OCDE 1994 and 1999) has recommended the computerisation of employment agencies and job advertising as the most cost-effective ALMP. Different channels used by job seekers (newspapers, job agencies, internet use…) during their search may have an impact on matching efficiency. Evidence has been found in other countries that employment offices are more effective than newspaper advertisements (see Lindeboom et al. 1994).

Increasing within-country differences are a common feature of transforming economies. However, comparing different units of the same country has the disadvantage of the lack of data. At the same time, the need to study short periods of time makes the use of panel data necessary, but comparing different countries is often criticised because they are subject to different policies. The compilation of district or regional data in transforming economies would be a useful tool for political advice on labour market regulations and government intervention.

Appendix I Second Stage estimations

1992	Model 1			Model 2		
Variable	coefficient	t	significance	coefficient	t	significance
ldis	-0.104	-3.42	0.001			
edu2	7.109	3.53	0.000			
edu3	8.763	2.67	0.008			
ia90	0.045	1.66	0.097			
sud	0.297	5.26	0.000			
dens	-0.0006	-5.37	0.000			
LTUpmlf	-22.916	-13.26	0.000			
ALMPpmlf	-1.550	-10.74	0.000			
e	-	-	-	n.a		
industry	-	-	-	n.a		
service1	-	-	-	n.a		
service2	-	-	-	n.a		
agriculture	-	-	-	n.a		
transport	-	-	-	n.a		
trade	-	-	-	n.a		
construction	-	-	-	n.a		
constant	-8.880	-26.06	0.000			
Adj R^2	0.445					

1993	Model 1			Model 2		
Variable	coefficient	t	significance	coefficient	t	significance
ldis	-0.178	-4.45	0.000	-0.190	-4.76	0.000
edu2	11.306	4.29	0.000	8.138	3.04	0.003
edu3	9.502	2.21	0.027	15.803	3.42	0.001
ia90	0.023	0.66	0.511	-	-	-
sud	0.250	3.37	0.001	0.326	4.19	0,000
dens	-0.001	-6.25	0.000	-0.0007	-4.57	0.000
LTUplf	-30.846	-13.63	0.000	-50.300	-15.22	0.000
ALMPpmlf	-2.011	-10.64	0.000	-2.104	-6.62	0.000
e	-	-	-	-1.71e-6	-0.87	0.387
industry	-	-	-	-0.00004	-0.25	0.803
service1	-	-	-	5.374	2.57	0.010
service2	-	-	-	42.652	4.91	0.000
agriculture	-	-	-	-2.084	-0.85	0.397
transport	-	-	-	8.344	4.58	0.000
trade	-	-	-	-6.482	-2.73	0.007
construction	-	-	-	-0.390	-0.09	0.930
constant	-11.085	-24.84	0.000	-10.931	-23.69	0.000
Adj R^2	0.452			0.629		

1994	Model 1			Model 2		
Variable	**coefficient**	**t**	**significance**	**coefficient**	**t**	**significance**
ldis	-0.255	-3.86	0.000	-0.256	-3.89	0.000
edu2	18.791	4.32	0.000	13.656	3.09	0.002
edu3	13.375	1.89	0.059	21.950	2.88	0.004
ia90	0.107	1.81	0.071	-	-	-
sud	0.364	2.98	0.003	0.573	4.47	0.000
dens	-0.001	-6.57	0.000	-0.001	-4.06	0.000
LTUplf	-52.744	-14.13	0.000	-82.373	-15.13	0.000
ALMPpmlf	-3.335	-10.70	0.000	-3.461	-6.61	0.000
e	-	-	-	-3.84e-6	-1.18	0.239
industry	-	-	-	-0.0001	-0.53	0.599
service1	-	-	-	6.340	1.84	0.066
service2	-	-	-	75.055	5.25	0.000
agriculture	-	-	-	2.502	0.62	0.537
transport	-	-	-	10. 576	4.29	0.000
trade	-	-	.-	-1.234	-3.38	0.001
construction	-	-	-	8.378	1.15	0.249
constant	-18.640	-25.32	0.000	18.784	-24.71	0.000
Adj R^2	0.455			0.631		

1995	Model 1			Model 2		
Variable	**coefficient**	**t**	**significance**	**coefficient**	**t**	**significance**
ldis	-0.210	-3.01	0.003	-1.827	-2.63	0.009
edu2	12.196	2.67	0.008	6.260	1.34	0.180
edu3	4.383	0.59	0.556	9.900	1.23	0.219
ia90	0.117	1.88	0.060	-	-	-
sud	0.177	1.38	0.167	0.464	3.43	0.001
dens	-0.001	-6.33	0.000	-0.001	-3.45	0.001
LTUplf	-58.706	-14.96	0.000	-89.197	-15.52	0.000
ALMPpmlf	-3.624	-11.06	0.000	-3.994	-7.22	0.000
e	-	-	-	-4.43e-6	-1.29	0.198
industry	-	-	-	-0.0001	-0.43	0.666
service1	-	-	-	2.727	0.75	0.454
service2	-	-	-	78.165	5.17	0.000
agriculture	-	-	-	7.014	1.64	0.102
transport	-	-	-	10.235	4.21	0.000
trade	-	-	-	-4.490	-3.50	0.001
construction	-	-	-	10.293	1.34	0.180
constant	-16.670	-21.54	0.000	-16.988	-21.17	0.000
Adj R^2	0.435			0.612		

1996	Model 1			Model 2		
Variable	coefficient	t	significance	coefficient	t	significance
ldis	-0.190	-3.18	0.002	-0.156	-2.61	0.009
edu2	10.111	2.59	0.010	3.694	0.92	0.358
edu3	4.954	0.78	0.436	5.126	0.74	0.460
ia90	0.095	1.8	0.073	-	-	-
sud	0.008	0.08	0.935	0.291	2.51	0.013
dens	-0.001	-6.52	0.000	-0.0007	-3.15	0.002
LTUplf	-50.112	-14.94	0.000	-75.184	-15.20	0.000
ALMPpmlf	-3.070	-10.97	0.000	-3.401	-7.15	0.000
e	-	-	-	-6.38e-6	-2.16	0.031
industry	-	-	-	-0.00001	0.06	0.953
service1	-	-	-	-0.230	-0.07	0.942
service2	-	-	-	71.931	5.53	0.000
agriculture	-	-	-	8.003	2.17	0.030
transport	-	-	-	4.320	4.22	0.000
trade	-	-	-	-3.681	-3.84	0.000
construction	-	-	-	10.052	1.52	0.129
constant	-14.79	-22.38	0.000	-15.074	-21.82	0.000
Adj R^2	0.443			0.611		

1997	Model 1			Model 2		
Variable	coefficient	t	significance	coefficient	t	significance
ldis	-0.146	-2.74	0.006	-0.124	-2.33	0.020
edu2	9.377	2.68	0.007	3.339	0.93	0.351
edu3	5.648	0.99	0.322	4.103	0.66	0.507
ia90	0.117	2.44	0.015	-	-	-
sud	-0.006	-0.07	0.948	0.262	2.52	0.012
dens	0.001	-6.97	0.000	-0.007	-3.16	0.002
LTUplf	-42.954	-14.31	0.000	-63.660	-14.44	0.000
ALMPpmlf	-2.610	-10.42	0.000	-0.638	-6.22	0.000
e	-	-	-	-7.85e-6	-2.98	0.003
industry	-	-	-	0.00001	0.07	0.945
service1	-	-	-	-1.787	-0.64	0.522
service2	-	-	-	72.419	6.25	0.000
agriculture	-	-	-	8.079	2.46	0.014
transport	-	-	-	10.355	5.29	0.000
trade	-	-	-	-4.361	-4.53	0.000
construction	-	-	-	8.872	1.51	0.132
constant	-14.780	-24.98	0.000	-15.158	-24.62	0.000
Adj R^2	0.443			0.615		

1998	Model 1			Model 2		
Variable	**coefficient**	**t**	**significance**	**coefficient**	**t**	**significance**
ldis	-0.131	-2.74	0.0006	-0.111	-2.33	0.020
edu2	8.548	2.73	0.0006	3.210	1.00	0.316
edu3	5.112	1.00	0.316	3.855	0.70	0.486
ia90	0.103	2.40	0.017	-	-	-
sud	-0.015	-0.17	0.866	0.226	2.43	0.015
dens	-0.001	-6.87	0.000	-0.006	-3.13	0.002
LTUplf	-38.709	-14.41	0.000	-57.325	-14.53	0.000
ALMPpmlf	-2.347	-10.46	0.000	-2.374	-6.25	0.000
e	-	-	-	-6.62e-6	2.81	0.005
industry	-	-	-	0.00002	0.13	0.898
service1	-	-	-	-1.689	-0.68	0.499
service2	-	-	-	64.25	6.20	0.000
agriculture	-	-	-	7.312	2.49	0.013
transport	-	-	-	9.303	5.25	0.000
trade	-	-	-	-2.729	-4.48	0.000
construction	-	-	-	8.068	1.53	0.126
constant	-13.116	-24.80	0.000	-13.484	-24.47	0.000
Adj R^2	0.442			0.614		

1999	Model 1			Model 2		
Variable	**coefficient**	**t**	**significance**	**coefficient**	**t**	**significance**
ldis	-0.215	-2.69	0.007	-0.186	-2.33	0.020
edu2	15.087	2.88	0.004	6.417	1.20	0.231
edu3	9.388	1.10	0.272	7.465	0.81	0.419
ia90	0.156	2.18	0.029	-	-	-
sud	-0.040	-0.27	0.784	0.368	2.37	0.018
dens	-0.002	-6.39	0.000	-0.0009	-2.93	0.004
LTUplf	-66.024	-14.68	0.000	-97.259	-14.75	0.000
ALMPpmlf	-4.02	-10.71	0.000	-4.200	-6.620	0.000
e	-	-	-	-9.06e-6	-2.30	0.022
industry	-	-	-	0.0002	0.57	0.57
service1	-	-	-	-3.404	-0.82	0.415
service2	-	-	-	104.8	6.05	0.0000
agriculture	-	-	-	12.448	2.54	0.012
transport	-	-	-	15.678	5.09	0.000
trade	-	-	-	-2.289	-4.49	0.000
construction	-	-	-	15.197	1.73	0.085
constant	-20.490	-23.11	0.000	-21.088	-22.91	0.000
Adj R^2	0.437			0.624		

2000	Model 1			Model 2		
Variable	**coefficient**	**t**	**significance**	**coefficient**	**t**	**significance**
ldis	-0.240	-2.74	0.006	-0.207	-2.37	0.018
edu2	15.918	2.76	0.006	6.133	1.04	0.297
edu3	9.662	1.03	0.303	7.305	0.72	0.471
ia90	0.182	2.31	0.021	-	-	-
sud	-0.016	-0.10	0.919	0.426	2.5	0.013
dens	-0.002	-6.69	0.0000	-0.001	-3.06	0.0002
LTUplf	-71.682	-14.52	0.0000	-105.912	-14.63	0.0000
ALMPpmlf	-4.371	-10.61	0.0000	-4.513	-6.48	0.0000
e	-	-	-	-0.00001	-2.65	0.008
industry	-	-	-	0.0001	0.33	0.741
service1	-	-	-	-3.267	-0.71	0.476
service2	-	-	-	117.158	6.16	0.0000
agriculture	-	-	-	13.241	2.46	0.0014
transport	-	-	-	19.218	5.17	0.0000
trade	-	-	-	-3.532	-4.52	0.0000
construction	-	-	-	15.851	1.64	0.101
constant	-23.319	-23.96	0.0000	-23.935	23.68	0.000
Adj R^2	0.440			0.615		

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Co-nationhood and Co-nationship: Towards a New Research Framework

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Abstract:

This paper aims to put nationhood in a new perspective. Taking its starting point in the reality of divided nationhood exemplified in numerous post-conflict states and engaging in a critical manner with the existing narratives of nationhood, it is argued that there is a need to frame a new research approach to nationhood that takes into consideration aspects of co-nationhood and co-nationship in divided societies. The purpose is thus programmatic in that it is explored how a research framework might be conceptualized in spheres of societal relations, such as religion, language, history, culture, education, the economy, etc. The theoretical approach suggested for such a research framework draws on philosophical traditions of Kant, on post-structural approaches to constitutionalism and democracy as well as Luhman's social theory of communication. A new concept of 'openings of openness' is thus presented as a paradigm for ethical co-nationship in divided societies and a relevant tool in researching post-conflict state and nation building.

Keywords: *nationhood, divided societies, post-conflict states, agonistic respect, contingency, alterity, de-essentialized culture, ethical co-nationship*

Introduction

Political arrangements no matter how democratic in design do not guarantee sustainability in terms of ethical co-existence to sub-national groups, such as traditional national minorities in deeply divided societies.[1] Finding ways of living together in an ethically manner across sub-nation boundaries requires what Michael Keating has called "a philosophy that binds them together and gives them a democratic rationale" (2001: 171). Although Belgium is a democracy, it is considered a fragile example of a state of sub-nations (Kymlicka, 1995; Keating, 1988). Bosnia and Herzegovina is a non-functioning democracy of constituent sub-nations, and Iraq is courting an idea of 'anarchic consociationalism,' meaning a power-sharing arrangement that incorporates power struggles as part of its constitutive pathos.

[1] Traditional national minorities are those 'groups who formed functioning societies on their historical homelands prior to being incorporated into a larger state' (Kymlicka, 1995). More specifically, national minorities are a type of minorities who are *autochthonous*. While not entirely uncontroversial, the term autochthonous refers to a minority that is native to a particular region, in this case certain regions of Europe that were once either independent or belonged to a neighbouring state. The autochthonous minority's present minority status is a result of incorporation into a larger political unit or the change of borders after major conflicts in modern times. Most notably this has happened after major bellicose conflicts, such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I and II but also after the break-up of the USSR. National minorities of autochthonous status in Europe are in essence the groups that have inadvertently found themselves "on the wrong side of the border" (Malloy, 2005) They include, but are not limited to, Hungarians in Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, Serbia and the Ukraine; Turks in Bulgaria and the Balkans; Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia; Rusyns, Russians, Romanians, Slovaks, and Belarussians in the Ukraine; Moravians in the Czech Republic; German speaking Austrians in northern Italy; Italians in southern Austria and Slovenia; Germans in southern Denmark; Danes in northern Germany, and Russians in the Baltic states. While the territorial criterion for the autochthonous status of most of these groups is usually quite clear, the criterion of time is less so. Whereas the Hungarians had been in the Danube basin for many centuries prior to the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russians in the Baltic states have migrated fairly recently. But they were migrating within the territory of their own state much the same way the Turkish people had migrated into Bulgaria and other parts of the Balkans. Hence, the elimination of empires resulted in national groups residing away from what became their "nation-state" due to the change of borders within which they had at some point migrated. Autochthonous national minorities also include other "old" minorities, such as the Bretons in France, the Basques and the Catalans in Spain, the Welsh, the Scots and the Irish in the United Kingdom. In fact, these autochthonous national minorities might well be seen as autochthonous in a stronger sense inasmuch as they have been national groups attached to territory over an even longer period and some of which have held independence at one time. Except perhaps for the Scots, most of these national minorities did not choose to become minorities. Moreover, their members did not choose to belong to their respective minority.

Whether democratic or not, sub-nations rarely profess to the same religion or the same history. Usually they speak different languages, read different literature, worship different heroes and indeed are at odds in defining their territory (Claude, 1955; Laponce, 1960; Sigler, 1983; Van Dyke, 1985; Kymlicka, 1995; Jackson Preece, 1998; Vieytez, 1999). Few accounts describe how national minorities should live together ethically in a deeply divided setting. Whether democratic or not, it is usually assumed that to co-exist peacefully sub-nations must overcome particularism and submit to universalism (Barry, 2001). That not only begs the question of what constitutes co-nationhood[2] but also assumes that co-nationship[3] must be antagonistic in deeply divided societies.

Exceptions exist of course. James Tully offers "contemporary constitutionalism" based on ethical 'conventions' for deeply divided societies (1995: 183). This is a notion that preserves freedom and belonging as public goods. Onora O'Neill has offered a "revisionary" Kantian theory of cosmopolitan concern for the Other through critical practical reasoning (1996). And William Connolly offers "agonistic democracy" through contingent identity formation that fosters critical responsiveness about difference and extends agonistic respect toward the Other while maintaining a 'pathos of distance' (1991/2002; 1995). These are theories that help us take the first step toward an ethical account of co-nationship through a problematization of essentialist views.

In contradistinction to these theories, the general understanding of nationhood impedes these philosophical accounts by offering impoverished accounts of nationhood (Miller, 1995; Tamir, 1993; Barry, 2000). Except for Keating's theory of plurinational democracy, most theories of nationhood are statist and essentialist in terms of their characterization of structure and agency. Only lately have theorists begun to de-essentialize the processes and practices of nationhood. The practices of nationhood are, in particular, key to our sociological understanding of how we read individual ethical action. David Campbell argues for the need to analyze practices of nationhood in terms of face-to-face encounters (1998). Niklas Luhmann offers an opportunity to read face-to-face encounters with his theory of social communication which provides an innovative perspective on the way in which individual actions and

[2] Nationhood is used in this article in terms of the ontological nature and institutional arrangements that characterize a national group. Co-nationhood refers thus to the existence of such deriving from two or more national groups within one sovereign territory.

[3] Nationship refers in this article to the institution of citizenship as a set of ethics and norms used in inter-human relations within the national group. Co-nationship refers therefore to the idea that two types of citizenship co-exist within one national territory.

their outcome are to be interpreted in times of social change (1986). An eclectic approach is, therefore, needed to take nationhood theory to the micro-level of ethical inter-action.

The need to develop a new research framework thus emerges from some of the arguments about nationhood that have informed our present day understanding of nationhood. With this in mind, the aim of this paper is to take Keating's theory of plurinational democracy a step further in the quest for a philosophy of ethics that binds deeply divided societies through an agonistic notion of co-nationship fostered between sub-national groups, such as national minorities. The basic assumption thus follows Keating in that ontological co-nationhood is a phenomenon that is not going to go away (2001). It is necessary to accept sub-nation groups as an analytical category of democratic political institutions holding equal but shared value in a single state.

The term "co-nation" is used here synonymous with sub-national group, plurinational unit, federal or union-state, or any other well-known and approved classification in the field of state systems (Malloy, 2005: 38–39). But in contradistinction to these terms, co-nation implies ethical standing based on equal status irrespective of numbers. The significance of this term as opposed to any other offered in the literature is that it seeks to show ethical standing to the sub-nation group with regard to moral and social recognition (Honneth, 1995). This is not to say that in the constitutional arrangement of a state any of the above mentioned terms should not be used. It is not an aim of this paper to engage with constitutional lawyers or political institutionalists about state-minority arrangements. In fact, co-nation may even be used for national minorities who do not have separate institutions with decentralised powers.

Co-nationship thus adopts Connolly's contention that a non-essentializing view of individual identity allows human beings to become open toward the Other even under seemingly irreconcilable circumstances (1991/2002), if not on a permanent basis at least from time to time when circumstances offer the opportunity. Contingent conditions produced in deeply divided society may allow individuals to take actions that communicate ethical but agonistic openness toward the Other. Finally, co-nationship applies Luhmann theory in that it is not the intent and event of human inter-action but the result of the event in terms of social communication that is important (1986). Such contingent communications may be called, 'openings of openness' as they allow individuals to step into an ethical condition of human agency while also maintaining a distance.

The overall goal of this paper is thus to inform nationhood theory with an emerging concept of ethical co-nationship as a practice based on 'openings of openness'. The specific purpose is programmatic. The paper seeks to draw up a new research framework on co-nationhood practices which takes into account the ethical framework of openness based on agonistic respect while interpreting openings from a sociological and communication perspective. This will be attempted through a critical review of the prevailing nationhood theory offered in some of the current literature followed by a proposal for a research framework.

The review begins by putting the idea of 'openings of openness' in perspective. Section one offers a few empirical examples of the type of stories that inspired this pursuit. The events of 'openings of openness' offered are related to Luhmann's concept of communication and to Campbell's argument about face-to-face encounters. In the following section, a brief overview of Connolly's theory of agonistic respect is offered in order to show that 'openings of openness' happening on a contingent basis may be interpreted as a form of respect that goes beyond mere toleration. On the background of this, section three surveys the prevailing literature on nationhood theory with specific focus on the practices of nationhood. Arriving at a few key observations and concepts useful for the analysis of nationhood practices, the fourth section sets out to frame a new research agenda which might provide parameters for the empirical research needed to identify 'openings of openness' in deeply divided societies. The section argues that a number of spheres of societal relations could be examined in terms of 'openings of openness,' including religion, language, history, culture, education, the economy, the environment, and more.

Due to space constraints, the discussion is limited to a brief commentary on the spheres of religion, language, the economy and the environment. The conclusion highlights the assumption that in co-nation settings there will be no "constitutive tensions" (Taylor, 2001). Indeed, this is a given even where co-nations live quite separate lives. On the contrary, the main argument is that no matter how divided a society is, 'openings of openness' should be seen as a relevant part of such a conflict mode, as they are the 'glue' that creates the conditions of possibility of ethical co-nationship in co-nation states.

Nationhood and communication

In Cyprus, the immediate weeks after the 2004 negative referendum in the Republic of Cyprus on the Annan Plan to reunited Cyprus witnessed great disappointment among the Greek Cypriot voters who had voted in favour of the Annan Plan in their own referendum. Inhabitants of the electoral district of Derinya, which was settled mainly by the former inhabitants of a section of Famagusta called Varosha situated in the northern part of the ethnically divided island vowed that they would approach the Turkish Cypriot leadership and seek the right to return under Turkish Cypriot administration. In return, the Turkish Cypriot administration of Famagusta with the support of the Turkish Cypriot leadership proposed the return of the former residents of Varosha under a possible UN mandate. Moreover, before the referenda, the Turkish Cypriot Mayor of Famagusta, Oktay Kayalp and the Greek Cypriot designated-Mayor, Yiannakis Skordis had met from time to time usually under the aegis of the Chamber of Architects and Engineers to discuss matters of resolution. During the meetings the Municipal Councils of both communities, as well as NGOs participated. Both sides agreed in principle that Famagusta should be a bi-communal city.[4]

Similarly, when political relations finally began to defrost after years of physical separation of Cyprus, the leaders on both sides of the divided island requested international assistance with the emotionally charged and difficult issue of reconstructing cemeteries (UNDP, 2005).[5] Since 1963, Turkish Cypriot cemeteries in the southern part of Cyprus and Greek Cypriot cemeteries in the northern part have been neglected and damaged. For Cypriots now returning to their homes for the first time in thirty years, it was devastating to find that the burial places of their loved ones were in ruins or had disappeared. On both sides of the divide, political leaders showed willingness to soften the hard-nosed division.
In Kosovo, during a time when the town of Mitrovica in the Serb dominated

[4] Information provided by the Turkish Cypriot Mayor during a research project conducted by the author n July/August 2004

[5] A UNDP/UNOPS brokered pilot project implemented between 2003 and 2005, The Cypress Tree Project with the aim to provide an opportunity for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to rehabilitate cemeteries that had been inaccessible to them for many years was initiated. The project developed an inventory of all Greek Cypriot cemeteries in the north and Turkish Cypriot cemeteries in the south using a range of information sources including official records, staff visits, and engaging the public through a hotline with numbers for both communities and an interactive questionnaire on a website to capture living memory. The project supported the development of proposals by communities for protecting and/or rehabilitating cemeteries and carried out restoration work on five cemeteries. A database of existing cemeteries was completed, with 190 Turkish Cypriot cemeteries in the south and 151 Greek Cypriot cemeteries in the north identified and included.

North was going through a process of hardened division, with KFOR restricting movement across the bridges over the Ibar river running through the city and male Serbs forming a paramilitary force, Oliver Ivanovic, the leader of the Bridge Watchers – a self-established group to defend against Albanian encroachment into Serb areas of town – met weekly with the KLA-designated Albanian mayor, Bajram Rexhepi (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2005). Later, on the eve of independence, the now Mayor Rexhepi of Mitrovica worked hard to calm Albanian teenagers in the mixed Bosniak *mahala* (neighbourhood) just north of the Ibar river which divides the town. He dissuaded residents there from displaying Albanian flags, and he established telephone contact with a Serb leader in north Mitrovica, Nebojsa Jovic, to explain this and pledge co-operation on managing security over the following days (ICG, 2008).

That contact breed further interaction was evident during a recent private dialogue initiative, during which north Mitrovica Serbs concurred that the lack of city-wide media was a problem. When Serbs learned to their surprise that electricity cut-offs also caused difficulties for Albanians they began discussing the city's common problems and supported development of the dialogue (ICG, 2005). Moreover, a Serb owner of a construction company close to the inter-communal divide in Mitrovica recently observed that Albanians have begun coming to him for work. "They have stopped caring altogether who I am and started focusing fully on the business" the owner said (ICG, 2005). Business and leisure have furthermore a way of bringing divided groups together (Bilefsky, 2007). Ivan Milosavljevic, who owns a ski lodge in the town of Brezovica in the mountainous and largely Serb dominated region of Strpce in northern Kosovo, hosts Albanian guests every winter and is happy to share a drink with them. In the same town, Orlo Jovanovic has taken pork off the menu of his restaurant in order to please the Albanians who come to ski. Indeed, Serbs and Albanians get stuck together in the ski-lift during power failures and apparently still get down the slopes in a peaceful manner. When asked how this is possible, many answer that they are "tired of hating," and skiing is more important than residual ethnic tensions (Bilefsky, 2007).

This type of stories confirms David Campbell's commanding argument about the practices of nationhood in face-to-face encounters (1998). In his analysis of nationhood in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, Campbell argues that in the most difficult circumstances individuals exercised the capacity for ongoing and ever present judgement, evaluation and indeed discrimination (Campbell, 1998: 2). In those moments of judgement, individuals are just as likely to exhibit ethical standing of the Other by overflowing the categories and containments of the dominant narratives of nationalistic identity politics as they are to offer chauvinistic and xenophobic accounts. Thus, a rethinking is required in our

understanding of inter-ethnic conflicts and the way in which we approach the issues of ethnicity, politics, and responsibility. According to Campbell, we must therefore learn to appreciate the compelling demand of face-to-face encounters and analyze the alterity that makes ethical judgements possible.

Niklas Luhmann's theory of societal complexity offers an innovative perspective on the way in which individual actions and their outcomes are to be interpreted (1986).[6] In Luhmann's view, it is not what individual people do or say that informs our understanding of the world and thus social change, but the outcome of their actions and communications (King and Thornhill 2003: 11–18). Only those actions and utterances, which make sense to other people, are valid in terms of his analysis of agency. Thus, Luhmann distinguishes between interaction and communication in terms of fostering understanding among interlocutors.

Interaction refers to the informal exchange of views between individuals whereas communication refers to the products of the social system, i.e. synthesis of information, utterance and understanding. The analytical focus is thus not on the individual but on the piece of communication that is emitted by the individual or groups of individuals. Acts and gestures can be part of communication provided that they can be understood, and utterances can be both verbal and non-verbal. Moreover, Luhmann is not complacent about communications. Unlike many deliberative democrats, his view of communication does not suppose consensus. Three issues are central to his concept of *effective* communication, as described below.

Firstly, there is meaning. According to Luhmann, meaning can only be understood in context, i.e. the context that each individual is supplied. Secondly, effective communication is dependent on transmission. At a maximum, communication can only reach those who are present in space and time. Thirdly, effective communication is dependent on success, i.e. not only must the communication be understood by the recipients, it must also be accepted. It is thus not only a question of distortion and misunderstanding as many critiques of deliberative democracy would have it. It is therefore a question of transmitting back to the transmitter an acceptance (Luhman, 1986; King and Thornhill, 2003: 11–18).

Luhmann's theory is very sophisticated, and it is beyond the aim and scope of this paper to give an even remotely accurate description of his full theory. Nevertheless, the core tenet about communication may be instructive for the

6 My examination of Luhmann's theory relies on King and Thornhill (2003).

purposes of the analysis presented in this paper. Luhmann's social theory abandons altogether the idea of a body politic with each part contributing to the well-being of the whole. To Luhmann, social functions are a product of self-description rather than some external model indicating how society operates or should operate. In being self-descriptive, societies divide themselves into social functions through a differentiation of specialist activities rather than naturally balanced institutions which when dis-functional create chaos or anarchy. This way Luhmann is able to explain social change and actually make social change a continuous event in society. The focus is thus not on people, their actions and their beliefs but on the products of these. His theory is not, however, anti-human but holds that understanding society cannot be reduced to seeing society as a collection of individuals who possess a consciousness (King and Thornhill, 2003: 11–18).

To Luhmann, people's consciousness and communication must be kept separate because the thoughts of people cannot be observed but their communications can. Social change happens because 'every decision changes the world in some way and millions of decisions are made every day' (King and Thornhill, 2003: 34). On this view, social change is not managed, controlled and predicted but is simply contingent in nature. This means that when something happens, a decision is made which gives rise to further decisions the outcome of which is change. Change is thus a result of choices, selections and rejections, and the decisions that made the change happen are nothing more than attempts to give meaning to contingent occurrences. A contingent occurrence is therefore an event which is neither necessary nor impossible.

Nationhood and contingency

In the previous section I argued that 'openings' are the contingent occurrences, and 'openness' is when the communication is understood and accepted by all parties to the contingent occurrences of interaction. Contingent means that openings are conditioned, and occurrences refer to events, such as human interaction but not only human interaction. Moreover, the problem with 'openness', i.e. the successful outcome of a communication is that 'openness' may have many shades of positivity. On a highly positive notion the successful communication may actually communicate acceptance in terms of recognition, whereas on a less positive notion acceptance may only amount to a certain degree of respect. A communication that emits tolerance is antagonistic and would not be considered successful because it does not involve understanding and acceptance. The successful outcome of a communication is thus also

contingent. In short, contingency determines not only our actions but also our understanding. Contingency is therefore constitutive of individual being.

According to William E. Connolly contingency is a fundamental link between identity and difference. Connolly's politics of identity\difference presupposes that all identities are contingent and only the acceptance of contingency can lead to an ethos of democracy where one becomes alert to new dimensions of ethical concern in the relations of identity to difference (Connolly, 2002: 121). It thus opens political spaces for agonistic relations of adversarial respect. The particular model of democracy that Connolly promotes is called "agonistic democracy" meaning a "practice that affirms the indispensability of identity to life, disturbs the dogmatization of identity, and folds care for the protean diversity of human life into the strife of interdependence of identity\difference" (Connolly, 2002: x). The politics of identity\difference does not exhaust the social space precisely because it leaves room for other modalities of attachment and detachment. As such, it disrupts consensual ideals of political engagement and aspirations by insisting on cultivating agonistic respect.

