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Letter from the Editor

Dear Reader,

We are happy to tell you that we are receiving a large number of high quality submissions for articles. We wish to serve the security studies community, and especially the academic community in this region, by offering academics and professionals in the security studies field an opportunity to publish with us. We are currently a bi-annual publication, but we expect to put out some extra issues every year to support the academics who have presented papers at the International Society for Military Sciences. Several of the articles in this issue began as conference papers of the ISMS. While having a special focus on Baltic issues, we are also interested in discussing broad issues of European regional security, as well as furthering academic discussion concerning stability operations and counterinsurgency.

As you will see in this issue we have a mix of articles on Baltic Regional military history with three articles on the World War I and post World War I era, we have two articles focusing on current Latvian Security issues, and we have two articles that focus on current stability and intervention operations that involved the European nations and armed forces.

Call for Articles for the Baltic Security and Defence Review

The Baltic Security and Defence Review is a peer reviewed academic journal published twice a year by the Baltic Defence College, a staff college for the three Baltic States located in Estonia. The language of the journal is English. The journal focuses on current security issues and military history – with an emphasis on security issues as they affect the Baltic States. We welcome scholars to submit academic articles of 6,000 – 12,000 words in length with endnotes (Chicago style) on subjects dealing with: European Security and NATO issues, small state security issues, current security issues of the Baltic Region, the military history of the Baltic region, as well as articles on counterinsurgency and stability operations. Submit all articles and enquiries to:

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Best regards from the Editor,

James S. Corum PhD
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Call of Duty – Modern Warfare: The Effects of Landmines and IEDs on British Troops in Afghanistan Post 2001

By *Shaun Allan**

Most people would accept that modern warfare, however disagreeable and horrific, must be waged with weapons of a certain ferocity and technology. The current conflict in Afghanistan displays all the ferocity of modern warfare which entails the wide use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including Afghanistan's massive landmine legacy.¹ These landmines and IEDs are perhaps amongst the most awful weapons on the battlefield today, they are inanimate victim-activated explosive devices recognizing neither friend nor foe, making no distinctions between soldiers or civilians they continue maiming and killing long after war is over. Whereas IEDs are assembled from various explosive components or unexploded ordnance (UXO) etcetera appear as and when an insurgent places them, and usually left with pressure plate activation or set off electronically by the insurgent using a command wire, grip switch or mobile phone.²

The pages of the Royal Marines journal *The Globe & Laurel* refer constantly to IEDs and landmines, chronicling marines' encounters with them. Landmines and IEDs, whatever their configurations, are taking a heavy toll on frontline British soldiers deployed to Afghanistan. Furthermore, the changing nature of the conflict in Afghanistan throughout its course has not only affected tactical and strategic thinking on a military level in the Helmand theatre, but also in the United Kingdom on how to combat the many explosive threats. The development of new techniques and equipment for countering the high and increasing threat of IEDs and landmines is a constantly evolving process both in Afghanistan and the UK.

* Shaun Allen is a former Royal Marine and has served with the British Army Engineers in Afghanistan. Currently a PhD Student at the University of Hull in the UK

This paper investigates the substantial existential threat landmines and IEDs pose to the British soldier in Afghanistan, and the British Armed Forces and government's response in countering the threat. Furthermore, when British soldiers are injured by an explosive device, what measures are in place to save those soldiers' lives and afterwards rehabilitate them? To understand the situation in Afghanistan the investigation will ask three core questions:

1. How effectively do British troops respond to the landmine/IED threat?
2. How do the injuries inflicted by landmines/IEDs affect tactical and strategic thinking out in the field and in the UK?
3. How are injured British troops rehabilitated after a landmine/IED strike, and what happens to them once they are rehabilitated?

British troops deployed in Afghanistan (2001-present) have received superb medical care and are aware that they will be prescribed the life-saving treatment they require. All newly-arrived British troops at Camp Bastion (Britain's main base) are given a tour of the field hospital reassuring them they will be cared for should the worst happen.

The paper will review the origins of the threat by investigating the historiography of the Soviet/Afghan war of 1979-89, endeavouring to discover the reasons why Afghanistan became the most heavily-landmined region on earth. Moreover, an investigation into continuing landmine proliferation and the exponential rise in the use of IEDs will be carried out to discover why the nature of warfare in Afghanistan invites the heavy use of landmines and IEDs. The research follows a framework continuum of landmine/IED deployment, the counter-insurgency patrol, the process of a minestrike, the casualty evacuation (casevac), and finally medevac (medical evacuation) and rehabilitation to discover fully how these factors affect the overall tactical and strategic thinking of the British armed forces and government.

Furthermore, a comparative strand will be woven throughout the work comparing the Soviet 40th Army and their Afghanistan experience with that of the British forces currently engaged in Helmand. Hopefully, this will help to reveal the many similarities and help in understanding the intricacies of fighting a protracted asymmetrical war.

I am an ex-Royal Marines Commando and last toured Afghanistan in 2006-7 as part of 42 Commando's Operation Herrick 5 deployment. As a part of 131 Commando, I was attached to, and deployed with 59 Commando Royal Engineers working as a Combat Engineer.³ I witnessed the effect of landmines and IEDs first hand (civilians and military) due to my role in theatre, and witnessed the injuries and deaths these weapons cause. I have lost personal friends in Afghanistan and have seen other friends injured. This is a country I will never forget. These experiences have led me to ask how and why these deaths and injuries occur, also what are the consequences of such explosive trauma?

The Soviet Union and the context of Afghanistan's troubles

To perhaps most people in the West it may seem that conflict in Afghanistan suddenly started after 11 September 2001, and the attack on the Twin Towers. Perhaps there may have been a passing interest in Afghanistan when the Soviet Union invaded in 1979; and perhaps interest was maintained to a certain degree by the resistance of the Afghan Mujahideen (anti-Soviet Muslim fighters) against Soviet occupation. However, when the Soviets finally withdrew completely in 1991 and with the Cold War over that interest all but evaporated. The subsequent civil wars that raged in Afghanistan and the emergence of the Taliban registered hardly any interest in the West. However, following the terrorist attacks on New York, 11 September 2001 Afghanistan was on the radar again.

Afghanistan today has a massive landmine legacy and UXO problem, the causal knot of this was the Soviet Union's invasion of 27 December 1979, and the strands of this historic knot still choke Afghanistan today.⁴ The invasion was launched to prop up Afghanistan's embattled Communist regime, in place since 1978 following a Marxist coup.⁵ Moscow firmly believed that it had the ability to transform Afghanistan, stabilize its government, and achieve broad international recognition of the Communist regime in Kabul.⁶

After Soviet intervention Afghanistan became embroiled in a series of wars in which oceans of blood has flowed, and continues to flow, with landmines, UXO, ERW and IEDs playing a major role in the land's omnipresent misery. Afghanistan today remains one of the most heavily-

mined nations in the world.⁷ However, how did this occur? Furthermore, who was responsible for this statistic?

The blame game: the tactics of mine deployment

Landmines were traditionally deployed by state armed forces and used primarily to defend strategic locations, to channel or divert enemy forces, to deny routes and key positions to the enemy and to slow down enemy movement. However, the Soviet-Afghan war was to change this doctrine completely.⁸ Much of the blame for the introduction and proliferation of landmines in Afghanistan lies with the occupying Soviet forces and their Afghan allies during the 1979-1989 war. However, their Mujahideen opponents were also not blameless during this war.⁹ The Soviets not only used more mines than any professional military has ever done in a low intensity war of this sort, but they also used mines in an irresponsible and cavalier manner, not recording the majority of the landmines they deployed.¹⁰ The repercussions of these actions are still felt by Afghanistan's civilians and the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) today - a landmine once laid can remain active for upwards of fifty years.¹¹ However, there was a financial reason for the extensive Soviet landmine use: these mines were inexpensive in a war fought on the cheap. The Soviet commitment in Afghanistan represented only 6 per cent of all Soviet divisions deployed, and only 2 per cent of its total defence spending.¹²

Minefields in Afghanistan are found in many different settings. In the low intensity insurgency and counter-insurgency occupation the Soviets and the Afghan Communist government army deployed mines, predominantly Anti-Personnel (AP) everywhere they perceived a threat, and used landmines as an anti-morale weapon.¹³ Many of Afghanistan's major cities were heavily mined.¹⁴ Kabul and Kandahar international airports are still heavily mined, with strict no-go areas. A recent article in *Soldier* magazine reported a serious injury to an Italian soldier who detonated an AP mine while running around the perimeter of Kabul's military airport.¹⁵ Furthermore, as Afghanistan is predominately an agricultural country, and to aid land clearance, the Soviets deployed landmines, many air-scatterable AP mines on agricultural land as well as in villages. Landmines were deployed in religious shrines, village wells, graveyards, and irrigation ditches.¹⁶ Added to these mined areas was the mining of feeder roads with

mine belts 200-300 metres long, usually three rows deep, closing gaps on either side of the road or often laid up to the edge of the tarmac.¹⁷

These deployments, it has been argued, were calculated and cynical attempts to cut off the Mujahideen and other Jihad groups from the support of the local populace.¹⁸ The result of these mine deployments was the almost complete paralysis of Afghanistan's agricultural infrastructure due to the remotely-mined mountain grazing land and the large-scale mining of fields and irrigation systems.¹⁹

The use of landmines, particularly anti-personnel mines, in the context of modern warfare cannot be said to be targeted primarily at the military any longer, since the very design of many of the mines, and their various methods of dissemination, are such that civilian casualties and long-term infestation of the land are inevitable rather than coincidental.

Slow motion warfare and continuing proliferation

The deployment and laying of unrecorded scatterable mines is a militarily double-edged sword, as dangerous to the Soviets and their Afghan allies as it was for Afghan civilians and resistance fighters, due to minefield movement and the enemy movement of mines.²⁰ Soviet losses of men and vehicles to landmines were significant in the context of their struggle. The Mujahideen use of mines was far more selective (and perhaps more tactically effective) than the Soviets' prolific use.²¹ The Mujahideen did not possess many mines at the start of the Soviet-Afghan conflict; a problem soon remedied.²² The Mujahideen should also take some blame for the proliferation of unmarked landmine usage as opposing guerrilla forces, fighting for Afghanistan's various warlords, often used mines to force populations off the land reducing potential support for rivals.²³ Furthermore, the Mujahideen, like the Taliban today, used IEDs and explosive charges made from a variety of UXO.²⁴ However, the question arises as to how landmine proliferation is continuing in the latest war against the Afghan government and the ISAF in Afghanistan (2001-)?

During this modern era of the asymmetrical warfare carried out by the Taliban and other Deobandi terrorist/insurgent groups landmine usage is low due to the difficulty of obtaining landmines.²⁵ Instead, the majority of explosive attacks are carried out with remotely-detonated IEDs.²⁶ Nevertheless, Anti-Vehicle (AV) mines have been in use since at least

2003 by the Taliban, and reports from various foreign military contingents acknowledge that the Taliban have been seeking new and heavier AV mines.²⁷ During 2006, there were unconfirmed reports of Chinese-made AV mines in use by insurgents.²⁸ In June 2008, there were several reports of a new use of anti-personnel mines by the Taliban in the Arghandab district of Kandahar province.²⁹ A spokesman for Afghanistan's Ministry of Defence noted: 'The Taliban had laid landmines – anti-vehicle and anti-personnel – on the roads and footpaths in Arghandab.'³⁰ The increased usage of AP and AV mines was confirmed by a US Army captain, also mentioning the extensive use of IEDs and pressure plates to trigger explosions.³¹

Although the proliferation of landmines has slowed (the Ottawa Treaty 1997, banning AP landmines may be a factor) in Afghanistan insurgent groups are still keen to procure both AV and AP mines for use in their continuing struggle.³² Evidence of this comes from many ISAF and media reports of landmines being discovered whilst being smuggled into Afghanistan. In August 2008, three people were arrested with 30 AP mines and one AV mine in Pul-i-Khumri in Baghlan province.³³ During December 2008, ISAF forces recovered AP and AV mines among other weapons in the Ghorak district of Kandahar.³⁴ Furthermore, in January 2009, coalition forces recovered AP mines and pressure plates among weapons in Kandahar province.³⁵ During the Afghanistan New Beginnings Project, a joint Afghan-UN security force 'task force' uncovered large caches of weapons and munitions, including landmines; more than 2,900 tons (2.9 million kg) of munitions were discovered in northern Afghanistan.³⁶

Nevertheless, munitions are entering Afghanistan, but who is supplying these munitions? There is evidence that many of these supplies came, and still come from, Pakistan.³⁷ In 1997 a cable from the US Department of State to the US Department of Defence revealed that the Pakistan Interservice Intelligence Directorate (ISI) was supplying the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel and food, using a private transportation company that left Pakistan late most evenings.³⁸ Pakistan has given strong diplomatic support to the Taliban in the past, along with financial and military aid.³⁹ The ISI incident occurred in 1997. However, it is rumoured that support from Pakistan is still ongoing, and Taliban fighters in Zabul province have boasted of Pakistani support in 2006.⁴⁰ This support continued as the ISI played a double game with elements helping the

Americans with their fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban, whilst simultaneously still funding and training extremists.⁴¹

Furthermore, minefields have recently been laid along the 2,400 kilometre border between Pakistan and Afghanistan by the Pakistani Army to combat the growing Taliban insurgency in Pakistan as they try to close the border to Taliban infiltration. However, are these landmines secure against tampering and removal?⁴²

Proliferation continues, and landmine warfare remains a fact of modern war despite the Ottawa Treaty and despite the work of various non-governmental-organizations (NGOs).⁴³ It was estimated in the 1990s that for every mine cleared in Afghanistan another twenty were laid, adding to the Soviet legacy.⁴⁴ Landmines and ERW are a fact of life in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the vast majority of the landmines in Afghanistan are the responsibility of the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the Mujahideen. In their attempts to destroy local support for the Mujahideen, the Soviets used the strategy of land-denial in a brutal and cavalier fashion. Moreover, the vast majority of the mines deployed were not recorded and are still causing problems in 2010/11. The proliferation of landmines was augmented by the Mujahideen and various warlord militias, and continues today through the actions of the Taliban and the Pakistani Army. With fresh contamination of UXO and ERW littering Afghanistan one could argue that the place is one giant minefield. The question that has to be answered now is how many landmines are there in Afghanistan?

It just does not add up: calculating landmine figures

In Afghanistan, it was postulated, after the Soviet withdrawal that there were 35 million landmines of all types in the country.⁴⁵ However, it is now agreed that this figure was somewhat exaggerated and the official calculated guess at the number of landmines deployed in Afghanistan is now the conveniently round figure of 10 million.⁴⁶ This latter figure is accepted by most military organizations and all the de-mining NGOs.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the UK Mine Information Training Centre (UK-MITC) recognizes that this may be a convenient number, as the Soviets did not record many of their landmine deployments.⁴⁸

The UN organization Mine Action Coordination Centre Afghanistan (MACCA) estimated the number of hazardous areas in 2006 to be 6,502.⁴⁹ The Landmine Monitor Report estimates a contaminated area of 668 sq. km (2009), a reduced figure that stood at 852 sq. km in 2007 prior to extensive mine-clearing.⁵⁰ The British military's figures indicate that Afghanistan's contamination is around 716 million metres squared across 32 of the 34 provinces.⁵¹

The landmine problem is vast, making soldiering in Afghanistan a very dangerous business. However, what are the types of landmine and IED that the British forces face? Moreover, how are they activated and to what effect?

Landmines: models, UXO and IEDs and how they work

The Battlefield Engineering Wing at UK MITC estimates that there are 64 different models of landmine and UXO currently in Afghanistan.⁵² Twenty-three of these configurations (types) are anti-vehicle, 11 are anti-personnel (blast), 20 are anti-personnel-scatterable and fragmentation, and 10 belong to the category of UXO (see Figures 4 and 5).⁵³ There are nine different categories, all designed for specific roles: these are AP Blast, AP Fragmentation, AP Bounding Fragmentation, AP Directional Fragmentation, AV Blast, AV Shaped Charge, AV Off-Route, UXO and Booby traps/IEDs.⁵⁴ Over the last three decades, including the Soviet-Afghan War, many AP and AV mines have begun to rely on blast as their primary damage mechanism. Before this innovation most explosive weapons systems used gunpowder explosives or TNT (2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene) to drive metal such as fragments and shaped charge jets to engage targets.⁵⁵ Most AV mines still use TNT as the main charge, although some use more powerful explosives or mixtures such as Composition B.⁵⁶

However, to understand the threat one has to understand how these mines, including IEDs, work when initiated. Explosives are generally the principal means of harnessing enormous amounts of energy to attack a target. When an AP landmine/IED is activated by its victim, the high explosive detonates, generating very high pressure gasses which rapidly expand and affect their surroundings.⁵⁷ The AP mine relies primarily on the shockwave produced by its high explosive detonation to cause injury,

although a degree of fragmentation is inevitable as the casing and fuse assembly are shattered.⁵⁸ The effect is normally localized and unlikely to cause more than one serious casualty per-mine, although mines with thick Bakelite casings create a more substantial fragmentation hazard.⁵⁹ Although the size of the charge varies considerably between mines, most are intended to cause serious injury rather than kill. A typical wound will destroy one foot or leg and cause multiple lacerations from casing fragments and surrounding debris.⁶⁰ In some models of AV mine the anti-handling devices can cause the mine to explode due to changes in light, which makes defusing problematic.⁶¹

Some mines with low metal content have been buried in stacks of three, the top two without fuses, to prevent detection.⁶² In Afghanistan, improvisation is apparent when AP mines are placed on top of AV mines. This initiates the AV mine by the weight of a person activating the AP mine.⁶³

The preparation of IEDs can be carried out almost anywhere and everywhere, from materials that can be acquired from agricultural and medical supplies, such as the ample amounts of UXO and ERW that litter Afghanistan, or simply by stacking mines.⁶⁴ The use of suicide bombers could also be classed as an IED, and could perhaps be regarded as mobile IEDs. The manufacturing of the Taliban's IEDs does not require a highly technical knowledge of explosives. Much of the information used to make IEDs is disseminated through extremist websites, and much information and knowledge has filtered into Afghanistan from Iraq.⁶⁵ And, of course, the Deobandi groups engaged in Jihad against the British forces in Afghanistan have their own explosives experts who pass on their knowledge.⁶⁶

IEDs can be victim-detonated by the use of an improvised pressure plate. For example, a plastic lemonade bottle containing bare wires and buried just beneath the surface can be used for initiation. When the plastic bottle is stepped on, the wires touch and the IED is activated.⁶⁷ However, IEDs can also be command detonated either by electronic means such as a mobile phone (a technical advantage not available during the Soviet-Afghan War) or by someone hidden with a hand-held means of initiation (grip-switch).⁶⁸ IEDs are often very difficult to locate due to their sudden appearance, different configurations and compositions. They are currently proving quite effective tactically for the Taliban against British patrols and

convoys, which are slowed down considerably due to the threat.⁶⁹ IEDs are currently the number one cause of British casualties in Afghanistan.⁷⁰

Counter-insurgency: A hard unglamorous slog

The current war in Afghanistan has changed beyond all recognition. To date, the conflict has experienced three phases. Phase one: the initial launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 ended with victory for the Northern Alliance supported by Western Special Forces and airpower.⁷¹ However, phase one also involved (for the Taliban) organizing a strategy for insurgency with major contributions from Pakistan's ISI and Arab insurgents.⁷² Phase two started when the ISAF, at the invitation of Afghanistan's government, sent in a greater military presence. Consequently, between Operations Herrick 4 and 5 (2006-7), insurgent attacks increased by 300 per cent.⁷³ The conventional warfare continued throughout Operation Herrick 5, as 42 Commando took over the lead role in Helmand. However, by Operations Herrick 6 and 7 (2007-8), after punishing defeats from the British forces' in Helmand the Taliban gradually, because of heavy losses proceeded through an evolution of tactical and strategic 'combat Darwinism' and the shooting war phase ended.⁷⁴ Phase three became the asymmetrical war a hard, unglamorous slog.⁷⁵ The British armed forces in Helmand Province were prepared to meet the landmine threat; however, they were totally unprepared for the IED threat despite what was happening in Iraq during the same time-period.

The current IED phase is twinned with a tactic of well-aimed shots, usually occurring in Helmand's 'green zones' agricultural areas, gardens and vineyards that are bisected by irrigation ditches.⁷⁶ These tactics are psychological weapons which, if not managed effectively, can become corrosive to morale.⁷⁷ The struggle currently taking place in Afghanistan has taken the form of a classic asymmetrical conflict; protracted in nature with currently much of the strategic initiative belonging to the Taliban, although this is changing.⁷⁸ This is not a traditional 'big battalion' Western symmetrical way of war, with victory belonging to the strongest side.⁷⁹ Instead the British have come to realize that the conflict in Afghanistan is laden with intangibles, consisting of many variables.⁸⁰

Afghanistan's green zones were a constant source of trouble for the Soviets, as they are today for British troops. The green zone areas provided perfect concealment for the Mujahideen (as they do for the Taliban). Furthermore, Afghanistan's green zones in many parts of the country bordered highways and provided optimum sites for ambush, as AV and AP mines and IEDs were easily concealed at the edges of the green zone, where ambush parties and snipers preyed on dismounted soldiers and sappers, as is the situation in Afghanistan's current conflict.⁸¹ Moreover, one can start to understand the Soviets' logic in some degree for heavily mining these habituated areas, especially in the light of the casualties they were suffering.

The whereabouts of minefields and the sites of potential minefields and IEDs have already been mentioned when discussing how the Soviets and Mujahideen deployed their quotas of mines. Every member of the armed forces and civilians from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) deployed to Afghanistan are briefed with theatre-specific lectures and scenarios in their pre-deployment training (PDT) packages. The PDT has gradually been tailored taking account of the changes in the conflict to a more asymmetrical way of fighting.⁸² Nevertheless, common sense and good soldiering skills should be applied when patrolling in Afghanistan, always carrying out five- and ten-metre checks every time a soldier stops; with the increasing threat of IEDs, tactics in the field are now slowly adapting to counter this threat.⁸³

British soldiers deployed to Afghanistan are as well-protected from the dangers of the battlefield as they can be. They currently don Kevlar helmets (for protection against shrapnel only), Osprey body armour with two heavy Kevlar plates front and rear, and now armour for the pelvic region, nicknamed the 'Combat Codpiece'.⁸⁴ This protects the groin area in a blast. This equipment is saving lives; however, some of those wounded are severely disabled.

While serving in the current conflict in Afghanistan, not only has a soldier to be aware of the sources of potential threats, but he must also be aware of the potential for mine migration. Mine migration involves the movement of mines from their original placement due to two conditions. Firstly, environmental: flood water or rising wadi levels; or, if these mines are around the base of a mountain, the mines can be deposited downhill or on the valley floor.⁸⁵ The second condition involves the phenomenon

of Afghan villagers using uncovered mines to deploy around their villages as a form of protection from outside aggression.⁸⁶

Nevertheless, how does the British Army carry out its missions in a land laced with mines and IEDs and has all of the initiative shifted to the insurgents? To counteract the IED threat the soldiers' mission is to dominate the ground to deny the enemy reassuring the Afghan villagers of their security whilst carrying out human terrain mapping (identifying the local pattern of life plus its relevant actors).⁸⁷

A typical foot patrol's pace is very slow, due to the high risk of landmines and IEDs in and around villages, and the fear the locals have of the Taliban, who will kill the villagers if they reveal the whereabouts of IEDs (although there will of course always be some collaboration with the Taliban).⁸⁸

An article in the *Globe and Laurel* explains how a typical patrol is conducted:

The pace of the patrol is dictated by the two Vallon [mine detector] men out in front of the call sign ensuring the route is clear, a crucial and stressful occupation.⁸⁹ The Vallon men carry as little weight as possible to aid concentration. In a straight line behind the Vallon men are two LMG [Light Machine Gun, a Minimi 5.56 mm] gunners, three marines carrying the ECM [Electronic Counter Measures, to stop electronic signals to IEDs], one which weighs over seventy pounds. In addition there will be a medic, one corporal and a sergeant or officer, and an interpreter. Every man is in full body armour, helmet with full scales of ammo, and three litres of water, ladders, spare batteries, extra medical kit and more water split between the call sign; all conducted in the Afghan heat well in the mid 40s.⁹⁰

The same laborious, slow-paced patrolling can also be applied to the movement of vehicles. A recent article in the *Globe and Laurel* attests to the high IED threat level that vehicles are facing. For example, a resupply run made by ASG (Assault Group) Viking (tracked vehicles) noted the following:

The most recent transit down the 11 km stretch revealed in excess of 16 IEDs (this route took 15 hours to clear). Added to

this are the guaranteed small arms contacts and RPG (rocket propelled grenade) attacks. The route clearance has to be conducted at walking pace.⁹¹

Soviet experiences of ensuring that a road to be travelled was clear of explosive devices involved the Soviet regiment which was required to move along that road deploying a Movement Support Detachment (MSD), which included a tank with a mine roller, a troop of sappers mounted on personnel carriers and a reconnaissance element. The MSD simply moved in front of the regiment and cleared the road, much the same as is now carried out by Trojan (to be discussed later) and the Royal Engineers.⁹² When the Soviets were withdrawing from 1988 onwards, one Soviet withdrawal, which took place between 29 June and 9 July, discovered 193 AV mines and 138 AP mines during the operation.⁹³

Prior planning to thwart asymmetrical warfare was used during ISAF's largest and most complex operation carried out to date in Afghanistan: the transportation of the Kajaki Dam turbine in 2008. A total of 150 vehicles (in a convoy six miles in length) travelled 180 km in six days, travelling at an average speed of one mile per hour.⁹⁴ Deception plans and concerted clearing attacks were in operation around the convoy's route to ensure its safe arrival at the Kajaki Dam, operations which included 4,000 British, Danish and Afghan troops.⁹⁵ The deceptions and feints employed by the troops ensured that only nine IEDs were deployed by the Taliban and all were made safe by the Royal Engineers.⁹⁶ However, this operation illustrates the organization, will and complexity an armed force has to employ to overcome an insurgency using asymmetrical warfare. The final cost incurred in carrying out such operations came to US\$200 million.⁹⁷

The British technical response to the explosive munitions threat

Blast-protected vehicles are now in theatre for the British forces. Although poorly armoured and fully-open, the Land Rover MWMIKs (Mobility Weapons Mount Installation Kit) are still in use (2010). The introduction of the Jackal and Mastiff armoured vehicles has improved safety, this after £718m was wasted on a previous 'armoured car' project.⁹⁸ Both models have a V-shaped hull which dissipates the blast from an AV mine and would perhaps mean the loss of a wheel in an AV/IED minestrike.⁹⁹ However, problems with the Jackal and resultant British

soldiers' deaths in AV/IED explosions have necessitated an upgrade, and the Jackal 2 and 2a are said to be safer.¹⁰⁰

Another addition to combating the landmine/IED threat is the Trojan armoured tank (a heavily armoured version of the Challenger tank, see Figure 8) and its Python mine clearance system, used for the first time on Operation Moshtarak 2010.¹⁰¹ With around 80 percent of British soldiers injured in Afghanistan by IEDs and landmines in 2010, including a number of explosives experts, the Trojan system is designed to reduce the IED risk.¹⁰² Heading a convoy - forming the vanguard of the Royal Engineers' refined and developed strategy known as 'Talisman', a route-proving and clearance capability comprising many specialist vehicles and equipment with specific tactics, techniques, and procedures - the Trojan can blast a way through IED-infested routes.¹⁰³ When encountering IEDs or landmines, the Trojan will fire its trailer-mounted Python rocket, a hose filled with explosives, which then detonates, neutralizing or destroying most of the IEDs/landmines along a pathway 183-230 metres long and 7.3 metres wide.¹⁰⁴ The Trojan will then follow the path of the hose using the mine plough to push aside unexploded devices, ensuring a safe path for the following vehicles and troops.¹⁰⁵ These unexploded mines/IEDs are then ideally made safe by bomb disposal teams.¹⁰⁶

Finally, when an IED is found, the EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) branch of the Royal Logistics Corps and the Royal Engineers are deployed to neutralize the device (see Figure 9).¹⁰⁷ During his recent visit to Afghanistan, the British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that the MoD would be spending an extra £67 million on countering the IED threat.¹⁰⁸ There is now a dedicated counter-IED team (codename Brimstone) which is part of the Joint Force Explosive Ordnance Group, which actively seeks out IEDs to clear routes and villages supported by a suite of mechanical and electronic equipment.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, engineers have a specialization in C-IED (Counter-Improvised Explosive Device), are all instructor qualified and, where possible, jungle-tracker GSA (ground sign awareness) trained; these soldiers are rigorously prepared to deal with the IED threat in Afghanistan.¹¹⁰ However, even with the correct combination of electronic countermeasures, metal detector technology, snipers (to shoot and explode exposed mines), and specially-training explosive search dogs, it is still deadly work.¹¹¹

Asymmetrical warfare and the threat of IEDs and landmines on the ground require the counter-insurgency forces in Afghanistan to deem the helicopter essential to operations. The Soviet forces in their war relied heavily on the versatility of helicopters in their roles in the transport of troops and logistics, as well as hovering fire support platforms.¹¹² The Soviets' use of the helicopter became a force multiplier, allowing troops to be moved rapidly to mass at critical points keeping the Mujahideen off balance.¹¹³ The Soviets had studied US forces' use of helicopters in Vietnam; however, Soviet improvements in the helicopter and its use were given impetus during the Soviet-Afghan War, a process that is evolving during the present-day conflict in Afghanistan.¹¹⁴

The British forces in Afghanistan are making increasing use of helicopters as more airframes were and are purchased, especially after the opprobrium caused by the British government's (Labour) penny-pinching prior to 2007.¹¹⁵

During Operations Herrick 4 and 5 (2006-7), there were only four Chinook helicopters for the whole British contingent in Afghanistan, one of which was a survivor from the torpedoed *Atlantic Conveyor* during the Falklands War in 1982.¹¹⁶ Consequently, almost all Chinook trips involved 'standing room only', as the troops crammed themselves in.¹¹⁷ However, this has changed with more airframes presently airborne and, unlike the Soviets' experience, as of yet there are no significant surface-to-air-missile threats against which to operate, although there have been incidents.¹¹⁸

Strategically, as the British government freely admits, when UK forces were deployed in Helmand Province in 2006, they deployed without the necessary personnel, equipment or intelligence to succeed in their mission – to rebuild Afghanistan.¹¹⁹ After a few months in Helmand the nature of the UK mission changed, with serious strategic implications. Namely the Taliban had reverted from symmetrical warfare to asymmetrical warfare with the IED their weapon of choice. The British government has had to invest in better counter-IED training, bring in more airframes for the safe conveyance of the extra troops needed to counter the explosive threat, invest in the correct ballistic kit for the soldiers at the front, and develop armoured vehicles and convoy systems headed by Trojan. However, this is very expensive, recent estimates of the costs for Afghanistan are around £18bn (2011), which does not include around £12bn of MoD 'write offs'.¹²⁰

George Orwell, in his essay 'You and the Atomic Bomb,' unintentionally summed-up IED asymmetrical warfare by stating: 'a complex weapon makes the strong stronger, while a simple weapon – so long as there is no answer to it – gives claws to the weak.'¹²¹ The Taliban's offensive claws are now evident; the British now need to find a definitive answer to it.