Connolly's theory of "agonistic respect" is a response to those democratic systems which are? often antagonistic, and which create environments where no positive social vision is enunciated (Connolly 2005: 125). Political systems where contestation takes priority over every other aspect of politics tend to foster conquest and conversion of the Other whereas agonism fosters respect for the Other in her own terms. Agonistic respect thus seeks to cultivate reciprocal respect across difference and to negotiate larger assemblages to set general policies. Agonistic respect is a reciprocal virtue appropriate to a world in which partisans find themselves in intensive relations of political inter-dependence but maintaining a "pathos of distance" that is often needed in deeply divided societies (Connolly, 1991/2002: 179). Respect is the dimension through which self-limits are acknowledged and connections are established across lines of difference. This is a respect that acknowledges the dignity of those who embrace different sources of respect. It is a respect that grows out of a care for life and the planet that precedes and nourishes it.

Agonistic respect also carries the expectation that one may contest one another on the source of respect especially when one party insists that eligibility for respect itself requires acceptance of the universal it affirms. It also may require one to be open to reinterpret your own essential faith. Agonistic respect is thus compatible with a model of pluralism. It does not allow for the consolidation of a majority identity around which a set of minorities is tolerated as satellites. Rather, it argues for going beyond toleration because toleration is antagonistic.

It thus provides co-nations with the possibility to surge into being from below the threshold of tolerance. Agonistic respect moves towards recognition without actually taking that step. This is why Connolly argues that co-existence must go beyond toleration but may not necessarily take the full stepof? recognition (Connolly, 2005: 125).

To be successful, agonistic respect must furthermore be accompanied by a sense of "critical responsiveness" (Connolly, 2005: 126). Critical responsiveness requires individuals to be willing to redefine their own identity in the ongoing interaction with others. It does not mean that the individual responds "paternalistically" or "humbly and warmly" to the other to prepare the other to convert to a universal identity (Connolly, 1995). Critical responsiveness does away with the 'us/them' syndrome so often afflicting democracy and instead offers a view that opens up cultural space and allows the Other to consolidate itself into something that is not afflicted by negative cultural markings. Agonistic respect requires the individual to deal with her identity in a different manner than most commonly known, namely through a non-essentializing process. Critical responsiveness may be very difficult to foster in real life but the examples from deeply divided societies provided above show that it is feasible to think of critical responsiveness of the actions of individual human beings. In other words, in real life, practices based on critical responsiveness happen; they just need to be identified, conceptualized and put to work in analytical approaches to co-nationhood. This is the focus of the rest of the paper.

Nationhood narratives

The new research framework to be developed emerges from some of the arguments about nationhood that have informed our present day understanding of nationhood. Unfortunately, only some of these can inform our ethical account of co-nationship constructively and critically. This is because most are concerned with the ontology of nationhood rather than the practices of nationhood. Drawing on the bulk of literature on nationhood, it is possible to group these into three narratives. Between these three groups a degree of competition exists which informs the argument of this paper.

The first group includes what I call the *statist narrative* and focuses mainly on the ontology and origins of nationhood. The second group, the *non-statist narrative*, focuses on the ontology and institutions of stateless nations which in this paper are called co-nations. Both of these narratives are institutional in approach. The third group, the *non-essentializing narrative*, focuses on

the processes and practices of nationhood. This narrative is sociological in approach. Each narrative paints a different picture of nationhood. In the following, a brief overview is offered of the first two narratives while the third narrative is discussed in more detailed although space does not allow for an exhaustive critique.

Statist narratives

The statist narrative about nationhood is rich in terms of both the ontology of nationhood and how it emerged as an historic reality. Here I will confine the review to the former. Ontologically, nationhood is usually equated with the state, so that the state is a nation and the people who live in the state embody its nationhood (Mill, 1872 in Gray 1991).[7] Within the statist theory of nationhood it is generally agreed nowadays that different cultures are represented in the nation in terms of traditions, religions, and identities. In other words, as an institution nationhood is a nation of different groups and as one nation they constitute the state (Alter, 1989; Hastings, 1997). It has been acknowledged that holding different groups together may be difficult and thus nationhood may be seen as a daily plebiscite (Renan, 1882).

Nevertheless, nationhood is usually understood as democratic, liberal and empowering in the sense that national self-determination is the doctrine by which a national group is held together and forms a democratic society (see Miller, 1995; Tamir, 1993). If it is not democratic and liberal then it is seen as non-civic (Kohn 1944) and considered what one might call 'ethnichood'. Furthermore, there is now also an emerging consensus in the literature that nationhood may refer to one core ethnic group usually holding hegemonic dominance of state institutions while subservient ethnic groups make up the rest of society (Smith and Wimmer in Kaufmann, 2004). These arguments advance the traditional views found in the mainstream literature on the subject. They suggest that nationhood and most states may possibly be informed by one hegemonic ethnicity while suppressing other ethnicities.

Most statist narratives, furthermore, assume that nationalism is a major part of the founding process of nationhood (for overview, see Smith, 2001). The founding processes of nationhood may be seen as voluntary and organic, objective and subjective, rational and emotional, political and cultural,

[7] The list of authors assuming that the nation and the state coincide is too long to insert into the text proper. One of the best reviews of this literature may be found in Smith, 2001.

constructed and imagined, and so on, depending on the school of thought one consults (Malloy, 2005: 126). Sentiments of loyalty, solidarity and patriotism are at the core of this debate together with lofty ideals of democracy, liberal freedom and equality (Habermas, 1996: 465).

The force of nationalism is also seen instrumentally as founded upon ideology, industrialization, reason, emotions, political ends, cultural hegemonic ends, manipulation, or as constructed and reinterpreting (Smith, 2001). Finally, it is assumed that nationalism is a psychological force that binds the people together in the efforts to build a nation and consequently (no matter whether it is rational or irrational) it is the sentiment that underpins nationhood (Hastings, 1997). How forces that sustain nationhood, not as an institution but as the (socio-)psychological state of mind, are generated is thus the core argument/issue of the debate about civic versus ethnic nationalisms and civic nations versus ethnic nations.

Non-statist narratives

What distinguishes the non-statist narrative from the statist one is the focus on inter-group relations rather than internal institutions and processes of nationhood. The non-statist view was acknowledged already by Hugh Seton-Watson in 1977. Other narratives in the same vein as Keating's include most notably the contributors to a volume edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully (2001) to which Keating contributed. Keating's main arguments question the analytical approaches to nationhood, statehood and sovereignty. The concepts of nation, state and sovereignty need to be kept distinct in political analysis.

The nation is a sociological concept based upon a community which is constructed but represents a reality based in social institutions and practices. At the same time, Keating argues, the nation is a normative concept which carries with it claims of self-determination. Nationality, on the contrary, is not singular or non-negotiable. People can have multiple national identities (Malloy, 2005). Co-nation democracy thus requires some allocation of power to co-nationalities often based on territorial claims but not requiring statehood. As such, sovereignty may need to be seen as non-absolute, not vested only in states. Rather, sovereignty can have multiple attachment points above and below the state. The normative view of co-nationhood is therefore that co-nations are perfectly capable of being democratic and liberal.

Keating supports these arguments with findings in four states, Belgium, Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom which, he argues, have exhibited alternative

traditions of sovereignty and whose co-nations have embraced post-sovereigntist doctrines, such as rapprochement with the European Union without holding statehood. In other words, co-nationhood does not need statehood but it can be seen as part of the political order of states. Keating argues that co-nationhood in these states appears to allow for multiple identities and may be seen as plural, contested, and shifting. Only at times of threat, crisis, or political polarization do national identities become monolithic, exclusive and unchangeable.

According to Keating, co-nations in the countries surveyed had become de-ethnicized even if they were ethnically essentialized in the origins of their nationhood. Nationhood is thus a construction that is made and reconstructed? over time, and co-nationhood politics are part of a continual process of adjustment. In this process co-nations must be placed on the same moral plane as the nation-state, and the inter-communicative aspects of democracy must be respected. These are the two building blocs that Keating argues are required as foundations for the search for a philosophy that binds co-nations together by a democratic rationale. Respect for difference, suspension of old beliefs of absolute? sovereignty and statehood will therefore be needed.

Although Keating's theory is institutional in that it focuses mainly on how co-nations may organize their society in spite of cleavages, he brings forward the main argument of this paper that no matter how divided a society is 'openings of openness' should be seen as a relevant part of such a conflict mode. In fact, Keating goes further and argues that co-nations can become de-ethnicized because nationhood is made and remade over time even if they were ethnically essentialized in the origins of their co-nationhood.

Non-essentializing narratives

Even before Keating was arguing for de-ethnicized co-nationhood, arguments had emerged which expose realities about the practices of nationhood and thus help explain better the ontological picture. Some of these arguments have emerged as a result of the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the subsequent conflicts. The third strand of nationhood literature has thus brought to the fore nuanced descriptions of the nature of the practices of nationhood through a problematization of essentialist views (Canovan, 1996; Brubaker, 1996; 2004). These non-essentializing narratives while not questioning the existence of the nation nevertheless deconstruct the way in which it is narrated. They are, therefore, not post-national to the extent that they imply the end of the nation. Moreover, while they focus on the ties that bind nationhood, i.e. the

processes, they argue that societal relations are far more complex than those described in the statist narratives. They argue that the practices of nationhood require nations to be flexible and adaptable to late modern life and global circumstances. This means that de-essentialized nationhood requires us to look at micro-level nationhood rather than just the broad strokes of nationalizing elites. In other words, the non-essentializing narrative takes Eric Hobsbawm's argument seriously that nationhood while constructed from above "cannot be understood unless also analysed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people" (1990: 10 quoted in Brubaker 2004: 2). The practices of nationhood at the micro-level are therefore at the core of this narrative.

Some of these arguments have particular bearings on the argument about 'openings of openness.' Firstly, there is the argument with regard to the nature of ethnicity and culture. According to Rogers Brubaker, there is a tendency to take ethnic groups as bounded and fundamental units of analysis while seeing them in a substantialist light (Brubaker, 2004). The tendency to see ethnicity as "groupism" rather than a relational, "processual" and dynamic phenomenon prevents us from seeing group identity in terms of categories, schemas, encounters, identifications, languages, stories, institutions, organizations, networks, and events (Brubaker, 2004: 3–4). This impedes our understanding of ethnic affairs and ethnic studies.

A similar argument has been made from the perspective of culture. Anne Phillips has convincingly argued that culture is often represented as a falsely homogenising reification which exaggerates the internal unity of cultures, solidifies differences that are more fluid, and makes people from other cultures seem more exotic and distinct than they really are (Phillips, 2007). On this view, culture is not a liberator but a 'straitjacket' forcing members of such cultural groups into a regime of authenticity, denying them the chance to cross cultural borders, borrow cultural influences and to define and redefine themselves (Phillips, 2007: 14). In other words, as opposed to the homogenizing view of culture, the fluidity of culture renders boundaries between cultures highly permeable, and it is almost impossible to identify individuals by discrete cultural tags.

Culture is immensely complex to analyze. It is a social phenomenon which means that it is fundamentally constructed by human beings and thus constantly changing. Roger Ballard has put it very succinctly. "Cultural systems are not God-given: rather they are always and everywhere the creation of their users. As a result they are never fixed and static, but are constantly being rejigged,

reinterpreted and indeed reinvented by their users" (2002: 13). In that respect, cultural processes are a mark of human creativity where new ideas, new perceptions, new inventions and new fashions are created. Because culture is transmitted through learning, we as individuals are 'coded' to carry certain cultural values just as we are coded to speak certain languages. This means that just as we can learn several languages, we can also learn the practices of several cultures.

These theories show that in deeply divided societies, there may be room for 'openings of openness' because ethnicity and culture are not hermetically closed forms. Key words are 'relational' and 'fluidity.' In so far as individuals are recognized not as living within closed groups but a being capable of transgressing borders when needed or when opportunities arise, the conditions of possibility for 'openings of openness' may occur. Moreover, Brubaker makes it clear that encounters are a vital part of understanding nationhood practices. Of course, opportunities for encounters are contingent. Brubaker underlines this in another argument about nationhood.

A second argument about practices of nationhood is the idea that nationhood is a socio-political category that may crystallize as a result of sudden events (Brubaker, 1996). Collective action as a result of events and happenings is at the core of this argument. Thus, events can have transformative consequences on nationhood and result in what Brubaker calls "nationness" (1996: 18–19). Moreover, the events and happenings that contribute to the creation of nationness are contingent (Brubaker, 1996: 21). This means, according to Brubaker, that nationhood is contingent, conjuncturally fluctuating and indeed a precarious frame of vision which forms a basis for individual and collective action rather than a stable product of deep developmental trends (1996: 19). It is worth noting that nationness is informed by the social communication that results from contingent occurrences or events. Although Brubaker concentrates on the collective experience of events, nationness need not only be a result of collective events. It might also be informed by individual face-to-face encounters happening as a result of 'openings of openness.' Either way events are contingent, but at the individual level, I would argue they may inform nationness with an ethical dimension.

The third argument is based on Andreas Wimmer's theory about the feasibility of explaining comparatively the emergence, stabilization and transformation of various forms of ethnicity (Wimmer, 2008). This theory is methodologically informed in that Wimmer wants to bring together macro and micro sociology and link these in a comprehensive framework of research. Rather than defining

ethnicity in its essence, Wimmer wishes to provide a new process theory focusing on how social forms are generated and transformed over time. "In a nutshell," Wimmer argues, his model "explains the varying features of ethnic boundaries as the result of the negotiations between actors whose strategies are shaped by the characteristics of the social field" (Wimmer, 2008: 973). The model is multilevel in that it follows four steps.

Step one draws up an inventory of strategies which ethnic groups might pursue; step two relates these strategies to institutional frameworks, power hierarchies, and political alliances. Step three analyzes the ethnic agents' ability to find consensus on boundaries at the micro-level, and step four shows that there is flexibility of boundaries which in turn have importance for our understanding of ethnic practices at the macro-level. According to Wimmer, a boundary displays both a categorical and a social or behaviour dimension. The categorical dimension refers to acts of social classification and collective representation whereas the social/behavioural dimension refers to everyday networks of relationships both those that connect people and those that create distance. The categorical dimension promotes closure against other groups, and the social/behavioural dimension dictates scripts of action about how to relate to others in the relationships, including how to keep distance from other groups. In the language of co-nationhood and co-nationship, I would argue that the categorical dimension supports the processes of nationhood, whereas the social/behavioural dimension would support the co-nationship practices. It is important to stress that Wimmer's purpose is not to show how strict boundaries are drawn, but rather to show that boundaries are soft and have unclear demarcations. In other words, the concept of boundary does not imply closure and clarity but flexibility which allows individuals to maintain membership in several categories or switch identities situationally.

As with the previous arguments, I believe this theory allows for, if not demands, the conditions of possibility for 'openings of openness' to happen on a contingent basis. In particular step four of Wimmer's theory provides us with the feasibility of thinking of openness. Wimmer also takes it a step further as I did with Brubaker's concept of nationness by arguing that the flexibility of boundaries and thus the conditions of possibility of 'openings of openness' informs our understanding of ethnic practices at the macro-level. Wimmer's concept of the social/behavioural dimension of a boundary which refers to everyday networks of relationships both those that connect people and those that create distance furthermore feeds right into Connolly's theory of agonistic respect through a pathos of distance. Moreover, Wimmer's argument that the social/behavioural dimension dictates scripts of action about how to relate to

others in the relationships as well as how to keep distance from other groups accentuates the fact that such action is indeed contingent.

The fourth and final argument addresses nationhood mainly in terms of processes while also providing an insight into the practices of nationhood. According to Margaret Canovan, nationhood is elusive because it is sustained through mediation rather than dogmatic nationalism (Canovan, 1996: 2005). On this view, nationhood is the mediator that links an intricate web of custom, contrivance and fiction allowing the polity to be experienced as if it is a community of kin (Canovan, 1996: 70). It is a blend of the ethnic and the political that holds together nature and artifice, past and present, fate and will in the nation.

A nation is not equivalent to an ethnic group, but "the common equation of the national with the ethnic is not surprising because a nation does to some extent need to *feel* ethnic; to be a community that is experienced as possessing depths of history, culture and kinship at the same time as being a political people" (Canovan, 2005: 43). The mediator nation furthermore draws on national forces that generate the power behind collective agency only when needed, i.e. when it is necessary to mobilize in order to create or defend the nation. Meanwhile, these national forces are stored like "power in a battery" (Canovan, 1996: 72–75). In other words, these sentiments can be dormant but do not disappear entirely unlike nationalism which is assumed to be at work at all times.

In terms of practices, it would appear that Canovan allows for individuals to be conditioned to act upon 'openings of openness' especially when national (collective) sentiments are dormant. The fact that most of the battery power is only used for collective action opens the conditions of possibility for individual actors to enter into face-to-face encounters with members of co-nations. This is of course highly contingent in that it is conditioned by the fact that the battery is in a storage mode, and collective sentiments are dormant. Some would argue this would mean that the nature of the conflict is not deep anymore. Dogmatic nationalism is dormant and thus society is becoming peaceful and more open. Hence, the need to speak of 'openings of openness' might be less relevant. However, as Canovan argues, national forces generate the power behind collective agency only when needed, i.e. when it is necessary to mobilize in order to create or defend the nation. Thus, the dormant mode is not permanent; what is permanent is the national forces not their power. In other words, the conditions of possibility for 'openings of openness' are contingent on the power of national forces. Nevertheless, 'openings of openness' can be seen as a staple part of nationhood practices while remaining contingent on the level of

mobilization of national forces. As such, 'openings of openness' are feasible to a varying degree dependent on whether dogmatic nationalism is in full swing or lying low.

Overall, the non-essentializing narratives of nationhood have given impetus to defining new approaches to the study of nationhood as well as nationalism, ethnicity and culture. They interrogate nationhood in terms of practices through a problematization of essentialist views. It is this narrative which provides the beginning of a list of concepts for our research agenda and helps bring us closer to our goal of theorizing an ethical account of co-nationship.

Firstly, our understanding of the *ontology of nationhood* is extradited from the substantialist notion and corrected with non-essential notions of fluidity. Secondly, our understanding of the *processes of nationhood* is freed from the idea that dogmatic nationalistic ideologies form the core forces creating nations. Thirdly, our understanding of the *collectivity of nationhood* is decoupled from its impoverished account of groupism as bounded and static. But more profoundly, the non-essentializing narratives have provided new dimensions and concepts as to the practices of nationhood that support the philosophical outlook of agonistic respect informed by a pathos of distance. These dimensions and concepts support the purpose of drawing up a new research framework aimed at identifying empirically 'openings of openness' in co-nation settings. Coupled with the Luhmann's sociological theory of communication, the research agenda should help us attain new knowledge about ethical encounters in deeply divided societies.

Towards a new research framework

As a result of the observations in the previous section, I argued that nationhood is under-explored in the statist narrative. For example, the statist view assumes that only states can mobilize nationhood sentiments, and the substantialist view assumes that national identities are not multi-dimensional. These factors leave us with an understanding of nationhood that neglects the rich and nuanced knowledge that nationhood is in fact shared in co-nation states and that the processes and practices of nationhood are mediated, complex, multi-dimensional both internally and externally and that alterity is indeed a component of nationhood practices.

A research framework on co-nationhood practices that seeks to identify empirically 'openings of openness' in terms of co-nationship and which allow

ethical behaviour would first and foremost have to challenge the perceived understanding of nationhood in terms of practices as follows:

- Practices of nationhood are not only homogenizing and exclusionary. Nationhood in terms of human inter-action both within the nation and especially across co-nation lines must be described not as oppositional but as inter-relational.
- The dynamics of nationhood practices are not merely to provoke us/them relations between nations and to bring about reified, essentialized views of a united group. Nationhood dynamics are also practices of contingent actions which while maintaining distance negotiate boundaries in a manner that allows for relational contact points of face-to-face encounters.
- Alterity tends to be seen as antagonistic and detrimental to sustainable nationhood. Too often it is assumed that human inter-action follows the directions of grand rhetoric. This seems weak impoverished. Rather, alterity is a component of nationhood practices that must be developed in research. The value of inter-facing with members of other nations needs to be captured better.

A new research framework could thus begin by identifying the spheres of society where the empirical stories of 'openings of openness' are found. The stories offered above were found in the economic domain thus implying a politics of interest rather than a politics of identity. But as the stories adeptly show, the two types of politics are intertwined and not separable. I have suggested in the beginning that a number of spheres of societal relations could be examined, including religion, language, history, culture, education, the economy, the environment, and more. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Space allows only very cursory discussions of a few spheres.

Religion

It is difficult to argue against the view that even in highly secularized societies, religion plays a part of everyday life in terms of the ceremonial actions that we adopt at the micro-level. Even virtual secularists may have their children christened or named in a religious ceremony. Young people who hardly ever go to church will chose a religious wedding rather than a civil one. The fact that we respect people's wishes for occasional religious ceremonies is not so much related to what religion is the focus of these ceremonies but the reality that these ceremonies signify happy moments in peoples' lives. It may appear that any wedding or other happy ceremony is such an occasion where the intimacy

and happiness of a family is respected across ethnic and cultural boundaries. A good example is the way in which people make their happiness public. In Western Europe it is common to encounter the motorcade of happy wedding goers blowing their horns while they drive through the streets of a city. It is not difficult to accept this behaviour no matter how noisy it may be, because you feel that it is an honest display of happiness.[8] The ability to respect other groups' ceremonies may therefore be worth studying in terms of the search for 'openings of openness.'

Language

In co-nation settings bilingualism is usually the norm even if not officially recognized in legal terms. In the good practice examples, such as South Tyrol/ Alto Adige in Northern Italy co-nation languages are officially recognized and bilingualism is a minimum requirement to serve in the public service. However, it is often assumed that two distinct languages are spoken and the usage is confined and compartmentalized. This is far from reality. Anyone who has lived in a border region will know that languages get mixed in curious ways. Words are borrowed, just as they are between the global languages. Words are transformed, pronounced differently in the borrowed form, etc. Legal standards simply are not able to keep languages separate.

For An example of this is found in the Danish-German border region where a new language is emerging in which a mainstream Dane or German may recognize their national languages but only barely. Indeed, this new language is at times rejected by observers as eroding the national languages. Some might call this phenomenon hybridity. Indeed, hybridity is the ingredient that helps break down rigid views of sovereignty (Browning and Perrti, 2007) and thus a notion which would support Keating's argument for shared sovereignty. This is not to say that hybrid identities emerge and eventually the deep division between co-nations will blur and disappear. Speakers are clear when it comes to their native tongue, and hybridity in language is not a sure road to hybridity in identities. For that exact reason, hybridity in language can be seen as 'openings of openness' which nonetheless maintain a distance.

[8] Such behaviour is of course subject to law in many countries where it is not allowed to use horns except in the case of extreme emergency. The law thus regulates what might otherwise be considered a cultural matter. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for making this comment.

The economy

An examination of how cultural and ethnic groups meet in the real market place seems an essential step if we are to take the above stories seriously. First, the economy is the sphere where many of daily life essentials are negotiated. Issues of public goods arguably involve problem solving across boundaries. Secondly, the economy involves internal as well as external relations. Thus, it is not just the mundane issues of public goods which are shared by co-nations that have to be settled, but also the issues of foreign trade and inter-regional aspects of co-operation across local borders to neighbouring states. Large infrastructure projects, matters of waterways, border control or customs control etc. The 'openings of openness' that would warrant empirical research are thus the attitudes and actions of actors involved in these major necessities. Thirdly, one could also imagine that the economy provides other areas of interest where in fact interest politics rather than identity politics take a precedent in co-nation life. This we have seen above could be access to leisure facilities, or other communal facilities which do not exist in abundance and therefore would have to be shared. The 'organizing of sharing' would have to allow for some 'openings of openness' that create linkages and, if managed well, ethical co-existence.

The environment

It is now known that in co-nation relations, protection of the environment often becomes an issue of co-operation for various reasons. First, co-nations often live in remote areas where the central state either deliberately or by lack of capacity neglects the ramifications of environmental degradation to traditional life. Co-nationhood in such areas would demand some action in terms of 'openings of openness' to overcome common environmental issues. Well known examples are the Native Americans in North America and the Zapatista movement. The Zapatista argued strongly in their freedom programme for the preservation of the Chiapas environment and the traditional way of farming in that region. To the Zapatistas it is the biodiversity of the Chiapas jungle that provides the identity for much of their independence struggle and thus their identity as indigenous people. Hence, the destruction of the jungle for oil extraction and large-scale logging were some of the core issues that motivated the Zapatistas.

The leader of the Zapatistas, Subcomandante Marcos, depicts the malevolence of a form of expropriation from the Earth unhinged from any sense of indigenous reality. But more importantly, the uprising was also a reaction to

the post-NAFTA flooding of the Mexican agricultural market with genetically modified corn. Corn being seen by Zapatistas as the original ancestor of all humans, its continued purity has profound importance for the preservation of their indigenous identity. Zapatista fighters were killed while guarding seed safe houses where their heirloom seeds preserved (see Becker, 2006). Finally, it is no secret that environmental disasters do not respect state borders, and hence co-nations living in close proximity would have to find ways of mitigating against such disasters. Thus, there seems basis for arguing that the environment is a sphere where ethnic and cultural groups become engaged in efforts to protect the Earth and that this might reveal 'openings of openness' that may be seen as linkages between co-nations no matter how severe the constitutive tensions.

Conclusions

Departing from the statist narratives on nationhood, I have argued that the non-statist approach to co-nationhood developed by Keating as well as the conceptual tools developed within the non-essentializing narratives, provide useful approaches for a new research framework aimed at developing an ethical account of co-nationship based on 'openings of openness.' By positioning the research framework within a setting of ethics provided by Connolly's theory of agonistic respect, and by seeing 'openings of openness' through the lens of Luhmann's theory of communication I have argued that we may read 'openings of openness' as a mode of ethical co-nationship. I have cautioned that these are contingent, not necessarily successful in terms of outcome and must maintain a pathos of distance. Nevertheless, while this is but a timid beginning, I believe the face-to-face encounters I have described are compelling enough to warrant greater attention. Such few examples plus a brief analysis of spheres do not of course form a theory. It takes a full examination and a comparative effort to achieve even the most modest theoretical approach. What has been attempted here is but a beginning to this exercise by suggesting some. If there is a morality hidden in these stories, the research framework may prove helpful.

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Helmut Kohl and the European Union

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Abstract:

Helmut Kohl has been one of the most important politicians in the world in the second half of the XX century. His actions in domestic and international politics have been very important. Also his contribution to the development of the European Union was very significant, maybe the most important role after the so-called father of Europe, Jean Monnet. He represented Germany, a main player in European politics even before Kohl, but more influential after him. Kohl had to deal with many different problems, such as the problems of Greece, the British rebate, and the German reunification, and solving them satisfactory from a European point of view. He also increased the level of integration mainly via two new treaties, the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht, or with international agreements as the Schengen agreement. He also established the conditions for further enlargements of the European Union, such as the fourth and fifth enlargements. He believed in a more federal Europe and his opinion about European integration can be extracted from the Genscher-Colombo plan, a draft to reform the European Communities launched by his long-term foreign affairs minister, Genscher. The great success of Kohl in his initiatives in the European field are the result of his charisma, the power of Germany, and what is more important, the identification he did between Germany and Europe, in other words, what was good for Europe was good for Germany. There was a Europe before Kohl and another one after him.

Keywords: *European Union, Helmut Kohl, Germany, German re-unification*

Introduction

Helmut Kohl has been one of the most important politicians in Germany since the end of WWII. He was the Chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998. Since the end of the war, Kohl has held the position of chancellor for more time than anybody else, almost two years more than Conrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor from 1949 to 1963. Just Otto von Bismarck held the office longer (Bismarck was German Chancellor from 1871 to 1890). Also Helmut Kohl was the Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) from 1973 to 1998, and won back power for his party after being 13 years out of it (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/321076/Helmut-Kohl). The current Chancellor, Merkel, is also a member of the CDU and is considered the heir of Helmut Kohl. "The chancellor of unity", Helmut Kohl, turned 80 on April 3, 2010, and the party raised his rehabilitation after the fall of the idol in 2000 because of the secret donations scandal.

Some critics (Bering, 1999, 45) complain that he used the party as a family to change policy and provide security, while obtaining formidable friendships with world leaders like Gorbachev or Bush, that were key after the great moment both in his political career and the history of Germany. He somehow made the world believed that the Germans had changed and were not a threat any more, which again could return trust in Germany. The reunification had many obstacles, and most people believed it was impossible to do. Kohl was a great advocate of it, and even more, he thought that it was a German issue that should be done by Germans.

This great historical role was also recognized by his successor, the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder, who after being elected chancellor, offered Kohl, who did not own a home, the residence he had occupied for more than a decade as head of government in Bonn, making him in fact a kind of honorary chancellor. It was a long and tough negotiation that Schröder likes to recall from time to time: "I wanted to give it to him for free, but he refused to pay any rent. And every time we agreed to set a price he insisted that the price was even higher, even though we all knew that he had never liked that house" (http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/01/internacional/1270125075.html).

In the months following his departure from the Chancellor, Kohl continued to be a real power in Germany, and international leaders who visited the country met with the following Red-Green government, but also with him. At the end of 2000, such widespread recognition changed when scandal erupted about secret donations that Kohl had been making outside the party's official accounting, amounts that had been in the millions, and were used for the

reunification and for the obstacles that arose in the East and West. Kohl was removed from the CDU after refusing to reveal the donors. Even today the identities of the donors are still a mystery (Pruys, 1996, 140). Anyway, Kohl never kept a single euro for his private use. His domestic record is impressive, but also his international actions were outstanding, such as his close relations with the U.S., his relations with the Soviet Union, and above all his role in the EU. The following article tries to enlighten the actions of Kohl related to the European building process, leaving aside other very important actions lead by Kohl related to domestic or international politics.

Germany in the EU

The beginning of the European integration was the European Coal and Steel Community, according to Robert Schuman, which was the first step in the creation of the European State. After WWII, West Germany was occupied by the U.S, UK and by a cession from the UK, and also France. The German area of Ruhr was still very important to control for the prevention of any German aggressive rebirth. The Americans tried to find a solution for it because, in the context of the cold war, they wanted a strong West Germany as the frontline of a possible European battlefield.

There were different proposals and negotiations, but the French rejected them. The U.S., then got involved in a war with Korea, and threatened to give full control to West Germany over the Ruhr area. It was the moment chosen by Jean Monnet to present his plan of a Community where all the members will have the same rights and duties, where they will share all the production, and what is more important, the member states will share sovereignty. This means that they could not use the coal and steel against each other. At that time, coal and steel were the basic materials for weapons, which were so important for war. The French government accepted Monnet's plan just because West Germany would have otherwise taken full sovereignty over the Ruhr. So, since the beginning of the process the European integration has been a matter between France and Germany (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/27482/anonymous/what-jean-monnet-wrought).

In that sense, Winston Churchill in 1946, then ex-prime minister of the UK, made a famous speech in Zurich about European integration, pointing out that it was needed to end the antagonism between Germany and France, and the wars between them, with the UK serving as a promoter of it, but in any case also a member of the organization (http://www.ena.lu/address-given-winston-

churchill-zurich-19-september-1946-022600045.html). Churchill still believed in the British Empire as a major player in the international arena, which was the result of the previous dominance of the UK in world politics, but he failed to detect the decrease of British influence and the rise of two new world powers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union.

As we can see, Germany was the main player with France since the creation of the European Communities, and afterwards their role just increased. The German economic miracle made the country the strongest economy of the continent and the main economic supporter of the Union. Germany also supported the as of yet to be born European Defense Community and other proposals for deeper integration. During the first part of the European integration, West Germany wanted to forget their past, WWII, the Nazi regime, and the best way to do this was by joining international organizations. Normalization in external relations was a priority and, for the European Communities, the best way to deal in equal terms with France, and afterwards the United Kingdom. The Treaty of Rome is a clear example, where the Germans accepted the costly Common Agricultural Policy because of diplomatic pressure from France. In any case, Germany has an economy based on exports, and the common market gave them free access to the European markets, something very important for the German economy even nowadays.

Charles de Gaulle tried to create a strong relationship between France and Germany, and he signed several agreements with Conrad Adenauer, Chancellor of West Germany, such as the Treaty of Friendship signed by the two leaders in 1963. It entailed regular summits between high officials of both countries, the creation of the Franco-German Office for youth and other cultural, political and economical initiatives (http://www.ena.lu/elysee-treaty-paris-22-january-1963-020705127.html).

The reasons of President de Gaulle were more nationalist, because he thought that a diplomatically weak Germany will stand beside France, giving more power to the French intention of becoming a "third way" in the Cold War. The French president changed his previous position because de Gaulle was against any cooperation with Germany during his years in WWI, and he even said, when he was a prisoner in Germany, that any cooperation with Germany was impossible (http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/). He showed pragmatism by enforcing the relationship between Germany and France, which was a milestone in European integration. Nevertheless, when he tried to change the Community from the inside with the Fouchet plan, the Germans did not back him and the proposal was rejected (http://www.ena.lu/draft-treaty-fouchet-plan-ii-18-january-1962-020002275.html).

The German government did not want to deal with France outside of the communitarian rules, because it was the only way to protect them from the arbitrary behavior of the French General. Anyway, Adenauer supported France in many delicate issues, such as the veto against the UK, a personal decision of de Gaulle that without German support would have never succeeded, or the creation of the Lomé agreement, where the main beneficiary was France, in order to keep some international influence in its ex-colonies.

The relations between France and Germany were developing stronger and they were the leading force of the Community. Any new measure had to be approved first of all by Germany and France, and they were the clear motor of the European integration. A good example would be the Schengen agreement, a bilateral international agreement signed between France and Germany for the free movement of people out of the European Communities Treaties or laws. Later, other countries joined the agreement, and afterwards became a part of the European Union.

Mitterrand and Kohl also had a very close relationship, and his initiatives were crucial to the current shape of the European Union, the Treaty of Maastricht being the main consequence of their agreements, and hence the Euro, political cooperation, etc. The development of the Franco-German friendship was deeper, reaching a higher level. As a prize for their great cooperation, both won jointly the prestigious Karlspreis award in1989 (http://www.karlspreis.de/preistraeger/1988/vita.html). They also became allies against the pressures from Margaret Thatcher, establishing a long-term relationship between both countries as the heart of Europe.

Equal and peaceful relations between both France and Germany have been the most notorious achievement of the European integration, and the possibility of war between them seems impossible nowadays.

The relations between Kohl and Chirac were also good, following the tradition established between France and Germany after WWII. Their main achievement was the creation of a Troika in European affairs between France, Germany and Russia (http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/1997/diciembre/01/internacional/1N0094.html). It was clearly against the European spirit, because it was not under the surveillance of the European institutions, or European legislation, being just an international agreement, but was usefully used by Schroder and Chirac in their relations with Russia. The normal situation would have been a bilateral agreement between the European Union and Russia, and not between Germany, France and Russia, that decreased the power of

Europe. Even nowadays, in some delicate issues, Germany does not support their partners in the European Union towards Russia in order to protect German interests in the Russian market and the role of Russia as an energy supplier. In the long term it is going to weaken Germany and the European Union, as they cannot face united Russian policies. The establishing of the Troika was against Helmut Kohl's ideas about European integration.

Chirac and Schroder also have a strong partnership, and they used to meet before the European Council meetings and then present a common position there. It created some problems inside the Union, because there were some complaints. If the Germans and French agreed before the meetings, and presented a common position, the rest of the members of the Council could not reject it. And they urged France and Germany to discuss with all the members of the Council, without a previous Franco-German agreement, accusing them of being anti democratic (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/Frankreich.html).

Germany is still a leading force inside the European Union, and its relations with France are still strong. Merkel and Sarkozy are the main political leaders of the Union, and the relations of France and Germany are still the central core of the Union, with most of the important decisions needing the support of these two countries. Lately, as we have seen with the financial crisis in Greece, it has been Germany that decided how to help Greece, the rules to follow and even the intervention of the International Community.

In any case, it is dangerous to have a strong and independent Germany inside the Union, because the economic interest of the German economy, based on exports, cannot fit with the common wealth of the whole Community. For example, a weak Euro will foster the German exports to the rest of the world, but harm the imports of other members of the Union. Also, Germany needs the other members to have a commercial deficit with them. This means more public debt for the other members to pay for what they buy from German companies, and an important surplus for the German state for what they sell. It means that the best solution is more integration in the economic field, with some kind of European Economic government to control the less disciplined members, such as Greece or Spain, but also Germany, therefore finding the best solutions for the whole Community.

Problems with Greece in 1982

The first important issue regarding the European Communities Kohl had to deal with, was a crisis created by the then Prime minister of Greece, Andreas Papandreou, father of the current Prime minister of Greece, George Papandreou. The Greeks threatened to block all the decisions of the Communities, as de Gaulle previously had done, if his requirements were not fulfilled. The problem was mainly about money and the voting system inside the Community. Greece did not get so much income from the European budget as it was expecting before (http://www.ena.lu/accession-greece-portugal-spain-european-communities-1981-1986-020600078.html).

The reasons were various, such as the incompetence of Greek civil servants who were not ready to do their tasks in the terms of the European Communities, or the small support of the Common Agricultural Policy to the Mediterranean production, by then around 80% of the European Budget (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_en.pdf). At that point, the negotiations were difficult, and Papandreou even blackmailed the Community with threats to withdraw Greece from the organization (see: http://www.european-network-of-political-foundations.eu/cms/index.php/eng/Members/Andreas-Papandreou-Institute-for-Strategic-and-Development-Studies), a step taken by Greenland in 1985. Mitterrand, the president of France was against any arrangement making exceptions for Greece, because it could lead to exceptions for all the member states. Thatcher was against increasing the British financial contribution to the EEC budget, and just Helmut Kohl, new in his chancellor office, was more receptive to an agreement. The German leader had to negotiate with the other leaders of the European integration and added some more money from Germany to the EEC budget. His reasons were mainly European, because West Germany had little to earn in economic terms. Mainly solidarity and supporting the European integration were his main reasons to reach an agreement with Papandreou and the other European leaders. The situation of the Communities could have been difficult if a member state withdrew from the organization at a moment when the Community was changing its rich club status to a more European one. So, the intervention of Kohl was fundamental in solving this crisis and he did it in order to strengthen the European dream.

Finally, a European Mediterranean Fund was created and included in the Communitarian budget in order to secure funds for Greece. After that, the Greek economy started an improved development, the European Communities showed solidarity with its members, and the external imagine of the EEC was better, becoming the dream of many other European states. All of this could not

have been done without the intervention of Kohl as mediator in all the conflicts between the very different positions of Mitterrand and Papandreou (Kariotis, 1992, 77). It was the end of the first crisis of Greece inside the Communities, and much less deep than the current crisis. Anyway, nowadays the Greek economic crisis will lead probably to a deeper integration because the Euro cannot work properly without common institutions and common rules.

On the other hand, the crisis of Greece showed, as the empty chair crisis before, or the British rebate afterwards, that a voting system based on unanimity, was not effective and was under the whims of the member states. The main importance of this crisis was to show that even a small country like Greece, not as powerful as France, could also block the decisions in the Communities. It was a fact that made clear the need for reform and Helmut Kohl, with a more federalist approach, championed to change it to a qualified majority system, and improvement entailed in the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht, the main contributions of Kohl to the European building process. After that blackmailing from member states was much more difficult and nowadays situations such as the Papandreou's pressure are impossible.

Single European Act

The European integration was in crisis in the 80's with different issues such as the British rebate, the Mediterranean Fund or the enlargement to Spain and Portugal were solved, and Kohl was a key actor in order to reach agreements and overcome the crisis. In the case of Spain, Kohl, a conservative politician, supported Felipe Gonzalez, the socialist president of Spain, and supported the enlargement to Spain and Portugal against the negative approach of Giscard d'Estaing first and afterwards the more neutral position of Mitterrand. It meant afterwards the total support from Spain for German reunification and shows the pragmatism of Kohl, establishing close relations with Gonzalez, or Mitterrand, both socialists, without fences built by ideology. Kohl ascended to the government in 1982, and he believed profoundly in the idea of the European Union, and gave a push to the integration process after these main problems were solved. A new Treaty was drafted, the Single European Act, another major step in the European building process.

There were three major figures in the elaboration of the Treaty, Helmut Kohl, Mitterrand and Thatcher. The French president rejected the idea of reforming the costly agricultural policy to protect the French farmers. He was open to the idea of increasing the multinational role of the European Communities in

some areas because the benefits, mainly economical, would be greater than the political losses, mostly French sovereignty. He also was a strong supporter of the French-German cooperation as the only way to increase the international influence of France. Finally, he also saw Africa as the natural area of influence of France, so the European Communities with different policies such as the Lomé agreement, the commercial policy, aid development and others, would help France to increase the French influence in the African continent. Margaret Thatcher believed more in an intergovernmental Europe against integration, free market and weak intervention from the European institutions, a close relationship between the U.S. and Europe, and the development of a defense policy as a complement to NATO, never as a competitor. Helmut Kohl was the biggest supporter of European integration of the three of them, and he also believed in close cooperation between France and Germany, but as a difference with Mitterrand, as the motor of the integration, never as a brake. His ideas about Europe were closer to a European federation and he really believed deeply in the idea of Europe.

The main achievement of new Treaty is the creation of the Interior Market, a real common market between the members of the European Communities. It is based in four basic rules, free movement of goods, free movement of capital, free movement of services, and free movement of persons. It means the creation of a European market with common rules, common duties and common rights for the economic agents inside the European Communities. Different reports made by the European Commission, such as the Ceccini report, outlined the benefits of the Single Market, as increasing the GIP 2% or 2 million new working places. As Germany, the main economy of the European area, was focused on the external market, its economy greatly benefited. Kohl had to negotiate with Mitterrand, allowing the French president some minor victories, such as the French influence in Africa. Moreover, Kohl accepted to keep the CAP as it was. The Agricultural policy was expensive, sucking more than half of the European Budget, and Germany was the main contributor to the Budget. The idea of Mitterrand was to use the German money, via European Communities, to protect the French farmers (Holden, 1992).

The money of the European Budget comes from the own resources of the Union and is collected by the member states. It was based on a common percent on the economic activity. So, all the member states paid the same percent, but the ones with bigger economic activity paid a larger amount of money (http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget_glance/index_en.htm). It was the reason why Germany was and still is the main contributor to the EU Budget. Kohl used the German contribution to bargain with Mitterrand, offering him the CAP for

the Single Market, even against Mansholt's opinion, the former agricultural affairs commissar, who wanted to dismantle most of this policy because it was inefficient, and since the earnings for the German economy with the Common Market were going to be bigger. Kohl had the support of Thatcher, who believed in the free market, and thought the Single Market would be more like a free trade area. The German Chancellor stressed this point to get her support. Afterwards, it was clear that the SEA was an important milestone in the creation of the European Union, and a great mistake by Margaret Thatcher according to her ideas about European integration. Helmut Kohl played a central role in the creation of the new treaty, ending with the crisis in the European building process and increasing the economic power of Germany. Again, he matched his European ideals with his German policy, benefiting his country and strengthening the European integration.

Thatcher, Bush, Gorbachev and Kohl

The relationship between Thatcher and Kohl was very difficult in many issues, especially concerning the German reunification. Thatcher was clearly against it, and even tried to influence Gorbachev to stop it. Anyway, their relationship started before with a conflict about the English contribution to the European Budget. Thatcher created a crisis inside the Communities because the contributions from the UK to the European Budget were not balanced with the investment from EU money on British soil. It was, because at that time, the main policy of the EU was the Common Agricultural Policy, and most of the money was spent there, and the British agricultural sector was minimal. So, the UK was giving much more money than they received. Thatcher wanted to change this situation, and asked for a British rebate, clashing with the French government. The role of Kohl in this entire crisis was closer to the French position, and against Thatcher. When an agreement was reached, Kohl made it clear that Germany was not going to pay the British rebate because his country was already the main contributor of the EEC and France was the country, via CAP, that got bigger benefits. Kohl included in the agreement about the British rebate a clause reducing the German contribution to the British rebate, and so increasing the French contribution (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4566133.stm). Anyway, his personal contact with Thatcher was bad afterwards.

Another clash between both leaders came with the Single European Act and the desire for a free trade area from Thatcher, and the German approach of a Common Market with common institutions and sharing sovereignty. The

negotiations were hard, but finally Kohl got his way assuring Thatcher that the Common Market was almost a free trade area. It was one of the biggest mistakes of the British Premier during her political career because the influence of Europe was afterwards visible in our everyday life.

Another important conflict was about the German reunification, because Thatcher was against it and tried to boycott it. The support of the U.S. and France made useless all the efforts of Thatcher, and left her even more isolated in the European political arena (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6829735.ece).

The ideas of both leaders about European integration was radically different, with Thatcher preferring a trade area without common institutions and without sharing sovereignty, and with a close relationship with the U.S.A. Basically, Thatcher believed in the Europe of the nations, and cooperation between them, but never integration. On the other hand, Kohl supported a much more federalist approach, seeing integration as something good for the Europeans in general, and for the Germans in particular. He argued that a federal Europe would just bring benefits for European citizens with a very low cost, and some sovereignty of the member states. Kohl did not want a more united Europe just for nothing, he wanted it in order to increase the power of Europe, and secure Germany inside it, as well as increase the welfare of European citizens. The fight between these two giants was long, as they were the political leaders of their countries at the same time, from 1982 till 1990, and even later when Thatcher was a member of the British parliament campaigning against the Treaty of Maastricht, an important step in the European integration, born from the cooperation between Mitterrand and Kohl. In terms of European integration, Helmut Kohl got his way in many European issues and was a counterbalance against the efforts of Thatcher to dismantle the supranational spirit of the organization. The relationship between Kohl and Mitterrand was crucial to take over Thatcher's resistance. The most important consequences of the influence of Kohl in European affairs was that he was a giant in political terms, almost the only one who could face Thatcher, negotiate with her and increase integration at the European level against the wishes of cooperation by Thatcher (Wall, 2008).

The main common point between Thatcher and Kohl was their support for a close relationship with the United States. Both of them did not understand Europe without the support of the U.S.A. Even though their ideas about Europe were very different, cooperation versus integration, the role of the U.S. was very important to their visions. Anyway, Thatcher was closer to Ronald Reagan, and Kohl to Bush. On the other hand, Kohl had his main disagreement with

Mitterrand about relations with the U.S.A. The French president maintained a much more independent policy from the one of the States, a third way in the Cold War. The support of Kohl for the policies of the U.S. during the end of the Cold War was an important fact for German reunification and the creation of the European Union. Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977 said, "Kohl succeeded in carrying out his vision because of the trust that the principal international actors in this unfolding drama had developed for one another." (http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/__PR/P__Wash/2010/03/31__Kohl__Birthday__PR,archiveCtx=2028290.html).

The friendship between Kohl and the president of the U.S., George H. W. Bush, lasts even today, and the American president, in a commemoration of the German reunification, said about Kohl that "We would not be standing here if it were not for his vision, his tenacity, his singular leadership, let me simply express my conviction that history will surely rank him as Europe's greatest leader in the last half of the 20th Century." (http://www.georgebushfoundation.org/Page.aspx?pid=283). The relationship between Bush and Kohl was crucial in order to solve different international problems, such as the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Germany (1983); the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989); German unification (1990); the demise of the Soviet Union (1991); and the creation of the European Union (1992). It includes the time of Bush as a vice-president in the Reagan administration from 1981 to 1989. The relations of Kohl with the Reagan administration were mainly done via Bush, and many of the dialogues between Germany and the U.S.A. at that time were done under the supervision of both, Vice-President Bush and Kohl. His relationship was even stronger when Bush became president in 1989. As we have seen, Helmut Kohl believed profoundly in the German reunification and in the European integration as a part of the same process, and the creation of the European Union could not have been done without the support of the U.S.A., or at least the positive attitude of Washington. The EU also is a consequence of the end of the Cold War. The relations of Kohl with Gorbachev were also friendly and very intensive. The previous vision of the Soviet Union concerning the European Communities was bad, because it was seen as a tool against the workers of the world, and so against the Soviet Union. The EEC was a tool of the U.S. in the fight against the U.S.S.R. and hence it was seen as an enemy. As Europe was divided into three main groups of countries, Western countries, neutral countries and Eastern countries, the neutral states could not have joined the EEC because it would have gone against their neutrality. The relationship between Kohl and Gorbachev changed this Soviet perception about European integration and made it possible for Finland, Austria and Sweden to join the European Union. (http://www.ena.lu/fourth_enlargement-020102390.

html). Even when they joined the organization in 1995, the Soviet Union had collapsed, and the collaboration between Kohl and Gorbachev established the foundations needed for it. Also, the good relations between Helmut Kohl, and the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, helped to make smoother the transition from the Cold War, and from three sides Europe into a united Europe. The relationship between Kohl and Yeltsin proved fruitful in the international arena and kept Central and Eastern Europe stable (Economist, 1996) allowing for the enlargement of the EU to these areas of the continent.

Genscher-Colombo plan

During the 80´s the Communities were under a different crisis, such as the British rebate, or the Greek crisis and the integration process was stopped. There were different proposals in order to solve the problems of the Community and make the European Communities stronger. One of the main proposals came from the collaboration between the German Foreign Affairs Minister, Hans-Dietrich, and Emilio Colombo. The plan was not drafted directly from Kohl, but his long-term relationship with Gensher shows us a strong concordance between both politicians on European issues, and Gensher could not have made this proposal without the agreement of Helmut Kohl. So, the influence of the German Premier in this plan is obvious, and the proposals endorsed in the plan expressed many of the Kohl views in the European building process.

The Gensher-Colombo plan proposed to weaken the veto power and make a stronger political cooperation for the EU in 1981 (http://www.ena.lu/german-italian-proposals-020102139.html). The veto power was a direct consequence of the policies of Charles de Gaulle and his particular vision of the European Communities as a Europe of the nations, where the cooperation of the different states was the key factor. It means that cooperation was over integration, and that sovereignty could not be transferred from the national level to the European level. In order to protect national interests from common decisions a national veto was needed. But as we have seen, it was used first of all by de Gaulle, and afterwards by Thatcher and Papandreou to block the working system of the Communities. It made the system slow, where consensus was needed in any decision, and ineffective because nobody made decisions that could benefit the whole community if they could harm a small part of it. The proposal of Genscher was clearly a step towards a more federal Europe where common interest was considered over national interest. The main problem here is that if decisions are taken by the majority, some kind of common institutions should protect the members of the organization from the negative effects the decision

could have in some of them. In other words, a government of Europe would be needed to avoid an asymmetric crisis that could affect just some parts of the system. Of course, Genscher was not proposing a federal state, but changing the voting system from unanimity to qualified majority, which is a step towards it. Also, qualified majority as we have nowadays in the European Union provides protection to the national interest of the member states via different measures.

Genscher also proposed increasing the political cooperation between the member states in order to increase the international role of the organization. Again, an important step for a federal Europe supported by Kohl, a single and strong voice abroad. The beginning of the European Integration in its current state started with the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It was the first actor in the international relations of Europe, establishing the first offices of the High Authority outside the member states in 1954 in Washington, and in 1955 in London. The High Authority in the ECSC was similar to the current European Commission in the European Union, but with more independence and, what is more important, with more power and more freedom in the decision making process. The establishment of these offices in the U.S.A. and the UK, marked the beginning of the External Services of Europe. The reason to open these offices was mainly economical (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/delegations/index_en.htm). Since then, we can see how the international relations of the EU are mainly based on economic issues.

During these first steps of European Integration, the attention of the European Institutions mainly focused on the Western World, because these countries were the main commercial partners of the member states of the ECSC. But there were also political reasons in the context of the Cold War that the defense done by the U.S. on European soil was against the threat of a communism expansion. After the creation of the ECSC and other European Communities, the U.S.S.R. accused them that they were a tool of capitalism, against the workers of the world, and an organization made by U.S. to fight against the U.S.S.R. This situation meant that the international influence of the EU in the communist world was minimal until the fall of the Soviet Union.

The strongest influence of the international relations of the EU during the Cold War was mainly developed economically via the Commercial Policy, the Lomé Agreement, and the Common Agricultural Policy. The close collaboration of Helmut Kohl proposed to give a political dimension to the economic importance of the Community. In that sense, it was also proposed in the plan to have closer cooperation between economy and politics inside the Community. European integration was mainly economic, and Genscher and Kohl thought that more

integration in the field of politics was needed in order to avoid a mere free trade area in Europe.

Finally, the report also entailed the inclusion of security and defense policies inside the Communities. The last attempt to do that was the proposal of a European Defense Community in the 50's. The proposal was accepted by all the member states, including West Germany, but France wanted more guaranties about the political control of the EDC. The Italians proposed a Political Community to deal with these problems and the French parliament rejected it. It meant the end of the EDC. It is clear that a Common Defense means a common army in the terms it was being presented, because the EDC was based on integration rather than cooperation. And the problem was who was going to command the army, when was it going to be used and who was going to take the political responsibility for the actions of the European army? (see: Koutrakos, 2001).

If we accept this plan as the views of Kohl about Europe, as the close relationship between him and Genscher points, it is clear that a federal Europe was his option. The insertion of internal politics, decision-making reform, the strongest link between economy and politics, external politics, common positions abroad and security and defense policies, gives us as a result a European state. Of course, it respects the differences between member states, and the control from the hypothetical central European government in other areas would be weak, as their own federal government in Germany works. A great autonomy for the member states, common policies in defense, external relations, economy and a majority voting system inside the Union are the basis of the federal idea of Kohl about Europe.

The end of the cold war, German Reunification and the Treaty of Maastricht

German reunification has been an important milestone in the political career of Helmut Kohl because of obvious German internal reasons, but it also had a huge importance in the European Union. The role of the German Chancellor in the negotiations with the European powers was decisive and can only be understood in the context of the European Union. Margaret Thatcher and Mitterrand were against the reunification of Germany because they thought it could alter the balance of power established after WWII. A united Germany would be more populated than its partners in the EU, more powerful economically if the German economical miracle was going to be repeated, something assumed as a

fact, and more influential politically because of its geopolitical position towards the ex-communist states of Europe. Kohl had to deal with the resistance of France and the United Kingdom to unblock the reunification, but he counted on the support of the U.S.A.

Thatcher said to Gorbachev that Britain was against the reunification, and she wanted the Soviet leader to stop it. She also communicated to the American President her opposition to German reunification. Helmut Kohl tried to negotiate with her, but the British Premier stood firm in her hostility, giving Kohl no other choice but to outmaneuver her. Kohl focused on Mitterrand, the French president, because counting on U.S. support, he just needed another main leader of Europe to follow along with the reunification. Previously he won the support of other European minor players, such as Felipe González, the President of Spain.

The fears of Mitterrand of a strong united Germany as a danger towards France was the main issue in the negotiations with Helmut Kohl. The Germans proposed to keep the integration in the European Union as a way to hold Germany tighter to Europe, less independent and less able of an aggressive policy against France (Wofgramm, 1997, 145). Helmut Kohl, a federalist, was the political leader who had supported strongly European integration more than any other important politician, and resolved two main issues with this action. The idea was clear, with a united Germany inside a deeper Union, its influence would be smaller, and its capacity to act independently reduced, and more importantly, its capacity to act against French will was made almost impossible. Cooperation between these two countries became afterwards indispensable for the proper functioning of the European Union. The agreement between Mitterrand and Kohl was expressed in the elaboration of a new treaty for the European Union, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991. The main concerns of the French president were political and economical, and for the first issue the Treaty increased the qualified majority as a voting system inside the Union, which was a movement to make impossible any important German decision to be taken unilaterally. As international political cooperation was not included in the treaties, Maastricht enabled it as a way to have a common voice in the international world, and not anymore just a German or French or British voice. It is important to remember that before the reunification took place, Genscher, the German Foreign Affairs Minister had presented a plan to revitalize Europe and included political cooperation. This means that Kohl gave to Mitterrand something not accepted by France before, but at that moment, something to hold tight Germany to France via the European Communities. Other provisions were included in the Treaty towards the European Defense Community via the Western European

Union, which was another proposal from Genscher. The idea of the French was that a common army would mean that no German national army could be built against France. Anyway, the provisions included in the Treaty were vague and even today the European Army seems a far achievement (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1560631.ece).

Finally, the economic power of Germany was expressed with the main role of the German currency in the economic affairs of the continent. The German Mark was the leading currency of Europe, being the currency of reference, the real center of the European Monetary System. It could be a dangerous weapon in the hands of a strong Germany. It is important to remember that at the time of the reunification everybody was sure that the economical development of East Germany was going to be fast and strong, as it happened with West Germany after WWII, something that really did not happen. Anyway, the best way to avoid a German independence in monetary issues was creating a common currency for the European Union, the Euro. This was an action agreed upon in the negotiations between Mitterrand and Kohl, and again meant to be a closer step to the European Federation, and close to the idea of Europe defended by Kohl. The French did something unthinkable just a few years before in order to keep Germany deeper inside the Community. Mitterrand expected to influence Germany via the European Institutions in a stronger way than just with bilateral agreements. At the moment we see that Germany was not really a threat to the rest of Europe, and the reunification did not mean a stronger leadership of Germany in the continental issues, mainly thanks to the deeper integration of Germany into the European Union, and the enlargement of Central and Eastern European countries inside the Union. This late action has made the relations between Germany and Central and East European countries more based on the rules of the European Union, and not on bilateral agreements that could have given Germany much more power over these countries.

The Treaty of Maastricht meant a huge deepening in the European integration, and brought closer the future state of Europe. The reforms included there, such as the creation of the common currency, the Euro, will bring deeper integration because they cannot work properly without deeper integration. The current economic crisis, and the situation in Greece, makes clear that an economic government is needed in the EU, or at least between the member states of the Euro zone, in order to have a strong currency and solve the problems of an asymmetrical crisis. At the moment, just the solidarity of France and Germany can save the Greek economy, but their help is just voluntary, and if they decided to leave Greece alone, it will mean a disaster for the Greeks. Just with a European Economic government the crisis could have been avoided, forcing

Greece to follow the common rules and the monetary aid from Europe would be insured. Helmut Kohl, a supporter of the European federation, made it closer by holding Germany tighter to the European Union to overtake the opposition of France and Mitterrand (Panarella, 1995, 340).

On the other hand, German reunification also brought many people inside the Community, because once reunited, the Eastern part of Germany became a part of the European Union. It brought 16 million people into the European Union and if we compare it with Greece's more than 9 million when they joined the Community, or Portugal's more than 10 million in 1986, it can be said that the German reunification meant another enlargement in the European Union. It also changed the internal rules of the European Union in the number of members of the European Parliament. Since the creation of the European Communities there has been parity between France and Germany in the European institutions, as both countries were similar in size and population, so Germany and France had the same number of members in the European Parliament. The reunification meant that Germany was more populated than France, and got 27 more members than France. Anyway, in the central institution of the European Union, the European Council, each member state has different weighted votes according to their importance in terms of population, economy and politics. Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom have the same weight, 27 votes, in the European Council. It does not reflect the differences between France and Germany, but it reveals the parity between France and Germany as a consequence of the agreement between Mitterrand and Kohl.

The reunification of Germany had another consequence in the internal affairs of the EU, because Germany needed the European financial tools in order to invest in East Germany. If they had done it unilaterally it would have been against the rules of the Common Market and state intervention in the market. A new fund was created to help in the reconstruction of East Germany, and different objectives were included in the funds of the EU, such as regional differences or industrial restructuring.

The reunification of Germany was the masterwork of Helmut Kohl, and it has huge consequences for Germany and for the European Union. His negotiation skills made possible the reunification, his main internal issue, and the development of the European Union, his main external issue.

Conclusions

Helmut Kohl is one of the main architects of the Europe we have nowadays. His contributions to European integration have been huge and he has been the most important politician in terms of European integration since the creation of the ECSC until nowadays. He did not have a famous speech as Churchill or Thatcher did about European integration to extract from it his ideas about Europe, so the best way to see his ideas in the European field is by examining his actions and his power. He was the Chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998, and hence he had a lot of expertise and contacts, and these made possible difficult steps in European integration that any other leader could have not achieved. He also represented Germany, one of the most powerful states inside the Union, giving him more chances to reach his targets. His skills as a negotiator made possible agreements in the case of Greece or the Single European Act, making possible a deal between such different positions from leaders as Papandreou, Mitterrand and Thatcher.