The physical effects of a minestrike

There are many related injuries suffered when a soldier activates an IED or AP mine. When a mine is activated, blast overpressure waves, or sonic shock waves, affect the ears, followed by the lungs and the gastrointestinal tract hollow organs; these injuries often present themselves 24 hours later.¹²² Much of the debris from the explosion is driven up along the fascial planes of the leg, incorporating tissue stripped from the bone.¹²³ Furthermore, as more powerful explosives are being used in Afghanistan and modern warfare in general, brain injuries have increased and become highly complex.¹²⁴

The sources of blast injury, including mines and IEDs can create an enormous pressure wave within a few microseconds, spiking to a peak overpressure.¹²⁵ High order explosives such as PE-4 can create pressures of over four million psi.¹²⁶ The high pressure gas then expands from its point of origin to compress the surrounding air in an accelerating wave of superheated air molecules, and generates a pressure pulse (called a 'blast wave') in all directions.¹²⁷ The high pressure blast wave travels at an initial velocity of 1,600 feet per second.¹²⁸ Anyone standing in the vicinity will experience stress and shear forces 1,000 times greater than atmospheric pressure.¹²⁹ At the same time, projectile fragments from the IED can travel at initial velocities of up to 3,000 miles per hour.¹³⁰ After the initial blast wave, there is an exponential decay in pressure as the large volume of displaced air floods back into this relative vacuum, again under high pressure. This 'secondary wind' dissipates as the pressure returns to steady state. Blast winds from both the positive and negative pressure phases can propel objects and people a considerable distance.¹³¹ This collective activity takes a fraction of a second.¹³²

The consequences of these blast explosions after activation result in pathophysiological damage caused by the extreme pressure differentials

developed at body surfaces.¹³³ A high frequency 'stress wave' can cause great damage to tissues and organs, including the brain.¹³⁴

Research into injuries sustained in Iraq and Afghanistan show that the number of serious brain injuries is approximately five times that of the number of amputees and can lead to serious post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).¹³⁵ The characteristics of explosive blast injury to the brain (traumatic brain injury or TBI) are unique, and a study carried out by American neurologists has concluded that although the debilitating traumas, such as oedema, intracranial haemorrhage and vasospasm, are well-documented, little is known about how exactly an explosion causes these sequelae.¹³⁶

After a mine or IED-strike, the soldier is taken out of the battle and, in the majority of cases, the war. The landmine victim needs blood transfusions twice as often as those suffering from other battlefield injuries, such as firearms casualties. The usual number of units of blood required to operate on patients with minestrike injuries is between two and six times higher than that required by other casualties of war.¹³⁷ A study carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found that 'for every 100 people wounded by weapons other than mines 44.9 units of blood were required, while every 100 mine injuries required 103.2 units of blood'.¹³⁸

During the Soviet-Afghan War, landmine casualties were recorded predominantly as going into shock (86.5 percent of Soviet mine-wounded did).¹³⁹ In 10 to 15-percent of the patients, shock, defined by tachycardia, hypotonia and cardiac dysrhythmia, was so severe that it was irreversible even with standard resuscitation of fluids and support.¹⁴⁰ In these cases, because of the complications, blood pressure fell well below tolerated levels and the symptoms of these soldiers were out of all proportion to their apparent physical injuries.¹⁴¹ Of the Soviet mine casualties, 32.6 percent required one to one-and-a-half litres of blood in transfusions, 53.1 percent required up to two litres, and 14.3 percent required up to three-and-a-half litres of blood in transfusion.¹⁴² Nevertheless, due to the drop in blood pressure, massive forced infusion-transfusion therapy was necessary; however, this treatment often failed.¹⁴³ Surgical intervention (such as amputations and surgical care of AP/AV mine injuries) within two or three hours of the infusion-transfusion therapy was poorly tolerated and frequently ended in death, usually on the operating table.¹⁴⁴

Soviet research carried out during the Soviet-Afghan War also discovered that heart injuries caused by a blast from an AP/AV mine or an IED further complicated treatment. Autopsies disclosed that 45.6 percent of the Soviet mine-wounded who died in hospital had suffered some form of heart injury.¹⁴⁵ Soviet mine and IED casualties were also brought into the field hospitals suffering from extensive lung injuries. Moreover, around 20-25 percent of Soviet mine casualties with injured lungs developed focal pneumonia within the first hours of injury.¹⁴⁶ Soviet autopsies revealed that 22.8 percent of mine casualties had lung injuries with large areas of blood-saturated tissue. Low focal haemorrhaging was noted throughout the lungs.¹⁴⁷

A final and, at first, hard-to-diagnose injury was disturbance of the central nervous system (CNS). This condition occurred when the injured Soviet troops did not receive proper intermediate care, making them vulnerable to CNS disturbances. These particular patients were brought in showing symptoms of pronounced traumatic shock, neurological examinations and spinal taps revealing no evidence of brain injury.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the patients' brain functions would quickly worsen, ending with the patients losing consciousness or lapsing into a deep coma. A significant proportion of these men would die from severe disturbances to the central nervous system.¹⁴⁹

The Soviets discovered that if infusion-transfusion therapy did not normalize haemodynamic indicators in land mine injuries, this was an indication that the patient had suffered heart or serious brain injury or was in early septic shock. The Soviet medical personnel through trial, error and considerable research, learned to adjust and improve their treatments, which form the basis of the AP, AV and IED trauma treatment used by British medics today.¹⁵⁰

The physical effects of an AV minestrike

In contrast to AP mine injuries, AV minestrikes are not associated with specific injury patterns. Depending on various factors, an AV mine blast may result in a full spectrum of physiological effects, ranging from a minor scratch to a fatal injury and may injure all parts of the body.¹⁵¹ However, the more likely injuries from AV mines are usually from blunt trauma due to crew members being thrown around inside the compromised vehicle.¹⁵² Furthermore, thermal burns are a common

occurrence due to ignited fuel, ammunition or hydraulic fluid, or as a direct result of the anti-armour device.¹⁵³ Alongside thermal burns soldiers are likely to suffer from blast overpressure, and toxic fumes which can result in pulmonary oedema.¹⁵⁴ The results of a study carried out on AV minestrikes during the war in Croatia between 1991 and 1995 have been analysed. The vehicles involved in these incidents were light (such as lorries, cars and buses) and six of the seven mine types reported were blast mines. Of the 464 victims, 42 (9 percent) were injured and 12 (29 percent) of the injured victims died.¹⁵⁵ The major cause of death was brain injury and the most frequently injured body region was the leg.¹⁵⁶ Traumatic amputation of the leg, leg fracture, eye and brain injuries (with skull fracture) were the most-often reported injuries.¹⁵⁷

A Soviet report from the early 1980s regarding their armoured vehicle AV mine incidents reveals that injuries suffered by their soldiers were recorded as follows: 63.6 percent leg injuries, 20.1 percent arm injuries, 13.5 percent spinal and chest cavity injuries, and 2.8 percent hip injuries.¹⁵⁸ Research for the Swedish Army conducted on heavier vehicles, however, showed that the victims suffered a different severity of injury. For example, in the vehicle mine incident described in the Swedish research, six of the nine vehicle occupants were injured; however, none of them died. The injured occupants suffered lower extremity injuries but none of them suffered traumatic amputation, eye or brain injuries.¹⁵⁹

Of course the injuries or fatalities suffered when involved in a minestrike are dependent on the vehicle involved. Open and closed vehicles subjected to blast mines will not necessarily result in the same severity and type of injuries. In the case of an open vehicle, the occupants are more exposed to detonation products, heat and blast wave.¹⁶⁰ The occupants of an open vehicle may also be ejected, which can result in multiple injuries to the whole body when falling on the ground, especially skull, brain and neck injuries.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, injuries may include fractures to the pelvis and femur and the severity of the injuries will depend on the height of the fall.¹⁶²

An AV blast mine detonated by a vehicle can result in multiple injury mechanisms causing physical injuries to the whole body. Mine injuries are by their nature unclean. The explosive brunt carries ground particles, dirt, bacteria, and remnants of clothing and metal fragments.¹⁶³ The type of injuries occurring due to the mine blast under the vehicle can require complex and expensive treatments and often result in disability and long-

term impairment.¹⁶⁴ However, a long and tortuous learning curve in the treatment of mine and IED victims has ensured better survival rates when today's soldiers become injured.

All sewn up: modern medics in Afghanistan coping with casualties

Advanced medical equipment and changes to evacuation procedures are helping to save the lives of soldiers and civilians who in previous conflicts would have died. The Surgeon General of the British Army, Lieutenant General Louis Lillywhite, has stated that 'We are seeing a lot more complex casualties surviving to the UK and thereafter'; adding: 'The available data from Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that the survival rate on operations achieved by the UK forces was better than any previous conflict'.¹⁶⁵ Doctors have even begun to classify some of the more seriously wounded troops as 'unexpected survivors' and between 2006 and 2008, 75 members of Britain's armed forces fell into this category.¹⁶⁶ The medics at Camp Bastion's Role Three Hospital (CBRTH) have drawn on the hard-earned experience of the Americans in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in their conflict in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, innovations in the best medical procedures are still taking place, as the care afforded to injured troops improves. When casualties arrive at CBRTH a consultant-led team takes the injured soldiers into a four-bed emergency room, where a team of up to nine specialists assesses their injuries, applies initial treatment, and quickly prepares the patients for surgery, often in less than 20 minutes after arrival.¹⁶⁸

Before progressing to surgery, patients can be X-rayed within seconds, without being removed from the treatment bay, using the hi-tech Dragon direct digital scanner.¹⁶⁹ In addition to radiographers, CBRTH has vascular and orthopaedic surgeons and, if the support of neurological surgeons is needed, they are a short flight away at Kandahar.¹⁷⁰ To help CBRTH cope with those who are in need of blood transfusions, blood donated by the troops in Helmand keep the stocks high.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, for those who need their blood staunching, clotting agents are being produced from the donated blood. New procedures involving platelets (the human body's natural coagulants) are also possible thanks to blood taken from volunteers.¹⁷²

Of the 4,015 aeromedical evacuations to the United Kingdom from Afghanistan and the 346 deaths, 304 as a result of hostile action, from October 2001 to November 2010, only one soldier has died at CBRTH and just 13 men have died at The Royal Centre for Defence Medicine in Selly Oak and Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham, whilst 36 soldiers have died of wounds in transit to CBRTH.¹⁷³ Considering the injuries that are suffered due to small arms fire and the horrific injuries that can be sustained from landmines and IEDs, the medical staff at both CBRTH and Kandahar are performing great feats in their attempts to save the lives of British troops. However, we must now discover how the injured are taken to Camp Bastion.

Swoop and scoop: medical casevac in Afghanistan

When an explosive device is initiated in the field, first aid is administered along with a call to the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT), usually four medics and a section of soldiers (eight men in full battle order on thirty minutes' standby), at Camp Bastion.¹⁷⁴ The casevac (casualty-evacuation) then flies the stricken soldier to a dedicated helipad, only metres away from the front door of Bastion's hospital.¹⁷⁵

The average evacuation time in Helmand in Afghanistan during Operation Herrick is around two hours and 57 minutes from the time of injury to touchdown at the hospital using a CH47 Chinook.¹⁷⁶ In comparison, the Soviets during their operations in Afghanistan casevaced 90 per cent of their wounded within six hours, only two percent taking 24 hours or more depending on the combat situation.¹⁷⁷ Everything possible is ensured to save the lives of wounded men in Afghanistan; this is good for morale and can only enhance the reputation of the already highly regarded medical staff and medics serving in Afghanistan.

How dangerous are landmines and IEDs for British troops?

Landmine and IED deaths have been rising year on year in Afghanistan. When the ISAF first became involved in Afghanistan in 2001, there were very few IED or landmine-strikes.¹⁷⁸ However, the fatalities have steadily increased.¹⁷⁹ During the campaigning year of 2010, there were 577 successful (for the Taliban) IED and landmine incidents involving ISAF forces; 340 soldiers died as a result of these incidents. This statistic

translates to a figure of 58.93 percent (November 2010) of the overall ISAF deaths caused by IEDs and landmines for the year.¹⁸⁰ In 2009, there were 7,228 IED attacks in Afghanistan, a 120 percent increase from 2008.¹⁸¹

Figures from the British contingent from 2001 to November 2010 show that a total of 110 soldiers were killed by landmines and IEDs from the number of 305 soldiers killed by hostile action.¹⁸² These figures translate to 88 soldiers killed by IEDs; nine soldiers from suicide IEDs; five soldiers from AP mines; and eight soldiers from AV mines.¹⁸³

Explosive munitions were the major cause of death in Afghanistan in 2010 and have been since 2008, when they first breached over fifty percent of ISAF casualties.¹⁸⁴ Figures released by the MoD also disclose that until the end of 2009, 168 troops were classed as having suffered loss of limbs, parts of limbs or eyes from IEDs.¹⁸⁵ Government figures underline the increasing dangers troops face in Afghanistan and Taliban IEDs now account for 80 percent of all injuries and fatalities suffered by British troops.¹⁸⁶

Comparatively, Soviet deaths from mines in their conflict were initially high until the Soviets developed mine countermeasures, which reduced their losses. Among the countermeasures was the issuing of flak jackets, sandbagging and reinforcing vehicle floors, and riding on the top of armoured vehicles.¹⁸⁷ Riding outside, on the armour of the transports, was a matter of life and death in Afghanistan; should the vehicle strike a mine, the soldiers would be thrown clear.¹⁸⁸

Nevertheless, although the number of Soviet deaths fell, the number of injuries caused by mines rose.¹⁸⁹ Vehicle losses peaked in 1984 and 1985 during the heaviest fighting and declined only when the Soviets prepared to withdraw.¹⁹⁰ Of the 620,000 Soviet personnel who served in Afghanistan, official Soviet figures suggest at least 14,453 were killed or died from wounds, accidents or disease. This represents 2.3 percent of those who served. A further 53,753 (8.67 percent) were wounded or injured.¹⁹¹ However, recent research has revealed that the Soviet casualty figures for Afghanistan were severely undercounted; the actual number of Soviet dead was almost double the official figures.¹⁹² Nevertheless, using the available data, Soviet soldiers were two-and-a-half times more likely to be injured or killed by landmines than small arms fire and the number of

wounded from mines stood at around 25-30 percent over the course of the war; how many of these incidents involved the Soviets' own mines was not discussed.¹⁹³ Throughout the war, landmines caused 30-40 percent of the trauma cases treated by Soviet medical personnel.¹⁹⁴

The British in Helmand during this current conflict are slowly learning the lessons of the past, especially medical lessons, and can now save the lives of the most terribly injured soldiers. Better anti-mine/IED countermeasures (just as the Soviets carried out in their conflict in Afghanistan) and better evacuation procedures are in place. Now that the rate of over 80 percent of casualties (2010) caused by explosive devices has been reached; only time will tell if all the British forces countermeasures will succeed.

Hospitals and recovery

Around 6.6 per cent of Britain's retained armed forces (April 2010) have been disabled, primarily through the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁹⁵ This figure has leapt from the 2009 figure of 2.3 percent, representing a 4.3 percent increase.¹⁹⁶ The vast majority of these retained disabled soldiers have become disabled through IEDs and landmines. These figures may be explained by an escalation in explosives injuries in Afghanistan, currently standing at around 80 percent of all battlefield injuries.¹⁹⁷ If this rise in explosives injuries continues and more, primarily, rehabilitated amputees are passed as fit to continue in a non-combat role, do the armed forces and the MoD, a) have the medical capacity to treat the growing list of injured, sometimes seriously injured soldiers; b) can they afford the increasing costs of more medical infrastructure, equipment and medical specialists to care for the increasing numbers of injured personnel; and c) if the figures of retained disabled soldiers rises at the same rate, can the armed forces stay as efficient a fighting unit as it currently is when, say, in the future around 10 per cent of its force comprises of disabled soldiers?

The reports of fatalities in Afghanistan rightly make the headlines almost every week. However, what is not so well documented is the fate of soldiers who return to Britain with life-changing injuries. As ascertained earlier, the rise in injuries is mainly due to the increased usage by the Taliban of IEDs and landmines. The increase in British casualties is also a

reflection of the ever-increasing numbers of soldiers in Helmand. Another reason for the increase in the number of surviving injured soldiers is the result of the ever-improving evacuation system, the Immediate Response Team helicopters and better emergency medical facilities on the frontline. These improvements have resulted in soldiers surviving injuries that would previously have killed them. Until November 2010, there had been around 150 men who had been injured in Afghanistan who had undergone amputations, many of them during that year.

There is now a new £545 million critical care ward at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Birmingham, where injured troops medevaced (medically evacuated) from Helmand Province are being treated.¹⁹⁸ Civilian and military medics waiting at the hospital to receive new patients are in constant communication with colleagues in Afghanistan, to ensure that both sides are prepared for the day ahead and know all they can about the patients about to be medevaced.¹⁹⁹ The MoD also claims to have contingency measures in place for receiving an increase in casualties over and above the previous year's total.²⁰⁰ The level of organization for the care of casualties is first class, starting in the patrol bases which all have a medic attached; to the Forward Operating Bases, operating with small medical detachments; through to the field hospitals at Camp Bastion and Kandahar, where, after initial life-saving surgery, the patient is medevaced to Britain.²⁰¹

Becoming involved in an IED/landmine blast is devastating to the party involved and these injuries are now becoming ever more severe as the Taliban increase the size and usage of their IEDs to create greater explosions.²⁰² The escalating use of explosive devices can be traced using the UK government's Defence Analytical Services and Advice statistics. From some 93 battle injuries in 2007, there was a spike to 254 battle injuries in 2008; these numbers increased again to 487 battle injuries in 2009, with 668 battle injuries in 2010.²⁰³ This evidence is reiterated by the head of the prosthetics unit at Headley Court (British Forces rehabilitation centre), who has been struck by the growing severity of the injuries he sees and, since the first triple amputee in 2008, receiving patients with such injuries is becoming an increasingly routine occurrence. He adds that 'the more the patient is missing, the more complicated they are to treat'.²⁰⁴ The greater the explosion in which these soldiers have been a part, the greater the chance of traumatic brain injury (TBI).²⁰⁵ However, when the

amputee or the soldier with TBI has recovered sufficiently in the hospital, what happens next?

Fixing Royal, Tom, Jack and the Crabs: rehabilitation

Once service personnel have received life-saving surgery, they are transferred to the Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre at Headley Court (DMRCHC) to start their individual rehabilitation programmes, usually for three to four weeks before they are granted sick leave.²⁰⁶ Once on sick leave, the soldiers are given a date to return for ongoing rehabilitation.²⁰⁷ The process these injured soldiers are involved in can be a long one; many will be in rehabilitation for a number of years.²⁰⁸ Many of the patients also have to continue receiving operations as a result of their injuries; one Royal Marines Sergeant has had 38 such operations since he was injured in 2008.²⁰⁹

For the soldiers at DMRCHC, military discipline and routine are integral to how the rehabilitation programme works.²¹⁰ The military routine not only adds structure to the soldiers' day, it also reminds them that they are still soldiers and they are still working, albeit in unfamiliar surroundings.

A typical day for the ranks in rehabilitation commences at reveille 0730; after showering and shaving the first detail commences at 0830 where the soldiers register for their daily periods. Each rank has a set programme throughout the day, whether spent with the physiotherapist, with prosthetics or in the gymnasium; the soldiers are kept busy until 1630 when the day ends.²¹¹ The recovery rates within the unit are very good. The prime advantages the injured soldiers have are their age, fitness and health and that they are used to the rigours of vigorous exercise.²¹²

Patients with particular injuries often require long periods of rest after intensive treatment; however, this time spent recovering can present problems of its own, as worry and anxiety can manifest themselves in concerns about the future. A drop in morale can often occur when soldiers go home on leave. When they are at home they realize they cannot do what they used to, and they will never be the same again; a trip home magnifies these problems and can sometimes cause extra strain.²¹³ Nevertheless, to help ease the minds of the rehabilitating soldiers, initiatives have been put in place. In the case of the Royal Marines, many

remain with their parent units; those who are experiencing disabilities over and above what their units can cope with, mainly bilateral and triple amputees, may be assigned to Hasler Company.²¹⁴

Hasler Company gives Royal Marines amputees a temporary alternative to working in unit rear parties (guard duty at camps when the unit is deployed), and rehabilitation is further enhanced for these Marines with the Fortitude Programme, which uses adaptive sport and adventure training.²¹⁵ The army organizes similar courses, such as Exercise Snow Warrior (Adaptive) which is run through the Battle Back scheme.²¹⁶ Battle Back provides a key strand in the rehabilitation process through sport and adventure training, with packages including water-skiing, canoeing and paragliding through training for Paralympics trials. Hasler Company and Battle Back also help increase the rate of recovery and fitness of the rehabilitating soldiers to prepare them for the day they are fully rehabilitated.²¹⁷ However, there are also unseen injuries caused by explosions: head injuries. How do these patients recover? Do they recover?

Shell shock: old injury inflicted with new weapons

Of the soldiers who return from Afghanistan with amputations, many are essentially the same people apart from their missing limb(s). However, the patient who returns with a TBI is usually a different person altogether. The condition of TBI can affect both physiological and behavioural actions.²¹⁸ One side of the condition displays an inability to use the limbs, sensory deprivations, balance problems and physical fragility, making one more prone to medical problems. The other side of TBI involves troubles that affect one's use of language, memory, personality, feelings, judgements and social skills.²¹⁹

Figures for ISAF head injuries for 2001-7 indicate that head and neck injuries, including TBI, now account for one quarter of all casevaced soldiers.²²⁰ Traumatic brain injury is the general term now used to describe brain damage that results from a sudden head trauma. The brain damage can be either focal or diffuse, and injuries are classified as either closed (no penetration of the skull) or penetrating.²²¹ One third of all combat soldiers are exposed to blast explosions, half of them experiencing brain trauma and within three years many have altered mental function.²²²

Injuries occur as a direct result of blast wave-induced changes in atmospheric pressure (primary blast). There are also secondary blasts that can cause injury from the objects set in motion, and tertiary blasts causing injury through the victim being put in motion.²²³ Another interesting factor in increasing cases of TBI in soldiers is that historically the explosions soldiers are now surviving in Afghanistan would, on most occasions, have killed them had they been involved in a blast from any previous war in the twentieth century.²²⁴ This situation is due to the body armour used by British troops and the excellent battlefield medicine being practised. However, the lack of head protection (helmets only protect the head from shrapnel) ensure that blasts affect this exposed area.²²⁵ The casualties now surviving these greater explosions from IEDs or stacked AV and AP mines are now suffering complex neurological and psychological impairment caused by a combination of the concussion from these explosives, emotional trauma, and the stress of witnessing the brutality of war: in other words shell shock, first proposed during World War One.²²⁶

Another major problem that has been linked to the condition of mild TBI is the development of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Studies suggest that those with mild TBI have a greater chance of developing PTSD than those with severe brain injuries and longer periods of unconsciousness.²²⁷ The incidence of TBI and any PTSD can be debilitating for a soldier and, therefore, the soldier cannot be used by his unit on operations. There can also be a delayed onset and many soldiers leave the services undiagnosed.²²⁸

Vigilance is the key for detecting any soldier suffering mental stress. During the period of July to September 2010, 1,329 British military personnel who had served on Operation Herrick were assessed for their mental condition; of this number, 942 were assessed as having mental disorders.²²⁹ The report does not specify the types of mental disorder or how many may be attributable to TBI; however, it does go on to state that PTSD remains a rare condition affecting 0.3 per 1,000 strength.²³⁰ This may have something to do with hot debriefs (immediately talking about an incident) in theatre after a contact or explosive incident with the soldiers involved. Soldiers are also encouraged to talk about their experiences with colleagues and family, or write a dissertation.²³¹

The facilities at DMRCHC are adapting and have improved. There is a dedicated 20-bed neurological ward and a 58-bed accommodation block for the mild-traumatic brain injury patients.²³² The MoD also has 15 Departments of Community Mental Health (DCMH) centres throughout Britain which are near military bases.²³³ There are also five more of these DCMHs at major permanent overseas bases, and their mission is to support personnel in a service environment.²³⁴ This system applies to the Territorial Army and reservists too.²³⁵

Nevertheless, perhaps more so than amputees, TBI cases face a harsh future; many face an indeterminate length of time for recovery and many will never recover. Soldiers with closed-head TBI are hard to diagnose and it is usually family members who notice changes in emotions and functional behaviours that are not recognized by the patients.²³⁶ The cost to those who slip through the net can in some cases (a very small percentage) have an almost processional descent to destruction. The social and occupational consequences include medical separation from military service, loss of job or unemployability, relationship troubles and divorce or break up, speeding fines, assault, drug abuse, alcoholism, and so on.²³⁷

Life after rehabilitation: what next?

Once soldiers are deemed to have completed their rehabilitation and their condition has stabilized to a sufficient degree, they are referred to the Naval Service Medical Board of Survey (NSMBOS) at the Institute of Naval Medicine in Alverstoke. (The process about to be explained also applies to the army and the RAF.)²³⁸ The role of NSMBOS is to:

determine and recommend, from a medical perspective, the highest possible permanent medical category within which an individual can continue to be safely employed within the service, or to recommend their medical discharge, where they may no longer be deemed to be fit for military service.²³⁹

The individual concerned is invited to attend NSMBOS and is involved fully in the process.²⁴⁰

After three weeks, the NSMBOS recommendations are referred to the Naval Service Medical Employability Board (NSMEB) for consideration.²⁴¹ This board determines if an individual is to be discharged

for medical reasons. The decision takes into account ‘the current manpower situation and potential impact to the service [to be discussed later] and to appointments or drafts of other personnel in the branch concerned.’²⁴² Consequently, it is the NSMEB which decides whether a medically downgraded (unable to be deployed operationally) rank/rating will be retained or discharged.