The ideas of de Gaulle about the European Union can be understood through the Fouchet Plan, because he did not make a clear speech about European integration. In the case of Helmut Kohl, we can understand his vision about Europe through the Gensher-Colombo plan, because Gensher was his long-term foreign affairs minister. It is clear in this plan that integration should be deeper in Europe, approaching it to a federal state. Also, the issue of German reunification and the Treaty of Maastricht are the masterpieces of his work for Europe. He linked both as a part of the same project, providing huge benefits to German citizens, European citizens and European economic actors. After some years, the economic profit is clear, and nobody doubts it. He also opened the gates of the political integration, included in the Genscher-Colombo plan in terms of deeper political cooperation, and deepening economic integration. The creation of the common currency in the Treaty of Maastricht meant the end of the economic integration, and following the spill over effect of the Neofunctionalism, it will lead us to political integration. The idea is that economic integration provides benefits to Europeans, but in the case of a crisis it will not have enough tools to fight it, because there are no political institutions to deal with it. It is similar to the case of the U.S.A., where the economic crisis in just one state, such as in California at the end of the 80's, can only be solved by the federal government of Washington.

Nowadays, because of the financial crisis of Greece, some Europeans are calling for the creation of a European economic government to help the countries with troubles and protect the healthy economies of the area. Finally, the role of

Kohl at the end of the Cold War, and his relationship with Gorbachev and other Soviet politicians changed the vision of Europe from the Soviet Union, allowing the neutral European countries to join the organization, and afterwards the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.

The work of Kohl towards a united Europe is impressive and effective, giving him a privileged position in the history of European integration. In 1991, the European summit in Vienna made Helmut Kohl a European citizen of honor, being the second person to hold this award after Jean Monnet in 1974 (http://en.euabc.com/word/607).

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The Re-establishment of Parliamentarianism in Estonia, and the Evolving of the Riigikogu's Competence in the Realm of Foreign Relations

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Abstract:

Estonia lost its de facto independence on 17 June 1940, when the USSR occupied the Republic of Estonia. This also put a stop to Estonia's foreign relations. Estonia's missions abroad, which carried on their activities in exile, continued to, indeed, represent, on a de jure basis, the Republic of Estonia. Even when, in practice, the state and its power structures no longer existed. Thus, Estonia could also not have a legitimate parliament.

In 1988 began the period during which Estonia's independence was re-established. And the local Supreme Soviet, which, in accordance with Soviet laws, fulfilled the functions of a legislature, played an essential role in this process. During this period, Estonia's foreign relations were, gradually, also restored. In this situation, the Supreme Soviet made use of the competence, in the realm of foreign relations, granted to the Supreme Soviets of the individual Soviet Republics by Soviet laws. In 1991, Estonia's independence was re-established, and the local Supreme Soviet launched itself, full-scale, into the development of foreign relations. With the 1992 Constitution, constitutional rule was restored in Estonia, which called for a parliamentary state. The Estonian parliament—the Riigikogu—thereby acquired jurisdiction in the realm of foreign relations characteristic of a parliamentary state.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the gradual development of legislative authority in the course of the transition period, as well as to analyze the principles of its realization from the

restoration of independence on. Special attention is paid to the non-recognition policy as a principle that made it possible to restore independence by making use of legal continuity. Just as attention is focused upon the activities of the local Supreme Soviet in the realm of foreign relations, which was carried out with the aim of re-establishing Estonia's place on the world map. The development of the competence of the Riigikogu is viewed from both a legal as well as a political standpoint. The author tries to find an answer to the question of how the authority of the legislative body was realized in the course of the transition period, when the powers of the legislative and executive authorities were not yet clearly defined. With the election of a legitimate parliament in 1992, another question arose—do, and if so, how, the legal and political authority of the Riigikogu hook up, especially in the realm of foreign relations? Does the Riigikogu, in its actual activities in the realm of foreign relations, have the power given to it by the Constitution, or has this been delegated to the level of the executive authorities?

As source materials for the article, Estonian SSR and transition period statutes, as well as those of the Republic of Estonia, have been used, as have books concerning this subject matter. Special note should be made of: books that deal with Estonia's legal continuity, such as Dunsdorfs, 1975; Mälksoo, 2005; Marek, 1954; Sarv, 1997; Verdross, 1950; Vitas, 1990; publications that deal with the competence of Estonian institutions, such as Uibopuu, 1996; 1998; and historical surveys, such as Nutt, 2005a; 2005b; Tannberg, 2005. Use has also been made of archive materials.

Keywords: *competence, constitution, continuity, foreign relations, non-recognition, parliamentarianism, restitution.*

1. The non-recognition policy and the competence of a Soviet Republic in conducting foreign relations

The USSR occupied Estonia on 17 June 1940. On August 6 of the same year, Estonia was annexed and incorporated by the Soviet Union, thus having all the "rights" of a Soviet Republic. On August 25, the *Riigivolikogu* confirmed the Constitution of the Estonian SSR, which was officially in force till 1978, as well as renamed itself the Temporary Supreme Soviet of the ESSR.

But the USSR did not succeed in obtaining recognition for the occupation and annexation. The only country to give explicit *de jure* recognition to Estonia's annexation was Sweden (Ilmjärv, 2004, p. 905). On 6 November 1940, Sweden handed the Soviet government a note in which it stated that the Swedish government regards the Soviet Union as being "in charge of international law" in the Baltic states, and therefore being responsible for the debts of the Baltic states (Dunsdorfs, 1975, p. 123).

Most states, on the other hand, did not want to take a definite stand, with Germany and its allies—Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Japan—expressing support rather than opposition to the annexation (Dunsdorfs, 1975, pp. 890–896). Even the other European states reacted to the liquidation of the Baltic states by ignoring it. Positions regarding this matter were just not taken, so that the notes of Estonia's and the other Baltic states' ambassadors, with which they asked that the occupation not be recognized, were just left unanswered. This was, for instance, how Norway, Denmark, and Finland acted (Dunsdorfs, 1975, pp. 906–910).

The only state that reacted sharply to the occupation of the Baltic states was the United States of America, doing so independently of any initiatives launched by the foreign missions of the Baltic states. On 23 July 1940, the U.S. State Department publicly condemned the annexation of the Baltic states (Dunsdorfs, 1975, p. 910). The United States based its non-recognition policy on the Stimson Doctrine. Named after Secretary of State Henry Stimson, it was first enunciated in January 1932 in connection with Japan's aggression against China. The United States government declared that it would not recognize territory that has been conquered, or has been incorporated by means of treaties that have been forcibly concluded as a result of aggression. This meant that the United States would refuse to recognize any territorial changes, agreement, or treaty that had been achieved by means of force (Vitas, 1990, p. 3). The United States continued to recognize the Baltic diplomatic legations on its territory.

At the same time, Washington declared that it does not recognize the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian governments in exile (Ilmjärv, 2004, p. 913). As a result of the aforementioned non-recognition policy concerning the status of the Soviet-occupied Baltic states, the Estonian foreign missions could continue functioning in several Western countries. The Estonian Consulate General in New York functioned throughout the duration of the Soviet annexation. Foreign countries were forced to close their diplomatic representations in Estonia, but when the United States closed its Embassy in Tallinn on 13 August 1940, the U.S. declared that it is being forced to do so (Nutt, 2005a, p. 150).

The United States non-recognition policy influenced the whole world's attitude towards the Baltic states. During and after the Second World War, several states declared, in various contexts, that they do not recognize the illegal incorporation of Estonia, and the other Baltic states, into the Soviet Union. Thus, from the standpoint of international law, the Republic of Estonia, in a *de jure* sense, continued to exist, regardless of the *de facto* Soviet occupation and annexation (Mälksoo, 2005; Sarv, 1997, pp. 27–34). Since Estonia, as a state, continued to exist *de jure*, regardless of the occupation, its 1938 Constitution also remained in effect throughout the Soviet occupation.

In Estonia, debate has repeatedly arisen over the question whether Estonia would have been able to preserve its independence if, in the 1930s, it had been able to remain a democracy. In comparison, a good example is Finland where, in the 1930s, democracy also suffered setbacks, but survived. In the fall of 1939, Finland resisted Soviet aggression, lost 11% of its territory as a result of the Winter War, but managed to preserve its independence. Finland's executive and military leadership had, in the interests of avoiding war, been ready to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union concerning the matter of military bases, but the *Eduskunta* (Finland's parliament) had not been willing to accept this.

In Estonia, events followed another route. The authoritarian government that assumed power in 1934 lasted until the nation was occupied, and, under pressure, signed the document with which it helped to dismantle Estonia's independence. Without a doubt, Estonia gave in to Soviet pressure to conclude a treaty concerning military bases, hoping thus to avoid aggression. Estonia lacked an autonomous legislature, which could have decided whether to resist the USSR or to succumb. In other words, would the survival of democracy have been able to save Estonia's independence in 1939–40? Did the choices that were made by Estonia and Finland play a decisive role from the standpoint of the independence of these states (Nutt, 2006)? At least it is clear that thanks to

its democratic governmental system, Finland had been able to retain noticeably broader foreign relations channels than Estonia. One of these was parliamentary communicating abroad. Estonia lacked such an opportunity for developing its foreign relations.

A 1940 British Riga Embassy report finds that an essential role in the Baltic states losing their independence was played by the fact that they had authoritarian governmental systems (Ilmjärv, 2004, p. 899). This position can be doubted, since Estonia's possibilities for successfully resisting aggression were noticeably smaller than Finland's, and Great Britain definitely did not have the slightest intention of, in any way, militarily protecting the Baltic states. Also, a democratic system of government was unable to save Czechoslovakia's independence. But the ultimate truth in this matter cannot, obviously, be ascertained.

During the period of the illegal Soviet annexation, the local Estonian administration was given the nominal authority to conduct foreign relations, as were all Soviet republics. But, actually, this did not mean anything. Although Section 68 of the Constitution of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, adopted in the course of the Extraordinary Session of the IX Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, on 13 April 1978, stipulated that the Estonian SSR is a sovereign socialist state, and, according to Section 72, the Estonian SSR has the right to have relations with foreign states, to conclude treaties with them, to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives, as well as to participate in the activities of international organizations. But this right was regulated by Section 28: The foreign policy activities of the Estonian SSR are guided by the foreign policy objectives, functions, and principles specified by the Constitution of the USSR.

Actually, the Estonian SSR never concluded an international treaty, never had a diplomatic representative, nor had membership status in any international organization. Chapter 12 of the Constitution of the Estonian SSR, which specified the competence of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, does not bring forth any issues dealing with foreign relations, although Section 108 assigns the appropriate competence to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR. According to Clause 13, the Estonian SSR's international treaties are ratified or denounced by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which also, according to Clause 14, appoints and recalls Estonian SSR diplomatic representatives in foreign countries and international organizations, as well as, according to Clause 15, accepts the letters of credence and recall of foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to it. Clause 5 of Section 118 of Chapter 13 assigns the competence for managing the relations of the Estonian SSR with

foreign countries and international organizations to the Ministers' Soviet of the Estonian SSR, which is to function according to the procedures that the Soviet Union establishes for regulating the Republics' mutual relations with foreign countries. Thus, the Ministers' Soviet was not able, in its conducting of foreign relations, to abide by the legal instruments of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, even if they had been issued, but only according to the directives of the Soviet Union's central authorities. Since the Estonian SSR was not granted such authority, the Foreign Ministry only performed ceremonial functions and, to a limited extent, Soviet consular functions within the territory of the Estonian SSR.

The Soviet Union tried to stress, simultaneously, two contrary aspects. One the one hand, the fact that the Soviet Union is a united federal state that has sovereignty over all of its territory, and, in the realm of foreign relations, also represents the Republics. According to this thesis, Estonia ceased to exist as a sovereign state when it "voluntarily joined" the USSR and ceded its sovereignty to the Soviet Union. But, on the other hand, the Soviet Union emphasized the sovereignty of the Republics, so that the Estonian SSR, as a "sovereign Republic", was a subject of international law, even as a part of the USSR (Mälksoo, 2005, pp. 144–145). Thus, according to the Soviet Union, the continuity of the Republic of Estonia was passed on to the Estonian SSR.

The international community unanimously rejected the claims that the constitutive parts of the Soviet Union were independent subjects of international law. And therefore, the Soviet Union's attempts to present the Baltic "foreign ministers" as the legitimate representatives of independent states remained unsuccessful. Nor was the Soviet Union able to obtain recognition for the annexation (Mälksoo, 2005, p. 145). Krystyna Marek, an authority on international law, has stressed that 'there is no identity or continuity relationship between any of the Baltic Soviet Republics and the independent Baltic states' (Sarv, 1997, p. 60). As the only anomaly, the Ukrainian and Belarus Soviet Republics were permitted, as "independent Soviet Republics", to become members of the United Nations. But even here, the non-recognition policy came into play. Namely, the Soviet Union attempted to gain UN membership for the Lithuanian SSR, but since Lithuania's annexation by the USSR was not recognized, the Lithuanian SSR was not accepted into the UN (Nutt, 2005b, p. 239).

2. The Supreme Soviet's activities in the realm of foreign relations during the transition period

The formal rights for conducting international relations, which were granted by the Constitution of the Estonian SSR, became an issue after the Constitutional amendments of 1988, following which the attaining of sovereignty became a serious endeavour. Several jurists have found that the first legitimate constitutional legal instrument was the decision to declare the historical blue-black-and-white colour combination to be the national colours (see the Constitution of 1938, Section 6, Subindent 1), as well as the cornflower and the swallow to be Estonia's national symbols (*EVPk*, 2002; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 19). Conditionally, constitutional amendments can also be viewed as the partial subjective restoration of Estonia's conduct of foreign relations. With this legal instrument, the Estonian SSR judicial system became an inseparable part of the world's universally recognized UN Human Rights Pact, which protects human and citizens' rights (Uibopuu, 1996, p. 24). This was the first legal instrument with which the Estonian SSR, as a Soviet Republic, recognized itself, independently, as the subject of international legislation. Although both the Soviet Union, as well as the Constitution of the Estonian SSR, gave the Soviet Republic this right, the pertinent decision was not recognized by either the USSR or the UN, or by any other state or international organization.

Nevertheless, based upon the Estonian state's legal continuity, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR did not, in 1988, have the competence to make decisions dealing with Estonian statehood, nor to adopt decisions that would have bound Estonia as a state. Estonia was still occupied by the Soviet Union, and the Supreme Soviet had been "elected" according to the laws of the USSR and by an undemocratic voting system. Among other things, people who were not Estonian citizens, and therefore did not have the right to vote in elections for an Estonian legislature as well as for or against the right of self-determination in the territory of the Estonian Republic, had participated in the elections. Otherwise, it would have meant that the legitimacy of Estonia's legislative power would have been transferred over to the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, as well as the transferring of the legal succession of the Republic of Estonia over to the Soviet Union. Thus, the decisions made in the span of 1988 to 20 August 1991 by the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR should be regarded as having being aimed at the restoration of the Estonian state, but not as legitimate decisions that had been made by the legislative body of the Republic of Estonia.

Decisions that had been adopted during the Soviet period did not become valid post-factum until they were recognized by the institutions of the re-

independent Republic of Estonia, and were judicially legitimized by Section 2 of the Implementation Act of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia (*Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse...*, 1992), which stipulates that existing legislation is valid after the Constitution enters into force and if it is not in conflict with the Constitution or the Implementation Act, and until this legislation is either invalidated or completely conformed by the Constitution. The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR even admitted its lack of competence to make decisions in the name of the Republic of Estonia when it adopted the decision concerning the "historical-judicial assessment of the events that occurred in Estonia in 1940", with which it determined that what happened in Estonia in 1940 was an act of aggression, being a military occupation, as well as an annexation of the Republic of Estonia by the USSR. Therefore, the forcible changing of the governmental system of the Republic of Estonia had been, from the standpoint of international law, invalid, and the joining of the Republic of Estonia with the Soviet Union null and void (*EVPk*, 2002, p. 24; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 20).

The essential question is, who can be the embodiment of legal continuity if the state's constitutional institutions cannot function due to the occupation and annexation by a foreign state, and their one-to-one restoration in accordance with the state's own laws is not possible. And also, if it is not possible to completely restore the validity of the constitution and legislation derived from it. Estonia was in exactly such a situation.

Prominent academician Endel Lippmaa and persistent restitution proponents claimed that the only possible solution would be for the 1938 Constitution to again be made factually effective (a new constitution could be adopted only if the 1938 Constitution was used as a judicially valid basis) and to restore state institutions to the extent that it would be possible to do so on the basis of the 1938 Constitution. Unfortunately, it was not possible to restore all the institutions called for in the 1938 Constitution in their original form; so, therefore, it would have been possible to implement this Constitution, one way or another, only on a selective basis.

Several international law theoreticians have, on the other hand, seen as the embodiment of the continuity of an unlawfully annexed state not so much the exact restoration of its legislation, but rather the continuity of its people (population). For instance, the author Alfred Verdross, of Austrian heritage, has stated that a state is not embodied by its government, but, primarily, by its people. According to him, 'on the basis of international law, a state's identity is not reflected in the identity of its constitution, but rather, in the continuity of its population, which is renewed by its constantly interchanging generations' (Verdross, 1950, p. 19 cited

in Mälksoo, 2005). Adapting this to the Estonian context, the embodiment of the identity of the Estonian state was the Estonian citizenry, who had the right of self-determination concerning Estonia, and the sovereignty to determine Estonia's fate (Sarv, 1997, p. 57). On the basis of this principle, the competence of Estonia's bodies of power is derived from the fact whether they have been established according to the free expression of will of Estonian citizens, or if they have been put into power by a circle of other individuals.

Thus, the answer to the question of whether the state defines itself as the state that was eliminated as a result of being occupied or unlawfully annexed, or recognizes the legitimacy of the annexation and proceeds to create a new state, which is based upon the legal continuity of the occupying state and independence is achieved by seceding, depends, in principle, on what is the will of the citizens of the state and what are used as the bases for their actions in the process of restoring the state. And Enn Sarv has stressed that 'a state exists as long as it is internationally recognized, and as long as even some characteristics of a state have remained (for instance, a government, embassies, a citizenry capable of independently expressing its will, or even part of this)' (Sarv, 1997, p. 28).

The debate concerning the issue of whether the Republic of Estonia should choose, for the restoration of its independence, restitution or secession started already in 1988. Restitution was supported mostly by people with dissident roots who supported more radical forms of action, also by younger intellectuals and Estonians living abroad. The concept of restitution rested upon two bases: Estonia is continually an internationally recognized *de jure* state, the foreign relations of which are conducted by missions abroad still having appropriate authorization (the Consulate General of the Republic of Estonia in New York). Also, in a legal sense, there is an Estonian citizenry, which can be defined by the 1938 Citizenship Act, and which has the right to specify Estonian statehood. The secession alternative tended to be supported by the leadership of the People's Front, which found that restitution is not feasible, but that independence would be possible to achieve through a gradual increasing of autonomy by means of an agreement with Moscow, and by using Soviet power structures. This position is reflected in the People's Front Initiative Centre's declaration of 23 July 1988, in which, after the subsection dealing with Estonian history, it is recognized that:

> *At the same time, this is not a basis for demanding the restoration of Estonian independence. The implementation of relations based upon equality between the Soviet peoples, the development of socialist federalism is the only realistic guarantee for ensuring*

> *the survival of the Estonian people. The People's Front Initiative Centre does not approve of separatist endeavours that do not take into consideration international, economic, political, and ethnic factors that are actually influencing Estonia's situation… The most painless means for this is to change the Soviet Union from a federal state to a union of states. (Laar et al., 2000, pp. 405–406).*

But the secession alternative would have meant the involving of the whole Estonian population of the time in the creation of a (new) state, the desisting of the claim that the state was an annexed state, and the abandoning of the legitimate Republic of Estonia's recognized missions abroad, as well as the ignoring of the Western states' non-recognition policy. By November 1989, the debate between the restorers of the Republic of Estonia and the creators of the third republic was ending, whether intentionally or by chance, in favour of the first party. Attention was focused upon the issue of the restoring of independence, which pushed aside other, also essential, matters (Laar *et al.*, 2000, p. 629). Later, when the state's continuity alternative had been ultimately accepted, and the state had been restored on this basis, the process was summarized by Lennart Meri with the following: 'The authority of the Estonian state, or the Estonian concept of state—state philosophy, if you will—is based upon the continuity of the state.'(Oplatka, 2000, p. 58).

On 16 November 1988, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR passed a law concerning changes and amendments to the Constitution of the Estonian SSR. Section 5 changed Section 74 of the Constitution of the Estonian SSR, and implemented the prerequisite that for Soviet decrees and other legislation of general application to apply in the Estonian SSR, they have to be registered in accordance with procedures put in place by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR. At the same time, the Provision authorized the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR to stop the implementation of any Soviet legal instrument. On the same day, a declaration was adopted concerning the sovereignty of the Estonian SSR, and a resolution concerning the Treaty of Union. Enn Sarv has called the latter a legal instrument, which 'reduced that Treaty to an internal Soviet legislative occurrence, actually to the level of an unsuccessful attempt to legitimize the belonging of an administrative unit known as the Estonian SSR to the Soviet Union and to give it territorial autonomy' (Sarv, 1997, pp. 162–163). And to also make it impossible to legally equate the Estonian state that was being restored with the state that was annexed in 1940. At the beginning of 1990, the Supreme Soviet explicitly undertook the restoration of the Republic of Estonia on the basis of legal continuity.

On the 70th anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty, on 2 February 1990, the Assembly of the Estonian SSR declared: 'Democratic self-rule, based upon the continuity of the Republic of Estonia, is, to this day, unquestionably, the political ideal of the Estonian people.' (Schneider, 1997, p. 120). The 30 March 1990 decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, concerning Estonia's national status, declared that the occupation of Estonia by the USSR, on 17 June 1940, has not disrupted the *de jure* existence of the Republic of Estonia, and that Estonia's territory is occupied to this day. Based upon this, the Supreme Soviet declared the authority of the Soviet Union in Estonia to be illegitimate from the moment that it was implemented, and declared the Republic of Estonia to be restored (*restitution ad integrum*). With these decisions, a transition period was declared to be in force until the formation of the constitutional organs of government of the Republic of Estonia.

In connection with the use of Estonian insignia, it was decided, with legislation of the Estonian SSR, to implement Sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the 1938 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. The use of the name Estonian SSR was abandoned, and the name, the Republic of Estonia, was again adopted. With all this, the Supreme Soviet declared that Estonia is an independent and autonomous republic, and that in Estonia only self-implemented laws are valid. But, at that time, there was no way to actually implement these provisions in Estonia.

With the legislation adopted by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia, concerning the bases upon which Estonia was to be temporarily governed, it was decided to end the subjecting of Estonia's bodies of power to the Soviet Union, and it was declared that mutual relations must be based upon the validity of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty. Without bringing special attention to it, an end was put to the USSR's competence to represent the Supreme Council and the Government of the Republic of Estonia in matters concerning foreign relations. Following the adoption of this legislation, with the Supreme Council's decision concerning its action programme during the transition period, until the restoration of the Republic of Estonia, and the temporary working order of the government, the Supreme Council endeavoured to have the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian problem dealt with as a common Baltic issue on the multilateral international negotiations level (*Eesti Vabariigi seadus*..., 1990, 15, 248). At the beginning of April 1990, a memorandum was issued with which the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR and the Estonian Committee appealed to the governments of all European states, as well as those of the United States and Canada, to put into the CSCE 1990 agenda the issue of restoring the Republic of Estonia, which had lost its independence during the Second World War, as a

subject of international law (Tannberg, 2005, p. 387). This was the first foreign relations act adopted by the Supreme Council. From that point on, the Estonian authorities stressed that contacts with the Soviet Union must be dealt with as negotiations, or as foreign relations, which Moscow very stringently avoided doing.

In the summer of 1990, the government of the Republic of Estonia formed commissions for negotiating with Moscow, with the talks starting at the end of August. The Soviet Union called the negotiations consultations. Moscow finally concluded that the most suitable solution would be to conclude a union treaty and to force the Baltic states to sign it, thus tying them once again with the Soviet Union (Tannberg, 2005, p. 388). Politics had, once again, made an about-turn. The union treaty, which in 1988 had been offered by the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR as a solution for renewing bilateral relations between Estonia and the USSR, had, by the summer of 1990, become a political priority for the Soviet Union, but had become unacceptable for Estonia.

Events in Estonia and the other Baltic states forced the Western states to also be active. The Baltic freedom movement brought with it protest actions, especially in the United States. The Vilnius bloodbath of 13 January 1991 resulted in a worldwide condemnation. Parallels were drawn with the Soviet aggression in Hungary in 1956. This was followed by bloodshed in Riga on January 20.

The support of the Russian SFSR for the Baltic states played an important role in the ending of the January crisis and the avoiding of bloodshed in Estonia. On 12 January 1991, Estonia and the Russian SFSR signed a treaty in Moscow with which both parties recognized the inalienable right to national independence. They recognized each other as sovereign states and subjects of international law. This was, understandably, just a symbolic act, since neither party was actually sovereign. On January 13, Boris Yeltsin and Arnold Rüütel signed, in Tallinn, a joint declaration with which they recognized each other's national sovereignty and legally elected bodies of power. This joint declaration was sent to the UN's Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, asking him to convene an international conference so as to find a solution to the Baltic crisis (Tannberg, 2005, p. 389).

The treaty was later the cause for many an argument in Estonian and Russian relations. At the same time, it revitalized contacts between the top leaders of Estonia and the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev had not lost hope of concluding a union treaty. The referendum initiated by the Soviet leadership in the spring of 1991 that posed the question of whether the Soviet Union should be preserved, and the Estonian referendum dealing with the restoration of national

independence and autonomy, produced opposite results (in Estonia 77.8%, or 737,964 people said yes; 21.4%, or 203,199 people said no) (Tannberg, 2005, p. 390).

After the Soviet referendum, in which 77.3% of the people supported the preserving of the USSR, the so-called Novo-Ogarevo process was presented at the end of March 1991 (9+1, in addition to the Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova did not participate in the referendum), which presented a union treaty—the Union of Sovereign States (today known as the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS) Treaty. On August 16, Mikhail Gorbachev invited the Baltic Soviet Republics to sign this, with the date set for August 20. The Baltic Republics did not respond. But this was too much for the reactionary elements in the Soviet leadership, who formed the State Committee of the State of Emergency, and tried, with a military coup attempt that they launched on August 19, to prevent the entering into force of the union treaty (Tannberg, 2005, pp. 391–392).

The activity of the Baltic states in the foreign policy realm even increased after the referendum. At the beginning of May 1991, the heads of government of Estonia and Latvia, as well as the chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, released a joint declaration in Washington with which they endeavoured to gain international recognition and protection. They appealed to world public opinion that the Baltic states be treated, in the international arena, as independent states (Tannberg, 2005, p. 391). Herein lies an interesting theoretical problem: what would have happened if the world's countries would have, on the basis of this declaration, recognized the Baltic states? Would this have also meant the abandonment of the non-recognition of the occupation and the annexation, as well as the ending of the diplomatic accreditation of the Consulate General of the Republic of Estonia in New York and the legitimate representative of the Republic of Estonia? In this way, the local Soviet administration would have been recognized as Estonia's (just as Latvia's and Lithuania's) legitimate representative body. And in the best case scenario, the Baltic states would have been viewed as states having seceded from the Soviet Union (actually wishing to secede, since, in reality, they had not seceded, nor were they actually states).

On 20 August 1991, when the Soviet capital had fallen under the control of the State Committee of the State of Emergency, which was carrying out a coup, and Soviet military units had entered Tallinn and were waiting for orders to remove the administration of the Republic of Estonia from power, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia appealed to the parliaments and governments of the world's states not to recognize the so-called State Committee of the State of

Emergency as a legitimate organ of power, and announced that the Supreme Council will continue to proceed to restore independence (*Pöördumine maailma riikide...*, 1991, 25, 311). On the same day, the Supreme Council adopted the decision concerning Estonia's national independence, with which the national independence of the Republic of Estonia was declared and diplomatic relations were sought to be restored. With the same decision it was decided to form, out of the delegates of the Supreme Council and the Estonian Congress, the Constitutional Assembly for the formulation of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia (*Eesti Vabariigi Ülemnõukogu otsus...*, 1991, 25, 312).

The suppression of the so-called August Putsch provided an opportunity for the restoration of the independence of the Baltic states and speeded up the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was dissolved with the Belovezh Accords on 8 December 1991.

3. The restoration of independence and the Supreme Council as the conductor of the nation's foreign relations

The restoration of the Republic of Estonia through restitution, and not the formation of a new state that had seceded from the Soviet Union, was recognized by the states which had followed the non-recognition policy. Iceland, who's parliament had, already on 11 February 1991, adopted a decision pertaining to Lithuania, in which it affirmed that the recognition given to the Republic of Lithuania in 1922 was still in effect, adopted a similar position regarding Estonia (and Latvia) when these states had, in August 1991, declared their re-independence. Other Western nations gave their support and recognition to the idea of the identity of the Baltic states by announcing in August and September 1991 that they are restoring diplomatic relations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Müllerson, 1994, p. 120).

Actually, the European Union nations and the United States did not use the word recognition in their declarations, and on 27 August 1991, the special meeting of the European Union foreign ministers warmly greeted the fact that the Baltic states have restored their sovereignty and independence, which they had lost in 1940, and confirmed its members' decision to establish, without delay, diplomatic relations. The position of the United States was similar. President George Bush announced that the restoration of the independence of the Baltic states is the culmination of the 52-year policy of the United States not to recognize the incorporation of the autonomous Baltic states by the Soviet Union (State Department Press Statement, Washington, D.C., September 2, 1991).

Even so-called former socialist states (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary) unanimously recognized the independence of the Baltic states on the basis of their sense of identity (Mälksoo, 2005, pp. 72–74).

On the 6 September 1991, the Soviet Union also recognized Estonian independence. Moreover, the Soviet Union was one of the few states to recognize Estonia, in principle, as a new state that had seceded from the Soviet Union. Later, Moscow has stressed that the Republic of Estonia ceased to exist as a subject of international law after it had voluntarily joined the Soviet Union (Mälksoo, 2005, pp. 83–89).

On September 10, Estonia was accepted as a member in the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and on September 17, into the UN. Accession to NATO and the European Union became Estonia's long-term foreign and security policy priorities. Already by the end of 1991, Estonia became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

The recognizing of the identity of the Baltic states by the Western nations was later confirmed by the concluding of various agreements. In this context, the following model was adopted: the Soviet Union's contractual commitments were not regarded as being automatically binding for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Based upon the legal continuity of the pre-war state, the Estonian government officially notified the UN secretary general that it does not regard itself, in the context of contractual legal continuity, as being party to any of the bi- or multilateral agreements concluded by the Soviet Union.

Along with the restoration of the independent state, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia became quickly involved in foreign relations. First of all, it involved accession to multilateral international treaties that had been concluded at a time when Estonia was not able to participate, as a subject of international law, in foreign relations, so that several generally known legal instruments did not encompass Estonia. On 21 October 1991, Estonia acceded to 28 international conventions in the realm of contract law, the peaceful solving of disputes, human rights, as well as diplomatic and consular issues (*Eesti Vabariigi ühinemisest...*, 1991, 35, 428). Since the 1978 Constitution of the Estonian SSR, along with its amendments, was still in effect, the aforementioned international legal instruments were ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Council, rather than by the Supreme Council.

At the same time, the legal identity with the pre-war Republic of Estonia brought with it the question of the continuity of the treaties signed before 16 June 1940. On 26 June 1992, the Estonian foreign minister signed a declaration addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN, to the effect that Estonia regards as binding the convention concerning the demilitarization and neutrality of the Åland Islands (concluded in 1921). This was followed by the re-establishment of Estonia's membership in the conventions that were still in effect and with which Estonia had joined before the Second World War. The duration of the validity of only some of the pre-war bilateral treaties has been recognized, but definitely not that of all of them (Mälksoo, 2005, pp. 77–79).

On 28 June 1992, a new Constitution was approved in a referendum. In the lists of citizens with the right to vote there were 669,080 individuals, of whom 446,708 participated in the referendum. The Constitution was approved by 407,867, and opposed by 36,147 citizens (*EVPk*, 2002, p. 25; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 21). Since only Estonian citizens could participate in the referendum, then constitutional order was also restored in Estonia on the basis of legal continuity. The acceptance of the Constitution conclusively formalized the sameness of identity of the Republic of Estonia with the Republic of Estonia that was occupied and annexed in 1940. In this connection, jurist Enn Sarv has written the following:

> *After the acceptance of the Constitution, there is no more validity to the at one time quite widely held viewpoint, which to this day is held by Russia, that this is a "third" Estonia, a republic that seceded from the Soviet Union (the Estonian SSR having been the second), or that the citizenship derived from this should be based on the "zero alternative", meaning that citizenship should be automatically made available to all foreigners who were in Estonia at the moment when independence was restored. This all would be in conflict with the Constitution, so that the legitimizing of such ideas would definitely require the preliminary changing of the Constitution. (Sarv, 1997, p. 10).*

Thus, 'the Estonian state has truly done everything necessary to ensure its continuity, and that its continuity be recognized by the international community' (Sarv, 1997, p. 15).

Just as during the transition period prior to the 1920 Constitution, during the transition period associated with the restoration of Estonian independence the competence of the legislative and executive powers had not been very

clearly stipulated. The main peculiarity of the Supreme Council as a legislative institution, during this period, was the overlapping, in practical politics, of the competence of its members' activities with that of the members of executive institutions. The activities of the Supreme Council in the realm of developing parliamentary foreign relations meant, in substance, the holding of negotiations dealing with the achieving of independence. After the *Riigikogu* (Estonian parliament) elections, the relations of the members of parliament with their colleagues abroad acquired a new meaning (Raudhein, 2000, p. 16).

For instance, with its 13 January 1991 Decree, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia named the Presidium of the Supreme Council member, Marju Lauristin, to be its temporary plenipotentiary representative abroad (*Eesti Riigiarhiiv*, n.d.). There were quite a few such appointments. International diplomacy does not recognize a parliamentary plenipotentiary representative, and since the diplomatic status of Estonian representatives was not recognized anyway, then the development of such relations was possible.

So, in this manner, it was possible to repeat the practices that had been begun in 1917 and were continued until the implementation of the Estonian Constitution in 1920. Therefore, there was not much point to the separation of powers, so that the legislature and the governmental apparatus formed one unified whole, wherein Supreme Council delegates, in many cases, directly acted as representatives of the executive power. In 1991, foreign policy was carried out as conditions permitted. In time, the executive power went into the hands of the government, and the granting of executive authority, as well as control over it, remained in the hands of the legislators (Raudhein, 2000, p. 18). This "clean" separation of powers, which occurs relatively rarely in Europe, became possible with the 1992 Constitution.

Here, the author has limited himself to European parliamentary practices, and has not made a separate analysis of corresponding United States practices, where congressmen sometimes participate in the development of foreign relations very actively, often assisting in the realization of official foreign policy, but sometimes acting against it.

4. The legal competence of the Riigikogu at the beginning of the 1992 Constitution

The competence of the *Riigikogu* is specified in the Constitution. But several laws regulate the use of the *Riigikogu*'s competence. In the realm of foreign relations, the following laws regulating the *Riigikogu*'s competence are significant:

1) *Riigikogu* Rules of Procedure Act;
2) *Riigikogu* Administration Act;
3) The Foreign Relations Act;
4) The Foreign Service Act.

The Constitution of the Estonian Republic that was approved with the 28 June 1992 referendum is based upon Section 1 of the 1938 Constitution, referring to the similarity of the legal identity of the state that was declared on 24 February 1918, and which ceased to exist *de facto* in connection with the Soviet occupation of 16 June 1940. At the same time, the 1992 Constitution stipulates the competence of governmental institutions differently than earlier Constitutions of the Republic of Estonia (1920, 1934, 1938). The competence of the *Riigikogu* in the 1992 Constitution is defined more narrowly than in the 1920 Constitution, but more broadly than in the 1934 and 1938 Constitutions (*EVPk*, 2008, p. 66; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 65). In the realm of foreign relations, such differences in competence are less noticeable than in many other spheres, especially in the field of judicial competence.

The Constitution regulates the *Riigikogu*'s competence, in the realm of foreign relations, in two chapters: in Chapter IV, titled 'Riigikogu', as well as in Chapter IX, titled 'Foreign relations and foreign treaties'. Chapter IV regulates the *Riigikogu*'s competence generally, while Chapter IX relates to issues dealing with both foreign treaties as well as foreign relations generally, and also encompassing, in addition to the *Riigikogu*'s competence, other institutions as well. The Constitutional Assembly based Chapter IX on the draft presented by Jüri Raidla's Working Group (*EVPk*, 2008, p. 527; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 587). The proposal to title the Chapter 'Foreign relations and foreign treaties' was made by Professor Ilmar Rebane in his expert opinion of 26 November 1991 (*Põhiseadus ja Põhiseaduse…*, 1997, p. 1286). The competence of the President and the Government of the Republic, in the realm of foreign relations, are additionally regulated in Chapters V and VI of the Constitution.

Section 4 of the Constitution gives the institutions implementing Estonia's state power (the *Riigikogu*, the President of the Republic, the Government of

the Republic, and the courts) the general competence to act on the basis of the separation of power and a principle of balance. And in this context, the *Riigikogu* is the first to be listed, which refers to its central role as a body having the public's direct mandate. At the same time, this principle does not give the *Riigikogu* the right to reduce or increase the competence of any body, since competence is derived from the Constitution itself (*EVPk*, 2002, p. 352; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 416). According to Section 59, the *Riigikogu* is the legislative power, on the basis of which, Section 65 stipulates that the *Riigikogu* has the competence to pass laws regulating foreign relations (Clause 1), as well as to ratify and denounce international legal instruments in the foreign relations field (conventions, international treaties that fall under the competence of the *Riigikogu* on the basis of Section 121). Moreover, the *Riigikogu* formalizes the ratification of a foreign treaty with an appropriate law (*EVPk*, 2002, p. 382; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 449).

Despite the wording of the Constitution, Uibopuu is of the opinion that the *Riigikogu* actually gives approval for treaties, so that the term ratification is used, in this context, inaccurately. Ratification traditionally refers to an internal legal instrument, with which the state expresses its willingness to be associated with the treaty in question. This is established by Article 14 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Thus, using international law as a base, we can definitely use the term "ratify" to refer only to the legal instrument of a higher state body, hereby not taking into consideration the state's internal division of competence, and irrespective of the terminology used in constitutional law. It is wrong to talk about "parliamentary ratification" since parliament does nothing more than authorizes the director of the executive body to do the ratifying (see Ago, 1965, p. 71). Only if representing the state internationally had not been placed in the competence of the president, would it be possible to accept the parliament's totally unusual function as a representative body in the foreign policy realm (Uibopuu, 1993, pp. 21–23). Uibopuu justifies his position by comparing his quotes with excerpts from the texts of the Constitutions of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany. But such an interpretation can be regarded as being arbitrary for the sake of increasing the competence of the executive at the expense of the legislature. In Estonia, the president is not the head of the executive body, but rather, a stabilizer between the various bodies having power. But the competencies and the wording are not just incidental, and the president's autonomous decision-making power, due to his position in the state's judicial system, is much more limited than Uibopuu interprets it as being.

The *Riigikogu* cannot share its competence in the foreign relations realm directly with the public. Section 106 of the Constitution categorically does not provide the

opportunity for carrying out a referendum for, among other things, settling issues in connection with ratifying or denouncing foreign treaties. At the same time, the Constitution does not forbid the asking, by means of a referendum, the public for its opinion concerning issues dealing with foreign policy (Section 105). Clause 11, of Section 59, of the Constitution gives the *Riigikogu* the competence to present applications, declarations, and inquiries to other states and international organizations. And Clause 16 gives the *Riigikogu* the right to solve other national issues that the Constitution has not assigned to the competence of the President of the Republic, the Government of the Republic, other state bodies, or local governments. This also encompasses the realm of foreign relations, allowing the *Riigikogu*, within the framework of the Constitution, to decide for itself which competence to implement, which one to delegate, in accordance with the law, to the government, to state bodies, or to local governments. There still remains the question of whether the *Riigikogu* may delegate a particular competence to the President of the Republic, since the competence of the president is exhaustively specified in Section 78 of the Constitution.

Uibopuu thinks that it is questionable whether the applications, declarations, and inquiries adopted by the *Riigikogu* and directed to other states and international organizations are, without special authorization, binding for the state. But, from an international law standpoint, this is not problematic if these statements have been agreed upon with the bodies having the proper competence in the realm of foreign relations. It would become problematic if the *Riigikogu* would, "on its own", try to involve the Republic of Estonia in international relations, if this action has not been coordinated with the president, or the head of the government, or the foreign minister. Another state cannot *bone fide* imply that it had believed the foreign policy competence of the parliament, since besides the competence to give general consent for treaties or certain types of treaties, parliaments, as a rule, do not have the legal presumption to deal in these matters. But a state can, from an international law standpoint, be held responsible for parliament's relevant activities, or more correctly, for its non-activities. This happens when parliament does not accept certain laws that international justice, or international treaties, would call for (Uibopuu, 1993, pp. 19–20).

From this Uibopuu chain of thought it can be assumed that international law limits a parliament's competence in the realm of foreign relations to a formality, even if the state's laws grant parliament a central role in the nation's international relations. Despite the fact that international law does not presume that previous authorization to represent a state would be given to only a head of state, a head of government, and a foreign minister, it is quite possible to reach such a conclusion. In itself, it would be quite strange if parliament ignored, in

the realm of foreign relations, the state's executive body, even if parliament had the right to do so. In a parliamentary state, parliament may dismiss the government, and in a situation in which the government's actions are no longer in compliance with the positions of the majority of the parliament, this is, as a rule, what ends up happening. A problem may arise with a head of state, if the dismissing of the head of state is not part of parliament's competence. Thus, a dual power situation could arise, meaning that both parties have legitimate authority and power.

But then the question arises of how to solve the situation in which a representative of the executive power has, by surpassing their authorization, taken commitments upon the state? The state is definitely internationally responsible for these results, but, at the same time, the state cannot allow this unlawful activity to forever hinder its sovereignty. Possibly, in this connection, it might be necessary, in the realm of international competence, to amend the *ex officio* determining of competence. In practice, such limits have been set even by just not recognizing the competence of a head of state or head of government by no longer recognizing the legitimacy of the individual's power. For instance, in some cases when the credentials for power have been seized by means of a coup (Honduras in 2009). But it is complicated to adapt such a precedent to a situation in which the head of state's credentials are legitimate, but that they have, during their time in power, begun to violate the constitution.

Section 120 of the Constitution specifies that legislation will establish how the Republic of Estonia relates with other states and international organizations. This is not very widespread in the realm of international relations. In many states, there is no specialized legislation regulating foreign relations, since the constitution, conventions, international treaties, and the bases for functioning in the realm of foreign relations that are acquired through practice are regarded as being sufficient. But, in Estonia, legislation regulating foreign relations, based upon the Constitution, is necessary, since the *Riigikogu* is the only body with competence in stipulating the general bases for operating procedures in the realm of foreign relations, while the Government, in this realm, has only the function of fulfilling the tasks specified in the relevant legislation. The Government does not have the competence to prescribe, with its own legal instruments, operating procedures in the realm of foreign relations (*EVPk*, 2002, p. 528; *EVPk*, 2008, pp. 587–588). At the same time, the Foreign Relations Act is not a constitutional law, but the Constitution does not provide for the possibility of delegating the prescribing of operating procedures in the realm of foreign relations to the executive body (the Government).

Section 121 of the Constitution establishes the competence of the *Riigikogu* regarding international treaties, stipulating that the *Riigikogu* ratify or denounce foreign treaties that alter the nation's borders; for the implementation of which it is necessary to adopt, change, or repeal Estonian legislation; on the basis of which Estonia joins international organizations or alliances; with which the state accepts military or material commitments; or which call for ratification.

Thus, in conjunction with the other provisions of the Constitution, for ratification it is necessary to have a simple majority of votes in the *Riigikogu*, except when material commitments are being made (Section 104, Clause 15), in which case it is necessary to have the approval of a majority of the members of the *Riigikogu*, or if the nation's borders are being altered, when a two-thirds majority of the members of the *Riigikogu* is needed. Thus, the specified international treaties cannot be regarded as being compulsory and binding in regards to the Republic of Estonia without the approval of the *Riigikogu*, even if the text of the treaty has been signed by an authorized representative of the state (*EVPk*, 2002, p. 534; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 590). The *Riigikogu* does not have to ratify, nor cannot even ratify, all foreign treaties. The cases when an international treaty must be either ratified or denounced are thoroughly, or completely, listed in Section 121 of the Constitution (*EVPk*, 2002, p. 532; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 589). Other treaties are ratified by the Government.

In addition to the ratifying of treaties, the *Riigikogu*'s competence encompasses the establishing of reservations (saving clauses) to the extent that a particular treaty allows this (*EVPk*, 2002, p. 534; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 590).

Section 123 of the Constitution sets a restriction upon the competence of the *Riigikogu* to conclude international treaties, specifying that the Republic of Estonia does not conclude international treaties that are in contravention of the Constitution. It is unclear what the consequences would be if the *Riigikogu* ratified a treaty that is in contravention of the Constitution. The *Riigikogu* would not be penalized as a result of this, and Estonia has committed itself, on the basis of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to fulfilling all concluded treaties. At the same time, the Constitution has pre-eminence over international treaties (*EVPk*, 2002, p. 550; *EVPk*, 2008, p. 611; Uibopuu, 1998, p. 187).

So, the question arises, is the treaty, in this case, null and void for Estonia, or does Estonia have to deal with the commitments that accompany it? On the other hand, according to the Constitution, international treaties that have been ratified by the *Riigikogu* have legal priority over domestic legislation, since the same Section 123 stipulates that if Estonian laws, or other legal instruments,

contradict an international treaty that has been ratified by the *Riigikogu*, then the provisions of the international treaty will be implemented.

The Constitution also stipulates the competence of the President of the Republic and the Government of the Republic in the conducting of foreign relations. On the basis of Section 78 of the Constitution, the president represents the Republic of Estonia in the realm of international relations (Clause 1), and signs instruments of ratification (Clause 6). Likewise, the competence of the president encompasses the appointing and recalling of Estonia's diplomatic representatives on the basis of recommendations made by the Government, the acceptance of the letters of credence of the diplomatic representatives of other states (Clause 2), and the appointing of diplomatic ranks (Clause 15). Thus, the powers of the President of the Republic in the realm of foreign relations are, primarily, ceremonial and protocol-related, but the authorized political competence is extremely broad. In the realm of foreign relations, the president has complete sovereignty, not being answerable to any institution. According to the Vienna Convention, the president has the right to sign treaties without having been formally delegated to do so, and the Constitution does not limit this power of the president (as opposed to the constitutions of some other states, like that of Finland).

According to Section 87 of the Constitution, the Government of the Republic implements the state's foreign policy (Clause 1); arranges for the implementation of laws, the decisions of the *Riigikogu*, and the legal instruments of the President of the Republic (Clause 3); presents international treaties to the *Riigikogu* for ratification or denunciation (Clause 4); as well as arranges for the implementation of relations with other states. Thus, the Government operates within the competence stipulated by law and the *Riigikogu*. The Government has an extensive independent competence within the process of ratifying international treaties, since the Government is not required to obtain the *Riigikogu*'s approval for the concluding of treaties that do not need to be ratified by the *Riigikogu*. But the *Riigikogu* does not have the competence to independently conclude, ratify, or denounce international treaties, being able to do so only at the Government's initiative (Section 87, Clause 4). Thus, the *Riigikogu*'s competence to conclude international treaties is considerably limited by the competence granted to the Government.

The Constitution does not stipulate the competence of other government bodies in the realm of carrying out foreign relations. This is done according to relevant laws and government regulations. And according to Clause 2 of Section 87, the directing and coordinating of this activity is within the competence of the Government.

5. The competence of the Riigikogu in comparison with the competence of the parliaments of some other European states in the realm of conducting foreign relations

When the competence of the *Riigikogu* is compared to that of other parliaments, it can be said that the *Riigikogu*'s competence is fairly typical for a parliamentary democracy, encompassing the ratification of the more essential international treaties, the determining of general foreign policy trends, holding regular debates concerning foreign policy, participating in the work of the assemblies of international organizations, and developing relations with the parliaments of other states. But the implementation of foreign policy falls within the competence of the Government, and the *Riigikogu* does not have significant opportunities to become involved in this. In comparison, use has been made of a study conducted, at the author's request, by the Economic and Social Information Department of the Chancellery of the Riigikogu, that presents an overview of the procedures being implemented in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden (*MSI*, 2008).

In all the states having been observed, the negotiation and the concluding processes involved with entering into an international treaty are, without exception, within the competency of the executive body. The states were chosen, primarily, on the basis of the availability of adequate information and sources concerning this issue.

Although practical experiences differ, parliament's role in the concluding process of an international treaty is not essential so much in the negotiating and bargaining phase, but rather, at the stage of implementing international agreements and treaties: before a treaty is implemented, the legislative body also has its say (to a greater or lesser degree). At the same time, it must be kept in mind that often the competence to authorize an international treaty does not, after all, mean parliament's direct and actual involvement in the concluding process or negotiations of international treaties. Actual involvement is dependent rather on traditions (not on the constitution), according to which, parliament has the opportunity to make appropriate proposals to the government. For instance, the Czech parliament has the right to adopt a resolution with which the government is asked to also involve the parliament in the negotiations of an international treaty, although such a resolution is not binding for the government. The Austrian parliament has a fairly similar mechanism. But it is complicated to carry out and present such a comparative analysis of customs and traditions, so that, therefore, it is hard to individually evaluate, state-by-state, the extent

to which the various parliaments are involved in the process of concluding international treaties.

The role of parliament in the ratifying of international treaties can be quite varied from state to state. In most states, the approval of the legislative body is required only for treaties dealing with certain matters (almost without exception, when it would be necessary to amend domestic legislation, or to adopt new legislation, and/or when a whole list of conditions are specifically specified in the constitution, as in the case of Germany). The spheres in which the approval of the legislative body is most commonly required are of essential political, economic, or social importance (the altering of national borders, financial commitments). To a certain extent, parliament's role in coordinating amendments to legislation, or in adopting new legislation so that domestic legislation would be in accordance with the commitments about to be assumed in connection with an about to be concluded international treaty, can also be regarded as being part of the aforementioned ratification competence.

But, among the states being studied, there was not a single case in which parliament did not play some kind of role in the ratification of international treaties. There are even states where parliament's approval is required for the ratification of all international treaties (for instance, Columbia and Mexico). An essential difference often exists between unitary and federal states: for instance, to conclude an international treaty in Germany, if it affects the individual states, it is necessary to obtain the approval of the individual state parliaments. Similarly, in Belgium, the regional parliaments are involved in the ratification process of international treaties, if these treaties directly affect the regions. Generally, it can, superficially, be said that the more essential the treaty, the more parliament is involved in the negotiations, although, in the case of concluding most international treaties, the national parliament has a consultative role.

In summary: in the case of the states studied, in can be concluded that in most cases the executive body conducts negotiations as well as ratifies international treaties. The legislative body, parliament, is included only in the case of very essential (political) treaties. In Belgium and Sweden, there is the possibility of also involving, in the ratification process of international treaties, other institutions like the National Council and the Foreign Relations Council (although these just have a consultative role). As a rule, parliaments are unconditionally included in cases where the international treaty involves the amending of the constitution.

Conclusions

Estonia's foreign relations began to be restored during the transition period, starting in 1988. From a legal viewpoint, this was carried out by the Supreme Soviet, which was not a legitimate Estonian state body, but which, in accordance with the laws of the occupying Soviet powers, fulfilled the role of a legislative body. Soviet legislation gave the Supreme Soviets of the Republics limited authority to develop foreign relations, which actually did not exist. During the transition period, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR was able to start making use of these provisions. Thus, the Supreme Soviet, partially taking advantage of Soviet legislation and partially making use of precedents, assumed the functions of both the legislative and the foreign policy bodies of an independent state.

The competence of the legitimate parliament, the *Riigikogu*, first elected in 1992, is, generally, the same as in other democratic states. The *Riigikogu*, just as is the case in other states, makes use, within legitimate limits, of the usual forms of international parliamentary communicating. This activity tends to be limited by the relatively small number of the members of the *Riigikogu* (101) and its limited budget.

The competence of the *Riigikogu* for ratifying treaties is similar, primarily, to that which exists in the Northern European parliamentary democracies, especially Latvia, Lithuania, and the Nordic Countries. At the same time, the ratification process in Estonia is fairly simple, compared to, for instance, Belgium. The differences are greater in the case of states where treaties are ratified by the head of state (a monarch or a president). But even in those countries parliament has a significant opportunity for playing a role, in the form of granting its approval, or by making use of various traditions (United Kingdom).

When comparing democratic states, it becomes apparent that foreign policy is within the competence of the executive body both in parliamentary as well as presidential states. And parliament's competence, as well as its opportunities, to influence the state's constantly developing foreign policy are limited. The determining of the general orientation of the state's foreign policy is, actually, placed in the competence of the electorate, since foreign policy choices can be the subject of election debates. And the political powers winning the election also determine the rearrangements in the foreign policy sphere. But this does not increase parliament's role in shaping foreign policy.

Paradoxically, on the basis of the Estonian experience, it becomes apparent that during a transition period, when the separation of powers is hazy, parliament's

role could be greater than under constitutional conditions, since, so as to involve people with the appropriate competence, it becomes compellingly necessary to make use of untraditional forms of cooperation based upon competency. This is demonstrated by Estonia's experience, and also by how Latvia and Lithuania represented themselves abroad in the realm of foreign relations.

The author does not have relevant data concerning the experiences of Central European states and those which were formerly part of the Soviet Union. All the aforementioned did not demonstrate the strength of parliamentarianism, but rather illustrated a situation in which parliament's functions had not yet clearly developed. Individual members of parliament were included in the development of international relations due to their personal connections and abilities, but not as institutional representatives of the legislative body. Jaan Tõnisson, as a member of the Founding Assembly, back when the Republic of Estonia was first created, and Marju Lauristin, as a member of the Supreme Council, represented Estonia in the realm of foreign relations as extensions of the executive body, but not as representatives of the people's assembly. But, as people's delegates, they noticeably influenced the government's foreign policy decisions, which, in conditions where the separation of powers exists, the legislative body, or a member of the legislative body, could not do. With the consolidation of parliamentary democracy, such shifts in competence ended.

This leads to the intriguing question of whether such activity, based upon competency and ignoring institutionality, was beneficial or not, and whether a strict separation of powers is even appropriate for a small state? From the viewpoint of making maximum use of potential abilities, obviously not, but from the viewpoint of the stability of democracy as a system, this issue is worth discussing. Untraditional diplomacy was, in the course of a transition period, in many ways, the only alternative, since a professional diplomatic corps just did not exist. And a strictly institutional route would not have been available for the development of Estonia's foreign relations. At the same time, it is obvious that for properly shaping a democratic society, it was necessary to develop an institutional social structure. In long-time democracies, where it has not been necessary to go through a transition period, such an alternative process for developing foreign relations might seem to be incomprehensible.

At this point, it would be appropriate to once again touch upon the subject of the legal and political competence of parliament. The author has so far not seen any studies that have brought forth the differences between the legal and political competence of parliament, and therefore makes use of his own experiences, observations, and analyses. The most obvious difference between legal and

political competence becomes apparent in a dictatorship, where the actual running of the state is not based upon laws, but rather, upon informal power relationships. Thus, in Nazi Germany, the Constitution of the Weimar Republic was never repealed, but, in practice, it was not observed. Which, among other things, made it possible to do away with the functions of a people's assembly, to establish Adolf Hitler's dictatorship, and to implement extensive repressions against political opponents as well as minorities (primarily Jews, but also sexual minorities, the disabled, etc.). In the Soviet Union, there existed a constitution from 1936 to 1977, which was, at one time, regarded as being the world's most democratic. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the running of the country by completely ignoring the constitution. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as the people's assembly and legislative body, was elected non-democratically, and it completely lacked the right to make independent decisions.

It would, of course, seem to be natural that in a democratic state, based on the rule of law, there cannot be such a divergence between legal and political competence. But that is not the way things are. The political competencies that have developed in practice do not contradict, in a normative sense, what is stipulated in relevant legislation, but, nevertheless, do comply with the power structures that have evolved through practice. As a result of this, the political competence of the executive body of a parliamentary state, for instance, ends up being, in reality, somewhat broader than the legal framework would assume. But in such a situation, parliament's competence is limited to the fulfilling of formalities. At times, such a concentration of power in the hands of the Government can lead to such arrogance that members of the Government no longer bother to coordinate their activities with parliament, being confident that no one will dismiss them. Parliament would have the right to do this, but the results of this would be so unpleasant that a governing coalition would not start changing the personnel of the Government in such a manner. At the same time, the government coalition votes for a draft act introduced by the Government, regardless of whether they are aware of the potential results of this legislation, and whether the particular members of parliament who vote for the draft are actually informed about whether they are fulfilling or breaking their election promises. At the same time, the Government does not even promote the draft introduced in parliament, not even bothering to justify why, and just referring to the fact that the Government itself will deal with the issue (*Eesti Vabariigi Valitsuse...*, 2009).

And in foreign relations, such legal and political convolutions are even noticeably more pronounced than when dealing with domestic issues.

Nevertheless, it is not just a minor question whether parliament, delegating a large part of its power, especially in the foreign policy realm, to the government, is not, in a national sense, distancing essential decision-making from itself and the people. The delegating of power is not an objective in itself, but a realistic endeavour to try to cope in the international arena. But here, a very delicate situation could develop, in which the government takes advantage of its competence to assume irreversible international commitments upon the state, which are not acceptable for either the people or their legislative representatives. Estonia was in such a situation during the concluding of the so-called July Treaties in 1994. (The July Treaties were the treaties that were concluded between Estonia and Russia, on the basis of which, Russian military forces were withdrawn from Estonia, but which, at the same time, enabled the demobilization of a large number of Russian professional military personnel in Estonia, and ensured unprecedented social benefits for them – *Author's note*.) Later, the treaty had to be ratified by the *Riigikogu*, but it did so, practically, over a barrel, since the commitments that had been assumed for the state with the signing of the treaty, could not be annulled. Thus, the question also arises in the foreign policy realm, of how, in a democratic state, the people are actually represented in the governing of the state, and whether parliament, as the representative of the people, has a realistic chance to participate in the making of foreign policy decisions that are formulated by a limited circle of officials, but which affect the whole nation.

Analysing who actually makes decisions in the foreign policy realm, the foreign policy expert Eiki Berg recognizes that 'experts are the ones from whose pens appear political analyses that bear practical weight, or foreign policy doctrines. Having influential positions in society as scientists, government officials, or journalists, many experts are able to influence foreign policy' (Berg, 2002, p. 13). Former Foreign Minister Jüri Luik has stated that

> *foreign policy was in the hands of a very small circle, and basically, the Foreign Ministry dealt with it, to which the delegation (this refers to the Estonian-Russian negotiations, which resulted in the concluding of the so-called July Treaties – Author's note) belonged. The role of the Riigikogu was very small. In retrospect, it is possible to criticize or evaluate – was it good or bad, but the facts remain. (Berg, 2002, p. 92)*

These views clearly show how far decision-making in the foreign policy realm actually is from the legislator who is responsible to the people, among other things, for the activities and developments in the foreign policy realm.

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The Comparative Analysis of Fundamental Assumptions of Russians in Estonia and in Russia

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Abstract

The current paper focuses on the analysis of fundamental beliefs of and expectations for the world as a whole and the self in this world of Russians in Estonia and Russians in Russia. The overall objective is to examine the principal models and controversies of national and ethnocultural processes of ethnic Russians living in different sociocultural contexts in Estonia and Russia. The research products will be realised by integrating the theoretical and methodological work on ethnopsychology and sociology of culture, and by using the data, collected by the authors. On the basis of the research analysis, we intend to give a better understanding of the possibilities for dealing preventively with ethnopolitical and multicultural conflict situations and traumatic experience of migration.

Keywords: *ethnocultural processes, ethnopsychology, Russia, Estonia*

Theoretical background

We can predict certain ways of individual and social behaviour of people, if we do have knowledge of the division of norms, values and beliefs by which they categorise the events, and of the shared beliefs and ways of communication, they value the most significant.