Each case of continued employability is thoroughly reviewed by these naval boards and given detailed consideration. Some of the injured soldiers may choose to pursue careers outside the services; some are able to continue in their previous specializations.²⁴³ However, sadly, there are many who have service-ending injuries. As with the example of the Royal Marines, these men cannot be taken on in strength because the organization is operationally focused and deployable.²⁴⁴

Unfortunately for those discharged after receiving payments from the government compensation scheme for injuries, if a disabled soldier cannot work he has to claim Disability Allowance as there is no MoD long-term care as yet.²⁴⁵ Instead, the government relies on charities such as Help for Heroes, the Royal British Legion, Saint Dunstan’s, and Combat Stress.²⁴⁶ Those patients medically discharged with mental ill health currently have twelve months’ care with a mental health social worker, but are then encouraged to seek charitable help or join a veterans’ association.²⁴⁷ However, the government of Great Britain and the MoD now recognize - - or have been forced by public pressure-- that they have to do much more to ensure the Armed Forces have the support they need, and that veterans and, just as importantly their families, are treated with the dignity they deserve. Consequently, the government says it is looking to improve the ‘package of welfare and health care for those who serve, particularly in the area of mental health, and to make improvements to accommodation wherever possible within budgetary constraints.’²⁴⁸

The proposed improvements from the MoD include injured personnel being treated in dedicated military wards and providing extra support for veteran mental health needs; in addition, under the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme, a tax free lump sum payment can be received by injured personnel while they are serving. The maximum lump sum available to those with the most serious injuries is £570,000.²⁴⁹ In addition, it has been promised that the most seriously injured personnel

receive a Guaranteed Income Payment;²⁵⁰ these are tax free, index linked, and paid monthly for life.²⁵¹

For the mental health scheme, Dr Andrew Murrison MP, the Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Health, is currently undertaking a study for the Prime Minister (2010-11) into the relationship between the Armed Forces (both serving and veterans) and the NHS, focusing on mental health.²⁵² There are currently six community-based mental health pilot schemes running in Stafford, Camden and Islington, Cardiff, Bishop Auckland, Cornwall, and Edinburgh.²⁵³

Of course, this sounds promising, certainly for those who have been injured serving their country and in 2006, when General Sir Richard Dannatt became head of the army, he wanted injured soldiers to be prescribed the care they needed, for life if necessary; he stated: 'If we had a hand in damaging them, then we are responsible for them'.²⁵⁴ General Dannatt also promised that severely disabled soldiers would be given the opportunity to continue their service in the forces.²⁵⁵ Furthermore, new establishments, known as Army Convalescence Centres, would care for the 'long-term' injured, so that they could live together in a military environment where they would receive rehabilitation, counselling and advice on their future in the military.²⁵⁶

However, the pledges made by General Dannatt have come under the harsh spotlight of defence cuts and manning levels. A recent *Sunday Times* article leaked an MoD document entitled 'Management of Army Personnel who are Medically Unfit for Service', which essentially maintains that five per cent (5,000 troops) of the army is no longer fit to deploy.²⁵⁷ The article goes on to say that the MoD has decided to throw the wounded largely on the mercies of the Help for Heroes charity and the Royal British Legion, with some troops receiving one-off payments of only £6,000.²⁵⁸ The article reveals that this cull of unfit troops will be carried out under a system known as 'manning control'.²⁵⁹ This is a cost-cutting measure to prevent soldiers serving a 22-year engagement (the British military sign a 22-year term of engagement with an 18 month notice if one wishes to leave before the full-term) which would entitle them to an immediate pension and redundancy considerations.²⁶⁰ The MoD was also quoted as stating in the report that careful handling of the

cull would be needed, as the MoD could be seen to be ‘discarding those who have sacrificed so much on our behalf’.²⁶¹

The cull, if true, would renege on General Dannatt’s promises. The MoD has denied that they have drawn up plans to ‘discharge large numbers of personnel in one go’.²⁶² Defence Secretary Liam Fox has distanced himself from the report, saying: ‘I will want current ministers to review all these papers to ensure that those who have fought and sacrificed for their country are treated in a proper and honourable fashion’.²⁶³ Fox, whilst ordering the review, unsurprisingly blamed the previous Labour Government for setting the rumoured processes in motion.²⁶⁴

Nevertheless, because of so many retained wounded soldiers, many fighting regiments and units are under strength.²⁶⁵ An example is the 1st Battalion the Mercian Regiment (infantry), which has lost 25 per cent of its strength (2008/10) through battlefield injuries in Helmand. Financial controls restricting its headcount mean that it cannot recruit another 70 men to replace those who have been injured, while the injured Mercians remain in the army, either in rehabilitation or employed within the regiment.²⁶⁶

The MoD and the British Armed Forces face some very difficult choices and it remains to be seen how those injured soldiers currently employed by their old units, and those currently undergoing rehabilitation fare. The recent Strategic Defence Review has dictated that the MoD has to endure spending cuts of £4.7bn, and has to reduce all three services by 17,000 personnel.²⁶⁷ Can the government keep its promises regarding the injured? Or will the military charities have to work ever harder to raise the funds needed to look after those who sacrificed their minds and bodies in the service of their country?

On 16 May 2011, the Armed Forces Covenant documents were published for the perusal of both Houses of Parliament with the promise of enshrining the covenant in law.²⁶⁸ In the documents under debate are proposals to support financially veterans groups, rehabilitation, counselling, etcetera.²⁶⁹ These proposals are at an early stage at the time of writing, so it remains to be seen whether anything positive will emerge.

Conclusions

Soldiers will always be killed in wars and currently the main killers of these soldiers are IEDs. Lessons have and are being learned, although one must say at a slow rate, as to how to combat IED asymmetrical warfare. Improvements in vehicles, personnel protection and heliborne operations have improved for the British albeit again slowly. The maiming and killing of many soldiers may be partially due to the slow reaction time of the British Government and the MoD to adjust to the war conditions of Afghanistan.

Strategically the largest problem faced in Afghanistan is the threat of IEDs. Death and injuries from these devices in 2010 accounted for over 80-per-cent of all the injuries suffered. More money and training is now targeted at countering the IED threat, and casualties suffered so far in 2011 are down; although the British have now deployed to a smaller area of operations.²⁷⁰ Tactical and strategic problems in Helmand Province are starting to be addressed by the British government, MoD and the British Armed Forces.

Medical care afforded to injured British soldiers from the moment of a mine strike to the day they finish rehabilitation is probably the best in the world. British military doctors, nurses and medics are rightly held in the highest regard by the soldiers who serve on the frontline.

Once rehabilitation finishes, some of these disabled soldiers are currently being given non-deployable jobs at their old units. Nevertheless, if the numbers of British Armed Forces who have been disabled from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continues rising can the MoD and the government ensure that the British Armed Forces can be as effective as they once were?

The leaked MoD documents hinting at a cull of non-deployable soldiers does not bode well for the future for British disabled and future disabled soldiers. Furthermore, with the 2011 Strategic Defence Review taking away funds and personnel away from the MoD what other choice do they have? This is a serious ethical question for the government to answer, especially in an era of austerity and cuts, although the government always seem to find the funds to start a new war (Libya 2011) and to fund their own privileges.²⁷¹ In addition, will the new Military Covenant make any

difference to the military and its veterans or, due to 'lack of funds' is this simply an example of more popularism?

Disabled and discarded soldiers are often not a pretty sight. Many are troubled not only physically, but mentally too. Civilians who have not experienced war find it hard to understand their problems, and the NHS is not trained to deal with the injured soldiers needs, especially when that soldier is suffering from a TBI. These discarded veterans will likely, like discarded veterans from past wars, feel betrayed, misunderstood and alone. Integration into civilian life will be hard and many will be ignored and left to nurture their personal resentments and pain. Some will commit suicide when it becomes too much, some will finally seek help when they are on the verge of such desperation. The government assures the military and its disabled that there will be funding available for the long-term care needed for our most severely wounded soldiers. It is the very, very least that the British government can do.

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²⁰ UK MITC, *Mine Awareness Advisor Course Booklet* (Gibraltar Barracks: UK MITC, 2006), pp. 2-6.

²¹ Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, pp. 50-2

²² *Ibid.*

²³ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA), *Mine Action Programme: Afghanistan* (New York: United Nations, 1999), p. 10.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

²⁵ International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), *Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 'Afghanistan'* (London: 2009), p. 2.

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NATO, Libya Operations and Intelligence Co-Operation – a Step Forward?

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With the ‘fall’ of Tripoli towards the end of August 2011, it has become increasingly apparent that the intelligence co-operation witnessed in Libya during the NATO campaign performed an increasingly important role in realizing operational and strategic ‘successes’. These recent intelligence developments can be opened up for some further analysis, forming the main focus of this article. Ultimately, this article concludes that, over time and albeit while gradual, we have seen what can be regarded as ‘a step forward’ in co-operative intelligence activities in Libya. Although several pressing difficulties have been present, and have had various impacts at different junctures of interactivity, the ‘problems’ encountered have not completely overwhelmed either operationally or strategically all of the diverse participants involved in Libya.

Introduction

At the end of August 2011, Tripoli fell to advance of the rebel forces that had risen up to depose the regime of Colonel Gaddafi.¹ Arguably, Western input, particularly under the guise of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command and co-ordination, had been critical to the success of the Libyan rebel operations.² With the prominent death of Colonel Gaddafi on 20 October 2011, it now seems to be an appropriate time to reflect, at least initially, on the performance of arguably the most important of those inputs, namely *intelligence co-operation*. Accordingly, we can consider what role the intelligence activities played in the Libya conflict as events unfolded from March 2011 to October 2011.³

The intelligence activities in Libya consisted of both human and technical intelligence dimensions. Both of these HUMINT and TECHINT dimensions are reviewed in this article. To summarize, on the HUMINT front, the multitude of intelligence efforts included interviewing key

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Gaddafi regime figures – many of whom ‘defected’ over time as the operations were progressed by NATO and its allies. The ‘defectors’ provided a range of insights, which varied considerably in terms of their usefulness in contributing to mission accomplishment factors –insofar as those factors were understood and as they evolved during the operations. The HUMINT dimension also included interacting, again to various different degrees of effectiveness, depending on the metric used, with the multitude of participants on the ground in Libya that were aligned against Gaddafi, including the significant use of Western ‘military advisors.’

Meanwhile, alongside night-time bombing and similar combat support from NATO military components, on the TECHINT front there were several prominent technologies employed to include Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance platforms with Target Acquisition capabilities (collectively, IS[TA]R tools) that were used to obtain coverage of the several battlespaces within Libya. The battlespaces where surveillance was needed were spread across a large area of Libya.⁴ The ISTAR platforms employed in Libya consisted of a mix of both manned (piloted) fighter aircraft and included the, “first use of the new reconnaissance pod on the [French Navy’s Dassault] Rafale,’ which reportedly ‘played a major role in the operations.’⁵ As the Libya operations were ‘ramped-up’ over time, at least some unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were also used there.

Taking a snapshot analysis approach, this article adopts a straightforward structure. It mainly consists of two parts: Part one examines the background factors in order to provide a context for the discussion that follows. Part two moves on to explore what can be regarded, at least arguably, as the key developments that have occurred in the domain of intelligence in Libya in 2011. Finally, as the analysis comes to a close, some general conclusions are presented. These conclusions offer an answer to the question whether there has been a genuine step forward amid the mix of events.

Ultimately, this article aims to identify a range of both operational and strategic-orientated lessons that have emerged from the recent Libya operation. The main focus in this article is the intelligence dimension, as this is where one can witness some of the most notable developments as the Libya operations unfolded. At times the developments came very rapidly. Indeed, many different intelligence, defence, and security

practitioners and decision-makers encountered some steep-learning curves in Libya. As the dust of the Libya operation settles, the events can now be examined in depth.

PART 1 – Background

Finally in 2011, the honeymoon period that Libya's Colonel Gaddafi enjoyed with the West after he -- rather suddenly and unexpectedly -- decided to come in from the cold and renounce support of terrorism and renounce his nuclear weapons program in March 2003 turned out to be distinctly short-lived.⁶ But by 2009-2010 Gaddafi was again increasingly becoming *persona non grata*-- and not only with just Britain and America, as Switzerland and Germany were also experiencing distinct citizen-protection and law enforcement difficulties with Gaddafi and other members of his family and their entourages, including damning brutality allegations.⁷

Gaddafi was fast losing credibility in international circles. Arguably, this was also partly due to his crude attempts to capitalize upon the release on compassionate grounds in August 2009, by Scottish authorities, of convicted Lockerbie bomber, Abdel Baset al-Megrahi. Gaddafi's credibility further suffered from his crude attempt to exploit strains in UK-US relations over the matter.⁸ The grieving families of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing victims again made front page news as the release of the mass murderer of their family members was paraded before the world. The lack of debate about this summary action, and the indication that real motivation for the release of al-Megrahi, convicted of murdering almost three hundred innocents, was to gain advantage for British corporate interests rather than to express mercy for a "dying" man, shocked the American and British populations alike. The release of the Lockerbie bomber was made with little consideration for the views of the families or of the United States and there were many strongly expressed beliefs, including from the head of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), that legitimate justice had been denied.⁹ Instead of this highly sensitive issue being handled diplomatically and in more of an appropriate 'cloistered' manner by Gaddafi, with the ailing al-Megrahi's transfer carried out quietly in private behind the scenes, an element of 'stirring up' international relationships was particularly noticeable when a very public

and flamboyant welcome home party greeted al-Megrahi on his arrival at Tripoli airport after his release from Scottish custody.¹⁰

Fast-forwarding to February/March 2011, several Western diplomats and intelligence assets began taking a greater interest in Libya. This occurred as Libya continued to descend into chaos amid the backdrop context of the other so-called 'Arab-Spring/Reawakening' developments, including the developments in Libya's neighbor, Egypt. This also occurred as the various machinations surrounding the eventual passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, enacted to protect Libyan civilians, got underway.¹¹ Notably, following the recent uprisings in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt during December 2010-January 2011, and triggered largely in response to the arrest of a Libyan human rights campaigner, the revolt against Gaddafi's rule in Libya gathered momentum on 17 February. The revolt first took the form of popular mass uprisings in the eastern port cities of Libya, especially in Benghazi. Subsequent attempts by Gaddafi loyalists to ruthlessly quash the rebellions compelled the West to take action in forums such as the UN and NATO under the justification of a 'responsibility to protect' ('R2P').¹²

When charting the timeline of events the 'Libya crisis' consisted of the roughly discernible key phases: Violent protests (16-23 February); Rebel advance and Gaddafi retaliation (24 Feb-6 March); Crisis escalation (7-18 March); Coalition bombing begins (19-20 March); Advance and retreat (21 March-15 April); Battle for Misrata (16-25 April); Stalemate (26 April-12 August); Battle for western Libya (13 August-present [16 August]);¹³ followed by what can be termed the Battle for and fall of Tripoli (17-29 August); Endgame: The hunt for, and the capture and killing of Gaddafi (30 August-20 October); and Ending the NATO mission (21-31 October).¹⁴

For the UK the interest in Libya greatly increased in February. In early March the British interest was uncomfortably exposed when a covert team of Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and Special Air Service (SAS) personnel were inserted into Libya to form a protective unit known as the 'Increment.' The unit was tasked to protect British civilian and diplomatic personnel.¹⁵ This unit was surprised by and surrendered to a group of rebels. Meanwhile, the Dutch military personnel experienced similar exposure problems when found by Gaddafi's forces.¹⁶

The availability of arms, and other *matériel* across the full spectrum of lethality, and Gaddafi's willingness to deploy them in the name of terror, formed the central concerns for several Western governments as well as international organizations and NGOs. As the campaign in Libya continued these weapons proliferation concerns remained a strong focus.¹⁷

Some form of a response was warranted by the Western nations. From the start, the option of deploying the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) tools in particular, alongside target acquisition (TA) capabilities, were increasingly attractive to the Western nations. These tools formed a key part of the capabilities employed by the NATO coalition to help enforce the 'no fly zone' over Libya and were explicitly deployed in order to protect civilians, as strongly stipulated by the UN Resolution of 17 March, UNSCR 1973.¹⁸

Throughout the campaign, these IS(TA)R assets also offered a great potential for delivering intelligence products to multiple customers. This product could be suitably packaged, including with several counter-intelligence and security mechanisms that were adequately enforced through sanitization, to allow sharing and co-operation with multiple partners, including the rebel forces. The primary intent was to provide those parties with effective situational and battlespace awareness concerning Gaddafi's forces.¹⁹ At a minimum, a more positive and productive 'need to use' mentality, beyond merely the more restricted 'need to know' basis, towards intelligence co-operation with the rebels became apparent over time and that helped facilitate intelligence liaison in all of its guises.²⁰ The key developments of this are now examined.

PART 2 - Key developments

As the campaign against Gaddafi got underway in the spring of 2011, there was much 'saber-rattling' from Gaddafi. He continued to make considerable noise as a high degree of strategic and operational stalemate was encountered into the early summer of 2011.²¹ Information and psychological operations (INFOPs/PSYOPs) from all participants also increased in their volume. The full range of intelligence activities, together with mis- and dis-information and other deception activities, were engaged

as the battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Libyan people got underway.²²

Initially, as the campaign in Libya gathered momentum, several command-and-control (C2) issues needed to be overcome.²³ The complex partnerships involved, including both *among* the NATO allies and *between* the NATO allies-- particularly the key players of the US, France and the UK-- with the rebels, were slow to develop. All of these diverse political and military relationships remained fraught with varying difficulties as the campaign progressed. This included some problems of a historical, even personal, nature, that extended beyond mere operational stresses, such as the ‘fog of war’ and collateral damage factors encountered, for instance, during early April when NATO aircraft bombed some tanks that turned out to be rebel force rather than Gaddafi force tanks. Also, while the operations were generally sustained over time, for several of the parties, which, at least initially, resembled more a blurred ‘ragtag’, many of the ‘problems’ encountered did not get much easier in terms of helping with their navigation.²⁴

Significantly, the earlier Western interactions with Gaddafi, witnessed during their aforementioned ‘honeymoon’-period (circa 2003-2009), were particularly problematic. A legacy of bitterness was left in the wake of those interactions, especially amongst those who had reportedly been subject to rendition by Western authorities to the custody of Gaddafi’s regime and where subsequently they had then been tortured. Overcoming these obstacles required effective negotiation, so that the present operations, and future interactions would not, at least potentially, become counter-productive. This would lead to a strategic quagmire and thereby challenge the overall mission objectives. Earlier intelligence-related developments were regarded as being particularly damaging, having both an impact on ‘internal’ and ‘external’ as well as ‘old’ and ‘new’ partnerships and their related dynamics.²⁵

Naturally, the nature of this diversity and complexity affected the intelligence dimension and the partnerships that developed, and on how they developed. For instance, the disparate band of rebels aligned against Gaddafi consisted of a diverse array of participants of various degrees of questionability, including allegations that some parties were aligned with al-Qaeda. That provided some particularly vexing vetting problems for the Western intelligence services *vis-à-vis* their well-established security

considerations. Although, arguably, this last factor was slightly better mitigated later as the rebels gradually became somewhat more organized and cohesive and were able to form the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) with its own selection criteria.²⁶

Overcoming the stalemate in Libya, which was particularly acute during the early summer of 2011 as the rebel forces' mobility and advance generally stagnating against Gaddafi's increasingly entrenched forces, required the implementation of some significant tactical changes.²⁷ These tactical changes eventually were enacted and were especially evident in the approach adopted by NATO *vis-à-vis* intelligence and in its subsequent handling and action. The changes included Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya obtaining rapid intelligence turn-arounds for the established intelligence agencies involved.²⁸

Technical intelligence (TECHINT) assets, for example those offering ISTAR capabilities, were not the only ones employed. There was also an increase in the use of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection that went substantially beyond the early flight of the high value person Moussa Koussa, Gaddafi's former intelligence chief, to Britain at the end of March.²⁹

As the Libya campaign unfolded over time, HUMINT was clearly increasingly gathered from participants who were wider-ranging and more centrally located to the action. These parties included the rebel leaders and countries' other more formally involved civilian (diplomatic) and military personnel, for example featuring in the form of 'military advisors', and their, frequently private sector, associates. Most usefully, the mix of these participants were located in, or at least nearby, forward battlespaces, and who, as 'boots (and eyes) on the ground', were helpful in actively spearheading the attacks against Gaddafi's forces (see below).

The ISTAR assets continued to perform an undeniably important role in the campaign over time. However, when taken on their own, they clearly did not have enough of an effect to break the continuing grip of Gaddafi's regime and his defensive forces.³⁰ While these assets and their product could substantially assist on the contextualization and situational awareness fronts, to have more of an impact and to tip the balance in of operations more decisively in the NATO coalition's favour, NATO had to implement more *proactive* and longer term approaches in parallel with the

largely short term and tactical assets. Again, the ‘military advisors’ deployed in Libya performed an important role here as discussed below.

As NATO and other Western-inspired operations were ‘ramped up’ towards the end of April 2011, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with weapons platforms were also approved for use in Libya. The UAVs included at least two US armed Predator models, with the Libyan rebels reportedly acquiring their own off-the-shelf ‘Aeryon Scout Micro UAV’ as a workable solution to help overcome IS(TA)R product sharing paucities between the diverse partners involved, as well as addressing other more widespread general IS(TA)R coverage shortages and the problems of under-reach, there being approximately four or five areas that required intelligence coverage in order to conduct effective air operations).³¹

These drones helped contribute towards the portfolio of precision weaponry being deployed by, in particular, the US forces supporting the Libyan rebels.³² However, together with the rebel forces, the Western forces soon saw some acute equipment shortages in this area because of the high-demands exerted by the conduct of operations. Dealing with these shortages stimulated several wide-ranging debates within the NATO Alliance.³³

When considering the overall intelligence developments in Libya, an especially significant factor has been the increased use of Western military advisors.³⁴ As Lolita C. Baldor of the *Associated Press* newswire noted: ‘As the battle in Libya appeared at stalemate, it was an open secret that foreign military advisers were working covertly inside the country... The operation was kept separate from the NATO command structure to avoid compromising its mandate from the United Nations — to protect civilians... [and served to help] transform the ragtag rebel army into the force that stormed Tripoli.’³⁵

At times these military advisors took the form of national special forces who provided the rebels with the key contributions in the form of intelligence training and logistics support in locations such as Benghazi. These support tasks were performed at the same time other special forces personnel were carrying out a more conventional role in guiding precision air strikes from NATO coalition air assets. They also served as forward intelligence gathering operatives and, being Western professionals, could

be counted on relaying an accurate picture of events on the ground to NATO command centres and their national governments.³⁶

The increased use of Internet-based ‘social networking’ tools by NATO was apparent in helping to improve the intelligence collection and co-ordination capabilities in the domain of HUMINT. Most notably, Twitter™ was harnessed, and it was also used to facilitate some of the intelligence liaison with the rebels. This was a particularly useful tool in the absence of, and indeed without even needing, more specialist communications technologies, such as battlefield radios. This work included focusing on the noteworthy tasks of target acquisition and verification.³⁷

With the improved degree of coordinated and collective action with the rebels being established, albeit in a gradual manner, the developments in Libya has begun to turn in to NATO’s and its partners’ favour.³⁸ After the most important milestone in the campaign in Libya, namely the rebel capture of Tripoli was successfully realized at the end of August 2011, the parties involved have become increasingly vocal about their participation. These developments have included offering further valuable insights into advances undergone in the intelligence domain.³⁹

Significantly, as a ‘British diplomatic source’ reportedly observed: ‘From quite an early stage there has been a view that Gaddafi’s stranglehold would only be broken if there were practical measures on the ground as well as the air campaign... What we are talking about is offering expertise, diplomatic support and allowing others [such as small groups of former special forces operatives, from, e.g., security companies] to be helpful.’⁴⁰ From the multitude of developments in intelligence activities during recent operations in Libya, several valuable lessons both of strategic and operational note can be learnt for potential future application.⁴¹

Conclusions

Several conclusions can readily be drawn from the brief analysis undertaken in this article. Most notably, although over time several difficulties arising from command-and-control (C2) problems as well as direct operational developments were experienced, the overall intelligence activities in Libya substantially reflected a step forward. As the intelligence

developments unfolded over time, and while their ‘specialness’ may have varied considerably, the advances that have been noted enabled a much higher degree of both operational and strategic effectiveness.⁴²

Extending beyond merely their high relevance regarding intelligence activities and how those operations are implemented, several wider lessons can be learned from the recent military campaign in Libya. As this article shows, the highly complex operations in Libya were conducted simultaneously across a multitude of challenging battlespaces. These raised challenges both physically, geographically and conceptually, as well as politically, as all these different aspects had to be effectively navigated by a multitude of different-ranging defence, intelligence and security services and decision-makers.

Identifying and learning the plethora of lessons that can be drawn from the developments encountered during this case study of the Libyan experience forms a valuable process for the several participants that were intimately involved-- including both the several Western armed forces that formed the majority of the NATO coalition forces. These forces, as the brutality of Gaddafi’s rule and regime was sustained, eventually were increasingly aligned against Gaddafi personally – as well aligned to target Gaddafi’s close associates.⁴³

Many useful lessons can be gained from examining the NATO and Libya operations that can be used for future applications. This is especially the case of likely future intervention operations that will be based on the enduring ‘responsibility to protect’ (‘R2P’) principle.⁴⁴ This is particularly useful at a time when highly complex and vexing international issues, such as the examples of an unstable Syria or Iran are becoming major international security concerns for many countries.⁴⁵

While it still remains to be seen where future developments will take Libya in the post-Gaddafi era, we do know that the use of increasingly optimized intelligence, in both qualitative (quality) and quantitative (volume) terms, helped contribute towards effectively breaking the stalemate the late spring and early summer of 2011. Being employed in highly difficult circumstances, the tool of intelligence cooperation continues to make a valuable, even essential, contribution to overall events.⁴⁶ Significant insights with both short- and long-term value and

boasting specific and broad utility can readily be reaped and communicated.

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The Democratic Civilian Control of Private Security Companies in Latvia

Individual Study Paper for the 2009-2010 Joint Command and General Staff Course

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Introduction

After the collapse of Soviet Union and reestablishment of the independence of the Republic of Latvia the former Soviet militia organization was reorganized into the Latvian State police and built up as a new organization by reliable and loyal Latvian citizens. In the early 1990s, due to a shortage of manpower for the national security forces, the newly created Latvian National Guard (LNG) also cooperated with the Latvian Police in matters of the interior security of the nation. This greatly helped the fragile nation to maintain security and the assistance was furthermore a highly useful auxiliary in the fight against criminality, especially in the countryside. However, statistical data provided by the Latvian Central Statistics Department also shows that the number of robbery, property theft and burglary crimes have not decreased since the early 1990s.¹ Unfortunately, due to the economic crisis there is no reason to think that the levels of criminality will decrease.

It is widely regarded that interior security is the responsibility of the state and is normally the monopoly of the state. In Latvia the Latvian State Police, together with LNG, serve together to guard governmental institutions and vital objects as a part of public policy. However, the 1990s also saw the process of privatization as it also touched the sector of nation's interior security. There was a rapid development of the privatization of security in Latvia and many private security companies (further - PSCs) were established. Indeed, there are various definitions to describe the term "Private security company" and these are essential to review. "Private" means that the entity is a non-governmental institution. This has a broad meaning; "Security" stands for protection of society, state, its citizens, as well as its material values and nonmaterial wealth. The term "company" is best described as an organization that is created for

specific reasons and interests in order to gain profit and benefit. For example, from the point of view of the Swiss Federal Council, a “private security company is a company performing operations in the field of security, such as guarding real estate and movable property, personal protection, and secure transport of goods and valuables.”²² Another source defines PSCs as a “non-state actors that are privately owned and are employed for profit, pursuant of security ends, and predominantly protective.”²³ A work of the Geneva Centre for Democratic control of the Armed Forces states that PSCs or other branches of the private security industry encompass, “actors who provide security for people and property under contract and profit.”²⁴ In short, the definitions from different sources are very similar. Coming to the common definition, one can easily agree that a PSC is “a commercial entity which provides security services for governmental and private clients.”²⁵

To be clear, at the start of this study, it should be noted that private military companies (PMCs) are another group of actors in the private security industry. However, there is a difference between the PSCs and PMCs. One definition states that PMCs “are a kind of modern corporate ‘mercenaries’⁶ that employ civilian contractors and work for profit while offering offer a wide range of services from combat and operational support, advice and training, to arms procurement and intelligence gathering.”⁷ According to national laws there are no PMCs in Latvia, and the establishment of any kind of PMCs is forbidden. Thus, PMCs will not be examined in this paper.

However, today, PSCs are an important example of an institutional armed non-state actor in Latvia. Such actors can have both positive and negative influence on the political, economic, social and legal aspects of the interior security environment in Latvia. Under various circumstances, the existence of this kind of force could threaten and weaken the democratic pillars and values of a country. Therefore, it is important that a system of democratic civilian control is established over the PSCs and to discuss how the state-- using its legislative, executive and judicial power-- can keep under the private security sector with its PSCs under control. In Latvia there has been no comprehensive research concerning the maintenance of democratic civilian control over the PSCs in the context of interior security. This study hopes to begin a worthwhile discussion on these important issues.

In this study I will examine the Latvian democratic civilian control of PSCs in the context of the interior security of Latvia. One of the main issues to be examined is whether the PSCs toe the line of democratic civilian control in Latvia. This is a relevant issue because the issue democratic civilian control needs to be examined from different perspectives to include how this control is to be brought about. According to the explanation earlier noted, the aim of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of the democratic civilian control of PSCs in Latvia. The hypothesis of this study is that private security companies do not have a well-developed legislation to govern their behaviour, and if strict civil democratic control of an armed and well-trained and organized non-state actor is not maintained, such an actor can be used against national security and can weaken the democratic pillars of the state.

Focusing on this hypothesis I will use one of the approaches of institutional study, namely, normative institutionalism, which states that, “seemingly neutral rules and structures actually embody values (and power relationships), and determine “appropriate” behaviour within given settings.”⁸ From an institutional point of view, this kind of setting embodies five parts: “a constitutional and legal framework, civilian control, parliamentary control, judicial control and a kind of ‘public control.’”⁹

This paper will consist of four chapters in the main body to argue the hypothesis. In the first chapter I will describe the process of privatization and transformation of the interior security sector in Latvia from the early 1990s to 2010. In the second chapter I will analyze the basis of the democratic civilian control using the theoretical framework and normative platform as well as the real conditions faced in Latvia. Furthermore, I will discuss the issue of the cooperation between the State Police and the PSCs and the probable advantages of such cooperation. In the last chapter of the main body of the study I will discuss the most important challenges for the Latvia’s interior security as they concern private security companies. The findings of this study will determine whether the hypothesis is correct. In the conclusion I will summarize the findings of the research and discuss how they apply to the future of Latvia’s private security sector.

Transformation of the Security Sector in Latvia

In the early 1990s, after the re-establishment of the independence and sovereignty of the Latvian Republic, a thorough re-establishment and reconstruction of governmental institutions, as well as the establishment of new institutions, was carried out in all country's significant governmental spheres – judiciary, legislative, and also executive. Among other significant tasks of the government it was also very important to build up and create a stabile interior security system. Changes were made, not only in the public administration, but also in the economic sector in Latvia. This resulted in many new businesses and organizations in Latvia and produced a positive economic effect. At that time the sector of interior security, public order and policy was split among such actors and institutions as follows:

- Latvian state police with its own cooperation “Safety Guards” (apvienība “Apsardze”), Object Security Department and Security Police (Drošības policija),
- Local government police (municipal police)
- Latvian National Guard,
- public/state companies and institutions security sections,
- large private enterprise security sections,
- private security companies

This division of the Latvian security sector still existed until May of 2010¹⁰ when, according to Order of the Minister Interior Affairs, the Latvian State Police's auxiliary “Safety Guards” will be shut down. Under the Central Public Order, the Police Department's “Safety Guards” force, organized into five regional units,¹¹ had the contract to protect more than 17 000 property units.¹² Generally, state service is not a commercial entity. However, the “Safety Guards” that were present in all parts of the country had been paid for the watching and protecting different kinds of property objects and earned a lot of money for the Latvian state budget.

Just in the capitol city of Riga there are 3300 objects that were protected. The liquidation of the “Safety Guards” began in June 2009.¹³ Another important issue concerning this division is that there are approximately 813 experienced professionals who are part of the Safety guards. Now, the question is opened for the Minister of Interior Affairs whether these specialists will become unemployed or whether they will receive new job opportunities as employees of PSCs?

Of course, if the Safety Guards transition to PSCs, it will be to the profit of the PSCs because the Safety Guards kept watch over many objects with high security requirements such as the radioactive waste depot “Rodons” in the vicinity of Riga, the regulations for the security of this installation requiring guards armed with rifles.¹⁴ Furthermore, in addition to the 3300 objects for security protection in Riga mentioned above, the Security guards took care of guarding institutions not included in the list of objects being secured by State Police.¹⁵ For instance, there are not only Latvian governmental institutions such as, the Ministry of Finance, the State Revenue Service, the Free Port of Rīga, the State Audit Office of the Republic of Latvia, the Constitutional Court, but there are also other institutions such as the Embassy of Chinese Peoples’ Republic¹⁶ that contracted the Safety Guards to provide security. I would like to emphasize that there is a correlation between quality of the guard services provided and the credibility of an institution. The better the quality of the security the more credible and reliable are the Latvian State police in the eyes of international community. This leads to the conclusion that the factor of security credibility should be taken into account in the broader discussion of PSCs and interior security.

If we compare two Regulations issued by the Cabinet of Ministers: “Objects guarded by State Police” No. 457¹⁷ which came into force in 2003; and No.808¹⁸, which replaced the previous one and has been into force since 2008, then it is noted that the number of governmental executive, judicial and legislative institutions and foreign embassies guarded by State Police decreased dramatically from 39 objects in 2003 to 16 in 2008. As a result, those changes made in the Regulations have already allowed the PSCs to take over security for those objects in terms of providing guard services. Consequently, it might be stated that after the disbanding of the Safety Guards the vacuum of guarding institutions will be bridged by PSCs. On the one hand the liquidation of one governmental institution, the Safety Guards, will create an opportunity to develop new contracts for a number of the PSCs and that is an opportunity that the private entrepreneurs will welcome. On the other hand, those changes will significantly shift the efforts of the security sector and also reduce the budget income for the State Police. This is an issue of public morale and perceptions. When the Latvian population sees State Police patrol cars driven by state police and sees a constant presence of the police then the population also has a feeling of greater security. Another issue is that the

local population has much more respect and trust for the state policemen than to they have for members of the PSCs.

The local government police (further - LGP) is another institution in the system of interior security. This is a police force founded by a local government¹⁹ and the local governmental authority²⁰ has a primary task to “guarantee the safety of persons and society”²¹ in a very broad sense. It means that the LGP operate within the borders of a set district and provides security. Usually they patrol as a means of securing the public order, and are responsible for public order during different kind of local events. In a case of a need they cooperate with the State Police. However, the LGP can be also paid for securing and giving protection for local property objects. In that way, they can be qualified as an institution in competition with the PSCs.

As it was stated in the introduction, the LNG units have been one of the reliable partners of the newly created Latvian State police in the securing of public order²² and combating of criminal acts²³ in all the Latvian territory. According the Law on the National Guard of the Republic of Latvia, the LNP is one of the main actors in Latvian defence system. Among other major tasks, such as defence of the state territory, the LNGs involved in the defence of Latvian society.²⁴ The Latvian National Guard is also among the organizations providing guard services for the public. In fact, the LNG is an official organization that has given many Latvians an opportunity to earn a living ²⁵ despite the fact that the main part of National Guard's institution was based on principle of voluntary participation.²⁶ However, in 1994 after the transformation of LNG and its integration into the Latvian National Armed Forces (further – LNAF), the policing functions encompassing public order and security in an entrepreneurial environment, which was at that time carried out by the LNG, slowly have been taken over by PSCs.

I would next like to underline the importance of the security services of the Latvian banks. The banking system was another major actor of the business sector that needed protection and security. The statistics of the Association of Latvian Commercial Banks show that only within two years, namely, between 1991 and 1993 the number of established private banks in Latvia grew from sixteen to sixty-one.²⁷ Hat was the high point and later the number of private banks decreased. Since 2002 the number has been stabilized and came to a bout 23 private banks²⁸. Furthermore,

Latvian private banks began to establish their own security divisions – the banking interior security services-- in order to be not dependent upon the Latvian State Police institutions, the LNG or the PSCs for their security and protection. In December 2007, Latvia signed the Schengen Agreement and joined the Schengen Area²⁹. This joining allowed the ready crossing of borders for the citizens of the member countries of the Schengen Agreement without being stopped on the border for the passport control. However, this action also created better conditions to carry out organized criminal activities such as bank robbery, theft of property, and auto theft. This means that, on the one hand, since Latvia has been a member of Schengen Area the flow of tourists due to the simplification of the border procedures has been increased. This has been good for the tourism sector and also the banks. On the other hand, it became much easier for the persons contravening the law to cross the border and to move for one country to another. All this forced the banks to start thinking seriously as how they can increase the security of the banks, to use their own assets, or to sign contracts with PSCs. Thanks to the development of different high-tech tools it is possible to use many technical facilities, such as video cameras, sensors of high sensitivity, and alarm systems, to secure the banks. However, the real presence of an armed and uniformed guard at banks also sends notice to potential robbers and gives a clear message that an invisible alarm system does not send. Since he is physically present, a security guard can immediately speak to any suspicious person and, in that way, disrupt the probable robbery of a bank.

In the banking system there is another participant to be noted, namely the Latvian Central bank (further – LCB), which as a Latvian governmental institution has its own security department. The main task of the Security Department of the LCB is to protect the Bank's security against unlawful transgressions and ensure the safety of the public property held by the Bank.³⁰ The LCB does not have contract with any private security companies. The likely reason for this is the governmental security requirements and the risk assessment of the governmental security institutions, where an interior security institution has to be completely reliable one and the security guards are civil servants and under government control. From this point of view, the LCB's physical security is one of the main pillars of the Latvian interior state security. According to the State Defence Concept, in a case of war or state of exception, the security department of LCB will be included in the

LNAF.³¹ It means that the selection, recruitment, and professional standards set for the LCB security guards are close to those of the army or police ones.


The interior security services of public state companies and institutions' are another important part of security environment. A few of them that belong to this category are: Rīga International Airport (AIP), the stock company "Latvijas Dzelzceļš" (Latvia Railway), Rīgas HES (Riga Hydroelectric Power Station (HEPS)), Aizkraukles HES (HEPS), Ķeguma HES (HEPS), Gāzes krātuve Inčukalns (Inčukalns Underground Gas Storage Facility). All the companies mentioned here have significant importance for the national economy in terms of security. A common factor is that all these institutions have heightened security standards. For example, the internal safety and control division of Rīga IAP cooperates with law enforcement institutions, ensures the internal safety of the airport, and ensures the protection of its controlled areas against unauthorized interference in its work. The internal safety division also analyses the possible risks and problems to the safety of the company and develops a program to prevent safety and crime threats. There is also a section of Identification Office, which processes the issuance of identity cards and controls the issuance of entry permits and electronic admittance cards.³² There is also a subunit - the Security Division that arranges and ensures the guarding of company's property, buildings, aircraft, equipment and other objects, as well as carries out the identification card requirements in the territory of airport³³. In other words, it is important for the governing body of such companies vital to the national economy (such as Riga Airport) to establish reliable and highly trained interior security services, where there is a low rate of personnel turnover and turbulence.

Because the Latvia State police and LNG could not cover all the needs for the security of the private commercial sector, the door was opened for PSCs. Favourable preconditions and an enabling environment was created for the development of private security industry in Latvia.

As noted, the PSCs have been a fast developing branch of the economic and security market in Latvia. The number of PSCs grew from a few in 1995 to 255 in 1999. The second period of increase was from 1999 to 2003, when at the end of 2003 there were 270 PSCs with a total number of personnel of 5000.³⁴ In 2003, the ratio of the personnel between state's

police with its 10, 600 policemen and private security companies with their 5000 employees was two to one.

However, the chart below, taken from data in the Annual Public Reports of State Policy from 2000 to 2008,³⁵ shows that the real number of PSCs is larger than has been given in other sources. This also applies to the number of security guard employees, and in 2008 there were almost 16 000,³⁶ while the number of policemen who serve in the State Police was 9088.³⁷ The ratio of police to private security guards in the other data is completely different, namely a reversal so that the number of private security guards is larger than the number of policemen. In these cases, a serious imbalance among the main players in the security sector is indicated and this should cause concern for the governmental security institutions.



Annual Public Reports from 2000 to 2008, State Police of Latvia, at <http://www.vp.gov.lv/?sadal=189>

After the disbanding of the Safety Guards the number of PSCs and their employees will likely increase. This means that the policemen who have been fired will establish new PSCs and make contracts with the previous business partners of the auxiliary Safety Guards. They will continue to provide security, no longer as state employees, but as part of the private labour market in providing security to different objects. Nevertheless, there is also the danger that chaos could arise in the security sector due to the liquidation of the State Police auxiliary that guards a large number of objects if there is not a simultaneous transition to an organization that can provide security to the objects. A gap in the security capabilities could provide opportunities for criminals and the Latvian State Police need to

take account of this danger. An especial danger is in the rural areas because it is more difficult to contract for private security than in urban areas where such companies are available. In rural areas it takes more time to find an appropriate PSC and to close a contract.

In the next chapter of this study I will analyze the basis of democratic civilian control, reviewing the theoretical framework and normative platform as well as the reality of the Latvian conditions.

Framework of the Democratic Civilian Control over PSCs in Latvia — the Definition of Democratic Civilian Control

One of the main terms discussed in this paper is “democratic civilian control,” which encompasses three separate, but at the same time related and overlapped, meanings. I would define the first part of the term, “democratic,” as a form of state’s organizational structure or, more precisely, a form of government where the state is governed by elected representatives and appointed executors. It is democratic because the state power is divided among three main governmental institutional pillars: legislative, executive and judicial, each with their spheres of competencies. The second part of the term, “civilian,” should be understood as the involvement of society (non-governmental institutions, organizations, mass media) in the decision-making and controlling process of the state administration. The taking part of civil society in controlling of institutional establishments is a hallmark of democracy. The last, but not the least one is “control”. In the case of PSCs, trying to define the “control” I would describe it as a system of normative documents and organized and very well developed set of governmental and non-governmental institutional tools, how to supervise, observe, inspect in order to watch over the lawfulness of the acting of PSCs in their providing of security guard services for governmental institutions as well for private business partners. If there are indications or evidences of violation of normative documents, the control mechanism should interfere in immediately in order to interrupt and exterminate violation of a law.

Competencies of the institutions

The supervision’s effectiveness of PSCs and how much the PSCs are accountable hinges on a perspicuous structure and frame of standards and

normative documents. It also depends on efficient governmental institutions, which as supervision authorities have to play the main role while accomplishing the control functions over PSCs. Further in the next part of this sub-chapter I will provide insight into Latvian legislative, executive and judiciary institutions and will examine their contribution made to the democratic civilian control over the PSCs. In order to have a better visual overview I worked out a depiction³⁸ of a Latvian institutional framework of democratic civilian control of PSCs.

Legislature

First of all, one should ask why legislative institutions are needed and what their role is. The answer on the question, why legislature is need in the terms of democratic civil control is quite understandable. According to H. Borns, legislation is necessary to make PSCs and their individual members accountable for their actions, particularly since a major difference between PSCs and state public security providers is that the latter are directly accountable to parliament, government and the public, whilst PSCs only have to respond to shareholders and clients.³⁹ The only one legislative institution of the Republic of Latvia is the Parliament (Latvian - Saeima). Accepting the fact that public security, state's interior security and protection of any kind of property (e.g. real estate, finances, intellectual property, and intangible assets) is a considerable part and area of national security, the Parliament is responsible for adoption of "laws in the area of national security."⁴⁰ Furthermore, in the field of legislation, one of the Parliament's committees, the Defence, Internal Affairs and Corruption Prevention Committee is the main competent institution. Following, it reviews draft laws submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers, the Committee itself or the President of Latvia. The Committee also exercises parliamentary oversight on a regular basis, requesting information about the implementation of internal security policy reflecting national interests. Besides, the Committee also ensures an adequate legal framework for its implementation and initiates needed amendments to this legal framework. Last of all, the attention is also paid to the cooperation with civil organizations. While working on draft laws or reviewing other security-related issues the Committee finds out and takes into consideration the opinion of civil organizations by examining their written proposals.⁴¹ In short, all necessary legislative institutions in Latvia are established and they have the authority in issuing of laws and taking parliamentary control over PSCs.

Executive

As an executive authority, the Cabinet of Ministers is the main executive body in Latvia. However, the Cabinet is responsible for the issuing of regulations and instructions that are based on respective Laws. So, for example, the Cabinet does not create the required regulations that determine the actions of the PSCs, but rather the relevant departments of the Ministry of Interior carry out this task. One of the tasks of the Ministry of the Interior, is to approve and implement security measures for state security.⁴² In carrying out executive activities, the Ministry of the Interior and the institutions subordinated to the ministry (State police, Security police) have to draw up and implement the Latvian State policy of internal affairs, protect public order and safety, protect rights, prevent danger to the state and society, protect the national economy and the lawful interests of persons.⁴³

Another executive body is comprised of the state security institutions. Those are institutions that perform tasks concerning the national security system, intelligence, counterintelligence activities, and investigatory operations.⁴⁴ There are two institutions involved in these activities: the Constitution Protection Bureau (further – CPB) and the Security Police. Among their other tasks they are authorised to exercise executive control over PSCs. Examples of how the control and observation is exercised are noted later in this article.

Judiciary

In Latvia, judges shall be independent and subject only to the law.⁴⁵ This means that the principle of the independence of the judges is fundamental and inviolable. This also means that the Latvian judiciary, with its system of administrative, criminal and civil courts,⁴⁶ is separated from the executive power and acts as an independent governmental institution. As noted by a former Latvian Minister of Justice, “Where there is law, there is order, where there is order, there is security. Security means peace and harmony.”⁴⁷ Consequently, this complex system ensures that either PSCs can apply to an administrative court in a case a government institution makes a decisions concerning the PSCs that they find wrong. Any individual or institutional organization can apply to the civil or criminal court if there are indications that a PSC has broken laws or regulations in its actions. For example, if a special permit (License) is refused or

cancelled for a PSC, the PSC has the right⁴⁸ to appeal the decision to the administrative court.

Laws, regulations and reality

The basis for the democratic civil control is a set of normative regulations and a system that ensure controlling state governmental institutions and NGOs as well as public sector. In order to make PSCs amenable, as well as ensure their rights, it is necessary to establish a clear set of rules that should apply to each PSC without exceptions. Until 1998 there were no normative regulations for the private security industry in Latvia. Today in 2010 a basic national normative document exists as the Security Guards Activities Law (SGAL) that shapes the fundamental principles and framework of the PSCs, elucidates the types of Security Guard Services that are recognized under law, and provides restrictions and regulatory requirements needed to become a private security guard. The SGAL provides the legal controls over all activities by private security companies in Latvia. The SGAL was the first regulation for the private security sector and came into force in May 1998.⁴⁹ During last decade significant changes and improvements in this law have been made. Those changes have significantly influenced the shape of the private security market and number of PSCs that take part in the marketplace. The law allowed some foreign PSCs from European Union countries (notably the PSC “S4G” from Denmark) to establish subsidiary companies and make investments in the private security industry in Latvia. The changes in the law created some concern among Latvian Parliament members. For example, one of the former members of Latvian Parliament, J. Ādamsons, was worried about the changes in some paragraphs of the SGAL and argued that changes in the SGAL regarding the establishment of foreign PSCs and permission for them to act under equal conditions could negatively affect Latvia’s interior security.⁵⁰

The current edition of the law has been in force since 2008 and has since served as a framework law “for performing security guard activities in order to ensure the security of persons and society.”⁵¹ First of all, it should be clarified as to what are security guard activities are. According to the SGAL, security guard activities are a “provision of security services performed by a security guard firm, as well as ensuring the security of and the internal security of an institution, merchant or organization that shall be performed by staff employees.”⁵²

Based on this law there were three Minister Cabinet Regulations in force: the procedures for the registration of Internal Security Services No.104; the regulations on the licensing of Security Guard Activities No. 417; the Regulations on the Issuance of Security Guard Certificates to Natural Persons No. 584). Since coming into force in 1998, the SGAL has been revised more than ten times. Due to the many changes in the law, the first version went into abeyance in 2006 and was replaced by a new version of the SGAL.

Private security guard services

The next issue to examine pertains to what kind of services a private security guard of a PSC is authorized to perform, and what are the areas covered by established norms. There are different kinds of functions or spheres of activities that the PSCs offer to the client. According to the SGAL, a security guard merchant on the basis of a written contract may provide the following security guard services:⁵³

- ensuring the security guarding of immovable property, freight or other movable property or valuables;
- ensuring the security guarding of a natural person (body-guarding);
- ensuring the internal security of protected objects;
- designing, installing and servicing of technical security guard systems; and,
- provide consultations regarding security guard issues.

To sum up, the providers of security guard services, namely PSCs, are strictly bound to regulations and it is prohibited for them to provide services that are not in the SGAL. If they do otherwise, it would be an illegal act.

Special permits (licenses, industrial security certificates)

The next point is that a security guard company needs to have a special permit, a license, to provide security guard services. There are two types of licenses that strictly regulate the service providers for private security industry. The first category authorizes the security guard merchant to engage in the design, installation, maintenance and servicing of technical security guard systems, as well as provide consultations regarding these issues.⁵⁴ The second category gives the permission to provide all the security guard services highlighted above without exceptions. It is believed

that not more than 500 PSCs have the second category license. According to the latest data, one fourth of all PSCs have only the first category of license.⁵⁵ It is more useful for the PSCs to gain the Industrial Security Certificate. NATO guidelines are used for the establishment of the regulation for the Industrial Security Certificate. This is a new aspect for the PSCs in Latvia, and it allows the PSCs to compete for providing private security services for governmental institutions that deal with the EU and NATO classified information and subjects of sensitive information.

The leading state security institution, the CPB, is the only institution that has the authority to issue the industrial security certificates in Latvia, Right now there are only twelve PSCs among other almost six hundred, that have Industrial Security Certificates.⁵⁶ Consequently, those twelve PSCs have already created preconditions to step towards governmental institutions in providing all kind of security services for them. For example, after the transformation of LNAF, abolition of conscription in 2007,⁵⁷ and a reduction of government manpower and an ongoing review of security tasks, there remains a need to provide external security for bases and to have security guards at the entry check points of the military units. Furthermore, the disbandment of the auxiliary State Police Safety Guards also creates some freedom of action for PSCs. Possessing Industrial Security Certificates the PSCs such as SIA "Ave Lat Sargs" with 300 employees,⁵⁸ and the second biggest PSC SIA "Grifs AG" with 470 employees,⁵⁹ or the largest PSC A/S "G4S LATVIA" with more than 1500 employees,⁶⁰ can all ensure appropriate security service for any kind of organization or institution, even security for the military. For instance, beginning from 2007, PSCs offer a large-scale of services as well as a broad spectrum of services: physical security, technical security, installation of technical security systems, installation of alarm sensors for different kind of sub-institutions of Ministry of Defence, and also for LNAF Staffs and units.⁶¹

Restrictions for issuing of special permits

Other factors taken into account are the issuing of special permit (license). There are at least two main restrictions for issuing licenses. First of all, an individual merchant or a commercial company whose foreign investment (except EU Member States and European Economic Area (and EEA) states whose equity capital does not exceed 50 per cent, are entitled to

receive special permits (licenses) for the performance of security guard activities. An individual merchant or person who is entitled to represent a commercial company, shall be a citizen of an EU Member State or EEA State who has not been convicted of committing a criminal offence, and who has not had a determination of mental illness, addiction to alcohol, narcotic, psychotropic or toxic substances.⁶² The logical result of the restrictions noted above is that the establishment of a PSC in the Latvian private security market is closed for the citizens from non-EU countries (e.g. Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine). Latvian permanent residents (e.g. Russian speaking minorities) who do not have Latvian citizenship are recognized under the law as non-citizens and they also belong to this category. This norm is seen as a measure and a control tool as to how a state protects its system of interior security.

Another concern is persons who have been convicted of committing a criminal offence and who try to become a merchant or a security guard. They use even illegal methods to do this, establishing shadow PSCs in order to penetrate into private security business, or create preconditions for money laundering, or earning easy money offering security guard services. Such actions are defined as organized crime. The evidence for such of actions is found in the State Police Annual Public Reports. The situational analysis for 2001 showed the tendency of legalisation of racketeering, where organized crime groups tried to establish PSCs in order to protect persons who promoted prostitution or were top leaders of Latvian underworld.⁶³ In 2002, it was reported that there were PSCs, that contracted their own guard services to collect debts. This kind of racketeering is primarily oriented towards shadow business companies, which conduct smuggling, prostitution, and private public transportation.⁶⁴ Indeed, it applies also to the next group of restrictions that include the prohibition of issuing of special permits (licenses) for performing security guard activities if the competent state institutions such as CPB or Security Police have grounds to believe that an individual merchant or person who is entitled to represent a commercial company is engaged in an anti-state or illegal organization, or is a member thereof, and therefore poses a threat to the safety of the state or society.⁶⁵

There are also three cases prescribed, when a license has to be cancelled. Firstly, the activities of a security guard merchant are directed against the lawful interests of the State or society. Secondly, the security guard merchant violates or does not fulfil the requirements of this Law or other

regulatory enactments. Thirdly, the security guard merchant has knowingly provided false information in order to acquire a special permit.⁶⁶

The private security guard certificate

One of the main issues for PSCs is the selection and recruitment of appropriate employees in order to be successful and be competitive. It is defined that a security guard employee is a person who has received a security guard certificate in accordance with the procedures prescribed by this law, a citizen of a EU member state or EEA State who has acquired a security guard certificate, or has a comparable document certifying the professional competence of a person in the corresponding state who performs security guard activities.⁶⁷ In addition, there arises a question about official language knowledge. A security guard has to know official language spoken by Latvian population in order to be able to communicate because mostly he or she will perform security guard's duties within a society taking care of public order and property. In this case a Regulation No.733 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Republic of Latvia has been issued, which regulates the Procedures for Testing Official Language Knowledge Required for the Performance of Professional and Official Duties. This is used for obtaining the residence permit and for obtaining of status of European Community permanent resident. According to this regulation the fluency in the official language for the performance of professional and official duties has be certified by certificate of fluency in the official language of the appropriate grade issued by the official Language Testing Commission of the State Education Centre of the Education and Science Ministry⁶⁸. The extent of knowledge of the official language required for the performance of professional and official duties has been divided into three language fluency levels. The security service employee falls within the second level, which prescribes that one may freely converse on everyday and professional issues, reads and understands texts of various content, and is able to write documents, statements, surveys, minutes, reports, deeds necessary for work, as well as elaborated texts both on everyday and work subjects.⁶⁹ However, the reality shows a completely adverse picture. For example, Russian speaking security guards have difficulties in communication with the Latvians in the national official language. There have been many investigations and proof that forged documents have been used so that individuals can be taken into the private security guard

service. There were even three State Police officers who were caught with forged official language certificates and forged high school diplomas.⁷⁰

Another vital point is that a security guard certificate shall be issued to an individual in accordance with the procedures specified by the cabinet of ministers of Republic of Latvia after the relevant training and the passing of the qualification examination.⁷¹ The educational program for receiving the security guard certificate is worked out at Ministry of Interior and acknowledged by the Education and Science Ministry.⁷² Usually, security guard courses are conducted at private educational institutions, training centres, or at the PSCs (e.g. G4S, BASK Apsardze) that have their own facilities for organizing of a course. The duration of a course with the theoretical and practical part is 160 hours. It means that in attending a one month course a student is trained in the following subjects: legal basis of security guard activities, the tactics of guarding, technical hardware for guarding, firearms and special means, basic methods and techniques of special fighting, communication psychology.⁷³ The course concludes with an examination and a candidate who wants to become a security guard employee has to pass the examination. The Security Guard Certificate issued after passing the examination is not valid for a life-long period. According to the law “The term of validity of the security guard certificate shall be five years.”⁷⁴ The law prescribes that, “A state fee shall be paid to the organization giving the qualification examination for security guard activities and those issues the security guard certificate, as well as for the issuing of a security guard certificate following an extension of the period of validity, according to the procedures specified by the cabinet.”⁷⁵

Cooperation of the State police and PSCs

A close and successful system of cooperation and coordination between the state police and private security sector—the two institutional bodies that have a net covering the whole of Latvia— can increase the public safety and public order. Not only can such a network protect and guard the state’s strategically important objects,⁷⁶ but it can also serve to protect the nation’s critical intrastate infrastructure. The intrastate critical infrastructure should be understood as a, “European critical infrastructure located in member states whose disruption or destruction would have a significant impact on at least two member states. The significance of the impact shall be assessed in terms of cross-cutting criteria. This includes effects resulting from cross-sector dependencies on other types of

infrastructure.”⁷⁷ For instance, the cross-cutting criterion has to be tailored to Inčukalns Underground Gas Storage Facility, which with its location circa 50 km Northeast from Riga and the underground gas storage capacity of 4.3 Billion m³ is one of the European critical infrastructure’s objects because it supplies gas to Estonian and Lithuanian consumers and its destruction would have negative impact on at least three European national economies.

Despite the fact that the list of a state’s strategically important objects is a classified document, we can assume that Riga HEPS with its water reservoir, which located up the Daugava River about 10 km away from Riga is one of those classified objects and has to be protected by all physical and technical means available. The reason that such attention needs to be paid is that in case of the loss of the dam a major flood would ensue. Within a few minutes a mass of water would cover Capital Riga causing mass civilian casualties and causing substantial material damage. Furthermore, cooperation and coordination also apply to the protection and safety of Latvia’s population and private property. All of these mentioned cases could have a significant impact on Latvia’s interior security. On the other hand, if the cooperation is not well established between public and private security agencies the result would be a decrease in public order and an increase in the activities of organized crime.

First of all, to avoid overlap of effort and misunderstanding in the areas of responsibilities the tasks relating to security should be defined in laws and regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers. Good cooperation can allow a maximum of benefit for both sides—the government and private sector. After examining the normative documents (e.g. the Law of Police, SGAL, National Security Law) concerning the Latvian interior security and the public order sector it is clear that there are no general guidelines that define the cooperation of the State Police and PSCs, nor define their tactics, techniques and procedures, or the rights and duties of both sectors in terms of cooperation and coordination. Nor is there guidance on how the exchange of information should be organized. There is only one normative act, the Law of the Security of the Public Entertainment and Celebrations, where is defined, what the security providers are (e.g. PSCs, LGP or LNG) and how the provider responsible for the security of the event should act in a case of danger and or deal with a threat to the visitors of the event.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, this Law is only applicable when

there are huge public celebrations or events. The main issue is how to inform the police, mark off the danger zone, and evacuate people to a safe place if necessary.⁷⁹ For example, the Latvian Traditional Song and Dance Festival with more than 40 000 participants and 100 000 spectators in an open-air stage takes place every four years and is the biggest event in Latvia. The needed types of cooperation and coordination among all the security providers must be developed and elaborated, as well as fixed in a regulation.