From the point of view of the cultural-historical approach to psychology

(L.S. Vygotsky, A.N. Leontev, M. Cole, etc.), one of the basic laws of the development of human mentality consists in interiorisation by the individual of its external, sociosymbolic structure, which is joint with others and mediated by signs and activity. As a result, the former structure of mental functions as "natural" changes, i.e., is mediated by the interiorisated signs, such that mental functions will become cultural.

Vygotsky has formulated "the law of cultural development", according to which in human development intermental (interaction between people) precedes intramental (complex processes in mentality of the separate individual) and creates conditions for it (Vygotsky, 1983). In the process of formation of human culture, cultural mediation creates such a type of development at which activity of the previous generations collects in the present as specifically human components of environment, and influences behaviour of the person.

Sorokin, developing ideas about a threefold unity of culture, the person and society, asserted that there cannot be a person as founder, the bearer and the user of values and norms without cooperating in cultures and societies. For with a lack of culture and a society, there can be only isolated biological individuals (Sorokin, 1992, 193).

Thus, the thought is affirmed in the 20th century psychology that the development of the person goes from the sociocultural world of the society to the individual world of the person. The representatives of the scientific direction "culture and the person" (P. Benedict, K. Dubo., M. Mid, D. Honingman), which emerged in the 1920s and the 1930s, saw the problem as one of finding out how the individual operates, thinks, and feels in specific cultural contexts.

In modern European and American psychology, it is possible to distinguish two basic directions in studying the connection between cultural and psychological (first of all, personal) characteristics: 1) psychological anthropology (Hsu, 1961) and 2) comparative cultural, or cross-country cultural psychology (Cole, 1997).

A researcher working within the framework of psychological anthropology aspires to understand the phenomenon in itself, to show the presence of regular connections between the internal world of the person (a psychological variable) and ethnocultural variables.

In comparative cultural anthropology, a universal approach is used for explaining the studied phenomenon. According to the approach of cross-cultural psychology, similarities and differences of psychological variables are studied in

various cultures and ethnic communities. "Objective" methods – psychological tests, standardised interviews, the content analysis of the maintenance of cultural products, etc., which can be applied to various cultures – are thus used.
At the same time, it is necessary to keep in mind the essence of cultural context when, for example, specificity of the European-American culture is imposed on phenomena of other cultural systems (Triandis, 2007).

Today, in the scope of ethnopsychological research, it is possible to distinguish three theoretical orientations: relativism, absolutism and the universalism. Supporters of the cultural relativism believe that all psychological phenomena are caused by the cultural context; absolutists, on the contrary, ignore distinction between cultures, and universalists their similarity. Now, however, the general movement to universalism (Stefanenko, 1997, 73) is observed.

The supporters of universalism believe that fundamental psychological processes are general for all the individuals, but on their display the greater influence is rendered by culture (Berry et al., 2002, 326). Such universal constructs as the motivation of achievements, uneasiness, an extraversion-introversion, a control locus, a social distance, etc. were investigated in different cultures, and the received results yielded sociocultural interpretation (Berry et al., 2002; Semin, Zwier, 1997; Diaz-Loving, 1998).

It is necessary to note that there are various definitions of culture – "culture is a set of programs of a reinforcement" (Skinner, 1981), "the culture is similar to the computer program supervising behaviour" (Hofstede, 1991) etc. Triandis considers that the most universal definition of culture was given by Herskovits, having defined culture "as a part of environment which is created by the person" (Herskovits, 1955). This definition allows to speak of the objective culture (furniture, tools, planes), and the subjective culture (categories, norms, roles and values) (Triandis, 1972).

Psychological interests, developed in culture, and features of the relation of the person, transferred from generation to generation to the world – values, interests, beliefs and expectations, ethical standards – form the basis for his decisions and actions (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, Bardi, 2001; Smith, Schwartz 1997). There is an opinion that research of values is now the most important and actual direction of ethnopsychology (Lebedeva, 2000). In their research, universalists, studying various cultures, try to find out similarity and to allocate some fundamental valuable measurements by which cultures can be compared. They recognise that cultural values problems are reflected in any society faces (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 2007).

Thereupon the concept of an accessory to culture with a reference to the representatives of diasporas in a society with dominant status, and the culture of ethnic majority groups is also becoming topical. What system of values, for example, will dominate at the Russian in Estonia? Would this system of values coincide with the values of Estonians, or with the values of Russians in Russia, or would it differ from both? A researcher of the mentality of diaspora, Levin, writes that the life on a foreign land is noted by the change of an ethnocultural scale of values and stereotypes. In the mentality of diaspora, ethnocultural dominants are inevitably "greased" under the influence of social environment (Levin, 2001, 131).

Having set the task of empirical research of stereotypes of the national identity of Russians, we also take in consideration the existence in modern social psychology the divergence between the objective supervision, attributing Russians low level of "rational self-control" and "self-confidence in behaviour", and the subjective judgements of people from the Western countries, attributing Russians rather a high level under these factors (Peabody, 1985). For example, Peabody's psychosemantic analysis of the stereotypes of Russian character have revealed that Russians judge Russians as people with low level of "rational self-control" and "self-confidence", though they attribute the given lines to themselves to a lesser degree than to the stereotypified image of "a typical Russian" (Peabody, 1993).

Hypotheses of the given research paper rest on the following assumptions:

- the research will reveal distinctions in fundamental values and expectations of Russians in Estonia and Russians in Russia as the individuals of one ethnocultural group, but living in different sociocultural contexts;

- differences in fundamental beliefs and expectations of an ethnic Russian in Estonia and in Russia will specify that a Russian in Estonia can be included in the group, worrying about traumatic experience of migration.

Thus, ***the object of research*** are fundamental beliefs and expectations concerning the world as a whole and the self in this world of a Russian in Estonia and a Russian in Russia.

In the opinion of the authors of the given paper, the approach of Hofstede and Triandis, based on the comparison of cultures on the system of values, is sound and productive. Unfortunately, today models of Triandis and Hofstede are practically not spread in Russia and in the Baltic States, since their techniques

are not yet adapted for the Russian-speaking respondents. Therefore, we have chosen a technique of the research of fundamental assumptions about the world of Ronni Janoff-Bulman, as it is adapted in Russia and was applied to research of fundamental beliefs and expectations of the members of various ethnocultural groups, including those, who had endured various kinds of traumatic experience (see *Psychological help to migrants* by G.U. Soldatova, 2002).

Fundamental or base assumptions about the world, about its favour or animosities, about accident or the law of occurring events, about the value of own "Self", about the degree of possible influence on occurring events, etc., are inherent in any culture. Similar beliefs and expectations underlie a fundamental design of mentality. On the other hand, fundamental beliefs and expectations are formed in various sociocultural contexts and are directly associated with the basic values of a certain culture. The author of the methodology considers that at the heart of that image of the world, which we mentally design, three basic assumptions lie:

- the assumption of favour of the world;
- the assumption of intelligence of the world;
- the assumption of the value of own "Self"

(Janoff-Bulman and Frieze, 1983, and Janoff-Bulman 1985, 1989).

According to Janoff-Bulman, we believe that we are good people living in a benevolent and intelligent world. And it does not narrow any assumption, and extremely abstract concept in which basis lies our fundamental trust to the world and its acceptance (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, 12). Essential point of the given fundamental beliefs and expectations is that in ontogenesis are the earliest and first assumptions of the world (Erik Erikson, Benjamin Spock, W.R.D. Fairbairn).

Ronni Janoff-Bulman has developed a method of inquiring, "the scale of base belief" (World Assumption Scale-WAS), on the basis of the theory about the fundamental beliefs and expectations. The questionnaire, consisting of thirty-two statements, allows to estimate further named scales of fundamental beliefs in eight basic categories:

1) Favour of the world (BW, benevolence of world);
2) Kindness of people (BP, benevolence of people);
3) Justice of the world (J, justice);
4) Controllability of the world (C, control);

5) Accident as a principle of the distribution of occurring events (R, randomness);
6) Value of own "Self" (SW, self-worth);
7) Self-control degree, or the control over occurring events (SC, self-control);
8) Good luck, or luck degree (L, luckiness).

The authors of the given article investigated fundamental beliefs and expectations of the representatives of Russian diaspora in Estonia, who have grown up there after the restoration of the independent statehood in 1991, that is, have been born in Estonia (over 90 percent of the sample), or have arrived to Estonia together with their parents at a very early age (up to three years).

The research was conducted in 2006. The students of high schools of Tallinn (Estonia) and Belgorod (Russia) were interrogated to achieve two groups of respondents:

- "Russian in Estonia" (sample RE, 232 people);
- "Russian in Russia" (sample RR, 260 people).

Demographical variables were also considered. A Russian hereinafter means a respondent, who identifies himself with the Russian culture and language.

Research results

Descriptive statistics. If to compare the absolute level of descriptive statistics (averages, medians and quartiles) of scales at each sample, the average higher level is observed at a Russian in Estonia than at a Russian in Russia (averages on all scales 4.06 and 3.97, an average level of a median 4.12 and 4.03 accordingly). Thus, the level of a variation of estimations at a Russian in Estonia is lower (an average level of a standard deviation on scales 0.76 in comparison with 0.86 at a Russian in Russia).

A Russian in Estonia's two scales (SW – Value of own "Self" and BW – Favour of the world) have high levels of an estimation of the above mentioned fundamental beliefs, considerably allocated among others scales (medians are almost equal; 4.5 and 4.4 accordingly). At a Russian in Russia no scales are marked with so high level of a median. Regarding the scales with much lower level of median compared with other scales' level of medians, the Estonian sample shows presence of only one such scale (J – Justice of the world, the

median 3.78), and the Russian sample – two scales (J – Justice of the world, and L – Good luck; medians 3.75 and 3.75 accordingly).
Therefore, a Russian in Estonia is more highly appreciating the value of own "Self" and the favour of the world around that as a whole can be specified in a positive background of fundamental assumptions. Thus, it does not reveal hypothetically expected signs of traumatic experience.

Comparison of averages. Distinction of averages for two independent samples "Russian in Estonia" (RE) and "Russian in Russia" (RR) for each scale was separately tested by nonparametric criterion of the Mann-Whitney U test, as the most powerful nonparametric alternative t – criterion.

It was found out that there is statistically significant difference of fundamental beliefs between given samples RE and RR in the following scales.

- BW – Favour of the world (the importance p = 0.000, sample RE has an average rank 266.00 and sample RR – 229.10).
- SW – Value of own "Self" (the importance p = 0.0015, sample RE has the sum an average rank 268.01 and sample RR – 227.31).
- L – Good luck, or luck degree (the importance p = 0.0009, sample RE has the sum of rank 269.11 and sample RR – 226.33).

Of the five scales from eight, significant distinctions were not revealed about the following:

BP – Kindness of people,
J – Justice of the world,
C – Controllability of the world,
R – Accident,
SC – Control over events.

Three scales (BW – Favour of the world, SW – Value of own "Self" and L – Good luck, or luck degree), on which statistically significant distinctions are found out, have an orientation of distinctions towards excess of estimations at sample RE in comparison with sample RR.

It shows that, in comparison with a Russian in Russia, a Russian in Estonia:

- is more convinced in the favour of the world;
- is more convinced in the value of own "Self";
- more highly appreciates the degree of luck in life.

The comparison of the scales of fundamental beliefs of the RE and RR samples confirm the assumption that the ethnocultural accessory to migrants (even of their second and third generation) is, nevertheless, a primary factor forming their representations about the world (Levin, 2001). We see that statistically significant distinctions prove to be true only for three scales, while fundamental beliefs on five scales speak about the absence of distinctions.

In this respect, our initial conclusion will be that a Russian in Estonia is, first of all, a person with fundamental beliefs and social psychological characteristics inherent in Russian culture.

On the other hand, available distinctions testify to favourable enough experience of life in compelled emigration, as in comparison with a compatriot in Russia, a Russian in Estonia has a stronger conviction in such vital values as representation about favour of the world, about the importance of own "Self", about the degree of own good luck.

The last essentially differs from the negatively painted reflexion of emigrant experience, which are available in the Russian press of Estonia and on the Russian ideological information field. Aksel Kirch and Tarmo Tuisk have mentioned in their work that: "The role of Russia's media and the internet cannot be underestimated in the case of Estonian Russians (as this forms their strongest "core" evaluative dimension). Unfortunately interpretation of the Soviet Union's (including Estonia's) history in some certain aspects remains unchanged. This is also why there are young Russians who still have a one-sided cliché in their minds, for instance about II World War. Although most of these young Russians have learned the state language (Estonian) and as we see this is a precondition for integration, we still cannot take this fact as an indicator of a successful integration process in all of its comprehensiveness." (Kirch and Tuisk, 2008, 90)

On the contrary, it is possible to assume that the RE sample has gained positive experience due to residing as the second generation of emigrants to the member country within the European Union on the objectively higher economic level (for example, by widespread criterion of economic development of a country, the gross national product, corrected on parity of purchasing capacity of national currency, was $ 15,800 per capita in Russia in 2008, and in Estonia – $ 21,200 (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/RS.html).

The factor analysis

As a selection method the analysis of the main components, thus the quantity of the selected factors has served was equated to number of own values surpassing the unit. A method of repeated rotation of matrix Varimax was allocated for factorial variables. A selection of components on the basis of the analysis of factorial loadings (correlation factors between scales and factors) made it possible to explain the selected factors.

As a result of factorization, three generalised variables (factors) have been allocated, by which it was possible to find a semantic explanation, and give the verbal characteristic by means of following expressions: 1) "the world is fine" 2) "all fairly and controllable" and 3) "the value of self" and "good luck".

Russian in Russia. Having arranged the scales, which had entered into allocated factors on decrease of factorial loadings and having excluded from consideration of a scale with factorial loadings less than 0.4, the following configuration of factors came out. (Factorial loading is shown in brackets, and approximate verbal interpretation of factors is given in the form of the names of factors.)

Factor 1 "the world is fine":

BW – Favour of the world (0.789)
BP – Kindness of people (0.869)

Factor 2 "all fairly and controllable":

C – Controllability of the world (0.776)
SC – Self-control degree, or the control over occurring events (0.762)
J – Justice of the world (0.540)

Factor 3 "the value of self" and "good luck":

SW – Value of own "Self" (0.787)
L – Good luck, or luck degree (0.561)

At a Russian in Russia, the first factor explains 20.4 % , the second factor of 21.8 % and the third factor of 15.8 % of the total dispersion. Thus is the second factor variable the most important in the system of fundamental beliefs.

Russian in Estonia. The first factor explains 22.0 %, the second factor of 20.3 % and the third factor of 14.8 % of the total dispersion. For the given sample, the scale of fundamental beliefs, listed in the decreasing order of the absolute value of factor loading, is distributed between the allocated factors as the following.

Factor 1 "the world is fine":

BW – Favour of the world (0.779)
BP – Kindness of people (0.703)
J – Justice of the world (0.552)
L – Degree of good luck (0.450)

Factor 2 "all fairly and controllable":

SC – Self-control degree, or the control over occurring events (0.792)
C – Controllability of the world (0.717)
J – Justice of the world (0.492)

Factor 3 "the value of self" and "good luck":

SW – Value of own "Self" (0.889)
L – Good luck, or luck degree (0.446)

Comparison of the RE and RR samples on the basis of the factor analysis

Janoff-Bulmann's description of the research methodology of the assumptions about the world, included in the book, edited by Soldatova (Psychological help to migrants, M, 2002), offers the list of the generalised variables received on the basis of the factor analysis (favour of the world, intelligence of the world, the value of own "Self"). These three generalised groups on the scales almost completely coincide with the configuration of the scales for the RR sample. Further analysis results of factorization of the RR and RE samples will be compared with the results of Janoff-Bulman's factorization (see, Tabel 1; the bold type allocates scales coinciding under factors).

Table 1. Distribution of scales under factors in samples

Samples	"Russian in Estonia"	"Russian in Russia"	Generalized variables of Janoff-Bulmann
Factor 1 "the world is fine"	**BW – Favour of the world** **BP – Kindness of people** J – Justice of the world L – Good luck, or luck degree	**BW – Favour of the world** **BP – Kindness of people**	**BW – Favour of the world** **BP – Kindness of people**
Factor 2 "all fairly and controllable"	**C – Controllability of the world** **J – Justice of the world** SC – Self-control degree, or the control over occurring events	**C – Controllability of the world** **J – Justice of the world** SC – Self-control degree, or the control over occurring events	**C – Controllability of the world** **J – Justice of the world** R – randomness
Factor 3 "the value of self" and "good luck"	**SW – Value of own "Self"** **L – Good luck, or luck degree**	**SW – Value of own "Self"** **L – Good luck, or luck degree**	**SW – Value of own "Self"** **L – Good luck, or luck degree** SC – Self-control degree, or the control over occurring events

The first factor reflects positive relation to the world and people. Two scales have entered into a Russian in Russia in the first factor – "Favour of the world" (BW), and "Kindness of people" (BP), – and it coincides with the first generalized variable, offered by Janoff-Bulman's methodology. The given factor includes a Russian in Estonia, except for the first two scales, also the scales strongly enough connected with the factors Justice of the world (J) and "**Good luck, or luck degree"** (L). In substantial sense it means that only at confidence of justice of the world and of own luck a Russian in Estonia is ready to recognise the world favourable. It introduces an explanation of the first factor at RE simultaneously both from the aspect of the rational moment (justice), and the irrational moment (good luck) that makes the factor difficult enough for treatment.

The given circumstance (plurality of scales in one factor at Russian in Estonia) specifies on cognitive simplicity of the structure of consciousness that, in turn, can be a life consequence in emigration, that is, one's own structure of values is

washed away under the influence of the structure of the values of a society of the recipient, and resistance to this process strengthens for the account of cognitive simplicity of consciousness.

The second factor verbally designated as "all fairly and controllable" means confidence of the respondent of possibility to influence vital events. With the second factor at both samples, high correlation of interrelation scales have "Self-control degree, or the control over occurring events" (SC), "Controllability of the world" (C), "Justice of the world" (J), which reflect intelligence of a peace arrangement and controllability of occurring events from outside the respondent, and also conviction in a fair peace arrangement.

In this case, the maintenance of scales in a factorial variable also does not coincide with the second generalized variable, described by Janoff-Bulman. At Janoff-Bulman along with justice and controllability of the world into the second factor includes a nonrandomness of occurring events (reversive scale R). And at Russian in Estonia as at Russian in Russia, in this factor, along with justice and controllability of the world, the scale of own control over occurring events (SC) enters. It is probably the feature of Russian mentality that for a Russian the world is fair and controllable only if the independent control of events is possible.

In the third, the weakest, **the factor** the scales, showing the importance of the person in own eyes, and degree inherent in the person of luck and level of good luck (SW – Value of own "Self" and L – **Good luck, or luck degree**) have entered. This factor specifies in high degree of self-sufficiency, a self-estimation, selection by the destiny.

Unlike Janoff-Bulman (where into the third factor enters three scales – Value of own "Self", Degree of good luck and Own control of events), in our research at both samples are included into this factor only the two first scales and it is not connected with own control of events. On one hand, it underlines affinity of structure of consciousness of a Russian in Russia and a Russian in Estonia, on the other hand, – difference from results of Janoff-Bulman's factorization.

It is necessary to notice that scale R – randomness – as a distribution principle, ("the world is a lottery") at Janoff-Bulman negatively (reversively) correlates with the second factor; at a Russian it also is present at Russia, though and is weak (factor loading 0.2556). Substantially it means that for the respondent that the less than accident in occurring events, the more world is controllable and fair, that is more conceived. At a Russian in Estonia, the given scale R – randomness

as a distribution principle is more strongly connected with the second factor, but communication is positive (factor loading 0.3831). It is possible to assume in the consciousness of a migrant of the second generation naturally casual distribution of the blessings: someone was born the representative of the title nation, and someone – the representative of minority. Therefore the given belief joins in an overall picture of intelligence of the world of the migrant (the second factor).

Thus, allocation of factors and configuration of scales explaining them on the basis of the sample data "Russian in Russia" in comparison with the sample "Russian in Estonia" allows noting high degree of coincidence of structural features of these fundamental beliefs of two samples.

General conclusions

The factor analysis has shown affinity of structure of consciousness of Russian in Estonia and Russian in Russia. As a whole, the factorization coincides with Janoff-Bulman's structure: presence of three factors (Favour of the world, Intelligence of the world, Value of own "Self").

Following differences have been revealed also:

- Though in both samples the structure of factorization coincides, but at a Russian in Russia in consciousness structure the second factor (Intelligence of the world), and at a Russian in Estonia – the first factor (Favour of the world) prevails.
- A Russian in Estonia differ on structure of the first factor from a Russian in Russia that along with scales Favour of the world and Kindness of people enter scales Justice of the world and Good luck, or luck degree. A Russian in Estonia connect in uniform system not only opinion that "the world is fine", but also conviction in its justice, and also personal luck.
- Plurality of scales in the first factor specifies on the cognitive simplicity of structure of consciousness of Russian in Estonia that, in turn, can be a life consequence in emigration. Own structure of values is washed away under the influence of structure of values of a society of the recipient, and resistance to this process amplifies on the account of cognitive simplicity of consciousness.
- At Janoff-Bulman along with justice and controllable of the world into the second factor enter a nonrandomness of occurring events. And at a Russian to Estonia and at a Russian in Russia, in this factor, along with justice and controllable of the world, the scale of own control of occurring events enters

that probably is a feature of Russian mentality (for Russian the world is fair and controllable only when the independent control of events is possible).

- At Janoff-Bulman own control of events is included into the third factor (the generalized variable) and is connected with the value of own "Self".
- For a Russian in Russia the less than accident in occurring events, the more world is controllable and fair, that is, more intelligent. At a Russian in Estonia the picture of intelligence of the world also includes accident the in distribution of the blessings that apparently it is natural to consciousness of the migrant: someone was born the representative of the title nation, and someone – the representative of minority.

Thus, at a Russian in Estonia and at a Russian in Russia similarity of structure of basic values is revealed. That is, the ethnocultural accessory is the main determination, forming their fundamental beliefs.

Thus considerably substantial distinction that confirms a hypothesis that at the individuals carrying to one ethnocultural group, but living in different sociocultural contexts, distinctions in fundamental beliefs and expectations were found out.

As pointed estimations exceed an average level (Janoff-Bulman), it is possible to assert that a Russian in Estonia does not bear in his fundamental beliefs a trauma, which often accompanies emigrant experience (Soldatova, 2002).

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Education for Democratic Citizenship: Development of the Theoretical Framework for Estonia and EU

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Abstract

This article offers a comparative analysis of a theoretical framework that is adequate for civil education in EU and the Republic of Estonia. In both cases there are some normative ideals. The article questions whether or not these educational ideals are adequately grounded in social theory and practice. The article also questions if the objectives are implemented with relevant means, tools, social theoretical concepts and control systems.

The first section of the article makes a comparative analysis of three international projects. The second section is an evaluation of the Estonian civic education system and describes the implicit theoretical framework of the main Estonian textbooks.

The third section of the article outlines an original alternative framework for democratic education. The initiative for this alternative is prompted by the recognition of social and theoretical discrepancies in the current model. The alternative approach defines the main social actors and the main process of decision-making in the current political, economic and educational systems. The conceptual framework reveals the consequences of relational problems between the relevant actors in these systems. Knowledge of these challenges enables the actors affected by this problem to use their position more effectively.

In the end, rectifying these problems will lend to making the democratic educational ideal more of a reality. The author has imple-

mented this framework in empirical studies on public administration and educational management in Estonia. He has studied the relevance of relations between the main actors in public and educational organizations. The author also implements these concepts in his courses to undergraduate and graduate students at the Tallinn University of Technology (former at the International University Audentes). This system of concepts enables students to make a relevant connection between relevant contemporary social theories, comparative European studies and their actual experience with democratization. As a result, students are better prepared to participate in democracy because they have developed skills in critical thinking and careful analysis.

Keywords: *conventionalist education, democracy education, European citizenship, sociology in education*

Introduction

Abraham Lincoln defined democracy as government of the people, by the people and for the people. This statement includes all the main necessary members of a society: people, politicians, government, system of elections, system of governance, criterion for assessment of the governance. There are many models of both democracy (Dahl, 2000; Held, 1998) and education for democracy. In former decades, elitist interests and the respective elitist educational systems dominated Europe as well as other countries (Dekker, 1994, pp. 14, 23).

Therefore, discussing problems of education for democracy must extensively discuss the level of European Union as well as the perspective of the many EU Member States.

Representative democracy is a complex and controversial issue. Education strategies should provide insight into resolving problems of this complexity, but they have not done so yet. Typically, the social scientific quality of civics textbooks has been low. They have relied on the functionalist social theory and tended to rationalize or even justify political and economic authorities. They have avoided social conflicts and rather hampered than promoted social change (Dekker, 1994, p. 26). In England, the Advisory Group on Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy identified several significant problems to be addressed in citizenship education (Crick, 1998). In Germany, civics experts identified that there has been limited progress in the promotion of political literacy, basic values

and social skills (Händle *et al.*, 1999). Many governments and educators have realized the need to revise the existing curriculum (Naval *et al.*, 2002, p. 124).

In regard to educational practice, directive models dominate, although theory promotes the practice of constructivist strategies. Most teachers behave in authoritarian ways, although teacher–student partnerships are recommended in theory. This is especially typical of Estonia and other post-totalitarian countries. The hierarchical relations promote also authoritarian values and attitudes, compliance to existing power structures both in schools and societies. The authoritarianism does not tolerate either reference or criticism of existing social problems. Many social scholars have criticized the content of traditional social studies textbooks. They claim that these standard texts merely describe the main political institutions. They avoid controversies and hard social issues, including critical evaluation of current social and political institutions (Hedtke *et al.*, 2007, p. 9; Ross, 2001). They promote blind patriotism, obedience to laws and authorities (Davies, 2003, p. 161; Dekker, 1994; Ichilov, 1998, pp. 269–270). Education based on information delivery, symbolic control and hierarchical relations reproduces or even deepens the existing social structures and inequalities (Wilde, 2004, p. 8).

This paper addresses the issues mentioned above by critiquing their theoretical social adequacy in terms of contributing to democratic education. What is the main problem? How has it been addressed? First, I analyze the European program for democratic citizenship and some related studies. Second, I criticize the implicit theoretical framework of one current textbook in Estonia. Third, I promote a new social theoretical framework for civic education. It specifies the main social dichotomies plus defines the main social actors and their interrelations in the economic, political, and educational systems. This enables a focus on one central question: Are the relations between the main social actors adequate for democracy?

In this paper, I use the concepts of civics, citizenship and democratic education as synonyms. This provides for the inclusiveness of political literacy as a main concept for democracy and education.

The main educational issues for European democratic citizenship

The Council of Europe (CE) adopted the Declaration and Programme on Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) on 7 May 1999. Its first objective was the identification and development of novel and effective strategies, means and methods for the strengthening of the democratic fabric of society. Still,

the EDC did not focus on promotion of democracy (the strengthening of the democratic fabric). It gave attention to many **key issues** such as:

- The evolving concept of democratic citizenship in its political, legal, cultural, and social dimensions;
- The core competencies;
- Innovative methods of active and participative learning;
- Learning democracy in school and university life, including participation in decision-making and the associated structures of pupils, students, and teachers;
- Different partnerships;
- Changing patterns of work;
- Democratic leadership training, conflict resolution, and confidence building.

Actually, the concept of democratic citizenship was not defined. It was considered as a set of practices and activities for participation in democracy (Bîrzéa, 2000, p. 32). This is typical of British concepts: it does not clearly define the model. This is a negative aspect of such documents as it enables arbitrary interpretations of the main concepts. On the positive side, it encourages active participation (Kiwan & Kiwan, 2005). An important principle is that the program deals with democracy not only in politics, but also in educational, work and other organizations. One of the weaknesses of EDC is the fact that it does not challenge possible misuse of power by some authorities. This is present in the French civics education, but absent in the English (Kiwan & Kiwan, 2005, p. 156).

Francois Audigier (University of Geneva) (1999) outlines the basic concepts and core competences in more detail. Still, he also does not define the basic concepts. He distinguishes between three main competences:

- Cognitive (legal, political, historical, cultural, and procedural). Among others, these competences should enable revealing and challenging abuses of power by some authorities;
- Ethical competences and value choices (freedom, equality, and solidarity as the central values);
- Social competences or capacities for action (living together, cooperation, conflict resolution, public debating).

At the end of his paper, Audigier defines the five following values: freedom, equality, participation, responsibility, and solidarity as the hard core of EDC. Of these, three (freedom, equality, and brotherhood or solidarity) stem from the French Revolution.

Karlheinz Duerr and others (2000, p. 60) propose another classification. They distinguish between concepts of democracy (institutions and procedures, representative and participative democracy, democratic freedoms) and democratic principles. They also outline some teaching abilities, among others 'capacity to deal with controversial issues and challenge ambiguous and complex situations in the context of class or school', but not in the wider society (Duerr *et al.*, 2000, p. 62).

Between 2001 and 2004, policies for EDC were studied in all Europe (Bîrzéa *et al.*, 2004).

Ton Olgers, a civics teacher, curriculum developer, teacher educator and researcher in the UK, criticized the EDC policy. The policy documents rely too much on the rational actor theory (Olgers, 2001). This theory presupposes that all actors oversee the problems plus have the power and means to implement and control the situation. Actually, only governments with pro-EDC attitudes can do this, if they are surrounded with well-informed experts. But when at state level there is no interest whatsoever, or at least not enough, it is difficult to have a policy for democracy education. Ton Olgers also addressed value education. Values cannot be transferred, but they can be clarified. Democracy education, including analyses of values behind different situations and practices, enable clarifying and changing value orientations.

In 2002, the Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe adopted Recommendations for Education of Democratic Citizenship (*CE*, 2002). They again stressed the need to achieve the objectives of the EDC. Among others, civic studies should be linked to social sciences and develop critical thinking. Teacher education should be complemented with a special curriculum for EDC (*CE*, 2002).

The Thematic Network Children's Identity and Citizenship in Europe (CiCe) analyzes problems of democracy education and publishes methodical recommendations on many central issues, including teaching controversial problems. The guidelines by Wolfgang Berg, Leena Graeffe and Cathie Holden (2003) are useful for teaching complex issues. Still, the authors consider the complexities more as social psychological problems, related to group interests and value judgments. They do not touch upon controversies in social structures, in relations between main social actors. They do not analyze current social institutions critically. In society, various groups often have different social powers. Many of them may use their power for their particular interests and avoid rational and cognitive solutions beneficial for all the main social groups.