However, there is established the Society Consultative Security Board. The chairman of the Board is the Minister of Interior. Since 2008, monthly meetings have taken place in the Ministry of the Interior. One of the issues of the agenda during the meetings in which the Minister of Interior, all heads of the departments of the Ministry of Interior, chiefs of the police divisions as well as representatives of the private security industry participate is how to establish and improve the cooperation between the State Police and the private security sector in order to reduce and eliminate organized crime activities and ensure and maintain a stable interior security and public order in Latvia.⁸⁰ Examining the protocols of the monthly meetings of the Board it is clear that both parties are interested in establishing cooperation and show a willingness to do that. For example, the board discusses the shortcomings in the work of state police and PSCs and representatives of the private and business sector often came up with proposals for improving the regulations based on lessons learned. They also suggest improvements in the education and training of the private guards.⁸¹ However, one of the problems is the time needed to implement changes in the laws and regulations. However, despite minor difficulties, willingness is shown from both institutional sides to develop better cooperation with and to understand each other at the political level and to work for the development and creation of laws and regulations for the respective area.

There have been already some attempts to establish cooperation between the State Police and PSCs and to enter into a contract on a regional level. However, there are factors that influence the establishment of cooperation at the executive level among police offices and PSCs on the ground in districts, regions and towns. The State Police and a PSC "MG SIGNALS" have signed a Memorandum of Understanding that allows for police officers to regularly take part in the patrolling of an area protected by a PSC⁸². There are some advantages to this that ought to be highlighted.

First, by having a liaison officer in a patrol the police and security officers can faster make decisions, react on any kind of violations of laws or threats to public order, and rapidly contact the police unit base. We should also consider the fact that a police officer has more rights and opportunities allowed by the laws and regulations to act than a private security guard does. There are cases where the policemen are better trained, equipped, educated and have more experience than employees of the PSCs. There are, however, other cases that hinder cooperation. Some PSCs do not have adequate equipment and or enough security guards to provide effective guarding services and monitoring of many private properties using technical means (e.g. sensors, cameras, signalization installations). In a case of unauthorized penetration in the object monitored the PSC is not able to react appropriately due to the lack of resources. What happens when there are simultaneously three or four emergency calls? In order to solve the problem some PSCs have proposed a signing a contract with the state police and local governmental police stations. Generally, policemen are not against such kind of cooperation. However, there are at least two objections. First there needs to be a clarification of the issue of responsibility of additional tasks. One of the main tasks for the state police is the securing of public order and protection of society. However, a state police officer should not guard private property. Otherwise, the state police would spread their resources for additional tasks and would not be able to carry out their basic duties. As a deputy of the Riga municipality, D. Turlais, noted, there could be controversial situations when PSCs will earn the money, but it will be the policemen who will react to emergency calls, drive to an object where the possible breach of law happened, and have to take prompt action.⁸³ Thus, it means that for some PSCs there will be an imbalance between the capabilities, technical resources, manpower and number of contracts signed between PSC and owners of property. The critical point is that such kinds of problems are fairly rare. In the next part of this work we will examine what kind of challenges the PSCs can cause for Latvian interior security.

Challenges for state interior security

In several ways a PSC could be called as a private security army. They have uniforms; they are trained, equipped, and organized. I want to highlight and elaborate two main challenges for Latvian interior security. The first one is a concern that PSCs can be used by politicians in order to

gain power over the economy and political life by showing the public that they have a remarkable force in their hands. By lobbying the private security industry the political parties can get donations from some PSCs. If politicians make decisions to reduce the number of policemen, the private security sector with its PSCs will grow noticeably. This could all occur to serve private and political financial interests if politicians are more interested in ensuring large bank account for their party than in the state's interior security. For example, there is evidence that in one of Latvia's economic pillars, the Riga Free Port, which is guarded by the State Police auxiliary Security Guards, some politicians are trying to transform the established security standards by changing the Police law. Some politicians wish to hand over the guarding of Riga Free Port to the PSCs and to establish a separate and private Harbour Police that will not be under the chain of command of State Police, but will be subordinate to the Chief Executive Officer of the Riga Free Port Authority. Furthermore, two high ranking state police generals may retire and take the top positions in the private harbour police, and consequently make much larger salaries.⁸⁴ The same police officers who might benefit from new jobs in the private harbour police can influence the final decision making process for their favour. The discussions and disputes about establishing of private harbour police institution have already started at the Latvian Parliament.

However, all the proposals concerning the changes were rejected by the Minister of Interior Linda Mūrniece, who decided to stop the liquidation of the State Police auxiliary Security Guards stressing that the political parties "Tautas Partija"⁸⁵ (People Party) and political bloc Latvijas Pirmā Partija and "Latvijas Ceļš"⁸⁶ (Latvian First Party and Latvia's Way) have a political interests in establishing of private harbour police. For all that, there are conflicts and different standpoints inside the political blocs. For example, the deputy of Riga municipality D. Turlais strongly believes that instead of creating a new private security institution with manpower of 300 guards, which will be under command and control of Chief Executive Officer of the Riga Free Port Authority, the current division of State Police auxiliary Security Guards deployed at the Riga Free Port should be strengthened in order to ensure order and better security of materials and goods of strategic importance going through the Port.⁸⁷

No one can be sure that the leaders of organized crime could also use this situation for their benefit. If that were to occur, it would decrease

economic security of the state and destabilize the political system of Latvia.

The second challenge to underline is the threats to the common public order and security. There have been already cases when PSCs have threatened the public order and security. There have been many complaints about the abuse of power, beatings of civilians and the misuse of authority by PSCs. The most dangerous places where population has been threatened have been shops, camping place, bars and nightclubs. For instance, in December 2007, parents complained about a private security guard who, based on his suspicion of a pilferage, detained a ten year old girl in his office at a supermarket. Later it turned out, that the guard neither did know about his rights and duties as a guard, nor did he possess a security guards certificate. The girl proved innocent.⁸⁸ In July 2008, some guards of a PSC "RECRUIT", some of them wearing guard uniforms and some in civilian clothes, beat tourists at a tourist camp. After calling a patrol of a state police it was noted that two of the guards were drunk.⁸⁹ In July 2004, a security guard of a PSC "Falck Apsargs" beat a fifteen year old boy during a check in a café in downtown Riga. The beating continued in the guard's office and the boy received several significant head wounds.⁹⁰ Some private security guards have refused to heed police orders. For example, in December 2008, a drunken private security guard attacked a chief of a regional traffic police division of the state police in a front of a shop. With the assistance of a private security guard, the drunken guard was arrested and conveyed to the nearest police station.⁹¹ There are cases of private security guards being drunk and brandishing pistols in customers' faces.⁹² Of course, such guards will be taken to court and never again be allowed to work in the security sector.

In another case, a private security guard, without reason, threatened a woman with a pistol as she walked by a guarded business on the sidewalk.⁹³ All such examples demonstrate that the behaviour of the PSC security guards' behaviour does not match the basic standards of respect towards society. Those examples also show that some personnel employed in the PSCs are not able to act according to the official instructions. In short, sometimes PSCs bring insecurity rather than security for society. What follows is a decline of public order and security, and a threat to democracy values.

Currently, according to the security guards' training program, out of a total 160 training hours there are only sixteen hours for the module "communication psychology." There are only twenty-four hours for the module "legal basis of security guard activities." There is a strong argument to revise the training program of private security guards to ensure there is a greater emphasis on psychological preparation and education.

Conclusion

This study has examined the issue of democratic civilian control regarding to PSCs in Latvia from different angles and perspectives. The effectiveness of democratic civil control of PSCs in Latvia has been analyzed. In the first chapter I elaborated the privatization and transformation's process of the interior security sector in Latvia since the early n1990s. The second chapter went through the theoretical framework and normative platform as well as the reality faced. The basis of the democratic civilian control was also examined. The issue of the cooperation of the State Police and the PSCs and probable advantages was reviewed. In the last chapter of the main body the most important challenges for the Latvia's interior security concerning PSCs was discussed.

The findings of this study provide an answer to the hypothesis as to whether the PSCs-- without very well developed legislation and civil strict democratic control – could weaken the democratic pillars of the state and work against national security as an armed, well-trained and well-organized non-state actor. This hypothesis is partially verified. The Latvian security sector is a very complex environment that consists of different security providers: governmental and non-governmental ones.

On the one hand, the PSCs toe the line of democratic civilian control in Latvia. The legislation and civil strict democratic control of the PSCs is developed and is brought into effect in Latvia. From that perspective, it means that the PSCs are under strict control of the governmental institutions. The control of PSCs in Latvia is realized through legislative, executive and judicative institutions. The control is an effective one.

It is very unlikely that the PSCs as an armed, good trained and organized non-state actor could be used against national security and can weaken the

democratic pillars of the state. By creating of very well developed system of regulations and laws Latvian governmental institutions have established a framework of a control an alignment of PSCs and criminal cycles. It prevents establishing of illegal PSCs and infiltration of law breaker into PSCs.

However, on the other hand, private security sector with its resources creates a significant influence on political, economic, social and state's interior security environment in Latvia. There is considerable play for the PSCs as a lobbying force in political games and schemes. The private security sector is highly politicized in Latvia. This causes a very deep rooted concern not only for governmental institutions, but also within society. Thinking in terms that common public order and safety of the society is an important part of national security, under some conditions a PSC can bring rather insecurity than security for common public order and security. Several examples show that there is a lack of professional skills and knowledge in some PSCs. Examples given in the forth chapter leads to this conclusion: the greater the professional competence of the private security guard is, the better his ability to conduct guard services within society according to the regulations, and the more confidence, credibility and that guard will have within the society and the more successful the guard's service to the Latvian population will be. For that reason, the quality of the services of the PSCs should be improved.

There are two main areas where the changes and improvements should be made in order to improve the quality of the services. The first place is that in the selection and recruitment of the private security guards more attention should be paid psychological tests that define the psychological ability of the private security guard to act in different situations where they will be providing services. Second, the educational and training program for the qualification of the private security guard should be revised. More effort should be put not only on the physical requirements of the private security guard, but also on the subjects concerning legal basis of security guard activities, the psychological interaction of the guard and others, and cultural interrelationships.

Finally, this study can provide a comparison study of democratic civilian control of PSCs in other countries where the environment of private security sector is similar to Latvia in order to find out commonalities, probable risks, solutions as well as space for improvement. Bearing in

mind the situational aspects of the Latvian security systems, this approach will likely provide some improvements in the institutional capability of keeping the PSCs under government and societal control in the future.

Abbreviations

CPB - Constitution Protection Bureau

EEA - European Economic Area

EU – European Union

LCB – Latvian Central Bank

LGP – Local Government Police

LNAF - Latvian National Armed Forces

LNG – Latvian National Guard

PMC - Private Military Company

PSC – Private Security Company

SGAL – Security Guard Activities Law

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58. „Valsts policijas vadība pārceļas uz ostas policiju” (Leadership of the State police will move to the harbor police), „*Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze*” (Independent Morning Newspaper), 17 February 2010, at <http://zinas.nra.lv/latvija/16506-valsts-policijas-vadiba-parcelas-uz-ostas-policiju.htm>, accessed on 20 February 2010.

Annex No. 1


Number of recorded crimes in Latvia, 1990 - 2009

year	robbery	property theft	burglary	hooliganism	total
1 990	1 649	22 089	4 142	1 208	29 088
1 991	1 892	29 607	6 315	1 241	39 055
1 992	1 837	48 190	9 845	1 282	61 154
1993	1 177	39 356	9 075	1 193	50 801
1994	1 142	27 211	6 257	1 319	35 929
1995	905	24 628	5 083	1 406	32 022
1996	1 031	23 368	5 068	1 311	30 778
1997	829	21 892	4 418	1 285	28 424
1998	609	21 524	4 467	1 233	27 833
1999	2 619	24 773	4 706	1 179	33 277
2 000	3 160	28 737	5 614	1 300	38 811
2 001	3 059	28 697	5 439	1 217	38 412
2 002	2 664	27 160	5 177	1 309	36 310
2 003	2 503	26 984	5 327	1 440	36 254
2 004	2 467	31 358	6 031	1 425	41 281
2 005	2 163	23 924	4 310	1 014	31 411
2 006	2 248	22 790	4 624	1 064	30 726
2 007	1 468	19 639	3 654	847	25 608
2 008	1 441	23 639	3 538	762	29 380
2 009	1 516	27 067	4 133	582	33 298

Source: data base of the Central Statistic Department of Latvia, at <http://data.csb.gov.lv/Dialog/Saveshow.asp>, accessed on 20 February 2010.

Annex No. 2

Depiction of the institutional framework of democratic civilian control of the PSCs in Latvia



Annex No. 3

Guarding services for the sub institutions of the Defence Ministry

Provider of the services	Object	Type	time
National Guard	- Office of Latvian State Agency for defence properties (MOD)		
	- Medical Centre	Physically,	2005
	- Recruitment Centre	technically	2010
	- Staff of the Logistic Command		
	- Storages of Logistic Command		
National Guard, Private Security companies	Real estate of Latvian State Agency for defence properties (MOD)	Physically, technically	
Private Security companies	National Guard 2 nd region, Rēzekne	Installation of guarding systems	2008
	National Guard 3 rd region, Rīga	technically	2008
	National Guard 1 st region, Rīga	technically	2007
	Logistic Command storehouses, overall in Latvia	Installation of guarding systems	2007
	Air Force Staff of LNAF, Lielvārde	Physically	2007
	TRADOC base, Rīga	Physically	2007
	Military base Ādaži	Physically	2007
NGOs School of LNAF, Cēsis	Physically	2010	
Procurement Monitoring Bureau of the Republic of Latvia, at http://www.iub.gov.lv/iubsearch/q/NBS%20apsardze/pt/_pr/			

¹ See Annex No.1 “Number of recorded crimes in Latvia, 1990 – 2009”, Statistical data of Latvian Central Statistic Department, p.41.

- 2 Ordinance “On the Use of Private Security Companies by Federal Government”, The Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation, Swiss Legislation, at www.admin.ch/e/rs/1/124.en.pdf, accessed on 15 October 2009.
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- 4 Anna Richards, Henry Smith (2007), p.2
- 5 Born Hans, et al. (2007), p. 4
- 6 Born Hans, et al. (2003), p.71
- 7 Ibid, p.71
- 8 Lowndes Vivien, (2002), p.95
- 9 Hänggi, Heiner. (2003), p.16-17
- 10 “Apvienība “Apsardze” beigusi darbu 17 000 objektos” (Police cooperation „Security Guards” finishes guarding in 17 000 objects), at <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/apvieniba-apsardze-beigusi-darbu-17-000-objektos.d?id=29020145>, accessed on 15 January 2010.
- 11 Structure of the State Police of Republic of Latvia, at <http://www.vp.gov.lv/structure/view.php?id=248> accessed 15 January 2010.
- 12 “Apvienība “Apsardze” beigusi darbu 17 000 objektos” (Police cooperation „Security Guards” finishes guarding in 17 000 objects), at <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/apvieniba-apsardze-beigusi-darbu-17-000-objektos.d?id=29020145>, accessed on 15 January 2010.
- 13 “Apvienība “Apsardze” beigusi darbu 17 000 objektos” (Police cooperation „Security Guards” finishes guarding in 17 000 objects), at <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/apvieniba-apsardze-beigusi-darbu-17-000-objektos.d?id=29020145>, accessed on 15 January 2010.
- 14 Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Latvia, at <http://www.icm.gov.lv/lat/aktualitates/arhivs/?doc=14482>, accessed on 15 January 2010.
- 15 Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, No. 808 “Objects guarded by State Police”, at <http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=201138&from=off>, accessed on 15 January 2010.
- 16 Ministry of the Interior, at <http://www.icm.gov.lv/lat/aktualitates/arhivs/?doc=14482>, accessed on 15 January 2010.
- 17 Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, No. 457 “Objects guarded by State Police” at <http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=77556&from=off> accessed on 15 January 2010.
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<http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=201138&from=off>, accessed on 15 January 2010.

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²⁰ *Ibid*, Sect. 1 of Ch. 1

²¹ *Ibid*, Sect. 3 of Ch. 1

²² Law “On the National Guard of the Republic of Latvia”, Para. a) of Sect. 2, at http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/On_the_National_Guard_of_the_Republic_of_Latvia_.doc, accessed on 15 January 2010.

²³ *Ibid*, Para. 2 of Sect. 3

²⁴ *Ibid*, Para. 1 of Sect. 1

²⁵ *Ibid*, Subpara. 2 of Para. 1 of Sect. 50

²⁶ *Ibid*, Para.1 of Sect. 1

²⁷ Statistical numbers of The Association of Latvian Commercial banks, at <http://eng.bankasoc.lv/Association/statistics/figures/index2.php>, accessed on 03 October 2009

²⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁹ Library of the EU Information, at http://www.esia.gov.lv/eng/schengen_area/, accessed on 03 October 2009.

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³¹ State Defence Concept of the Republic of Latvia, Para. 16 of Sect. 4, at <http://www.am.gov.lv/lv/dp/Pamatdokumenti/LRValstsAizsardzibasKonceptija/>, accessed on 03 October 2009.

³² Tasks of the Internal safety and control division of Rīga IAP at <http://www.riga-airport.com/en/main/about-company/board/structure>, accessed on 03 October 2009.

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³⁴ Confederation of European Security Services, “*Panoramic Overview of Private Security Industry in the 25 Member States of the European Union, Latvia*”, (2005) at www.coess.org/pdf/panorama1.pdf, accessed on 15 October 2009.

³⁵ Annual Public Reports from 2000 to 2008, State Police of Latvia, at <http://www.vp.gov.lv/?sadal=189> accessed on 20 October 2009.

³⁶ *Ibid*.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p.34

³⁸ Annex No 2, „Depiction of the institutional framework of democratic civil control of the PSCs in Latvia”, p. 42 of the paper.

³⁹ Born Hans, et al. (2007), *Regulating Private Security in Europe: Status and Prospects*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Policy Paper – No 20; Geneva, p.4

- ⁴⁰ National Security Law of the Republic of Latvia, Para.1. of Sect. 6 of Ch. II, at <http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=14011>, accessed on 10 December 2009.
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- ⁴² National Security Law of the Republic of Latvia, Para. 1.3. of Sect. 10 of Ch. II at <http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=14011>, accessed on 10 January 2009.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.* Para. 1, 2, 3, 8 of Sect. 12
- ⁴⁴ National Security Law of the Republic of Latvia, Sect.15, at <http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=14011>, accessed on 10 January 2009.
- ⁴⁵ Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, Para. 83 Ch. VI, at <http://www.ttc.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/Constitution.doc>, accessed 16 December 2009.
- ⁴⁶ Latvian Courts at <http://www.tiesas.lv/index.php?id=45>, accessed on 17 December 2009.
- ⁴⁷ Apsītis H., former Minister of Justice of Latvia (1938), at <http://www.tm.gov.lv/en>, accessed on 15 December 2009.
- ⁴⁸ Security Guard Activities Law of the Republic of Latvia, Para. 7 of Sect. 5, and Para. 2 of Sect. 7, at <http://www.ttc.lv/advantagecms/LV/tulkojumi/dokumenti.html?folder=¤tPage=12>, accessed on 15 October 2009.
- ⁴⁹ Security Guard Activities Law of the Republic of Latvia, (1998), at http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=50687&version_date=25.11.1998, accessed on 15 October 2009.
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- ⁵² Security Guard Activities Law of the Republic of Latvia, Para1, Sect. 1, Ch. I, at <http://www.ttc.lv/advantagecms/LV/tulkojumi/dokumenti.html?folder=¤tPage=12>, accessed on 15 October 2009.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, Sect. 3, Ch. I
- ⁵⁴ Security Guard Activities Law of the Republic of Latvia, Para.3.1. of Sect. 5 of Ch. II at <http://www.ttc.lv/advantagecms/LV/tulkojumi/dokumenti.html?folder=¤tPage=12>, accessed on 15 October 2009.
- ⁵⁵ List of the licensed PSCs, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Latvia, at http://www.icm.gov.lv/lat/Pakalpojumi/licencu_sanemsana/files/text/licencetie-apsardzes-uznemumi-2010.pdf, accessed on 20 December 2009.

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⁶¹ Annex No 3., “Guarding services for the sub institutions of the Defence Ministry”, p.43 of the paper.

⁶² Security Guard Activities Law of the Republic of Latvia, Para.1. of Sect. 6 of Ch. II, at <http://www.ttc.lv/advantagecms/LV/tulkojumi/dokumenti.html?folder=¤tPage=12>, accessed on 15 October 2009.

⁶³ Annual Public Report, State Police of Latvia, (2001), p.16, at http://www.vp.gov.lv/doc_upl/Fish/Publ_parskats_2001.doc, accessed on 18 October 2009.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, P.19.

⁶⁵ Security Guard Activities Law of the Republic of Latvia, Para 2. of Sect. 6 of Ch. II, at <http://www.ttc.lv/advantagecms/LV/tulkojumi/dokumenti.html?folder=¤tPage=12>, accessed on 15 October 2009.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, Sect. 7 of Ch. II.

⁶⁷ Security Guard Activities Law of the Republic of Latvia, Sect. 1 of Ch. 1., at <http://www.ttc.lv/advantagecms/LV/tulkojumi/dokumenti.html?folder=¤tPage=12>, accessed on 15 October 2009.

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⁶⁹ Regulations No 733 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Republic of Latvia “Regulations Regarding the Procedures for Testing Official Language Knowledge Required for the Performance of Professional and Official Duties, for recipe of residence permit and for obtaining of status of European Community’s permanent resident and the state tax for Testing Fluency of the Language”, Para.

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⁸⁰ “Statute of the Society Consultative Security Board”, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Latvia, at http://www.icm.gov.lv/lat/sadarbiba_ar_nvo/skdp/?doc=15839, accessed on 17 January 2010.

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⁸² PSC “MG SIGNĀLS”, at <http://www.mgsignals.lv/lv-history.html>, accessed on 15 January 2010.

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Defence of the Latvia: Past, Present and Future

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Foreword

This article provides a subjective vision by the authors concerning the past, present, and future of the Latvian Defence system as a whole. The authors place a particular emphasis on the future of the Latvian Defence system and the security challenges to be faced in the 21st Century.

The main focus of the article is on the Latvian State's security and defence issues as they apply to the geopolitical situation of the Republic of Latvia, as well how the basic policy documents of NATO and the EU apply to Latvia. In addition, the NATO and EU strategies and concepts as they apply globally and in especially in the Baltic region are examined in the context of Latvian security. The views of various experts have been considered and, in their light, the assumptions of the authors' also will be critically examined.

This article is based on fundamental assumptions that the Latvian Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence are the law enforcement agencies of ultimate responsibility for the physical security and defence of citizens and Latvian State as a whole entity. Latvia is the member of NATO and EU, therefore, European and NATO security and strategic policy documents provide the key assumptions that are used in the formulation of security policy¹: First of all, that *military threats in Europe have generally been eliminated*; Secondly, that *no single state is capable of resolving the highly complex problems and challenges of the modern security environment s on its own*; Thirdly, the *crisis response and management system that exists, or is planned, has become the highest priority issue for these organizations (EU and NATO)*. The key assumption is as follows: The old, traditional defence system based on the legacy of Cold War thinking needs to be modified thoroughly.

First we need to present some remarks on definitions and understanding terms. In modern Latvian language word "Defence" has historically had a

dual meaning. First one is the classical term, associated with designations such as the “Ministry of Defence,” “Defence of the State,” and so on. However, when directly translated from Latvian to English the combination of words “Defence Forces” *does not have the same meaning* as “Armed Forces.” This should be understood by colleagues from other countries where “Defence Forces” typically mean the army and naval and air services. The Latvian definition “Defence Forces” is broader and could be translated more precisely as the “combination of all forces, formations and entities capable to be used in all the aspects of the state defence.” In the Latvian case the term “Defence Forces” might combine the term “Armed Forces” with the paramilitary units of Border Guard, the Police, the Security Services, and so on. On another hand, the term “Security” should be noted by those translating between Latvian and English that this term in Latvian, along with classical meaning “security” or “security of the state,” should be best understood as also often interpreted as “*Safety*” by Latvians. Thus, the context of this article is about the feasibility of “Defence Forces” in the Republic of Latvia to serve under a broad understanding of the term “State Security.”

The creation of Latvian National Defense Forces

The advent of Latvian National Armed Forces, hereafter referred to as the NAF, made its official appearance in the autumn of 1994. The foundational theories behind the creation of the NAF were developed through a period of debate characterized by articles and an exchange of opinions in various seminars and meetings. The NAF’s structure was thoroughly discussed and was stipulated in the National Defence Concept (NDC) published regularly since 1992. However, the separate and integral parts of NAF were placed under the command of different ministries and, in some cases, even under the direct command of the government.

The National Defence Academy (NDA) was envisioned as the ultimate training and preparation location of all military personnel for NAF: Defence Forces (DF), Security service, Home Guard, as well as for paramilitary units of the Ministry of Interior (Border Guard). In 1992 the only context of the defence discussion in Latvia took place within the theoretical context of war and traditional conflict. This fact is essential, because, indeed, the National Defence Forces are the forces to be officially armed and prepared for war on behalf of state. Since the birth of the state the role of the NAF is of central importance.

In 1993 National Defence Academy has carried out the task of conducting academic research into the “roles and command systems of the armed forces in democratic states at war and at peace.” This research, along with an analytical study on the Home Guard published 18 January 1994, was officially presented to the National Security Committee (NSC) where it received support and recognition.

These studies provided some of the theoretical foundations for the establishment of the NAF in peacetime. The research findings were summarized in the article, “The Basic Concept and Foundational Ideas for Building up the NAF of the Republic of Latvia.”²² On 8-9 December 1994 the NDA held an academic conference on these themes where, among others, the director of the Academic Scientific Centre, Kārlis Kresliņš, provided summaries of the defence related matters as follows:

1. The utmost priority of Latvia is to set up the NAF structure and command and control system properly.
2. The National Security Committee, the Parliament and the Cabinet of the Ministers should allocate strictly determined financial recourses for defence purposes for a time period of at least five years ahead.
3. The long term planning of the Latvian NAF should be set up in accordance with national defence concept.
4. The NAF officers and non-commissioned officers’ educational and training system should be set up as soon as possible. The NAF command personnel shall acquire Western European languages in the most efficacious way, with English being the primary effort.

If the Baltic States possess the necessary political will and far reaching military perspective and vision, they will be able to defend themselves. However, the national leadership needs to take a pragmatic and serious view that discriminates between illusions and realities. Taking into account their limited economic capabilities, the Baltic States could still create the necessary defence forces by means of coordination of their efforts and resources. The BALTBAT (Baltic Battalion) was a project that was already underway and illustrated the practical cooperation that already existed among the three Baltic States.

The essence of my address at the conference was provided as an article in the *Military Survey Magazine* of 1995., Nr.1(101). A considerable portion of this document from the 1990s is still valid for today’s discussion in 2011.

I was always sure, and I am still absolutely sure, that any problem must initially be thoroughly scrutinized and analyzed on the level of theoretical research, followed by practical suggestions to be worked out that include analysis of consequences (courses of action. This will enable the government to make rational and logical decisions. The practical execution of such decisions must be begun immediately.

My view was based on academic research and developed arguments. But a purely rational approach went by the wayside when, mostly due to purely political considerations, poor decisions were made in the autumn of 1994 when Defence Forces Headquarters and Chief of Defence Forces positions were liquidated, and National Armed Forces Headquarters was launched instead. Lieutenant-Colonel Juris Dalbiņš was promoted to Chief of National Armed Forces on 5 October 1994, simultaneously retaining (double hatted) the position of Chief of Home Guard, and maintaining the Home Guard Headquarters. This move was a different one from the proposals previously forwarded by the research group I headed, but the setup of the NAF Headquarters structure was logical and in full accordance with NATO standards.

The present condition of the National Armed Forces

In Article 2 of the “*National Armed Forces and Their Missions*” of the existing Law of National Armed Forces the following definitions are made:

- (1) The National Armed Forces are an aggregate of military formations, which form a militarily organized, trained, and armed part of the nation.
- (2) The goal of the National Armed Forces is to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Latvian state and its population against aggression.

Paragraph 1 is as appropriate today as at any time in the past. However, *Paragraph 2* came into effect before Latvia joined NATO and the EU. The Latvian defence policy has changed dramatically under present conditions, today the national defence is based on the legal and strategic concepts of collective defence. Therefore, this paragraph of the Law should be changed, and changed along with the whole of the Law. The Military Committee section was laid out in 2003, where the NAF Chief of Staff provided the presentation, “*The Security Architecture in the Context of Historical Changes.*” The primary idea of the document was, at the time that Latvia

was joining NATO, that Latvia had planned its state defence under conditions of complete autonomy. (See Figure1).




Figure 1.

The main development of the planning process was conducted through operational research carried out to best define the NAF structure for wartime, depending on the nature of the military threats faced, and the plan was to follow with the core NAF tasks and missions. For instance, *The State Defense Concept 2001(VAK-2001)* laid out the basic strategy principles for the nation: For the territorial and total defense the NAF war time personnel had to reach a figure of 50 000. The peace time structure of NAF had been set up in accordance with the financial resources available at the time and was then as close as possible to the war time structure.