Representative democracy can be regarded as controversial. It necessitates the equality of all citizens on the day of elections and the inequality after the elections. It relies on utopian rational actor theory and ignores the empirical studies on electorate behavior. Roberto Michels has pointed to the 'iron law of oligarchy' in representative democracy already a hundred years ago.

The EDC does not address these controversies. It regards democracy education as a set of good practices and activities. It does not say which theories and concepts are necessary for a description of these practices and activities. Democracy education should explain representative democracy as a controversial problem. Concepción Naval, Murray Print, and Ruud Veldhuis reviewed the EDC progress in 2002 and concluded, among others, that there was a need to formulate a theoretical framework for democracy education (Naval *et al.*, 2002, p. 124). Another study on education for democratic citizenship also stresses the need for diversification (Bîrzéa *et al.*, 2004). In 2008, Rolf Gollob and Peter Krapf published a manual for teachers in lower secondary education. The manual introduces the main concepts for the community level (identity, stereotypes, prejudice, equality, diversity, pluralism, and conflict). The last part of the book introduces concepts of power and authority, rules and laws, government and politics. It seems that they do not link the concepts to social theoretical framework, to social actors, and their relations.

In sum, the EDC has ideal and ambitious intentions, but its conceptual system remains non-theoretical, incomplete and ambiguous. It focuses on individuals and their participation. This activity of individuals remains but loosely linked to the national development. This theoretical framework is inadequate for the main goals of democracy.

The concept of democracy in European schools

Eurydice, the Information Network on Education, analyzed how citizenship education was taught in **European schools in 2004 and 2005.** There are both national reports and a comparative review. The review repeats the ideal goals of the EDC. 'Young people should become active and responsible citizens capable of contributing to the development and well-being of their societies' (*Eurydice*, 2005). It writes about political literacy, critical thinking, development of democratic attitudes and values plus active participation in the community at large (at international, national, local and school levels). Political literacy may involve learning about social, political and civic institutions, national constitutions, human rights, social issues and problems, history and cultural diversity (*Eurydice*, 2005, p. 10).

In reference to the EDC project, the review does not mention complex and controversial issues like social inequality, injustice, and discrimination. The responsible citizen should evaluate political actors and institutions critically, but the dimension of critical thinking is inadequate in this review (*Eurydice*, 2005, p. 10). The Eurydice publication does not describe progress in students' political literacy, critical thinking, democratic attitudes and values. Still, it describes students' participation in schools, parental involvement and the school's participation in society. It reveals the role of students' democratic experiences in their schools. On average, the role is significant.

In Estonia, students may have their own unions or associations; they may elect their class representatives, members of their student government and their representatives to school councils. Students in most, but not all, European countries have the same opportunities. In some European countries (France, Ireland, Portugal, United Kingdom) parents, as members of their school councils, may also participate in recruitment of teachers. In Estonia, as in most other countries, this is not the case. In Estonia, parents may have their say in election of facultative subjects, teaching methods, acquisition of textbooks, school plans, and internal rules. These activities are important for the development of parents' democratic experiences, but not sufficient for their effect on school management.

Eurydice also describes the methods by which the students' knowledge, attitudes, and participation are assessed in these 30 countries. The review neither evaluates the level of political literacy nor the dominant attitudes and values.

The EDC pays a lot of attention to links between the school practices and democracy education (Print *et al*., 2002). Recently, they published a book on this topic (*CE*, 2008). Education should rely on such practices. In Estonia, this is not the case. In the majority of European countries, democracy education is taken into account in the evaluation of schools. In Estonia, as in some other countries like Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Greece, this is not the case (*Eurydice*, 2005, pp. 45–46).

The Eurydice review (2005) does not adequately address the level of democracy education in Europe (Hedtke *et al*., 2007, p. 13). This means that most schools may teach passive and subordinated citizens, loyal to the existing political authorities and institutions. The individuals should contribute to the development of their societies, even if the dominant institutions do not aim for this development. People should not even criticize any failures, mistakes, mismanagement and misuse of power by the authorities.

Concepts in international studies on knowledge about democracy

The International Association for Evaluation of Educational Achievements (IEA) has studied students' political literacy since the 1970s. In 1999 and 2000, they investigated knowledge of content (25 units), 13 interpretation skills, 52 concepts, 62 attitudes and 22 actions. The investigation covered three domains:

- Democracy (characteristics of democracy, democratic institutions, citizenship, rights and duties);
- National identity and international relations;
- Social cohesion and diversity (Torney-Purta et al., 2001).

The research mainly covered factual knowledge and simple interpretation skills in democracy. It asked students about what was good and what was bad for democracy. As was true for the Eurydice study (2005), it did not touch upon complex and controversial issues, including the very concept of representative democracy. The scholars referred to many concepts of democracy (Held, 1998; Dahl, 2000), but they did not ask students to use the concepts for assessment of their democratic practices at schools, communities, and societies. They distinguished between conventional and non-conventional citizenship, but not between authoritarian and democratic, or non-critical and critical ones. Estonia also participated in the IEA studies in 1999 and 2000. As Estonian 14-year-old students lagged behind the international average, Anu Toots arranged a follow-up study in 2005. This time, the Estonian students demonstrated better results than the international average in 1999 (Toots *et al.*, 2006). Concerning teaching methods, about 70–80% of students mentioned the stress on factual knowledge. The same percentage of students pointed at opportunities to discuss and express one's opinion (Toots *et al.*, 2006, p. 33). As in other countries, the Estonian students also expressed their critical attitudes towards the governmental bodies. Only one-third of students believed that the Government cares about the public opinion in Estonia. Only one-third of Estonian students trust their Government (Toots *et al.*, 2006, pp. 41–42). The authors concluded that the role of civic studies in the education of democratic and active citizens is minimal (Toots *et al.*, 2006, p. 53), but did not point to the role of civics textbooks in schools.

Overcoming conventionalism in Estonian civics textbooks

Since 1994, many textbooks on citizenship education have been published in Estonia. In 2008, the Minister of Education accepted the textbooks by Katrin Olenko and Anu Toots (2005) and that by Leili Möldre and Anu Toots

(1999) as relevant for the civics examinations in Estonia. The books are titled *Ühiskonnaõpetus*, meaning science of society or sociology. The books by Anu Toots and her collaborators (1997, 1999, 2003, and 2005) have been formerly criticized (Kalmus, 2002; 2003; Haav, 2008a; b; Räis, 2008; Ruutsoo, 2000). As in many other countries, the Estonian civics textbooks have mostly described the main political institutions. The institutions have been isolated from their social contexts. There has been nothing about transition from Communist totalitarianism to democracy. They have ignored the students' democratic experiences at school, differently from many European countries (Print *et al.*, 2002). Estonian students have actually quite extensive rights and opportunities for self-governance and participation in school governance (*Eurydice*, 2005; Toots *et al.*, 2006; Torney-Purta *et al.*, 2001). These experiences have not been used in the former textbooks. The main theoretical framework has been eclectic. The concepts of individuals (actors) and society have been isolated from each other. Social hierarchies have not been linked to power structures as it is done in the Estonian textbook on legal studies (Kiris *et al.*, 2007). Although democracy has been the main concept, it has remained unclear and even utopian.

The Estonia's national report on education (*Eurydice*, 2005) argues that there are too many theoretical definitions and their number should be reduced in the textbooks. Actually, there has been a lack of social theory and there have been too many arbitrary statements.

The individualist approach may be correct in psychology, but it is inadequate in sociology and politics. The textbooks should describe the social institutions (the state, politics, economy, culture, language, etc.) as social and not as natural phenomena. Such issues as social inequality, injustice, and discrimination should not be reduced to problems of individuals. The concepts of democracy should be related to democratic practices in schools, communities, and society. As a result, the sociological approach would help in achieving the democratic goals of the civic education. It would contribute rather to the formation of the democratic citizenship than the authoritarian one (Haav, 2008a; b). The concepts should enable people to criticize the mistakes and ineffectiveness of the authorities, and not simply justify them. A similar conclusion was drawn in a study of civics textbooks in the United States 10 to 20 years ago (Dekker, 1994).

Sulev Valdmaa, head of the UNESCO Chair in Civic Education and Multicultural Studies at the Jaan Tõnisson Institute in Tallinn, Estonia, denies the very possibility of scientific (rational) approach to democracy. He argues that in the civic studies, unlike the exact sciences, the basic concepts cannot be defined at all. Only some general descriptions are possible. Students should read arbitrary

texts, make up their own opinions and express these to other people, including their exam givers (Valdmaa, 2008, p. 9)! In the national examinations, they do not ask about the basic concepts of society, democracy, etc. at all. It follows that even the political literacy of students is not valued in the Republic of Estonia.

Dualist concepts of individuals and societies as a theoretical basis for conventional civics

Conventional civic studies (as is true for many mainstream managerial, political, and educational textbooks) ignore the basic social theoretical dichotomies like individuals and society, social actors, and structures. Individual psychology focuses on individual actors and ignores the social influences. In general psychology, there is no such concept as society at all. One does not find it even in the best textbooks on social psychology (Hogg & Vaughan, 2008, Subject index). Often, society is reduced to a collection of individuals. Still, many social psychologists do not believe in individualist reductionism. They do not reduce the concepts of groups and organizations to collections of individuals. There is also anthropological social psychology (Weigert *et al*., 1986). The latter recognizes the influence of culture, language, and social structures on groups and individuals. Often, the concepts of individual and society, individuals and groups are isolated, not integrated. Hogg and Vaughan (2008, p. 6) argue that social psychology focuses on individuals in groups, but sociology focuses on groups, organizations, and societies. Aronson, Wilson and Ackert (2002, p. 11) assume that sociology provides general laws and theories about societies. These statements are misleading.

The dualist concepts of the isolated individuals and the mechanical society enable social manipulation and discrimination. They are tools for oppressive education.

The critical civic education

David Held (1998) distinguishes between many models of democracy. Often, traditional representative and new participative models are contrasted (Dekker, 1994) and minimal (or conventional) and maximal (or non-conventional) models of civic education are distinguished (Steiner-Khamsi *et al*., 2002, p. 215). The minimal civic education focuses on civic knowledge and participation in elections, with little attention to participation in other democratic processes (DeJaeghere & Tudball, 2007, p. 48). The maximal education also promotes human values, democratic attitudes, and active participation (*CE*, 2002). Still,

both minimal and maximal civic education should use social theoretical and critical theories. They are necessary for evaluation of politicians and political parties. This enables a rational participation in elections and other political activities. Citizens should be able to make independent and critical decisions about possible abuse of power by the authorities (Audigier, 1999; Cochran-Smith, 2005; Ichilov, 1998, p. 271; Puolimatka, 1995; Turner, 1997).

Civic education should cultivate the skills and virtues of the deliberative citizenship (Gutman, 1999, p. xiii; Kahsnitz, 2005, p. 131; Klafki, 1996, p. 63). It should contribute to social transformation (White, 2003, p. 754). To do so, the syllabus should rely on the social construction of knowledge, inquiry and problem based instruction, students' involvement in community development and multiple perspectives (Gloria Ladson-Billings cited in Ross, 2001). Danny Wildermeersch and others (2005) outline the CREDIS theoretical framework that combines critical and radical citizenship, multiple identities and institutional and social learning. This approach focuses on learning processes and does not develop the concepts of democracy.

Students and teachers should take part in decision-making together, and critically analyze what happens when that knowledge is put into practice. They should critically analyze asymmetries in power and causes of social injustice (DeJaeghere & Tudball, 2007).

In sum, the critical civic education should aim at collective change. To do so, it should use social theoretical and critical theories. This idea is mentioned, but not outlined, in the citizenship project by the European Council. The concepts of critical civic education and deliberative democracy are absent in both normative materials and textbooks in Estonia.

Social sciences as the scientific basis for adequate civic concepts

The main textbooks on sociology consider individuals and society as interrelated concepts (Hess *et al.*, 2000, pp. 2, 7ff; Macionis & Plummer, 2005, pp. 4–11). Sociology studies general and typical characteristics of individuals. Sociology moves away from individualist to collective and social actors (Kontopoulus, 2006, p. 131). Kenneth Murray Knuttila compares many definitions of society and sociology, starting with August Comte (1789–1857), and concludes that sociology studies 'how human beings, as social agents, produce their social structures, and how human beings are produced—and reproduced—by those structures' (Knuttila, 1996, p. 20ff).

In short, society should be defined as a collection of social actors and their interrelations (interactions, norms, institutions, structures). This definition integrates concepts of actors and structures. Some scholars have developed the idea of the centrality of the dichotomy (duality) of actors (agency) and structures (Giddens, 1976; 1984, etc.; Layder, 1994). 'Action and structure are deeply implicated in each other' (Layder, 1994, p. 148). These ideas enable us to assess both the opportunities and the constraints of our lives. They empower us to be active participants in society (Macionis & Plummer, 2005, p. 9). Charles Wright Mills (1916–1962) has developed the ideas of deliberative sociology and education in his *Sociological Imagination* (1959). The Symbolic Interactionism, one of the main theoretical sociological perspectives, focuses on relations between individuals and society. Social identity theory analyzes the social construction of identities.

The development of alternative concepts for democracy education

We rely on the above-mentioned theories and consider the concepts of individual and society, social actors, and structures as integrated. These concepts are extremely abstract and general social theoretical categories. In a broad sociological sense, society is a collection of *relations* between individuals and not of the individuals themselves. This definition is too broad and does not distinguish between psychological and social relations. Psychological relations rely only on internal qualities of the related persons. In case of social relations, there are some external factors involved. These external factors (material resource, power, social norms) influence and mediate the personal relations.

In this sense, the individual is **a collection of one's social relations**, abstracted from one's physical body and psychological characteristics. Psychology is interested in individual personalities. Sociology studies individual actors as representatives of typical social actors. It focuses on individuals having similar positions in social structures. Individuals themselves also define their social identity by some social categories, by their positions in social hierarchies.

Thus, the social actor is defined as a collection of individuals occupying **similar position in the social structure**. The individuals as a social actor have similar opportunities to use social resources, power, other individuals, etc. for their activities. Different social actors have different positions in the social structure and different access to social resources.

Social structure is defined as **a system of social norms** that regulates the access to social and material resources. It introduces social inequalities between actors.

Society in a narrow sense is **a collection of social actors and structures or norms** regulating their interaction.

In sum, society is a complex concept. It relies on controversial ideas of equality and inequality. All people are equal by laws and enjoy the same human rights. In social practices, there are huge differences. Various individuals have different social (not personal) resources (authority) to influence others. Individuals can be classified into categories of social actors on the basis of their different opportunities to use social resources for their particular goals. They also have different opportunities to define the goals and achieve these goals. There may be three main types of social actors according to their opportunities to make decisions, use social resources or be a subject. They may be called rulers, superiors, and subordinates. In the private sector, there are owners, managers, and employees. In the public sector, there are politicians, administrators, and civil servants. In public schools, there are national and local authorities or material resource providers, heads of school, teachers, and students.

In the capitalist market economy and business organizations, the difference between social actors is clear. Business law defines the typical capitalist firm as a collection of rights and obligations. The rights of owners are defined in property and business laws. Those of the employees are regulated by employment laws. Employers define their employees' rights and obligations. In large business firms, entrepreneurs hire managers to run their businesses. This means that owners, managers and employees have different opportunities for decision-making in their organizations. These ideas have been developed in institutional economics, organizational theory and sociology by Oliwer Williamson (1975, etc.), William Ouchi (1980, see also Peters & Pierre, 2007) and others. Williamson focused on the main models of decision-making in market economy. On the market place, sellers and buyers, as the main actors, are equal and the decision-making is democratic. In a typical capitalist firm, owners, managers, and employees are unequal and the hierarchy model dominates. Williamson argues that the two main social institutions, democratic market and hierarchical firm, have institutionalized the economic development. Formal structures (business and labor laws, labor contracts, organizational charts, and job characteristics) determine the main organizational actors and their dominant models of decision-making (Table 1). Williamson contrasted democratic market and autocratic firms. In practice, the two models may be, and often are, complemented with the third model—that of the partnership. The social partnership of employers

and employees is well-known. The role of other partners is taken into an account by the multiple stakeholders' model. A full partnership model is more clearly explained below with regard to school councils.

Table 1. Main actors and models of decision-making in business organizations

Actors / Models	**Owners**	**Managers**	**Employees**	**Clients**
Autocracy	Traditionally superior to others	In managerial hierarchy	Traditionally subordinated	Not likely
Democracy	In teams of owners	In managerial teams	In work teams	Traditionally equal to producers
Partnership	Usually between owners. Sometimes in knowledge firms	More likely in knowledge intensive firms	More likely in knowledge intensive firms	More likely in knowledge intensive firms

In the public sector, the new public management theory implements similar ideas about actors and structures. In the democratic states, there are also two main models of decision-making, democratic elections and hierarchical power execution (Table 2). Free democratic elections determine the main decision-makers (politicians, members of parliament). The politicians adopt laws and the state budget and appoint the government. Ministers appoint administrators and those, in turn, appoint and control all other civil servants. Thus, the differences between politicians, administrators, and civil servants are very clear (Table 2). All these actors obtain their income from the state budget.

The main actors and models of decision-making are defined in public laws. Organizational charts and job characteristics sophisticate the roles and rights of main actors in details. Public administration reforms have reduced the role of hierarchies and challenged the model of bureaucracy in Europe (Jann, 1997). As a rule, the roles of participatory democracy and partnerships have increased (see also Lepa *et al.*, 2004). Robert Dahl (2000) argues that institutions of polyarchal democracy are necessary to enable participation of many interest groups in political processes. In polyarchy, some interest groups share the power.

Table 2. Main actors and models of decision-making in public organizations

Actors / Models	Politicians	Administrators	Civil servants	Clients
Autocracy	Traditionally politicians appoint and check administrators	Traditionally administrators are superior of the servants	Traditionally subordinated	Sometimes clients are considered as subordinated
Democracy	In parties	Managerial teams	In teams	Participative democracy possible
Partnership	In coalitions	In politico-administrative coalitions	Not very likely	Sometimes possible

These ideas have also been introduced into public schools and educational systems. The central and local authorities can be considered as owners and material resource providers. They appoint or elect heads of school and, in many countries, also teachers. Traditionally, education systems have been centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratic. As a result of educational reforms, the systems have been de-centralized in most developed countries. The role of participative democracy and partnerships has been increased. In some de-centralized school systems, schools have become practically independent and they implement more complex systems of decision making. They may combine three main models: those of democracy, autocracy, and partnership. The main governing body is the school council. It usually consists of representatives of all main educational stakeholders (students, their parents, teachers, administrators, and resource providers). The council can be constituted as a partnership.

Partnership is, or can be, a synthesis of the democratic thesis and autocratic antithesis. In schools, there are democratic organizations for students (self-governance, voluntary organizations), teachers (study council, professional and trade unions) and parents. The administration is usually hierarchical, but it may be supplemented with participatory democracy for others. In the council, all members are equal and the democratic model of decision-making usually dominates (Table 3). The decisions are obligatory for all partners. The main actors and models of decision-making are defined in organizational statutes and charters and job characteristics. They rely on educational laws and employment or service contracts. There were partnerships not only in schools, but also at local, regional and national levels in Estonia between 1920 and 1940 (Haav, 2004).

*Table 3. Main actors and models of decision-making in local schools**

Actors / Models	Owners	Head of school	Teachers	Students	Parents
Democracy	(Local inhabitants) Local council	–	Study council, teacher unions	Student organizations, self-governance	Parents' organizations & meetings
Hierarchy	Local government	Authorities –head of school – teachers	Head of school – teachers – students	Teachers – students	–
Partnership	In school council	School council	School council	School council	School council

**Source: Haav, 2005a, p. 423.*

In sum, society is a complex and partly controversial concept. It relies on equality and inequality, equal human rights and unequal opportunities. Everybody may participate in business, education, and politics, but they have various degrees of access to main resources. People are engaged with many social systems: political, economic, educational, cultural, etc. The systems consist of a number of formal organizations and institutions. People occupy different positions and play various roles in these organizations. On the basis of the authority to command organizational resource, individual actors may be classified into three main social actors: rulers, managers, and employees. The rulers set up the organizations, decide their goals, formal structures and rules, distribute the resources and check the results. The managers use the organizational resource, including their labor force, to achieve the goals. The employees are authorized to exploit technical and material resources. Their opportunities to take advantage of other employees are quite limited (Table 4).

Thus, all people are shaped by existing social structures and they may shape the structures, too. Still, there are important differences between people as social actors in their ability to use social resources and influence others. These differences rely on the autocratic model of decision-making. Autocracy challenges social equality, justice and effectiveness. In order to compensate for the negative outcomes of autocracy, it has been complemented with other models, especially with those of democracy, democratic leadership, participative democracy and partnership. If the subordinated actors are willing to contribute

to organizational development, then participatory and partnership models become inevitable. If the superior actors are reluctant to implement them, then they reveal their unwillingness to improve. In case of public organization, it is an issue of political and national loyalty. The models of decision-making are most important for the understanding of social and political processes. They may enable individual deliberation and organizational improvement, or social manipulation and stagnation.

Table 4. A typology of social actors: differences in control and decision-making

Actors / Control of resources	**Rulers (owners, employees, governors)**	**Managers**	**Employees**
All resources, control of managers	Rights to set up and close down one's firm, make strategic decisions	Right to propose strategic ideas	–
Organizational resource, control of employees	–	Right to make tactical decisions, to control one's subordinates	Self-management in teams, participation in management
Material and technical resources	Strategic decisions	Tactical decisions	Operational decisions

Teaching and learning democracy in the alternative framework

The school model (Table 3) demonstrates opportunities for students to practice democracy in their schools. Civic education should use these experiences and link them to political literacy and democratic theories. In Estonian schools, as in most EU countries, these opportunities and experiences exist. In Estonia—differently from other European countries—the civic syllabus, textbooks and national examinations ignore all of them. (In this case we can observe how the civic education system counteracts to its own aims. It hinders the acquisition of political knowledge, democratic values, attitudes and skills.) Estonian teachers may use these experiences in their lessons on their own initiative. If they do so, they fulfill their democratic and national mission.

The new framework is relevant to the ideal goals of civic education because it provides students with a set of concepts that offer insight into how the

achievement of these goals is theoretically possible. The classification of four main social actors in democracy clarifies that isolated individual citizens will hardly make a difference. Although all individuals have equal human rights, they do not have equal opportunities to participate in and influence political processes. Still, they can do this, if they become organized interest groups. If they follow political models of socialization and institutionalization, then they may become part of the political system and partners for some main power groups.

In schools and universities, individual students are not equal to individual teachers and administrators. If students become organized and have their representatives in governing bodies, they may become equal partners to other educational interest groups. Students have their national and international organizations, too. As a result, they may become active and influential parties in educational policy-making. According to the principle of justice in legislation, all parties concerned should have opportunities to participate in this. This happens also in Estonia. National student organizations have opportunities to take part in the drafting of educational laws. These experiences will demonstrate that the opportunities of individuals are limited, but those of organized social actors are not. If they combine their experiences with theories on democracy, they could make a difference. What are the main problems for students and citizens? Are they external: a lack of rights and resources? Or are they internal: a lack of knowledge and willingness?

In civic lessons, teachers and students may analyze their social positions and opportunities in educational, political and economic systems. They can also relate different social relations, models of governance and social values. In this way, they can clarify their values and develop their identities. Those in power often cultivate individualist values (success and well-being) and take advantage of their positions and autocratic decisions. The subordinated groups may realize that they should appreciate social values (social equality, well-being, and social effectiveness) more than individualist ones. In this case, they would support democratic and partnership models more than the autocratic one. It follows that schools can actually fulfill the democratic objectives of the Civic Syllabus, if there were relevant theoretical concepts and political will. If students continue to be stuck in current official textbooks and national examinations in civics, they will not realize the social construction of democracy. Politics is interaction between the main political actors. Unless people are organized and take part in political processes, they do not influence these processes. On the contrary, they may be easily manipulated by some groups of professional politicians.

Conclusions

The paper analyzed the theoretical relevance of concepts of democracy and democracy education in Estonia and the European Union. The European Program for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) is normative. It heralds for active and participative citizenship, but fails to link it with social theories and practices. These ideal goals are not supplied with any adequate theoretical framework and system of concepts. As a result, the main problems of democracy are not defined and the civic objectives can not be achieved. The same is also true for the Eurydice review (2005). It describes the ideal goals, but not the level of achievement of these goals in European schools in 2004. As a positive moment, it describes the students' democratic practices in European schools. The IEA has studied the students' knowledge in more details, but has avoided complex and controversial issues.

The Estonian textbooks, as many others, have mainly described the political institutions and processes in technical detail. They have ignored the concepts of contemporary social sciences and provided students with a number of arbitrary definitions. The arbitrary texts and definitions have also ignored the contemporary educational theories and social practices in schools, communities, and the state. It is difficult to change the civic education system and introduce an alternative theoretical system. The national report of the Eurydice 2005 has acknowledged the problems of social theory and practice.

The alternative approach considers theory of democracy as a system of hierarchical concepts. It relies on the main social theoretical dichotomies and defines the main concepts like individual and society, social actors and structures. On the bases of the main social actors and models of decision-making, the author has constructed original typologies (Tables 1–3). Social, political, and economic processes are results of interaction between the main social actors and structures. In representative democracy, all actors have opportunities for participation in political decision-making, but the opportunities of the élite and the people are very different (Table 2). They may also have different and even conflicting interests and values. This also makes the concepts of democracy and society complex and controversial. People should focus on the relevance of relations between themselves, politicians, administrators, and civil servants. This enables overcoming controversies and achieving collaboration.

In schools, the system of concepts (Table 3) enables linking students' practices and democratic theories. The author has done this in his classroom instructing of students in some universities in Estonia. There is a need to use this framework

to work out relevant textbooks for democracy education. Such work needs both financial and political support.

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Electronic Scientific Information in Technological University Libraries in Nordic and Baltic Countries

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Abstract:

*The Nordic region is famous for its unusually close cooperation in all aspects of life. This cooperation covers matters of culture, politics, education, and research, involving Nordic people at all levels of society. In Northern European countries, libraries are an essential part of the state infrastructure, their information systems are financed and the services they offer are developed by programs approved on the state level. In contrast to the situation in the Nordic countries, the development of the information system of Eastern European libraries is weakly included in the national programs for the development of information society. Spending on the development of electronic services and resources is undoubtedly an investment, because electronic access to scientific information is one of the key factors in increasing the number of scientific publications as well as the number of doctoral degrees granted by universities per year. The analysis of the financial opportunities of the six leading libraries of universities of technology—those representing the affluent Northern European countries on t*he one hand, and the less affluent Baltic countries on the other—*indicated that due to differences in profits, the opportunities of the libraries to spend resources on electronic publications are very different.*

Keywords: *benchmarking, digital libraries, electronic library services, electronic scholarly communication, expenditure, library services, performance measurement, university libraries*

Introduction

Sanda Bercovici (2010) has noted that since the beginning of the 21st century, university libraries have become more and more involved in the creative process of knowledge. The success of a university library depends on how it understands the dynamics and the complexity of the academic world; this understanding influences its activity and acquisition decisions. The rapid changes taking place at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the new millennium present a challenge to university libraries. There have been big changes in university libraries all over the world in the past ten years. Information technology is the factor which has changed the image of a university library. These changes include the introduction of automated catalogues and electronic access to scientific information. Cooperation between libraries at the national and international level has become an important hallmark.

The library plays an important role in the whole information structure of the university. Collection content and library services are designed to assist both in the educational process and scholarly research in the specific institution. New management strategies have been introduced into the reorganization of university libraries, and they are increasingly involved in producing higher performance. In an era of information dissemination, the libraries deal both with adapting and with information management (including the management of resources). Collection development is still one of the most important functions of an academic library. It must satisfy the needs of university users by collecting and preserving all types of relevant resources. Nowadays, efficiency, effectiveness and user satisfaction are not synonymous with large collections of publications (Bercovici, 2010).

For university libraries to be able to support research and learning activities, and the education of the general public, and to ensure the availability of necessary electronic information for the development of the state and society, the management and donors of the library have to be sufficiently informed to make and execute appropriate decisions (Schwede, 2007). Libraries need statistical information to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of their electronic environments, to devise development plans and realize strategic objectives, as well as to understand the effects following changes (earnings from frugal spending, the update of services, and the modification of work processes). Librarians wish to better understand how the information they buy from a variety of sources is being used. These are the needs that have initiated several projects and studies in the 2000s in Europe as well as in the U.S.

Martha Kyrillidou (2000; Kyrillidou & Giersch 2005) was one of the first scholars to present a model of the library in today's electronic environment where network-based services constitute a major share of all services. In her perspective, the change that had occurred in libraries brought along new assessment models, as the evaluation model of the traditional library was no longer appropriate. Under Kyrillidou's supervision, the new assessment model for the electronic library, DigiQUAL™, which enables users to evaluate the quality of e-services, was developed.

In 2002, the Association of Research Libraries led the implementation of the study *Measures for Electronic Resources (E-metrics)* (Blixrud, 2002). The project was based on the understanding that research libraries were lacking a good overview of how electronic resources and services are provided and used, as well as of the collection and methods of analysis of the data (statistics) in the e-environment.

The statistics of e-libraries, as well as the testing of assessment methods and the analysis of services have been studied by Jane Barton (2003; 2004). In her projects, Barton applied different techniques with the aim of testing the assessment indicators of electronic services and collections, the assessment methodology of the information needs of the user, the competence of the information market and marketing, and the influence and efficiency of the digital library.

Based on these and several other projects and research studies, performance indicators for the electronic library resources and services were developed and specified in the standards *ISO 2789:2006 Information and documentation. International Library Statistics* and *ISO 11620:2008 Information and documentation. Library performance indicators.*

The purpose of the present benchmark article is not to provide an overview of previous similar studies but to analyze the essential data, details of the use of electronic library services and resources, and the cost of electronic scientific information in Vilnius Gediminas Technical University Library, Scientific Library of Riga Technical University, Tallinn University of Technology Library, Helsinki University of Technology Library, Stockholm Royal Institute of Technology Library and Norwegian University of Science and Technology Library (henceforth referred to as VGTUL, RTUL, TUTL, HUTL, KTHL, and NTNUL, respectively), as well as to answer to the question whether the financial opportunities of the leading libraries of universities of technology in the three Baltic states have been equal to those of the Northern Europe technological

university libraries, following the triumph of electronic scientific information. The six libraries were selected because they all are members of the International Association of Technological University Libraries (IATUL) and have been long-time co-operation partners in library exchange of important publications.