There was proposed provisional defense planning concept to come into effect upon Latvia joining NATO where particular proposals were forwarded on NAF developments in accordance with necessary military capabilities that stemmed from NAF force proposals concerning NATO membership and the involvement in the Alliance's crisis response system. The NAF hierarchical structures designed for wartime/ peacetime/ and crisis periods/ are identical. A dedicated national, stand alone (VAOP) State Defense plan would not be developed (see. Figure 2).

That policy went into effect in the autumn of 2003, well before Latvia joined the NATO. Military Committee, and there were no objections to

this vision. Currently, Latvia is the member of NATO and the EU. The question is if these statements are still valid and if the Latvian planning system has adjusted to that?

In 2003 the European Union released its security strategy in which a set of 11 actual threats was identified (see Fig.3). In 2008 the EU developed and modified its formulations of security strategy in the document, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, where the spectrum of the threats was widened a bit. Cyber attacks and IT relayed threats, as well as energy dependence of countries, are these new threats named in the up to date document. In an analysis of these threats we can draw the conclusions that purely military threats against the EU and NATO are no longer very feasible in the current world. Current the world is confronted with major economic and financial crises. Latvia is heavily affected by the crisis. In order to allocate the scarce public finances for defense, it is vitally important to reorganize, optimize and properly settle the nation's defense structure. This begins, first of all, with the NAF. Are there clearly defined and formulated tasks and missions for the NAF, as well as a logical and corresponding planning hierarchy for the NAF? The executive algorithm of sequences to be followed has been available for some time.³

EU security strategy names 11 global threats

Category of threat	Higher priority	Priority
Terrorism	✓	
NBCD proliferation	✓	
Regional conflicts	✓	
Unstable countries	✓	
Organized crime	✓	
Poverty		✓
Diseases		✓
Decrease of population		✓
Recourses dependency		✓
Limited recourses		✓
Global warming		✓

Fig.3.

The commonly understood security related risks and threats to Latvia were first analyzed and this analysis was followed by the creation of the

National Security Concept. Following this the military risks and threats were examined to determine the basic essential necessary military defense capabilities of the state, to be set out in the creation of the *Military Strategy of the State* (MSS), which is the basic foundation for the *Law of the National Armed Forces*. In its turn, the *Law of the NAF* defines the essential tasks and missions of NAF, as well as their hierarchical systems, the chains of command, and the force structure and how all this fits into the whole comprehensive Latvian security system (See fig.4).

Why did it take Latvia four years after joining NATO (2008) to draft and approve the *New State Security Concept (VAK-2008)*? What is the reason to have a strategic level document that is totally different in terms of terminology and content from the similar core defense documents and definitions of the other Baltic States? These questions have been asked and discussed since 2005, however no clear answers have yet to be provided by the Latvian government.



Fig.4

In order to answer some of the discussion in a practical manner in 2006 we released the project of the *Military Strategy of the State*. This was presented on 16 September 2006 within a seminar hosted by the NDA. The Latvian Chief of the Defense Forces, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Security Committee, the former Ministers of Defense and Interior, as well as the chiefs of the national security agencies participated

in this seminar. The *Military Strategy of the State* was published in the *Military Survey Magazine*.⁴ In addition, the *Military Strategy of the State* project was presented in an international seminar and at a conference sponsored by the Baltic Defense College in Tartu Estonia. The project has received recognition through these events and no major criticism has been leveled at the *Military Strategy of the State*. However, at the time of this writing, the Latvian MOD has still not reacted or commented on the document.

The future of the Latvian National Armed Forces

The *New NATO Strategic Concept* defines the priorities of NATO as: collective defense, political and military stability, and maintaining the strong Euro-Atlantic link. There is also always the dilemma of national versus common alliance interests in NATO countries.

The *NATO Strategic Concept* develops these concepts: First, collective defense against threats and challenges to security. Second, it foresees crisis prevention crisis response and crisis control support operations through the means of military and political tools. Third, the concept encourages the collaborative security, partnership and cooperation of all the countries and organizations involved.

The *NATO Strategic Concept* names new security challenges and threats. These include global terrorism, cyber attacks, the security of energy sources, and instability caused by climate changes. This NATO concept resonates in the statement of the Latvian Prime Minister⁵ that the security of the state is ensured by economy stability, and that the support in the fight against terrorism, and the support of the virtual security programs, are fully in accordance with the NATO conclusions about the nature of the threats to NATO nations and the consequent security requirements.

On 24 August, 2010 the Cabinet of the Ministers reviewed the *Latvian National Security Concept (NSC)* which had the following statement: "Latvian military security is founded on the basic strategic principle of participation in the NATO collective defence system, where a possible military threat against Latvia is considered as a threat against the whole of NATO." It would be a logical commitment, if the NSC, which is based on the principles of the *European Security Strategy*, served as the foundation for further legal developments in order to establish the *Law of National*

Armed Forces, which defines the basic tasks and missions of the NAF together with their necessary structure (see Fig.5)

Democratic nations with established defence forces usually operate under the cover of a dedicated written military strategy or doctrine. For instance, Estonia has accepted for guidance a document at the strategic level where the defence related involvement of all the governmental institutions is thoroughly described and endorsed. The ultimate meaning of state defence is regarded in Estonia in a much wider perspective than just the purely military issues.

“*The Concept of the State Defence*” (*VAK*) was, and will remain, in effect in Latvia as a basic document to lay out the military defensive concept or military strategy. Classical philosophy teaches us that any progress has a spiral loop of development. For example, the National Home Guard was created and functioned as independent stand alone structure, governed by own array of legislative acts. Before Latvia joined NATO, the Home Guard had merged with ground forces in order to be part of the C2 structure and system under the tenets of the territorial and total defence concepts.



Fig. 5

When Latvia joined NATO the Home Guard was segregated as a fully independent structure and the other branches of the armed forces were

transformed into regular active forces or professional military forces, consisting of the ground forces, navy, and air force as the integral components. *The Concept of the State Defence* should be transformed into a foundation document that defines the threats, challenges and risks of the 21st Century under the auspices of the *EU Security Strategy* and the *NATO Strategic Concept*. The associated NAF competencies are determined as: the fight against terrorism (participation in international missions); cyber-attacks (security of the virtual environment); and participation in organizations of collective defence (NATO, NRF, or EU combat groups). Within NATO member nations there is a full recognition of the ultimate necessity of advance planning in areas of crisis response that needs to be fully implemented. We Latvians have discussed the feasibility of such advanced planning since 2003 in the context of sessions of the Presidential Military Committee. The NAF- related threats and the crisis-provoking factors are well developed concepts and are shaped under the EU security concept, as well as in the *NATO Strategic Concept*. These factors are noted by Latvian Prime Minister in the roles of Latvian agencies in fighting terrorism and in providing virtual security.

The vital military capabilities of the NAF

The Fight against Terrorism. This question is very multifaceted and requires considerable discussion, research and analysis. However, there is one clear axiom: No single nation will be able to fully eliminate the threat of terrorism within its own territory without help and support from outside.

First of all, if the world were more secure, then each nation, and Latvia itself, will be more secure. This is one of basic rationales for having Latvian military personnel involved in international operations abroad, namely peace support/ peacekeeping operations.

Secondly, NATO collective defence under Article 5 is a flexible tool designed for the purpose of deterrence against military threats from other countries, and is applicable in the fight against terrorism. In particular, the ultimate existence of NATO collective defence principles, and notably Article 5, brings the experts of military and policy affairs to the clear conclusion that straightforward military aggression directed against as NATO, or the EU countries, is very unlikely within the next decade.

It is important to note that the US military budget is approximately 45% of the world's military spending. Essentially, it means that if all the world's countries would conjointly wage conventional war against the USA, these many countries still could not win a victory. Several countries are in possession of nuclear arms. However, approximately 90% of the world's nuclear weapons are under control of the USA and Russia. It means that in case of a potential nuclear conflict where these two countries could get involved then there would be no realizable political or military goals because the winner of such a war would likely no longer exist.

Third, under a research project carried out under the auspices of the US and presented by the chairman of the working group,⁶ the working group experts drew the general conclusion that likelihood of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the future is very high. The basic question is where (?) and when (?) such attacks will be implemented. In fact, WMD has already been used already, for example, in the 1980s attack on the Tokyo underground railway stations. Additionally, we always should consider the indirect WMD (NBCD) threats caused by natural disasters. Recently in Latvia great concern has been noted on the leakage of industrial chemicals in the Port of Riga, where the situation was comparable to a WMD event.

A fourth conclusion has been drawn by working group researchers concerning the security and physical protection of critically important objects of the state's infrastructure. However, the specific conclusions about such issues are under the competencies of specially trained experts and the associated data and information about such issues remains highly classified.

What are the NAF's required capabilities for the NAF to wage an effective fight against terrorism?

1. The active participation in forces (formations) of the collective defence such as NATO NRF and/or EU military formations (EU Combat Groups) is needed. This task is one that can be carried out by the Latvian regular forces or the professional Defence Forces.
2. Participation in International Operations is needed, first of all in the peace support and peacekeeping operations. The professional military personnel of the Defence Forces should be involved in peacekeeping

operations. In addition, peace support operations need to also be supported by representatives from the civilian agencies and the police, as well as by military personnel.

3. The actual execution of crisis response planning within the country should be conducted by all the governmental and municipal entities and organizations, as well as by all residents of Latvia. The primary criteria are developing the right organization and leadership to prevent potential crises, than followed by crisis management itself, followed by post accident management.

Security in a virtual environment

We all have witnessed the recent IT relayed scandals as with Neo and with the WikiLeaks publications.⁷ The capabilities of Internet are immense. Information is sufficiently safe only when the number of the information package password lock symbols is the same as the number of symbols held by the information itself. In reality this means that it is impossible to create a totally secure channel for information exchange that cannot be hacked. This is a reality that has to be taken into consideration by governmental organizations as well as by individuals. People should keep in mind, that any our action, movement or location might be monitored and controlled. Emerging technologies of virtual personality control and influencing can affect the independence of the individual.

First, there is the positive aspect of utilizing the Internet. The mass media is always keen to draw public attention toward moral, juridical, or unlawful misdeeds of powerful persons or officials, and the borders of openness have been dramatically widened. For instance, Neo has revealed all the aspects of the Latvian governmental officials' salaries, otherwise kept in secrecy, thus providing ground for rumours and speculation. This action forced all the Latvian ministries to publicize all their internal payrolls.

The "WikiLeaks" scandal did not reveal any actual secrets in this case, but it did fully confirm the content of some assumptions and discussions that took place mostly at the level of unofficial information exchanges before the action. From these publications we can discriminate some issues and concerns about Baltic States Defensive Plans. During the annual Conferences on Security and Policy in Riga, the President of Lithuania has at least twice publicly expressed the necessity of such a plan to be worked

out. The actual existence of such plan was not any big secret within NATO or for our Eastern neighbours. It may be that such a plan was given an inappropriate designation. The plan might have been better named the *Crisis Response Plan of the Baltic States*, or a similar title. Both the *EU's Security Strategy* and the *NATO Strategic Concept* clearly define this point, that there is no any likelihood of conventional military aggression from countries outside the organizations. However, the risks and threats of terrorists' attacks (with WMD involved), cyber attacks, cyber-wars are of high probability. These events are in progress around the globe, and are accompanied by technology related accidents, catastrophes and so on. Countries have to set up well coordinated cooperation procedures in order to control accidents. For example, Estonia considers the contamination of Baltic Sea as the a serious risk due to massive chemical arsenals from World War I and II that could potentially be released on the sea bottom.

Neo has opened some new page of our regular life, at least here, in Latvia, in order to improve understanding about politicians and their doings, as well as about circulation of information. *WikiLeaks* scandal has amplified it to global level. Today it is quite impossible to create another Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or to hide the Katyn killings materials for decades, as happened in the past. Currently, when events of *Realpolitik* are used that still adhere to the concept of Machiavelli, "you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs," voters and citizens can sort out much more easily the nature of the leaders.

Recently the opportunities to have a look into the black and gray areas of international financial transactions have been increased. The Bank of America has been seriously concerned about threats in this area, and the notorious site *WikiLeaks* has made public data about bribery and international monetary transactions available to the mass media. The founder of *WikiLeaks*, Julian Assange, has warned before about the publicizing of controversial documents associated with prominent US banks. He noted the existing "corruptive environment" in some large American banks.

Neo and mostly *WikiLeaks*, have figured out the methods of the "cancer cure." "Cancer" means corruption and bribery in countries. The methods to cure it are to develop transparency and open the light on the flow of money. The grey and black money, belonging to politicians, individuals,

organizations, or normal citizens, circulates among different banks and numerous structures. Therefore, corruptive deals can be monitored and noted. Transparency of finance should be an immense blow against the system of corruption.

Secondly, the ultimate importance of Web security is in the context of virtual environment security. Estonia has faced a major cyber attack prompted by the dispute over the removal of the “Bronze Soldier Monument” removal. In order to react on such cyber attacks in a virtual environment, a specific NATO school has been set up with the mission to prepare experts on the virtual environment of security for NATO countries. This issue is a high priority in all the Western countries. For instance, US is seeking to hire about 10, 000 talented individuals for further education and training with the ability to deploy them into the virtual environment security activities.

Some facts and findings are noted here. The Iranian Nuclear Program was stopped temporarily by means of specifically designed software viruses. This has a twofold meaning: first of all, a one-time breach of this nature can indeed stop and render inoperable the program that has been condemned by the UN. However, the second—and dark side—of the event is that deliberate discrepancies imposed from the outside into a normal nuclear power plant function can also result in “Chernobyl type” consequences.

A general outage of large electricity networks has happened in USA in recent years. Some experts describe these technical problems as resulted by deliberate or unintentional faults within virtual, software associated digital environment. There are numerous cases of robbery in the virtual environment, when large amounts of money are drained illegally from private or enterprises accounts. We can just imagine technical disruptions created in the air traffic control digital environment and what consequences might come out of this. This list of potential digital risks can be further expanded.

The Latvian Cabinet of the Ministers session of 15 February 2011 fully supported the *Prime Minister’s Report on Security of the State*, where Latvian the priorities were formulated in order to address threats in the digital environment:

1. Improvements in matters of legal and legislative regulations.

2. Improvements in areas of International and inter-structural collaboration.
3. Improvements in areas of timely identification and reaction against threats.
4. Improvements in matters of IT user competency in digital technologies

What is the level of NAF involvement in the above mentioned priorities, and what digital competencies are needed for to meet the objectives? We have the Estonian example in which a nation addresses the issue by the establishment of the Centre of Excellence for Cyber Defence and produces highly qualified experts in this field, as well as a highly developed cyber security infrastructure as part of the comprehensive defence of the whole country. Latvia should conduct more research and analysis on these subjects.

At the US- initiated International Seminar in May 2006 the participants scrutinized the NAF's role in the country's defence system and other related issues. For instance, there were efforts to find the answers to these important questions:

1. What percentage of the state's budget should be allocated for country's security?
2. How will the government plan to deploy the armed forces for state defence?
3. How will the government allocate the responsibilities and duties between the three basic security sector elements: the armed forces, police and intelligence services?

What should be done in order to improve NAF performance?

First, it is necessary to organize and improve the Whole understanding of the defence sector personnel concerning the security challenges to the nation in the 21st Century. The main problem is often located in an individual's mind, when the right words and statements about collective defence are reiterated, but the fundamental way of thinking is still of that of the old Cold War mentality. Some are not able to accept seriously the inadequacy of country's self-defence system creation and development versus NATO Article 5 existence.

By providing the example of the military conflict in Georgia in 2008 some argue that the same scenario could be applied to Latvia. However, one needs to note the difference in the international status of both countries - Latvia is the member state of NATO and the EU. Other lessons from this conflict are not recalled; most notably that Georgia had spent about 10 billion US dollars for its defence capabilities, but still lost the war within 5 days.

From the initial stage, we should work out the joint vision and kind of comprehensive visionary platform, one based on a critical and open assessment, on matters of defence and security definitions. These issues need to be addressed by experts and the individuals involved and it would be best if members of Parliament (Saeima) initiated a public discussion on these issues.

Secondly, the legislative acts and the legal regulations need to be arranged in accordance with the true defence and security environment of the state. Some clauses and articles of *National Security Law* should be changed or even withdrawn, for instance, the articles on the execution of national defence program where the Latvian Supreme Commander-in-Chief is designated in case of war or crisis. Essential alterations should be made in the *National Armed Forces Law*, in order to render it as the “umbrella” for the family of the associated legislative acts that are designed to organize existing and future formations and entities and organizations of the state defence to include the Regular Armed Forces, the Home Guard, the Police, the Border Guards and so on.

Third, it is necessary to define clearly the roles, duties and responsibilities of the NAF within the Latvian Security system and hierarchy. There are massive changes in security and defence environment all around the world and governmental concepts themselves should be adjusted accordingly. We should use EU security strategy and NATO strategic concept as the essential references, along with continuous monitoring of the trends and developments of modern world, trying to be the active participant of the events, not just getting under influence of them.

Chief of Bundeswehr Transformation Centre Brigadier General Erhard Drews stated quite rightly⁸: “(...) *for leaders* (these military leaders responsible for planning and developments of defence system) *it is not*

enough just to monitor the ongoing changes. The individuals not thinking about "what will happen at day after tomorrow?" will lose the development course for tomorrow and will stay fully behind and outside of any developments!"\

Fourth, the NAF structure and its integral parts need to be precisely defined. It is absolutely unfeasible when the *Official Report of Prime Minister on State Security*, which was fully backed up by the Cabinet of Ministers, contains contradictory views. For instance, in the document there was the correctly formulated basic strategic principle of the Latvian military security: NATO membership, along with the associated collective defence system. However, this Prime Minister's report indicates further on:

- There is a current inability to provide the necessary armaments and equipment to carry out this mission and the level of Latvian participation in standing NATO Response Forces has decreased by 98 percent (the amount of personnel in regular NRF rotations is diminished from 253 to 3).

- Latvian PSOs involvement in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina is fully withdrawn for the sake of supporting the ongoing PSO in Afghanistan;

- The number of annual military exercises has dramatically decreased.

- The long term supply and logistic agreements and treaties (these are essential for the NAF's seamless developments and operations) are modified and changed, thus increasing the long term financial burden as well as diluting the level of trustworthiness of the Latvian Government performance as seen internationally;

- The social benefits of military personnel are decreased drastically.

The Report of Prime Minister contains a statement as follows: "To some extent, the function of state defence is covered by the Home Guard, which involves Latvian citizens in the defence of their territory and country." In this case, how should we consider the NATO system of collective defence? Does it mean that the Latvian defence policy is to be primarily one of self-defence, just as it was before Latvia joined NATO and the EU?

Fifth, we have to create a comprehensive NAF training and education system. The serious necessity of such a system has been

reiterated many times. A detailed analysis can be found in the e-journal article, “The Latvian National Defence Academy: Past, Present and Future”.

Conclusions

1. The Republic of Latvia has no other options in matters of defence policy and strategy than these defined in the *National Security Concept*: “Latvian military security is founded on the basic strategic principle of participation in NATO collective defence system, where a possible military threat against Latvia is being considered as a threat against the whole NATO.”

2. Latvia has the opportunity to arrange its defence in a highly efficient and logical way, thus becoming the pattern for other NATO and EU countries. Latvia can be more flexible than nations with massive military formations and matured military industries.

3. It is completely feasible to work out in Latvia a defence concept that based on logical principles and considers the merger of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior, with clear and precise assignment of duties and responsibilities without duplication of effort. Additionally, a unified educational system should be built up in order to professionally develop defence related subjects expert and specialists of all kinds.

¹ Kārlis Krēsliņš. “What Should the Latvian Army look like?”, *Military Science Magazīne* Vol.1

² Kārlis Krēsliņš „The basic concept to build up the NAF of the Republic of Latvia”, *Military Survey*, 1995., Nr.1(101). 7.- 21.p.p.

³ Kārlis Krēsliņš „Future of the NATO: Baltic Perspective” *Military Science Magazīne*, Nr.2.

⁴ *Military Survey Magazīne*, Nr.1 2006 (121)
<http://doc.mod.gov.lv/lv/ma/2006/1/>

⁵ <http://www.leta.lv/>

⁶ Germany hosted the CIOR Seminar in February, 2008.

⁷ Kārlis Krēsliņš “What are the prominent events in the first decade of XXI Century?” *Military Science Magazīne*, Nr.1.
http://doc.mod.gov.lv/lv/militara_zinatne/2011/2/

⁸ The NATO CD&E WG Conference was held in Germany in 2009.

Why Did Gallipoli Fail? Why Did Albion Succeed? A Comparative Analysis of Two World War I Amphibious Assaults

By Major Gregory A. Thiele

The First World War witnessed very few amphibious assaults. The British conducted a well-known landing at Gallipoli in 1915, which was a heart-breaking failure. The Germans also conducted an amphibious assault in 1917 in the Baltic. Although this German landing, codenamed ALBION, was successful, it has been nearly forgotten. Both Gallipoli and ALBION are fascinating in their own right, but they prove most illuminating when compared. Examination of both operations reveals that the decisions made before each operation began, before a single soldier set foot on shore, largely determined the outcome of the campaign.

The aim of this essay is to investigate the reasons for British failure at Gallipoli and German success in the Baltic. This essay will essentially be divided into four parts. The first part will describe the failure at Gallipoli. The second part will analyze OPERATION ALBION, a campaign with which many will be unfamiliar. The third part of the essay will discuss the factors that made Gallipoli distinctive from ALBION and which may have contributed to the outcome of each. The fourth part of the essay will compare aspects of the two amphibious assaults.

The Dardanelles had been a target of interest for the British Royal Navy from the outset of the First World War. The Ottoman General Staff realized this and had improved defences guarding the Straits, and “At no time after 17 August 1914 (two and a half months prior to the outbreak of hostilities) were the Dardanelles defences unready to receive an attack.”¹ The Royal Navy had conducted a first, tentative bombardment of the Turkish forts at the entrance to the Straits on 3 November 1914. The action “thoroughly alarmed the Ottoman general staff ... [and] accelerated the program of fortification and defensive improvements.”² The Turks, more alert than ever, would be ready when the Royal Navy returned in mid-March 1915.

The British Army became involved in the campaign against the Dardanelles almost as an afterthought. On the morning of 12 March

1915, the British Secretary of State for War, Lord Herbert Horatio Kitchener, called General Sir Ian Hamilton to his office and informed him that he would command the army force that was to assist the Royal Navy in seizing the Dardanelles. In his diary, Hamilton admitted that “my knowledge of the Dardanelles was nil; of the Turk nil; of the strength of our own forces next to nil.”³ Given Hamilton’s ignorance of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, he naturally had many questions for Kitchener regarding his new, unexpected assignment.

Kitchener minimized the Army’s role in the operation. Hamilton was told that “the Turks are busy elsewhere; I hope you will not have to land at all; if you *do* have to land, why then the powerful Fleet at your back will be the prime factor in your choice of time and place.”⁴ Kitchener also downplayed the risks associated with conducting a landing. Hamilton prudently

asked K. [Kitchener] if he would not move the Admiralty to work a submarine or two up the Straits at once so as to prevent reinforcements and supplies coming down by sea from Constantinople. By now the Turks must be on the alert and it was commonsense to suppose they would be sending some sort of help to their Forts. However things might pan out we could not be going wrong if we made the [Sea of] Marmora unhealthy for the Turkish ships. Lord K. thereupon made the remark that if we could get one submarine into the Marmora the defences of the Dardanelles would collapse. ‘Supposing,’ he said, ‘one submarine pops up opposite the town of Gallipoli and waves a Union Jack three times, the whole Turkish garrison on the Peninsula will take to their heels and make a bee line for Bulair.’⁵

Kitchener reiterated that the Army was intended to play a supporting role to the Royal Navy. He said that, “We soldiers are to understand we are string Number 2. The sailors are sure they can force the Dardanelles on their own and *the whole enterprise has been framed on that basis*: we are to lie low and to bear in mind the Cabinet does not want to hear anything of the Army till it sails through the Straits. But if the Admiral fails, then we will have to go in.”⁶ [emphasis added]

As the discussion progressed, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Wolfe Murray, and the Inspector of Home Forces, Archie Murray, were

called into the conference. Hamilton thought that, “Both seemed to be quite taken aback, and I do not remember that either of them made a remark.”⁷ Hamilton thought that, “This was the first (apparently) either of the Murrays had heard of the project!!!”⁸ This impression was confirmed when Hamilton found that the General Staff had no plan at all for an amphibious attack on Constantinople.⁹

Kitchener placed at least one constraint on Hamilton that should have caused concern, even during a preliminary conference. Kitchener placed the Asian side of the Strait “out of bounds.”¹⁰ He expanded upon this, so that Hamilton took him to understand that, “Even after we force the Narrows no troops are to be landed along the Asian coastline. Nor are we to garrison any part of the Gallipoli Peninsula excepting only the Bulair Lines [further to the north]”¹¹ The Turks had guns on both the Asian and European sides of the Straits. Even if Hamilton were successful in seizing the Gallipoli Peninsula on the European side of the Straits, the British fleet, its minesweepers and supply ships could still be subjected to fire from the Asian shore. It was unrealistic to expect operations on the European side of the Straits alone to have the decisive result Kitchener expected, unless the Turks capitulated at the first sign of a major British attack.

Throughout the conference between Hamilton and Kitchener, reference was made repeatedly to the expectation that the Turks would not fight. The Turks would not be able to resist the Royal Navy, but if, perchance, the Army’s services were required, an army landing would surely unhinge the Turks and cause them to capitulate. Regardless, once the Gallipoli Peninsula was in Allied hands, the Turks would see that resistance was pointless and simply quit.

One other important outcome of this meeting was that Hamilton was not allowed to take his own Chief of Staff, a man with whom he had “worked hand in glove for several years; our qualities usefully complement one another”¹² Instead, Kitchener appointed General Walter Braithwaite as Hamilton’s Chief of Staff. This action set a lamentable pattern as far as Hamilton’s staff was concerned. Hamilton would be called upon to plan an extremely difficult operation with a staff cobbled together in a haphazard fashion and consisting of officers with whose qualities he was unfamiliar.

Another harbinger of the future was the lack of information and resources devoted to an operation from which much was expected. When Braithwaite asked what intelligence the General Staff possessed on the Dardanelles, he found almost nothing and “beyond the ordinary text books those pigeon holes were drawn blank. The Dardanelles and Bosphorus might be in the moon for all the military information I have got to go upon.”¹³ When Braithwaite requested that aircraft accompany the expedition, Kitchener flatly refused the request.

There was one more indication regarding how little the British knew about the Dardanelles prior to landing at Gallipoli. The maps issued to the troops were abysmal. The quality of the British maps was so poor, in fact, that later, “captured Ottoman maps were sent to the Survey Office in Egypt and enlarged to a scale of 1:20,000, overprinted with grid squares and then issued to Australian and British units.”¹⁴ This did not solve the problem immediately; poor and inaccurate maps plagued the British throughout much of the campaign.

Upon preparing to depart London the next day, 13 March 1915, Hamilton once more called upon Kitchener for final instructions.

When I asked the crucial question: - the enemy’s strength? K. thought I had better be prepared for 40,000. How many guns? No one knows. Who was in command? Djavad Pasha, it is believed. But, K. says, I may take it that the Kilid Bahr Plateau has been entrenched and is sufficiently held. South of Kilid Bahr to the point at Cape Helles, I may take it that the Peninsula is open to a landing on very easy terms. The cross fire from the Fleet lying part in the Aegean and part in the mouth of the Straits must sweep that flat and open stretch of country so as to render it untenable by the enemy.”¹⁵

At the end of the interview, Hamilton admitted that he still lacked “facts about the enemy; the politics; the country and our allies, the Russians. In sober fact these ‘instructions’ leave me to my own devices in the East”¹⁶ It is no wonder that after this meeting with Kitchener, Hamilton felt that, “The British General is the product of an improvising nation.”¹⁷ In the case of Gallipoli, unfortunately, he was correct.

Hamilton's staff was assembled in a piecemeal fashion. He was introduced to some members of his staff at the train station, just prior to departing London for the Mediterranean. Surveying these men, he believed that they "still bear the bewildered look of men who have hurriedly been snatched from desks to do some extraordinary turn on some unheard of theatre. One or two of them put on uniform for the first time in their lives an hour ago. Leggings awry, spurs upside down, belts over shoulder straps! I haven't a notion of who they all are"¹⁸ Critical elements of the staff were still missing and would only catch up in early April, only a couple weeks before the landings occurred.¹⁹

Hamilton arrived in the Dardanelles just in time to witness the Royal Navy's failed attempt on 18 March 1915 to silence the Turkish guns and force a passage through the Straits. In a letter to Kitchener later that morning, Hamilton wrote "that the real place 'looks a much tougher nut to crack than it did over the map'" He also expressed concern that some of the information he had received from Kitchener regarding Turkish strength and dispositions on the Gallipoli Peninsula was incorrect.²⁰

The dissipation of the illusions that had accompanied Hamilton to the Mediterranean caused him to appreciate the obstacles he would face. Regardless, Hamilton was unwilling or unable to make Kitchener see that many of the critical assumptions that underpinned the expedition were demonstrably false. Hamilton's character as a soldier prevented him from forcing his superiors in London to reevaluate the mission. In its initial report on the Gallipoli campaign, the Dardanelles Commission (formed to conduct a post-mortem on the campaign's failures) claimed that such a review should have been conducted at this time. Part of the problem was that, "There was no meeting of the War Council between March 19th and May 14th. Meanwhile important land operations were undertaken. We think that before such operations were commenced the War Council should have carefully reconsidered the whole position."²¹ Officials in London did not seem to be aware of the changed conditions in the Dardanelles and continued to expect prodigies from Hamilton's Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

Confusion and disorganization were the rule as the expedition conducted preparations for the landing. There was a great deal to do and not a lot of time in which to do it. In describing this period, Hamilton wrote that,

“we are struggling like drowning mariners in a sea of chaos; chaos in the offices; chaos on the ships; chaos in the camps; chaos along the wharves ...”²² Some of the chaos resulted from the haste with which units had left Britain for the Mediterranean.

The rapid departure meant that ships had not been packed with an amphibious assault in mind. Equipment, people and animals had been stowed wherever a place could be found. In the case of the 29th Division “the way the ships had been packed put paid to any rapid disembarkation on hostile beaches ...”²³ In another instance, “The units of the Royal Naval Division ... were not embarked complete, the personnel having been placed in one ship, the transport in another, and the horses in another. The stores were not packed as they should have been owing to their not having arrived until a few hours before the ships sailed.”²⁴ On 18 March, Hamilton “cabled Lord K. to say Alexandria *must* be our base as ‘the Naval Division transports have been loaded up as in peace time and they must be completely discharged and every ship reloaded,’ in war fashion.”²⁵ As Alexandria was the only port with the facilities required to unload and reload the ships, transports were directed there.

At a conference aboard the *HMS Franconia* on 22 March 1915, Admiral de Robeck, in charge of the British fleet, informed Hamilton that the Navy needed the Army’s assistance.²⁶ The Royal Navy would not be able to force the Straits unaided. Hamilton wrote in his diary that, “At once we turned our faces to the land scheme. Very sketchy ...”²⁷ As it had been initially conceived, the operation would require only the Royal Navy to seize the Straits. If, due to some unforeseen circumstances, the Navy required assistance, then the Army was envisioned as playing a purely secondary role, with the Turks all but certain to run like geese before the combined might of the Army and Navy. All hopes now rested on the Army. Without a plan and without the bulk of his troops, Hamilton had little choice but to cool his heels while he cobbled together a plan and assembled his forces.

Hamilton had numerous concerns that loomed larger as the prospect of an amphibious assault became a reality. He was concerned that, “There is no provision for carrying water. There is no information *at all* about springs or wells ashore. There is no arrangement for getting off the wounded.”²⁸ Hamilton’s ability to conduct medical planning was

hampered by the fact that the “Principal Medical Officer and his Staff won’t be here for a fortnight.”²⁹

It was not only doctors that were still missing from Hamilton’s staff. On 30 March 1915, Hamilton wrote in his diary that he was, “Greatly handicapped by absence of any Administrative, or Q. [Quartermaster] Staff. The General Staff are working double shifts, at a task for which they have never been trained.”³⁰ The result was that officers who should have been wracking their brains determining how best to get ashore and achieve the expedition’s goals were consumed with other matters. When the remainder of Hamilton’s staff arrived on 1 April 1915, Hamilton was exultant. “God be praised for this immense relief! The General Staff can now turn to their legitimate business – the enemy, instead of struggling night and day with A. G. [Adjutant General] and Q. M. G. [Quartermaster General] affairs; allocating troops and transports; preparing for water supply; tackling questions of procedure and discipline.”³¹

Surprise is critical in order for amphibious operations to be successful. Much of the advantage of surprise had been lost by the actions of the Royal Navy on 18 March. After this attack, Liman von Sanders, a German general in command of the Ottoman forces at Gallipoli, expected the British to make another attack on the Dardanelles.³² Hamilton also realized that by waiting to conduct a landing, he was sacrificing the element of surprise. The Royal Navy promised to repair this deficiency by keeping the enemy busy and make the Turks “think more of battleships than of landings.”³³ In the event, the Navy was unable to keep this promise. As the Dardanelles Commission noted, the operation “was undertaken not as a surprise, but after ample warning had been given to the enemy of the probability of a land attack”³⁴ Hamilton himself felt that the chances of success “had already been muddled away by the lack of secrecy and swiftness in our methods. With check mate within our grasp we had given two moves to the enemy.”³⁵ Hamilton summed up the British predicament: “the military force ought to have been ready before the Navy began to attack. What we have to do now is to repair a first false step.”³⁶

Poor security further hampered British attempts to maintain surprise. Back in March 1915, Liman von Sanders had heard “of the concentration of a large expeditionary force” to force the Dardanelles.³⁷ The Turks did not need spies to keep them informed; information could be gleaned

simply by reading Egyptian newspapers. Hamilton wrote in exasperation, “The [Egyptian] *Gazette* continues to publish full details of our actions and my only hope is that the Turks will not be able to believe in folly so incredible.”³⁸

With strategic surprise forfeit, Hamilton wished to retain some measure of tactical surprise. At a 10 April 1915 conference with Royal Navy leaders, Hamilton described the early stages of the planned landing. He told them that,

With luck, then, within the space of an hour, the enemy Chief will be beset by a series of S. O. S. signals. Over an area of 100 miles, from five or six places; from Krithia and Morto Bay; from Gaba Tepe; from Bulair and from Kum Kale in Asia, as well as, if the French can manage it, from Beskira Bay, the cables will pour in. I reckon Liman von Sanders will not dare concentrate and that he will fight with his local troops only for the first forty-eight hours.³⁹

In the event, von Sanders was not to be so obliging.

Hamilton’s Mediterranean Expeditionary Force did not possess any special equipment for conducting an amphibious landing. Hamilton had heard of “some lighters being built ... for the purpose of landing in the North [Baltic Sea]: they would carry five hundred men; had bullet-proof bulwarks and are to work under their own gas engines.”⁴⁰ The difficulty, however, was to wrest these boats from those naval officers that still cherished hopes of operations in the Baltic and to transport them to the eastern Mediterranean. In this task, Hamilton was unsuccessful and these boats were not available for the initial landings at Gallipoli. The landings would be conducted primarily by troops being towed ashore in rowboats.⁴¹

The assumptions upon which the Gallipoli operation had been based had crumbled rapidly. As for the belief that the Turks would not put up a stout resistance, the Royal Navy’s attack on 18 March 1915 provided abundant empirical evidence to refute this assertion. The Ottoman fortress troops had fought well. The Ottoman Army was ready to do its part to repel invasion. The combat effectiveness of the Ottoman Army in the First World War has been consistently underrated. There is, “A

perception ... in the western world that the Ottoman army at Gallipoli was poorly trained and poorly prepared for combat. Certainly a case can be made that it was not as efficient as the German or British armies. Nevertheless, by the spring of 1915, the divisions of the Ottoman Fifth Army were very well trained.”⁴²

Not only were the Ottoman divisions well-trained, but in many cases they were also well-led and prepared. In addition, “Most of the regiments were composed of many combat veterans of the Balkan Wars and they had been training together for periods of up to eight months.”⁴³ British assumptions regarding the Ottoman Army’s fighting prowess (which should have been questioned before the landing occurred) were about to have disastrous consequences.

The British planned to land on several beaches at the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Each beach in this area was given a letter to distinguish it from the others (V, W, Y, for example). Another landing was to be made by troops of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC). The ANZACs were to land on the west side of the Peninsula and approximately 20 kilometres north of the Gallipoli peninsula’s southern tip.

The landings began early in the morning on 25 April 1915. In most cases, the landings were stoutly opposed, and, “Turkish rifle fire began at 4.20 am against the incoming boats, and 5 minutes later, effective shrapnel fire” started.⁴⁴ The Turks also moved quickly to reinforce the relatively small forces they had on the beaches. By early morning, “There were two separate forces [of regimental size] moving on Anzac under different commanders.”⁴⁵ As a result of this Ottoman counterattack, “Although they did not know it, the Anzac forces were now in real danger.”⁴⁶

By the end of the first day, the British had successfully seized a precarious foothold, but at great cost. That night, “troops from various sections of the Anzac line who had become separated from their units began to drift back towards the beach.”⁴⁷ The generals at ANZAC Cove sent a message that ultimately arrived in Sir Ian Hamilton’s hands. The message intimated that a withdrawal from ANZAC might be necessary that night. After conferring with the Navy, Hamilton ordered the troops at ANZAC Cove “to dig yourselves right in and stick it out.”⁴⁸ In a postscript, Hamilton added that, “You have got through the difficult business

[landing], now you have only to dig, dig, dig, until you are safe.”⁴⁹ The Ottoman Turks had effectively wrested the initiative from the Allies, at least in the vicinity of ANZAC Cove.

The Gallipoli campaign was far from over, but, for the British, the opportunity had passed. In the months that followed, the British and French conducted a series of assaults in an unsuccessful effort to expand the beachhead and to seize key terrain. The goal of dominating the Straits beckoned, but always remained just out of reach. The Turks, meanwhile, counterattacked and were equally unsuccessful in driving the Allies into the sea. The Turks, however, were able to retain the high ground that controlled the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The only change in this pattern came when the British attempted another landing at Suvla Bay, just north of ANZAC Cove, in early August 1915. The purpose was to bypass Turkish defences and to seize positions that would permit British forces to control the Straits. The operation was a fiasco; after getting ashore, the British failed to exploit their advantage while the opportunity offered. By the time the British bestirred themselves, the Turks had arrived in force and the opportunity had passed.

In the fall of 1915, British political and military leaders in London came to the realization that the campaign was a failure and ordered an evacuation. The evacuation took place between December 1915 and January 1916. This withdrawal, in stark contrast with the landings in April and August 1915, was well-planned. The Gallipoli campaign was over.

There were several critical factors that doomed Allied efforts at Gallipoli. The first was the lack of a clear plan at the outset of the campaign. The second consisted of a much broader category of failings that can only be classed under the somewhat general heading of “organizational failures.” Third, and perhaps most damaging, was the lack of good leadership at the highest levels, but particularly in the case of Sir Ian Hamilton.

The Dardanelles campaign suffered from what might today be termed “mission creep.” There was no consistent, overarching plan to which the British conformed throughout the campaign. As a result, one improvisation after another occurred, with ever-greater British resources committed for no corresponding gains. Increased commitments led to

the sense among decision makers that British prestige was inextricably linked to the endeavour in the Dardanelles. This made it much more difficult to call a halt to the operation. In fact, concern over the potential loss of prestige repeatedly induced the British to even greater commitments.⁵⁰

In the initial stages, the operation was conceived as a naval operation. The army was to garrison Constantinople once the Royal Navy had silenced the Turkish forts, passed the Narrows and steamed to Constantinople. The Navy's failure to win a victory unaided on 18 March 1915 and the Navy's admission that the Army would have to land destroyed the original concept. No reassessment of British strategy was undertaken; the Army simply began preparations for an amphibious landing.

Once the landings had taken place, British political and military leaders were irrevocably committed. They either would not or could not fully commit the resources necessary to achieve victory at Gallipoli given the fact that the fighting in France greedily consumed every man, gun and cartridge. Once committed, however, most felt compelled to see the operation through. As a result, reinforcements were fed to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in a piecemeal fashion. Hamilton himself had noted the improvisational nature of his mission immediately following his initial interview with Kitchener on 12 March 1915.

The organizational failures with which the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had to cope were many. The staff work as a whole was generally quite poor and was a shaky foundation upon which to build hopes for a successful campaign. Several weeks before the landings, Hamilton wrote, "One thing is certain: we must work up our preparations to the *n*th degree of perfection: the impossible can only be overborne by the unprecedented; i.e., by an original method or idea."⁵¹ In this object, Hamilton and his staff clearly failed. The landing plan, created by a makeshift staff with little time for meticulous preparation, was shoddy. The evidence for this is found not only in the large number of casualties that the British suffered during the landing and in the general lack of intelligence regarding the Turkish defences, but also in abysmal command and control arrangements.

Poor command and control planning handicapped Hamilton throughout the campaign, but was especially evident during the first, crucial days of the landing. Hamilton monitored the landing from aboard the *Queen Elizabeth*. Admiral de Robeck, commander of the Royal Navy's ships in the eastern Mediterranean, was also aboard the *Queen Elizabeth*. This arrangement had the virtue of allowing Hamilton to easily confer with his Navy counterpart.

It was not a flawless arrangement, however. The *Queen Elizabeth* was not configured as a headquarters for an amphibious task force. As a result, Hamilton's staff, what could be fitted aboard the *Queen Elizabeth*, was squirreled away throughout the ship. Many were "stowed away in steel towers or jammed into 6-inch batteries."⁵² One can only imagine Hamilton's difficulties if he wished to confer with any member of his staff.

In addition, as the most powerful ship in the fleet, the *Queen Elizabeth* had other duties than just acting as a headquarters for the operation. She was expected to provide naval gunfire as well, and Hamilton's diary is laced with accounts of the impressive effects of the *Queen Elizabeth's* gunnery. It is worth pondering whether or not this gunnery detracted, even marginally, from Hamilton's ability to effectively command the landing force.

During the initial landings, Hamilton had to divide his time between a multitude of landing beaches. As a result, he placed the landings on the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula in the hands of General Hunter-Weston.⁵³ This did not necessarily simplify matters, as the landing orders did not detail the means by which Hamilton and Hunter-Weston, on two separate ships, were to communicate.⁵⁴ This failure to plan for communications between all elements of the force, ashore and afloat, was to bear unwanted fruit in the events at "Y" Beach and at Kum Kale in the first days of the landing.

The landings at "Y" Beach were designed to relieve pressure on other landing beaches further south. Two battalions were landed at "Y" Beach. Because of the difficulty of the terrain, "Y" Beach was virtually undefended by the Turks and the British force landed without difficulty. Meanwhile, on "V" Beach, British troops were mown down as they attempted to get ashore from the *River Clyde*, an old ship that had been

intentionally grounded. Hamilton saw the opportunity offered at “Y” Beach, but restricted himself to tamely offering Hunter-Weston, who was in local command, “Would you like to get some more men ashore on ‘Y’ beach? If so, trawlers are available.”⁵⁵

Hunter-Weston refused the suggestion. Hamilton meekly acquiesced. His Chief of Staff, Braithwaite, “was rather dubious from the orthodox General Staff point of view as to whether it was sound for G. H. Q. [Hamilton] to barge into Hunter-Weston’s plans, seeing he was executive Commander of the whole of this southern invasion.”⁵⁶ Hamilton allowed the opportunity to go unexploited and thereby permitted the lives of British soldiers to be thrown away in continued attempts to land in the teeth of heavy Turkish resistance.

The next day, to his great surprise, Hamilton received a message that “Y” Beach was being evacuated.⁵⁷ Hamilton, aboard the battleship *Queen Elizabeth*, “could see a trickle of our men coming down the steep cliff and parties being ferried off to the *Goliath*: the wounded no doubt, but we did not see a single soul going *up* the cliff whereas there were many loose groups hanging about on the beach.”⁵⁸ Hamilton attempted to communicate with the soldiers and the ships, but to little avail, “The *Goliath* wouldn’t answer; the *Dublin* said the force was coming off, and we could not get into touch with the soldiers at all.”⁵⁹

This withdrawal perplexed Hamilton since he had issued no orders to withdraw. He could not fathom what had occurred. “Our chaps can hardly be making off in this deliberate way without orders; and yet, if they *are* making off ‘by order,’ Hunter-Weston ought to have consulted me first”⁶⁰ The troops did not appear to be under any pressure from the Turks, making their withdrawal even more inexplicable.⁶¹ Once again, Hamilton contemplated intervening in the affair, “but the Staff are clear against interference when I have no knowledge of the facts – and I suppose they are right.”⁶² Hamilton admitted to his diary that “this part of our plan has gone clean off the rails.”⁶³

This incident prompted Hamilton to complain in frustration (again to his diary):

Never ... has a Commander-in-Chief been so accessible to a message or an appeal from any part of the force. Each theatre

has its outfit of signallers, wireless, etc., and I can either answer within five minutes, or send help, or rush myself upon the scene at 25 miles an hour with the *Q.E.*'s fifteen inchers in my pocket.⁶⁴

When Hamilton discussed the withdrawal from “Y” Beach with Hunter-Weston the next day, 27 April 1915, Hunter-Weston said, “*He never gave any order to evacuate Y; he never was consulted; he does not know who gave the order.*”⁶⁵ [Italics in original] Several days later, the subject of “Y” Beach again came up during a conversation between Hamilton and Hunter-Weston. From their conversation, Hamilton felt “least said soonest mended.”⁶⁶

A chain of events similar to those on “Y” Beach occurred with landings on the Straits’ Asiatic coast. On 25 April, French troops were landed at Kum Kale on the eastern (Asian) side of the Straits. These landings were intended as a diversion from the main effort on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The French requested permission to withdraw from Kum Kale on 26 April. Hamilton initially approved the request. That afternoon, after discussions with the Navy and his Chief of Staff, Hamilton changed his mind and ordered the French to remain in place. At 2 a.m., Hamilton received a message saying that the French were withdrawing from Kum Kale and that it was too late to reverse events.⁶⁷ Hamilton supinely accepted this judgment and did not intervene.

Sir Ian Hamilton was precisely the sort of commander that one might have chosen to lead the Dardanelles Expedition. He got on well with the Royal Navy, his subordinates, and leaders of the French forces under his command. Hamilton was intelligent, thoughtful and courtly. These were excellent qualities. Unfortunately, Hamilton’s flaws as a leader were placed on display at Gallipoli, not his character as a gentleman. Gallipoli proved Hamilton to be indecisive and lacking a firm hand with his subordinates.

Hamilton’s method of command was to act as an “umpire” toward his subordinates. “Umpiring” is a term used by Martin Samuels in his book *Command or Control?*. The book compares the British and German command systems as they developed before and during the First World War. Samuels writes that, “Umpiring is a term coined to illustrate that practice in which an officer abdicates his command responsibilities,”⁶⁸ and, “The umpire ... having indicated a general mission *withdraws* rather

than *spur on* his subordinates.”⁶⁹ [emphasis added] Another indication of “umpiring” is that, “The umpire often avoids ‘interfering’ out of an excessive respect for the feelings and reputation of the subordinate. The relationship between the umpire and his subordinate may be considered more important than the successful attainment of the objective.”⁷⁰

Hamilton’s tendency to “umpire” is evidenced by his refusal to intervene in events at “Y” Beach or Kum Kale when he found events there not to his liking. Additional proof may be found in Hamilton’s unwillingness to confront Hunter-Weston regarding events at “Y” Beach. Hamilton’s diary is riddled with passages in which he bemoans a lack of resources. On the occasions that Hamilton voiced these concerns to London, the messages were usually understated and communicated without force or immediacy.

Hamilton failed to provide clear, decisive leadership at Gallipoli. He was found lacking in the unforgiving crucible of combat. The Dardanelles Commission was lenient in its criticism, claiming “it is inevitable that the capabilities of a commander in war should be judged by the results he achieves, even though, if these results are disappointing, his failure may be due to causes for which he is only partially responsible.”⁷¹ The reality is that Hamilton’s tendency to “umpire” rather than to provide strong leadership was an unmitigated disaster and had incalculable consequences, if not on the outcome of the campaign, then certainly for the soldiers he commanded.

Five months into the Gallipoli campaign, John Monash, an Australian brigade commander, penned a letter to his wife describing the campaign to date. He wrote

At Lemnos here the watchwords for everything and everybody are ‘inefficiency’ and ‘muddle’ and red-tape run mad. I only wish I dared to write without reserve about this and many other things. Just one brief summarized *précis* of the whole Dardanelles situation. In March last we gave the Turks ample notice of our intention to land a military force. We almost tell them in detail the date and place. Then we land a force which is adequate *only* to secure a bare landing and hold it defensively.⁷²

The “inefficiency,” “muddle,” lack of surprise, and lack of resources described by Monash were a direct reflection of the haphazard manner in which the Dardanelles expedition had been cobbled together by the

British government. The chaos also reflected the organizational shortcomings of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Most of all, however, the conduct of the campaign was the result of the ineffective leadership of Sir Ian Hamilton.

After his meeting with Kitchener on 12 March 1915, Hamilton had left the great man's presence and reflected on his lack of information. He had no intelligence about the Dardanelles and the General Staff had done no studies and prepared no plans for the operation. Hamilton could not imagine that such a failure would have been possible for the German General Staff. Hamilton believed that in the "German system plans for a landing on Gallipoli would have been in my pocket, up-to-date and worked out to a ball cartridge and a pail of water."⁷³ Hamilton's belief would be fully justified by events only two years later.

The Germans conducted their own amphibious landing in World War I. The operation, codenamed ALBION, occurred in the Baltic Sea. The German Army and Navy had no real experience with amphibious operations and, before ALBION, had essentially fought separate wars. As a consequence, there was no predetermined plan worked out by the German General Staff, as Ian Hamilton would have expected.

Paradoxically, OPERATION ALBION was the result of increasing desperation in the German High Command. Germany and her allies were slowly being ground down between the British and French on the Western Front and the Russians on the Eastern Front. The Germans expected that the Entente would have overwhelming numerical superiority once the United States was able to make its presence felt on the Western Front in the summer of 1918. The Germans calculated that they needed to defeat the French and British on the Western Front before the American troops became a major factor or the war would be unwinnable.

In order to conduct an offensive to defeat the Allies, German forces on the Western Front required a massive infusion of fresh troops. The only place such a large number of German soldiers could be found was on the Eastern Front. OPERATION ALBION was designed to force Russia, already reeling like a punch drunk fighter from the March Revolution which had toppled Tsar Nicholas II, to sue for peace. In his memoirs written immediately after the war, Erich Ludendorff, the man who had

become the virtual military dictator of Germany, confirmed this, claiming that, “The blow was aimed at Petrograd.”⁷⁴

With real interest in seizing the Baltic islands emerging within the German high command, planning began in earnest. In early September 1917, the German Navy formed a Special Staff to begin studying the problems associated with an amphibious assault on Ösel.⁷⁵ Although “the army officers were not on the Special Staff ... they began to arrive in Berlin as the war game was unfolding.”⁷⁶ Representatives came from the High Command down to the division that was earmarked to make the landings.⁷⁷

The Germans believed that maintaining the element of surprise was critical in order for ALBION to be successful. The landing on Ösel was not just an attack on the Russian garrison, or even on the Russian position in the Baltic, it was to be an attack on the psyche of Russian leaders in Petrograd. Tactical surprise was essential if the landings were to succeed, but the psychological effect of the blow on Russian leaders could be maximized only if they were unprepared for it.

The German plan called for two landings. The main landing was to be made in Tagga Bay on the northwest coast of Ösel, the island that dominated the Gulf of Riga. A secondary landing on Ösel’s north coast was to be made further east at Pamerort. Forces landing at Tagga Bay were to rapidly reorganize and strike out for their objectives at Zerel and Arensburg. There was a powerful Russian coast artillery emplacement at Zerel. With its elimination, the Imperial German Navy would be free to enter the Gulf of Riga, hunt down the Russian Navy and support German troops. Russian reserves were thought to be at Arensburg. The German objective was to prevent Russian forces from withdrawing from Ösel. By attacking the Russians at Arensburg, the Germans would not only prevent the dispatch of Russian reinforcements, but also pin the Russians in place and prevent their withdrawal.

The subsidiary landing at Pamerort was to be made primarily by two bicycle battalions. Their mission was to cut the Russian line of retreat from Ösel. Speed was essential. These troops were to land, reorganize and to ride east to Orrisar where they would block the stone causeway that led to Moon Island, the only means to or from Ösel. The Germans did not simply want to seize Ösel. Their goal, according to Erich von

Tschischwitz, the Chief of Staff of the XXIII Reserve Corps, the unit responsible for planning the assault, was to “bring about decisive results.”⁷⁸ This meant the destruction or capture of the entire Russian garrison.

The German army landed on Ösel in the early morning hours of 12 October 1917. Russian coastal batteries around Tagga Bay were smothered by fire from the Imperial German Navy. German troops quickly landed and moved inland. The Russian army, wracked by indiscipline, thought of little more than evacuating the island. The operation was over in a matter of days and resulted in a smashing German victory.

ALBION’s success is even more amazing when it is considered that the Germans worked with several significant limitations. The Germans began ALBION with no experience of amphibious operations, nor did they have any experience in joint operations. Prior to ALBION, cooperation between the Army and the Navy had been virtually non-existent in the First World War. In addition, the entire operation was planned and executed in approximately one month.

The German Eighth Army order, dated 24 September 1917, had several notable features. The commander of the Eighth Army, General Oskar von Hutier, had been placed in overall command of the operation, including all army and navy elements involved. First, the order mandated that the headquarters of the XXIII Reserve Corps, the landing force headquarters, must embark on the Navy’s flag ship. This meant that the naval and land commanders would be aboard the same ship and able to confer easily under any circumstances.

Second, the order spelled out a unique command relationship between the naval element and the landing force. The order stated that:

The elements of the land forces designated for the expedition are subject to the orders of the Naval Commander during the period of the sea voyage and up to the time of reaching shore after disembarkation.

Upon completion of disembarkation, the Commander of the Naval Forces will conform to the orders of the Commander of

the Eighth Army, or to those of the leader of the Expeditionary Corps, as the case may be, with all means at his disposal.⁷⁹

Such a command arrangement, mandated in writing, demonstrated great insight into the unique challenges of amphibious operations.⁸⁰ The Germans showed a surprising degree of sophistication in the way that they organized the operation.

It was evident to German staff officers during preparations for OPERATION ALBION that a “bold descent on a hostile shore required very careful planning ...”⁸¹ Such meticulous planning would require time to be completed properly. With winter fast approaching in the Baltic, time was running dangerously short. Periods of poor weather delayed efforts to sweep a path for the expedition through the German and Russian minefields. This delay provided the combined Army and Navy staff with the time that they needed to make important improvements to the plan.⁸²

The Germans conducted a great deal of reconnaissance in preparation for ALBION. The Germans conducted “reconnaissance from the air and by means of submarines, as well as information derived from other sources ...” and this effort “contributed towards forming a picture of the enemy and his defensive measures which, on the whole, was quite accurate.”⁸³

The desire for information had to be balanced with the need to maintain surprise. Air reconnaissance was conducted on other targets so that German designs on Ösel would not be disclosed to the Russians. Further, “reconnaissance flights were prohibited from flying over Tagga Bay,” where German troops would land.⁸⁴ Such was the concern over maintaining the element of surprise that, in spite of the desire for detailed information, only one German submarine was allowed into Tagga Bay before the landing.⁸⁵

The Germans knew that the Russians had one division with artillery on Ösel. The Russian troops were primarily stationed on the western side of the island at likely landing sites and to protect the coastal batteries.⁸⁶ It was also assumed that the Russian Navy in the Gulf of Riga would play an active part in defence of the Baltic islands. On paper at least, the Russians had established a powerful defence on Ösel.

One of the greatest sources of uncertainty that the German staff faced was the quality of the Russian Army and Navy. The Russian revolution in March 1917 had sapped the strength of the Russian military, but there was no way to know in advance how individual Russian units or ships would be affected. Russian troops had generally performed well during a July offensive, so the Germans made the assumption that the Russians would conduct a tenacious defence.⁸⁷ Once the landings had taken place, many Russian leaders and their troops thought of little but escape. Russian failure to put up a stout defence allowed the Germans to act even more boldly, “and ... many a chance was taken in their [Russian] presence which would certainly not have been risked had an enemy been dealt with that was a proper match.”⁸⁸

ALBION’s success can be attributed to several factors. First, from the operation’s inception, there was a clear focus on the desired outcome. Planners knew the results that were expected and bent their efforts to achieving them. Second, while the staff was cobbled together, it possessed a culture of cooperation that allowed it to overcome disagreements and interservice rivalries to produce an effective plan. Third, the Germans were willing to adopt innovative solutions to difficult problems. Taken together, these elements created a powerful mixture that allowed the Germans to overcome their shortcomings and achieve a spectacular success that is still worthy of study.

OPERATION ALBION had a clear focus from the very beginning – to seize the Baltic Islands of Ösel, Moon and Dagö – and this goal never changed. In this regard, Erich von Tschischwitz, Chief of Staff of the XXIII Reserve Corps, claimed that ALBION, “was based on a secure foundation ... and that it was directed with a distinct object in view. It thus ran its course according to schedule, and led to the desired favourable result.”⁸⁹

While German planners focused on seizing the Baltic islands, they understood that the operation’s ultimate goal was to induce Russia to sue for peace. In determining upon a course of action, these wider considerations played a significant role in how the operation would unfold. Surprise, essential from a tactical standpoint, also became desirable from an operational point of view in order to maximize ALBION’s psychological impact on Russian leaders. The goals

established for ALBION were clear and well-communicated and allowed the staff to craft an effective plan.