The details of the usage of e-services and e-resources at VGTUL, RTUL, TUTL, KTHL, and NTNUL, and the size and cost of their electronic collections are analyzed on the basis of the annual reports of the libraries (TUTL) and questionnaires sent to directors of libraries (VGTUL, RTUL, KTHL, and NTNUL). In order to evaluate the electronic services and resources of technological university libraries, the following data and performance indicators have been considered (based on, though not limited by, the International Standards ISO 2789:2006 and ISO 11620:2008):

1. Data and performance indicators related to the usage of the library services and resources: the number of registered users, the number of visits, the number of virtual visits, the number of licensed databases, the number of career reference collections, the number of e-publication titles, the number of loans, the number of downloaded content units;
2. Data and performance indicators related to the expenses of the library: acquisition costs, the percentage of expenses on e-documents in the acquisition costs, acquisition costs per student.

In order to determine whether the number of defended doctoral dissertations at universities may be related to the costs that university libraries have to pay for the acquiring of scientific information, the number of doctoral theses defended between 2004 and 2008 is compared by country and by technological university.

Here is a list of definitions for the terms used in this article (ISO 2789:2006):

- **electronic library** (**e-library**) is a unified system of electronic collections and services;
- **e-collection** is a collection of electronic documents;
- **e-service** is a service of the electronic library which is provided by the local server or which is available via the network;
- **e-document** is a record or material object regarded as a unit on which electronic information has been recorded.

The period between 2004 and 2008 was chosen for analysis because during this period the providing and use of e-services in the libraries increased considerably, as did the libraries' expenses on electronic scientific information.

Digital Scholarly Communication in the Nordic and Baltic Countries

The Nordic libraries are 'all developed in democratic societies where enlightenment and free access to information have by tradition been important elements and where the libraries are considered to be core institutions in society' (Larsen, 2005). Therefore the Nordic countries 'have a century long tradition of libraries and of providing access to information, knowledge and culture to all citizens' (Axelsson & Niegaard, 2005). 'The Nordic libraries are among the most frequently used in the world and among the most adaptable' (Larsen, 2005).

Libraries in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) began the process of digital library building in the 1980s with the implementation of computerized library catalogues (Fendin, 2004). *The Nordic Council for Scientific Information and Research Libraries* (NORDINFO), founded in 1977 (closed in 2004), was an institution that was financed through the common Nordic budget. The main purpose of NORDINFO was to promote Nordic cooperation within the field of scientific information and documentation, principally in connection with research library systems. Among NORDINFO's aims was to be instrumental in the development of better and more efficient ways of disseminating scientific information within the Nordic scholarly community.

The Nordic Electronic Research Library is a concept which is 'based on national developments within the research library sector in each of the five Nordic countries. The goals of the Nordic Electronic Research Library are built on national goals, which in general terms are to make scientific and technical information easily available in all the Nordic region, independent of subject area, publication form and location of the user.' (Hannesdóttir, 2000)

Among the individual Nordic countries, Finland is renowned for its comprehensive library system, which has high usage and lending figures and makes extensive use of technology and networks in research and public libraries. University libraries in Finland formed the first small-scale consortium in 1996. The establishment of the *Finnish National Electronic Library* (FinElib) was initiated by the Ministry of Education in 1997. FinElib is a consortium supporting Finnish research, teaching, and learning by promoting the availability and use of high-quality information throughout Finnish society. FinElib acquires both Finnish and international electronic resources (*Ministry of Education of Finland*, n.d.).

The Swedish Electronic Research Library (SVEBIB) is administered by BIBSAM, a consortium of Swedish university and research libraries. SVEBIB

is a content-oriented framework that relies on the Swedish University Network (SUNET). SVEBIB is expected to include all types of electronic resources that are relevant to the Swedish research and higher education communities and to make these available to all students, teachers, scientists, and scholars in the Swedish university system (*National Library of Sweden,* n.d.).

In Norway, the *BDB-BIBSYS Digital Library* project was started in 1998 to establish new services and integrate these into the existing ones. The purpose of the BDB project is to provide improved access to both new and existing digital information sources within higher education. The National Office for Research Documentation, Academic and Special Libraries (*Riksbibliotektjenesten*, or RBT) is responsible for developing national license agreements giving research and special libraries access to electronic sources. The RBT was merged with the Norwegian Archive, Library and Museum Authority (*ABM-utvikling*), established in 2003. It is an advisory and executive organization for the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, on the fields of archives, libraries, and museums (*Norwegian Archive, Library and Museum Authority*, n.d.).

In the Soviet period, the university libraries in the Baltic countries were comparatively well funded, with huge stocks and multiple copies of books, including a large number of textbooks (Pupeliene, 2004). Foreign books (in fact, any book published outside the Soviet Union since 1917) were distrusted in the Soviet Union. For example, in the period between 1945 and 1950 the Tallinn University of Technology Library received only 240 publications, mostly single copies of journals (Veskimägi, 1995).

Because of poor technological infrastructure as well as for political reasons, the access to electronic information was limited. The online-access to national and other databases in the region as well as the international supply via other electronic means came under the strict control of the respective ministries (Virkus, 2005).

At the beginning of 1990s the key word used to describe the library situation in the Baltic states was changes. In this context libraries first found themselves free but poor (Glosienė, 2001). The chronic lack of finances, poor information resources and underdeveloped library and information systems and networks, contradictions between the choice of literature to be published and the demand of readers, the conflict between a growing number of documents and the quality of access and inflexible library work and methods were the source of conflicts mentioned by several authors (Veskimägi, 1995; Virkus, 2005).

Although the creating of an all-Baltic comprehensive online catalogue of the collections of major Baltic research libraries was under discussion at the 4th Congress of Baltic Librarians (West & Lowe, 1998), these hopes and dreams unfortunately never fulfilled.

In Estonia, the requirements for academic libraries were set forth by the regulation of the Minister of Education and Research in 2002. According to the regulation means were allocated from the state budget for the acquisition of scientific information – part of the funding went directly to university libraries to support the acquisition of scientific information and part of it went to the *Consortium of the Estonian Library Network* (ELNET Consortium, established in 1996) for general procurement of electronic journals and scientific databases.

The *Library Information Network Consortium of Latvia* (LINC) is a non-profit state limited liability company, established in 1997 according to the model of the Estonian ELNET Consortium and by order of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia. The consortium is financed from the state budget. The project 'Electronic publications for Latvian libraries' was initiated in 2001 in cooperation with the international consortium eIFL.net (Electronic Information for Libraries). The purpose of the project was and is to introduce a wide choice of electronic resources in different fields in order to improve the quality and competitiveness of library services as well as to study the interests and needs of Latvian libraries in the field of electronic publications (Luse, 2004).

In Lithuania, the *Open Society Fund–Lithuania* was the first to promote online databases for libraries and played a great role in persuading the Ministry of Culture to allot special funds for electronic resources. Therefore this ministry was the first governmental agency which started partially funding subscription to EBSCO Publishing since 2001. The Ministry of Education and Science started allotting special funds for database subscription since 2003. From the very beginning Lithuanian libraries decided that the funds must be used only as partial payment for foreign online databases. This is because libraries feel bigger responsibility when they share the cost themselves (Banionytė & Vaškevičienė, 2005).

Findings

Usage of E-Resources and E-Services in Technological University Libraries

The value of the university library has traditionally been measured mainly by quantitative indicators, such as size, capacity, costs, etc. The collection, systematization and analysis of statistical data have remained important also in present time (Jõgi & Kont, 2009).

The numbers in Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate that students constitute only a part of the readership of technological university libraries, while a considerable part of the readership (for example, ca 30% in TUTL) is formed by other target groups (lecturers, scientists, and other interested groups). Therefore, the role of technological university libraries is much broader, offering services to different users.

Figure 1. Number of FTE students in technological universities, 2004–2008



The largest increase in the number of registered readers has occurred in VGTUL. While the number of students using VGTUL has increased by around 3,000 in five years, the number of registered users during this period has doubled—from 9,830 readers in 2004 to 18,920 readers in 2008. The number of registered users has also increased significantly in RTUL—from 13,067 readers in 2004 to 19,330 readers in 2008. It seems that libraries of technology universities in Latvia and Lithuania not only provide services for their home university, but fulfill much broader functions in the society, serving as their target groups all practitioners of science and development activities.

The number of registered readers in TUTL has remained relatively stable during the given period. In the Nordic region the number of students as well as the number of registered users in the technological university libraries has been stable.

Figure 2. Number of registered users in libraries of universities of technology, 2004–2008



* *The number of registered users in Stockholm Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) Library was not counted prior to 2008.*

Table 1 compares the number of regular visits and virtual visits in the six libraries. As stated in the ISO 2789:2006 Information and Documentation. International Library Statistics (*International Organization for Standardization*, 2006), virtual visits are a very important indicator for the work of a modern

Table 1. Number of library visits / number of virtual visits, 2004–2008

Library	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
VGTUL	428,981 / 195,990	389,978 / 180,135	522,384 / 269,956	374,934 / 145,358	380,959 / 162,307
RTUL	229,047 / 20,086	229,876 / 21,664	230,476 / 14,023	232,274 / 747,252	205,209 / 1,284,176
TUTL	234,949 / *	245,236 / 5,950,159	246,658 / 5,851,807	247,263 / 5,749,833	246,529 / 9,100,123
HUTL	285,608 / 2,908,032	274,719 / 2,956,340	253,227 / 3,447,000	235,984 / 8,868,034	233,479 / 10,047,754
KTHL	490,000 / *	470,000 / *	440,999 / 744,000	418,852 / 820,000	464,406 / 638,000
NTNUL	660,290 / 1,126,002	665,746 / 1,355,858	652,057 / 1,388,348	761,644 / 1,807,100	809,157 / 2,078,165

* *Data not available.*

university library and should be considered equal to a traditional library visit. *Virtual visit* can be defined as the user's request placed at the library's website from outside the library premises, regardless of the number of pages or elements viewed. Virtual visits are comparable to traditional visits.

The data given in Table 1 does not allow us to conclude that the increasingly dominant role of electronic resources in university libraries has resulted in a significant decrease in the number of visits and increase in the number of virtual visits. True, the number of virtual visits in the libraries where it was counted at least over three years, in most cases, however, shows an increasing trend.

Universities and their libraries anywhere in the world have experienced in recent years an enormous growth in documents in digital format. In several important research fields, especially in exact and natural sciences and technology, efficient research is no longer possible without network access and computers (Sinikara, 2007).

Data given in Figure 3 shows that the number of licensed databases has grown rapidly only in TUTL, HUTL and in NTNUL.

Figure 3. Electronic collection: number of licensed databases, 2004–2008



* *The number of licensed databases in Scientific Library of Riga Technical University (RTUL) was not counted prior to 2006.*

While in 2004 the number of databases in VGTUL exceeded those in TUTL (27 and 23, respectively), by 2008 the number of databases in VGTUL had decreased to 23 and increased to 80 in TUTL. The number of licensed databases in RTUL was not estimated until 2006, but the number of databases is still

extremely small compared to other libraries. The limited electronic resources certainly account for the considerably fewer virtual visits and a smaller number of content units downloaded in RTUL and VGTUL compared to other libraries. The number of licensed databases in the Nordic region has grown during the last five years in all libraries. From 2006 onwards, HUTL began to distinguish between 66 separate CSA (Cambridge Scientific Abstracts) databases, hence the sudden increase in the number of databases. Unfortunately, it is not known whether the large number of databases in NTNUL has been caused by the library's record-keeping specifics.

Table 2 presents the comparison of collections on physical data carriers (including, e.g., printed books and periodicals, but also CDs, VHSs, DVDs, etc.) and electronic collections (the number of titles of e-books and e-periodicals) in technological university libraries. The data has been collected according to the standard ISO 2789:2006. From 2004 to 2008, the number of collections on physical data carriers was stable in all libraries. Of the considerably increased number of e-publications in HUTL in 2006, around 240,000 are various digitized historical books from different disciplines, published in the U.K. and U.S. in the 15th to18th centuries and made available via different databases.

Table 2. Physical versus electronic collections (incl. e-books and e-journals), 2004–2008

Library	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
VGTUL	575,931 /*	574,488 /*	580,904 / 20,489	583,365 / 26,868	582,672 / 39,419
RTUL	2,333,910 /*	2,301,858 /*	2,205,044 /*	2,084,972 /*	1,961,419 /*
TUTL	718,536 / 31,000	723,136 / 37,800	723,906 / 43,800	733,4867 / 55,000	723,630 / 69,474
HUTL	237,087 / 10,999	241,104 / 13,068	240,800 / 260,228	240,875 / 311,547	234,894 / 326,151
KTHL	864,661 / 626,274	865,723 / 633,412	877,572 / 638,348	833,379 / 638,667	837,770 / 665,392
NTNUL	2,713,304 / 30,374	2,754,403 / 45,819	2,795,816 / 49,695	2,829,410 / 62,778	2,854,605 / 333,500

* *The number was not counted.*

Table 3 compares traditional loans and downloaded electronic content units in the technological university libraries. *Content downloaded* is defined as content unit (full-text article or abstract) that is successfully requested from a database, electronic serial or digital library collection. Electronic content units downloaded from a library collection indicate that users were able to find units relevant to them. In terms of traditional library loans, off-site loans in home, onsite-loans, loans through self-service device, and renewals (but not in-house usage) have been considered.

Thus, while in 2008 the libraries of universities of technology in the Baltic countries had a more or less equal number of readers, the services offered by these libraries were by no means at the same level. In TUTL the number of traditional library visits somewhat increased between 2004 and 2008, but decreased in RTUL and VGTUL. As a prerequisite to virtual visits to the library, the electronic services offered must correspond to user needs. The number of databases available in RTUL is very small, only 10 or 11. In VGTUL, the number of databases in 2008 remained at the same level as in TUTL in 2004 (in 2008, the number of databases in TUTL had increased to 80). All this affected the number of virtual visits as well as the small number of downloaded e-content units in RTUL and VGTUL. In KTHL and NTNUL the number of regular visits is much smaller than in RTUL and VGTUL, but the number of content units downloaded is, by contrast, many times higher.

Table 3. The use of collections: traditional loans / content units downloaded

Library	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
VGTUL	521,257 / 54,467	487,174 / 56,758	450,277 / 45,410	376,801 / 47,619	355,720 / 62,019
RTUL	752,243 /*	756,730 /*	670,780 / 95,000	630,261 / 74,213	352,680 / 229,754
TUTL	193,246 / 136,244	193,497 / 418,538	193,518 / 545,804	193,960 / 684,623	193,545 / 436,788
HUTL	181,557 / 245,046	253,264 / 255,642	271,545 / 264,895	256,447 / 291,849	241,760 / 353,627
KTHL	107,563 / 482,729	105,953 / 728,787	96,305 / 720,443	84,031 / 772,317	82,140 / 914,318
NTNUL	264,892 / 552,000	269,347 / 630,000	256,527 / 740,000	247,220 / 1,175,000	252,289 / 1,709,000

* *The number of content units downloaded in Scientific Library of Riga Technical University (RTUL) was not counted prior to 2006.*

The development of electronic publishing has considerably increased the independence of scholars and enhanced research activities. Electronic publications are primarily acquired to be used in the entire university and their access is related to the university's IP addresses. For example, since 2004, members of TUT have been able to use the online databases outside the university network. This opportunity was used by more than 200 people in 2004 and by more than 400 people in 2005.

Currently, the suppliers of databases and e-publications are still not able to offer standard usage statistics for electronic scientific information, which makes it difficult to obtain comparable data. This constitutes as a problem for all the six university libraries. However, data on the usage of electronic scientific information has improved each year, primarily due to the implementation of the COUNTER (*Counting Online Usage of Networked Electronic Resources*) and SUSHI (*Standardized Usage Statistics Harvesting Initiative*) projects, although this field is in need of further development.

Electronic Scientific Information Acquisition Expenses in Technological University Libraries

University libraries as well as librarians have to manage human and information resources with the following main goals in mind: to provide fast access to information, to satisfy the expectations of the users, and to reduce the cost of the services (Melo & Pires, 2010). Governments and universities have been investing large sums of money to improve access to the production of knowledge. It is important to know the return on the investments in technological university libraries.

A university library cannot exist without library material costs, which (in addition to workforce-related expenses) constitute the biggest and main expense.

Spending on the development of electronic services and resources is a prospective investment, because information has become a commodity that must be quickly and easily found if researchers are to be productive and competitive. Electronic access to scientific information is certainly one of the key factors in increasing the number of scientific publications by researchers as well as the number of doctoral degrees granted per year. A total of 7,538 doctoral degrees were awarded in the Nordic and Baltic countries in 2008. Approximately 6,800 were awarded in the Nordic countries (including Iceland and Denmark), while just over 700 in the Baltics.

Table 4. Number of doctoral degrees in the Nordic and Baltic countries / Number of doctoral degrees per mill. capita in the Nordic and Baltic countries (adapted from NORBAL) / Number of doctoral degrees in universities of technology in the Nordic and Baltic countries

Country / University	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Lithuania / VGTU	303 / 88 / 32	389 / 114 / 38	393 / 116 / 37	391 / 116 / 48	391 / 116 / 42
Latvia / RTU	79 / 34 / 17	112 / 49 / 25	93 / 41 / 34	158 / 69 / 32	165 / 73 / 43
Estonia / TUT	209 / 155 / 25 (3)	131 / 97 / 33 (5)	143 / 106 / 32 (4)	153 / 114/ 31 (9)	161 / 120/ 45 (4)
Finland / HUT	1,399 / 268 /129	1,422 / 271 / 139	1,409 / 268 / 148	1,526 / 289 / 160	1,526 / 287 /140
Sweden / KTH	2,763 / 307 / 223	2,757 / 306 / 241	2,768 / 305 / 234	2,853 / 312 / 190	2,890 / 313 / 236
Norway / NTNU	782 / 170 /155	855 / 185 / 152	905 / 194 / 149	1,030 / 219 / 173	1,244 / 261 /272

Table 4 indicates that in each country there was some increase in the number of defended dissertations between 2004 and 2008, but the largest growth took place in Norway. In Sweden, 2,890 doctoral degrees were awarded in 2008, which was the highest number in the region and about twice as many as in Finland. 1,244 degrees were awarded in Norway.

In terms of awarded doctoral degrees per million capita, Sweden was the first in the region between 2004 and 2008, followed by Finland and Norway. As to the Baltic countries, Estonia and Lithuania had been more successful than Latvia. Comparing the technological universities, we can see that in the years 2004–2008 the highest number of PhD theses was defended in KTH, with the exception in 2008 when 272 doctoral degrees were awarded in NTNU and "only" 236 in KTH.

The proportion of e-document acquisition cost in total acquisition expenditure is considered an important performance indicator. It has been included in international library statistics since 2006, but has been recorded by libraries even earlier. Table 5 reveals a big difference in the acquisition costs of the libraries, due to which the libraries have very different financial means to spend

on print materials as well as on electronic publications, unfortunately to the disadvantage of the Baltic libraries of universities of technology.

Tabel 5. Acquisition costs: expenditure on print materials / expenditure on purchase of databases; licenses (% from acquisition costs) [EUR]

Library	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
VGTUL	115,002 / 8,468 (7%)	148,957 / 7,158 (5%)	138,873 / 9,934 (7%)	156,809 / 16,070 (9%)	172,523 / 30,861 (15%)
RTUL	92,997 / 14,136 (15%)	102,822 / 20,104 (16%)	114,098 / 19,019 (16%)	142,064 / 20,536 (14%)	127,216 / 16,438 (13%)
TUTL	408,589 / 190,137 (32%)	426,034 / 255,494 (38%)	457,231 / 294,362 (39%)	363,369 / 455,656 (54%)	557,051 / 317,771 (36%)
HUTL	281,528 / 1,044,595 (80%)	168,718 / 911,354 (84%)	175,155 / 1,209,396 (87%)	186,343 / 1,274,929 (88%)	146,923 / 1,335,331 (90%)
KTHL	580,605 / 1,289,140 (69%)	521,561 / 1,397,388 (73%)	600,287 / 1,564,681 (72%)	472,533 / 1,683,558 (78%)	258,517 / 2,020,407 (89%)
NTNUL	2,893,575 / 1,435,475 (33%)	2,874,864 / 1,589,319 (36%)	2,427,638 / 2,247,868 (48%)	1,723,720 / 3,652,036 (68%)	1,003,659 / 4,283,924 (81%)

Here appears an interesting trend: while in the libraries of the Nordic countries the percentage of acquisition costs spent on printed materials declines, in the libraries of the Baltic region it increases. For example in Latvia and Lithuania only one-tenth of the acquisition budget has been spent on licensed databases and online journals. In TUTL this percentage is a little higher. Of course, one might argue that access to many databases (e.g., EBSCO) is directly government-funded in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, without further cost for libraries, but then again, the situation is the same in Finland, Sweden and Norway.

As far as university libraries are concerned,

> *[t]he two most interested stakeholder groups are the population the library is set up to serve and the institution to which it belongs. […] The institution, especially if it provides funding, will see university library quality on another scale: that is, the library is good if it helps to shorten studying time, produces graduates*

> *that quickly find a job, supports research in an effective way, helps to raise the image of the institution, and if it is cost-effective overall. The last issue will often be the most important when resources are scarce (Poll, 2001).*

To measure this, university libraries are using a performance indicator given here in Table 6—acquisition costs per student.

Table 6. Acquisition costs per student: expenditure on print materials / expenditure on purchase of databases [EUR]

Library	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
VGTUL	8 / 0.6	10 / 0.5	9 / 0.7	10 / 1	10 / 2
RTUL	6 / 0.8	6 / 4	7 / 1	8 / 1	8 / 1
TUTL	41 / 19	40 / 24	40 / 26	31 / 39	42 / 24
HUTL	2 / 69	111 / 60	12 / 80	12 / 84	9 / 89
KTHL	41 / 90	36 / 97	44 / 116	35 / 126	19 / 147
NTNUL	226 / 112	214 / 118	181 / 168	126 / 268	73 / 313

The values presented in Table 6 are calculated as follows: expenditure on print materials, expenditure on purchase of e-documents, databases / number of students

Acquisition costs of electronic publications per student have steadily increased in NTNUL, KTHL and HUTL since 2006, although the number of students in these technological universities has declined over this period. In TUTL this cost was the highest in 2006 (26 EUR) and in 2007 (39 EUR). Acquisition costs of electronic publications per student in RTUL and VGTUL have been very low and so have acquisition costs of print materials per student per year. This situation has not offered enough support for students. For example, the director of the University of Latvia Library said already in 1999[1] that the budget for purchasing new books should be 8 LVL (11 EUR) per student per year, whereas RTUL has received 4–6 LVL (6–8 EUR) per student per year over the last five years (see also Table 5). Needless to say, the electronic resources of RTU and VGTU Library are insufficient.

1 *Information obtained from literature reviews and personal observations.*

Summary and conclusions

Today, electronic research information resources and university libraries are crucial for the entire countries, as the economic and social development in the contemporary globalized world depends on this body of information. The actual cost of the electronic library and the needs of users are evaluated according to activities conducted thus far and on the basis of statistics. The range of e-services featured on the libraries' websites is expanding from year to year, which leads to the assumption that the users have grown accustomed to e-services and have established an increasing demand for such services.

Meager financial resources are still the most significant negative factor in the development of the Baltic technological university libraries. This is especially noticeable in the case of RTUL and VGTUL for the following possible reason: state financing of university libraries (including libraries of universities of technology) has been clearly inadequate in Latvia and Lithuania. The central technological university library in Estonia would also need more funding for acquisition of scientific information to meet the needs of researchers and the academic staff of the university.

Inadequate state support clearly affects the ability of libraries of technological universities in the Baltic region to supply their readers with scientific information. To answer the question posed in the introduction as to whether the leading libraries of universities of technology in the three Baltic states have had equal financial means to acquire electronic scientific information, it could be said that only TUTL has received more or less adequate financial support. However, compared to the libraries in the Nordic region, Estonian university libraries have no reason to be satisfied.

It should be noted that there seems to be no clear link between the increase in acquisition budget and a larger number of defended doctoral degrees, especially in the Baltic states. Perhaps this could be explained by the fact that in the Nordic countries PhD students have a better economic situation to focus only on their doctoral studies and this makes their activities more effective. By contrast, in the Baltic region no such grants are available for doctoral students and therefore they cannot fully commit to science. However, these connections require further sociological study.

Possible suggestions for the future would be:

- Establishment of a consortium of technological universities in the Nordic and Baltic countries. The need for specific and expensive databases would well justify that wish;
- Making the publishing of annual reports and other major statistical indicators in English on the websites of the libraries or IATUL compulsory for all IATUL members—this would facilitate carrying out a more systematic analysis of the development of libraries of universities of technology in different regions;
- Conducting a bibliometric study of doctoral dissertations in libraries of universities of technology analyzed above to observe the effectiveness of decision-making process in a library's acquisition of cited materials; identification of the forms of documents mostly used and evaluation of user satisfaction with the information on the basis of the range of information sources available in these libraries.

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BOOK REVIEW:

Tarmo Tuisk

David D. Laitin. Nations, States and Violence. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. XV, 162 p.

Professor David Latin's recent book, *Nations, States and Violence,* is a profound work that discusses serious topics and reasons for grievances and insurgencies that can, in many cases, lead to a civil war. Several examples from history have been analysed from the viewpoint of the country's ethnic composition. An extensive data set has been collected to enable statistical analysis. Latin's careful elaboration of historical facts and previously written researches show that the grounds that lead to violence and civil war do not show significant correlation on just to the existence of different ethnic groups in a particular country or a region. One of the main findings is that those different ethnicities, which have been living together throughout history, have also learned to protect themselves from violent behaviour. But it is more likely that insurgencies and civil war onsets happen in the regions, where due to the immigration, new settlers have arrived. In some cases, resettlement of people to certain regions has been set by state policy in order to build a nation state.

The results base on data sets that carefully examine all countries year by year in regard of possible onsets. There were more than 6,000 cases, while 127 of those qualify as civil wars according to the author's criteria (time period between 1945 to 1999, and with certain number of deaths on both struggling sides). Latin's worldwide experience and personal perception through fieldwork in different parts of the globe is tremendously contributing to the analysis. Several cases in Africa (Somalia, Nigeria), Asia (Sri Lanka), and Europe (Catalonia, Ex-USSR) have been brought to the reader in order to illustrate statistical analysis based on the data set. The findings of data analysis show that the reasons for a civil war do not lay in the heterogeneous composition of the state, but in, first of all, in the weakness of the state that is not able to provide basic services to its population, incapable to police its peripheries, and unable to distinguish law abiders from lawbreakers. Newly independent and newly democratizing states plus ecological conditions as a mountainous terrain are more likely "suitable" conditions for civil war onsets. Under these conditions civil war is profitable for

potential insurgents. Laitin's data shows, for example, that there is statistical association between oil and civil war. His quantitative research discredits the popular belief that nationalism and ethnic differences in and of themselves are dangerous. Laitin concludes that weak, incompetent states, unable to enforce the rule of law, are dangerous, and gives some answers, why do accumulated wisdom and his collected data conflict. He sets up a new foundation in order to understand nationalism: national identities are not given, but in the context of coordination opportunities, are taken; national cultures are not all-encompassing frameworks, but rather sources for useful coordination.

In chapter three about cultural foundations of nationalism, Laitin describes in details the case of Somalia, where in 1980 president Siyaad appointed his heralded general from recently ended war, Maxamad Caali Samantar, to a dual position of Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. This was a smart decision as Samantar himself orginated from an outcast Somali group, and did not belong to any "prestigious" clan. The president granted this way stability to his country as he knew that Samantar, despite his high position, would never get public support from others (against him) although rebellions (because of defeated war) against Siyaad himself could possibly emerge. As Laitin explains here the case of President Siyaad, "..the path of play leading to 'no coup attempt' along with 'careful presidential attention to the safety of his Minister of Defence and his ability to maintain control over the military hierarchy' constitutes an equilibrium." In this respect, another country, Estonia, might have been an interesting example in the 1990s, just after the restoration of independence at the collapse of Soviet Union. Estonia with approximately one-third of Russian-speaking population could had adopted something similar in order to ground accompanying tensions between Estonians and Russians, and to calm Russian-speakers, i.e. had an Estonian-speaking President and a Russian-speaking Prime Minister in order to stabilise the overall situation. Today we know that this scenario remained for Estonia only as theoretical and was never seriously considered because pre WW II constitution was adopted and all political institutions were re-established by Estonian citizens and their descendants. Estonian language was named the state language. Laitin explains this as Estonian Russians' move towards a new equilibrium, where all Estonian citizens principally relied on public affairs in a hundred percent Estonian (language of the Centre). "Estonian political and cultural leaders sought to do this by changing the benefits and costs for Russian speakers who had to rethink the value of the language repertoires appropriate for their children. The nationalizing government raised the costs for maintaining Russian monolingualism by denying citizenship to any Russian who could not pass examination in Estonian. Not only did the Estonian government raise the costs for Russians to maintain monolingual repertoires, but also raised the

benefits to them for speaking Estonian by making certain jobs available only to Estonian-speakers. These acts set off a competitive assimilation dynamic, as young Russian-speakers realized the advantages that would accrue them should they learn Estonian better than their peers. /.../ This initiated moves that could lead to a full cascade." Laitin summarises here that: "There is a discernable trend toward a unified nation-state of Estonians, composed of some one-third of the population that will trace its ancestry to Russian-speakers." As tipping game model is applied by Laitin to explain economic payoffs, in-group status and out-group acceptance, he concludes the chapter with Ernest Renan words that "nations are the products neither of nature nor of descent, but rather of choice". Latin's tipping model "illustrates that the primordial image of society, where class is dynamic due to opportunities for social mobility while nationality is static without any expectations of cultural mobility, is flawed."

The final conclusions of the book are worded as "homogeneity does not buy ethnic peace". The author means here that: "If the danger of intercultural violence is low, then it seems reasonable to accommodate to multiculturalism rather than eradicate it. The remedy proposed against civil war was a strong state, capable of effective counterinsurgency. Democratic institutions can stay strong if society is built on a system of layered and overlapping linguistic repertoires that create a new form of national homogeneity – a constellation of interlinked language repertoires rather than a shared single language." Laitin concludes his book: "The analysis herein does not, and we must not, build contemporary political theory on the defunct institutional foundation of the *nation-state*."

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