The planning staff that put together ALBION was assembled quickly and included elements from the Army and Navy and from the German High Command down to the division that was ultimately responsible for the landings. The result was a plan that met the requirements of all of the stakeholders. The Germans established clear guidelines for cooperation between the army and the navy.

As might be imagined, planning did not occur without some friction between the Army and Navy. The Navy planners wanted to load personnel and equipment wherever there was space. The Army planners, knowing that troops would have to disembark and be prepared to fight immediately championed a load plan that facilitated action ashore. The planning came to a halt as “they all conceded that they had reached a stalemate. The next day dawned clear, however and they agreed to toss out everything and start from scratch. From that point ... things went smoothly.”⁹⁰ By 18 September, the group produced a tentative load plan.⁹¹ Ultimately,

Between the Army and the Navy there developed an exemplary and harmonious cooperation without rivalry, throughout the entire chain of command from the Fleet staff and Corps headquarters to and below the individual ship and battalion staff. This cooperation had a wonderful, and an almost decisive, effect. All concerned were imbued with the one common determination: that of the unfailing success of the expedition. There was mutual understanding and the willingness to understand. There was also the urge within to assist, to support to the limit, the brother-in-arms and the comrade. These qualities created the prerequisites for the success of that tremendous undertaking in which, for the first time in their existence, both the Army and the Navy were called upon to engage.⁹²

The high level of cooperation between the German army and navy was crucial to the operation's success. In the initial stages of the assault, the German navy suppressed Russian shore batteries to allow the landing force to get ashore. Once ashore, the German army rapidly moved to secure their objectives, particularly the Russian coastal artillery on the

Sworbe Peninsula. These guns prevented the German navy from gaining access to the Gulf of Riga and attacking the Russian navy.

In another example of this cooperation, it should be recalled that a small force of bicycle infantry had been given the mission of blocking the causeway from Ösel to Moon Island.⁹³ This causeway was the primary route on or off of Ösel. As the operation developed, the Russians attempted to flee and the small German blocking force quickly found itself outnumbered. The German navy put in an appearance at a critical moment and provided naval gunfire support to aid the infantry in preventing the Russian escape. Seeing that any attempt to get off of Ösel was doomed, the Russians surrendered en masse.

Another important factor is that the Germans were not afraid to adopt new methods to address new problems. An amphibious assault certainly qualified as a “new method” as far as the Imperial German Army and Navy were concerned. Examples of German innovation and their creative approach to problem solving abound during OPERATION ALBION.

The command arrangement between the army commander responsible for the landing, von Kathan, and the naval commander, Schmidt, was groundbreaking. The Eighth Army commander, General von Hutier, made them equals, under his own overall authority. While this arrangement was the result of a compromise, it turned out to be an inspired decision.⁹⁴ The concerns of both the Army and Navy had to be addressed. Neither service could be permitted to dominate the planning process to the detriment of the other. Any questions which could not be solved by the two subordinates could ultimately be referred to General von Hutier for a decision.

In stark contrast to the British at Gallipoli, the Germans did not take a defensive approach to protecting their lodgement on the beach. Once ashore, they wasted little time before striking out for their objectives, “As soon as sufficiently strong forces had been disembarked, they were to take up the march ... [to cut] the Russian line of retreat towards Moon.”⁹⁵ The German decision potentially placed the beachhead’s security at risk. These risks seemed minor in comparison to the potential gains to be made if the Russians could be rapidly defeated. By attacking quickly, the Germans not only struck while the Russians were still reeling from the

shock of the initial landings, but also seized the initiative and forced the Russians to react to German actions.

The method that the Germans adopted for cutting the Russian line of retreat from Ösel was also quite daring. This task required a unit with mobility superior to that of the Russian infantry. A bicycle brigade was imported from the Western Front for the purpose. Bicycle troops were not new to the German army, but the unit involved in ALBION was transferred to the Eastern Front specifically because of their mobility. After landing, the bicycle troops could quickly move to block the causeway that constituted the only means by which the Russians could either withdraw from Ösel or reinforce the island.

OPERATION ALBION illustrates a number of important lessons that are applicable not just during amphibious operations, but in military operations in general. The Germans established a clear, achievable objective for the expedition and focused on this objective throughout the planning and execution of ALBION. Both the Army and Navy demonstrated a superlative degree of cooperation both during the planning and execution of ALBION. The nature of the problem faced by the Germans required innovation and the acceptance of risk. Without all of these factors, it is not only likely that the Germans would have failed, but they would not have attempted such a bold manoeuvre. Von Tschischwitz summarized the challenges that German planners had to meet thusly, “The execution of this plan of operation demanded a surprise of the enemy, rapidity and relentless aggressiveness on water and land, closest cooperation of the two arms, and mutual assistance on the part of all elements of both the Army and the Navy.”⁹⁶ ALBION’s success was the direct result of how well the Germans met each of von Tschischwitz’s challenges.

Gallipoli and ALBION are each worthy of study in their own right, but they are most useful when compared. Gallipoli illustrates many failures of planning and coordination while ALBION is a lesson in good planning and preparation. The Germans had to deal with many of the same difficulties as their British counterparts: command and control, the ad hoc nature of the operation, and a lack of amphibious doctrine or previous army-navy joint training. The difference between Gallipoli and ALBION is that the British were unable to effectively solve these riddles while the Germans did.

Unlike their British counterparts at Gallipoli, “the Germans solved complex organizational command and control problems.”⁹⁷ While Sir Ian Hamilton had difficulty communicating from ship-to-shore and commanding his forces at Gallipoli, the Germans expected there would be disruptions in their communications and planned for them. The Germans developed a communications plan with built-in redundancy. This plan consisted of “radio transmission, optical signals, and the dropping of messages.”⁹⁸ The Germans did not expect that this would entirely solve the problem and took further measures:

Inasmuch as reliance could not be placed upon telephone or radio communications between the several elements of the Expeditionary Corps which were scheduled to proceed upon diverging missions upon disembarking, it was necessary to provide each element with detailed directives. This method was to insure cooperation on their part, even if they should receive no information from the adjoining units or orders from higher authority, with a view to their acting in accordance with the plan of the whole, and thus contributing to the general success of the operation.⁹⁹

The purpose of ensuring that German small unit leaders possessed an intimate knowledge of their part in the operation was not to ensure that they could function as parts in a machine, blindly carrying out their parts. Knowledge of the plan would allow leaders at all levels to act quickly, take initiative and seize opportunities within the overall operational construct. “The victory was brought about by the fact that, after a great deal of careful planning, much was accomplished in a most daring fashion by trained leaders who were eager to shoulder responsibility.”¹⁰⁰

General von Hutier also played a significant role in planning OPERATION ALBION. Von Tschischwitz description of von Hutier’s involvement is interesting and is worth quoting at length. He wrote that von Hutier

showed much interest in the preparations and supported all proposals that promised to contribute towards the success of the enterprise. In order to make his personal influence felt, he had gone to Libau for the greater part of the preparatory period (from

September 30th to October 10th). At Libau centred the comprehensive and intensive mental work that had to be done. Here was the place where difficult decisions had to be made. The high qualities of leadership possessed by the Commander-in-Chief manifested themselves also during his direction of the joint operations of the Army and Navy, with the result that the cooperation of these two branches for the one great objective in hand was most happily regulated.¹⁰¹

As the Eighth Army Commander, von Hutier had many other responsibilities, but he chose to spend almost two weeks supervising the expedition's preparations. It is also worth noting that the British official in the position analogous to that occupied by von Hutier was Lord Kitchener. Kitchener did not go anywhere near the Gallipoli Peninsula until 7 months after the landings had occurred and even then, he only went to determine whether or not to withdraw British forces.

Both the British and Germans conducted Gallipoli and ALBION on an ad hoc basis. Neither had the doctrine, equipment or forces specifically designed for the conduct of amphibious operations. The British, as a maritime nation with a proud naval heritage, perhaps enjoyed the slight advantage of having conducted small naval landings in their past, but nothing in the British experience prepared them for the scale of Gallipoli. The Germans, meanwhile, were in totally uncharted waters. German troops involved in ALBION, "enjoyed no special 'marine' training, and the operation was put together on a month's notice. The naval flotilla was likewise an ad hoc arrangement."¹⁰²

The Germans made up for their deficiencies with careful planning. Little was left to chance. Wargaming played a prominent part in the German planning process and helped to refine elements of the plan. As a result of German war games, the size of the landing force was increased from a regiment to a division in order to "eliminate the chance of failure ..."¹⁰³ There were several important differences between Gallipoli and ALBION. One major difference is that Gallipoli was conducted at a much greater distance from the British base than ALBION was from the German base. Conducted in the eastern Mediterranean, any supplies or reinforcements had to come from Britain. The Australian and New Zealand troops came even further for their date with destiny at Gallipoli; they were from the farthest reaches of the British Empire in the South Pacific.

OPERATION ALBION, meanwhile, was not conducted on a global scale. Most of the German troops involved in the landings had been stationed on the Eastern Front. A few had come from as far as the Western Front. Elements of the German High Seas Fleet had come from Wilhelmshaven. The troops, warships and transports collected in the Baltic near Libau, and, “The distance from Libau to Tagga Bay was 187 nautical miles.”¹⁰⁴ This was insignificant compared to the distances with which the British had to contend during the Gallipoli campaign.

In terms of its scale, Gallipoli was a much larger operation than ALBION. In comparing ALBION to Gallipoli, Tschischwitz wrote that, “The scope of the Dardanelles adventure was incomparably greater.”¹⁰⁵ The Germans employed just a single reinforced division, while the British employed five divisions in the initial assault at Gallipoli alone. The number of divisions employed by the British undoubtedly introduced a level of complexity to their planning that was far greater than that encountered by the Germans. Given the manner in which each force met their challenges, it is difficult not to conclude, as did Sir Ian Hamilton, that if the Germans had been faced with conducting the Gallipoli landings that everything would have been “worked out to a ball cartridge and a pail of water.”¹⁰⁶

The British faced a far more determined enemy at Gallipoli than did the Germans on Ösel. The Turks did not run when the British landed and behaved with commendable courage throughout the campaign. Von Tschischwitz believed that the Turks were fighting for their nation and were provided substantial German aid. He evaluated the difference between the Turks and the Russians: “In that quarter [Turkey], a nation was fighting for its very existence. Its power of resistance grew steadily while German assistance was increasing. Moreover, the excellent soldierly qualities of the Turks proved to be on the same level as of yore. All this the Russians were lacking.”¹⁰⁷

The Russian failure to put up a fierce resistance not only doomed the Russian defence, it also allowed the Germans “to take many risks, inasmuch as his fighting spirit had considerably decreased since the revolution.”¹⁰⁸ Von Tschischwitz did not believe that improved Russian resistance would have had any impact on the outcome of the campaign. Von Tschischwitz wrote, “I admit that we were very fortunate; yet, one is justified in saying that the expedition against the Baltic Islands would have

succeeded even in the event of a more active and stubborn defence. Planning, preparation, and execution, which in the case of the Dardanelles expedition left much to be desired, insured success in the Baltic.”¹⁰⁹

The differing relationships between the Army and Navy in each assault are worth noting. The British conducted their landing to control land that dominated the Dardanelles. The Royal Navy had uncontested control of the seas. The landing at Gallipoli was necessary in order to allow the Navy to undertake difficult work of clearing the obstacles that blocked passage of the Straits.

In the case of ALBION, the Imperial German Navy had to clear the obstacles as a precondition for landing troops. The German Navy was concerned about Russian ships and British submarines that might be able to interfere with the operation. No consideration was greater than the mine threat. The Baltic was “infested with many thousands of mines, especially the avenues of approach to the Gulf of Riga and in the gulf proper.”¹¹⁰ Not all of the mines were Russian; some were German, laid to prevent the Russian fleet from conducting a sortie.¹¹¹ Clearing a path through the minefields was a time-consuming task, but was a necessary precondition for any amphibious assault on Ösel.

It is not surprising that decisions made before the British or Germans conducted their landings were instrumental in the outcome of each campaign. Von Moltke the Elder is reputed to have said that, “An error ... in the original concentration of armies can hardly be corrected during the whole course of a campaign.”¹¹² Decisions made early in planning, both good and bad, can have far-reaching consequences as a military operation unfolds. Both Gallipoli and ALBION demonstrate that good planning can play an important role in the eventual outcome of battles and campaigns.

At Gallipoli, British planning suffered from serious flaws. There was no clear goal or plan at the outset of the campaign; Hamilton was given very little direction and sent to the Dardanelles where he was quickly disabused of the notion of easy victory. Until the withdrawal, staff work throughout the campaign was of a uniformly poor quality, and Hamilton’s staff was not even fully assembled until the eve of the landings. A stronger leader might have been able to overcome these handicaps, but Sir Ian Hamilton,

an intelligent, thoughtful and sensitive leader, was not temperamentally suited to such a task.

During the planning for OPERATION ALBION, meanwhile, the Germans found ways to address all of the shortcomings of the British effort at Gallipoli. The Germans established a clear objective at the very beginning of their planning. They maintained a clear focus on this objective throughout planning and execution of the operation. In order to accomplish their mission and to overcome their lack of experience with amphibious operations, German Army and Navy planners developed a tremendous level of cooperation. This cooperation was critical to success as the contributions of each service were essential. The Germans were not hesitant to adopt innovative solutions to unique problems. The lack of amphibious experience necessitated a fresh approach to the novel problems of interoperability between the German Army and Navy.

German willingness to take risks paid great dividends. The German recipe for success was made up of equal parts good planning, willingness to accept risk. Von Tschischwitz believed that, "An overseas expedition will always be undertaken at great risk. In order to succeed, it will be necessary to make thorough preparations, to insure skilful and clear-headed leadership, to employ superior numbers, and to be favoured by good fortune."¹¹³

It is possible to learn a great deal from failure, and Gallipoli offers a number of valuable lessons. The Gallipoli campaign was replete with errors and mismanagement. Virtually the only part of the operation that was well-planned and conducted was the withdrawal. As a result, much of the lessons of Gallipoli are of the cautionary variety and Gallipoli serves primarily as a negative example of what not to do. No matter how exhaustive our examination of Gallipoli, however, it can never provide a positive model to guide our actions.

For a positive model, one must turn to OPERATION ALBION.¹¹⁴ ALBION was much better planned and conducted. ALBION should serve those responsible for planning and conducting amphibious operations with an example to emulate. It is ironic that both operations occurred during World War I and that the fiasco, Gallipoli, is so well-known and that the success, ALBION, has been largely overlooked. Both Gallipoli and ALBION are worthy of study, though for different reasons,

and both deserve the serious consideration of those interested in amphibious operations.

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² *Ibid.*, 9.

³ Ian Hamilton, *Gallipoli Diary* (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), 1: 2. Hereafter cited as Hamilton.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1: 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1: 6 - 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1: 8.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1: 7.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1: 7.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1: 13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1: 9.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1: 9.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1: 7.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1: 14.

¹⁴ Erickson, 188.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1: 15.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1: 15.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1: 20.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1: 16.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1: 19.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 1: 27.

²¹ Dardanelles Commission, *First Report* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917), 43.

- ²² Hamilton, 1: 80.
- ²³ Robin Pryor, *Gallipoli: The End of the Myth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 92. Hereafter cited as Pryor.
- ²⁴ Dardanelles Commission, *The Final Report of the Dardanelles Commission: Part II – Conduct of Operations, &c.* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, n. d.), 16.
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- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1: 41.
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- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1: 46.
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- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1: 64 - 65.
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- ³³ *Ibid.*, 1: 48.
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- ³⁵ Hamilton, 1: 95.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1: 48.
- ³⁷ Liman von Sanders, 56.
- ³⁸ Hamilton, 1: 77.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1: 97 - 98.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 1: 44.
- ⁴¹ One of the boats is on display at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, Australia, and carries numerous bullet holes.
- ⁴² Erickson, 30.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 34.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 50.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 52.
- ⁴⁶ Pryor, 117.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 119.
- ⁴⁸ C. E. W. Bean, *Official History of Australia in the War 1914 – 1918: The Story of Anzac* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1938), 1: 460.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 1: 461.
- ⁵⁰ Dardanelles Commission, *First Report* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917), 42.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 1: 94.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 1: 127.
- ⁵³ Hunter-Weston has come down through history as a controversial figure, often loathed for his lack of imagination and willingness to sacrifice the men under his command.
- ⁵⁴ Pryor, 92.
- ⁵⁵ Hamilton, 1: 133.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 1: 132 - 133.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 1: 146.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 1: 146.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 1: 146.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 1: 147.

⁶¹ Ibid., 1: 152 – 153.

⁶² Ibid., 1: 147.

⁶³ Ibid., 1: 152.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 1: 152.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 163. The events that occurred at “Y” Beach were addressed in the Dardanelles Commission’s *Final Report*. The report stated that, “After hard fighting extending over many hours, the force under Colonel Matthews [senior officer at “Y” Beach], having suffered many casualties and exhausted practically all its ammunition, was obliged to retire to the beach and re-embark.

“The decision to withdraw was made by Colonel Matthews.

“Immediately after landing, he had reported that there was no opposition, and afterwards, when attacked by superior forces and in want of ammunition, had sent a message to say that unless he had more ammunition he must withdraw; but he did not receive an answer to either message.” See Dardanelles Commission. *The Final Report of the Dardanelles Commission: Part II – Conduct of Operations, &c.* (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, n. d.), 20.

⁶⁶ Hamilton, 1: 181.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 1: 159.

⁶⁸ Martin Samuels, *Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888 – 1918* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 49.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 49.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 51.

⁷¹ Dardanelles Commission. *The Final Report of the Dardanelles Commission: Part II – Conduct of Operations, &c.* (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, n. d.), 87.

⁷² F. M. Cutlack, ed., *War Letters of General Monash* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1934), 71.

⁷³ Hamilton, 1: 42.

⁷⁴ Erich Ludendorff, *Ludendorff’s Own Story* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1919), 2: 122.

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⁷⁶ Ibid., 47.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 47 – 48.

⁷⁸ Erich von Tschischwitz, *The Army and Navy During the Conquest of the Baltic Islands in October, 1917*, trans. Henry Hossfeld (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff School Press, 1933), 30. Hereafter cited as Tschischwitz.

⁷⁹ Tschischwitz, 23.

⁸⁰ Modern U. S. Marine Corps amphibious doctrine mandates a similar “supporting – supported” relationship between the Commander of the Landing Force (CLF) and the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF).

⁸¹ Tschischwitz, 237.

⁸² Tschischwitz, 237.

⁸³ Tschischwitz, 19.

⁸⁴ Barrett, 110.

⁸⁵ Tschischwitz, 37.

⁸⁶ Tschischwitz, 18.

⁸⁷ Tschischwitz, 22.

⁸⁸ Tschischwitz, ix.

⁸⁹ Tschischwitz, 238.

⁹⁰ Barrett, 53 – 54.

⁹¹ Barrett, 54.

⁹² Tschischwitz, 237.

⁹³ Bruce I. Gudmundsson, *On Armor* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 26.

⁹⁴ Barrett, 52 – 53.

⁹⁵ Tschischwitz, 27 – 28.

⁹⁶ Tschischwitz, 31.

⁹⁷ Barrett, 6.

⁹⁸ Tschischwitz, 40.

⁹⁹ Tschischwitz, 39.

¹⁰⁰ Tschischwitz, 239.

¹⁰¹ Tschischwitz, 35.

¹⁰² Barrett, 4.

¹⁰³ Barrett, 43.

¹⁰⁴ Barrett, 115.

¹⁰⁵ Tschischwitz, 242.

¹⁰⁶ Hamilton, 1: 42.

¹⁰⁷ Tschischwitz, 242.

¹⁰⁸ Tschischwitz, 239.

¹⁰⁹ Tschischwitz, 242 - 243.

¹¹⁰ Tschischwitz, 19.

¹¹¹ Tschischwitz, 19.

¹¹² Helmuth von Moltke, quoted in Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 289.

¹¹³ Tschischwitz, 11.

¹¹⁴ There is some evidence that U. S. Marines studied ALBION while developing doctrine for amphibious landings in the mid-1930s in Quantico. Most

works dealing with the U. S. Marine Corps' development of amphibious doctrine in the 1930s mention only that Marines conducted an exhaustive study of Gallipoli. It is true that the documents in the Historical Amphibious File consist overwhelmingly of analyses of Gallipoli. It is possible, however, that ALBION played a greater role than previously thought in the development of this doctrine. ALBION was mentioned in several documents and in lectures at Quantico. For example, ALBION is mentioned in a lecture on "Naval Gunfire in Support of a Landing" given at Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, Virginia in 1929 (Historical Amphibious File, Box 2, Folder 61, Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia). Marines also had access to U. S. Army studies that referenced ALBION, several of which appear in the Historical Amphibious File (Box 3, Folder 97; and Box 36, Folder 672). In addition, there were two translations of von Tschischwitz that appeared in the early 1930s, one translation was by an Army officer and the other was by a Marine. It is possible that one of these translations could have made its way to Quantico during the time that the study of amphibious warfare was being conducted, although this is speculation. Marines were clearly aware of ALBION, but it is difficult to determine how influential ALBION was in the development of U. S. Marine Corps amphibious landing doctrine before World War II. If Marines had studied only the Gallipoli campaign, they would have had to have been an extremely bold and visionary group to have persisted in the belief that amphibious operations were still possible on a large scale. We can only speculate on ALBION's influence on the Marine Corps, but it is possible that ALBION influenced Marine Corps amphibious doctrine by providing a successful example demonstrating that future amphibious operations were still possible.

The Activity of the Italian Military Representatives to the Allied Commission in the Baltic States November 1919 – February 1920

By *Ciro Paoletti**

Introduction

Post World War I era saw the beginning of modern peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. In the aftermath of the World War the victorious Allied powers had to deal with imploded countries, new nations racked with civil wars, ethnic and national strife across Europe, the problems of unsettled borders and numerous state on state and intrastate conflicts. To deal with all these conflicts and crises, and to restore some semblance of order to Europe and to enforce the provisions of the several post-war peace treaties, the Allied powers set up a variety of commissions, often backed up by military force, to help settle the disputes. Then, as now, the preferred means of settlement was to negotiate a solution between the combatant groups if possible. However, force and the threat of force would be used if appropriate.

There have been relatively few in depth studies of the activities of these post World War I commissions. However, given the similarities of the crises and interventions by outside powers to coerce peace settlements, a study of the post World War I commissions is especially interesting. The study of the Baltic States in the post World War I era is especially worthwhile. There we find an excellent example of an early peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations in a highly complex political environment—where new national governments, an invading Soviet army, national factions, ideological factions, factional militias and irregular forces, and several major powers competed for influence and control in the region. To bring about some kind of stable peace was the mission of the Allied Powers in the Baltic States in the immediate aftermath of World War I. To help the process the Allied Powers send military forces to the Baltic States (primarily the Royal Navy) as well as teams of military

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representatives to deal with the various factions and enforce the Versailles Peace Treaty..

The Italian Archives offer an interesting glimpse into the inner workings of one of the most important of the Allied military commissions set up in the aftermath of World War I. Italy, which had no major interests in the Baltics, was invited to send a small delegation to the region. What exists in the Italian Archives today are the reports on the events in the Baltic States from the viewpoint of the Italians, who had no intelligence sources of their own and were in a position where they simply reported the positions, claims and arguments from the major players. It should be noted that the numbers and statistics given to the Allied representatives by the various factions and noted in the reports were clearly inaccurate and were often exaggerated to political advantage of the various parties. However, the documents are especially important in providing an account of the situation as seen by the Allied Powers' representatives on the ground as they reported back to the Allied Powers' Council in Paris and attempted to craft a solution in a highly volatile situation. The Italian documents of 1919 and 1920 represent the negotiating positions of the major players as they negotiated and coerced the withdrawal of large foreign military forces that were destabilizing the region. The documents summarized in this article are of clear value to understanding the context of post World War I politics and great power diplomacy and military engagement in the Baltic States in a chaotic time of the national formation of the three Baltic States.

The Political/ Military Situation in the Baltics in 1919

In the immediate aftermath of World War I the Baltic States were convulsed by civil unrest, an invasion by the armies of the Soviet Union, the intervention of German forces on the side of the Baltic States against the Soviet Army, to be followed by a conflict between the Latvians and Estonians with the Germans, followed by the establishment of anti-Soviet White Russian armies in the Baltic States, and followed by further conflict between the soviets, Baltic states, Germans and White Russians.

In the immediate aftermath of world War I Allied Military Commissions, constituted from representatives of the major Allied Powers, were set up in several regions to monitor the peace armistice agreement of November 1919, and later the Versailles Peace Agreement and the other post-war

treaties establishing boundaries, overseeing war reparations, evacuation of military personnel and so on.

It was the job of the various Allied Military Commissions to report back to the representatives of the Allied Powers in Paris and, when instructed, to impose the will of the Allied Powers on the former Central powers governments and the governments of the new states that arose in Europe in the aftermath of world War I. In short, the Allied Military Commissions

After Russian Revolution, the Baltic area became increasingly violent due to many clashing interests. The new Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were in a fight for survival against the Soviet Union, which had invaded their lands with overwhelming forces. Poland faced conflict on several fronts: against the Germans over the borders of Silesia, against the Lithuanians concerning the ownership of Vilnius, and against the Soviet Union—the main enemy. Unlike the Western Front, where the allies mandated that the Germans had to retreat to the Rhine in November 1918, in the East the Allied Powers mandated that the Germans keep forces in the Baltic States to ensure stability and to protect the Baltic States and Germany from a soviet Invasion. Indeed some Germans still supported the idea of annexing of the Baltic Provinces to the Reich and the Baltic barons, the local landowners, looked at the Germans to help them keep the land and political power in Latvia in their own hands. On the other hand, while the vast majority of the Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian people wanted independence, a portion of also favoured the communist system recently installed in Russia and these people allied themselves with the Russian effort to create communist republics in the Baltics.

On top of all this was the Allied Powers' imperative to defeat, or at least contain, the Soviet Union. To that effect the Royal Navy and British Army conducted military operations against the Soviet Russians, attacking the Red Navy's main base at Kronstadt, and were actively engaged in providing military support to the forces of the new Baltic States. In addition, the British and French were active in helping to organize and arm counterrevolutionary White Russian armies in the Baltics to fight the Red regime.

In early 1919 the situation was more or less as follows. Estonia was fighting against the Bolsheviks and was backed by Britain. A force of German Freikorps, Germans recruited from local ethnic Germans and Latvians, had delivered defeats to the soviet Army and had taken back most of Latvia. In Lithuania, German and Lithuanian forces drove the Russian Bolshevik forces back. In April part of the German forces in Latvia, under command of General Rüdiger von der Goltz, helped pro-German factions in Latvia stage a coup and establish a pro-German government. This led to a military confrontation between the Estonians and Latvians and Germans at the battle of Cesis in June 1919, in which the Germans were forced to retreat. This was followed by an Estonian-Latvian-German armistice on July 3rd, 1919 and in this settlement brokered and enforced by the Allied Powers, General von der Goltz's forces were to evacuate Riga and be evacuated to Germany. In the meantime, the Soviet offensive in the Baltics was repelled, partly by a French-British landing on 28th September 1919. The Red Army retreated to Saint Petersburg, which was besieged

So, in the fall of 1919, the Germans were still in Lithuania, and partially in Latvia. Due to their desire to keep their landed estates, the Baltic Barons supported the Germans, who still looked for some type of annexation of the Baltic areas to Germany.

In theory, the Germans declared they wanted to support Latvia and Lithuania against the Communists. But, in fact, the Germans were trying to provide a reason credible to the Allied eyes for their forces to remain in the Baltic. Three different foreign military organizations existed in both Latvia and Lithuania: the German Army (*Reichswehr*) that was refusing to leave, the White Russian troops commanded by Nikolai Judenich, and the German-Russian troops commanded by Pavel Bermond-avalov. Both the Latvian and the Lithuanian Governments were trapped between the Russian Communists and the Germans.

Creation of a Special Allied Commission in the Baltics

In Paris the Allies were looking at the Baltic situation, but they were divided as to how to approach the problem. The USA and Italy had no political interests in the Baltic, while France and Britain had perceived major interests. The British interest centered mainly on the fight against the Communists and for obtaining full independence the three Baltic

states. The French were thinking in terms of their traditional foreign policy in place since the latter half of the sixteenth century —and they wished to keep the Germans and Austrians in their place. The French also wanted a strong Poland to serve as their key Eastern European ally. In accordance with this view France suggested the establishment of a confederation of the Baltic States, to include Finland and perhaps Poland too.¹ France also pushed to support the independence of the Baltic States, and proposed to establish a special commission for the purpose. France backed up its policy by threatening Germany with the occupation of the Ruhr and Rhineland if they German government did not comply. In spite of the different policy positions of the Allied countries, they all saw the main problem by the latter half of 1919 was the presence of German regular and volunteer troops in the Baltic States. The Bolshevik threat was noted, but by late 1919 with the defeats the soviets had suffered on the Baltic fronts, the Bolsheviks were not an immediate threat to the region. Thus, the main issue had become the removal of the Germans, by force or other means.

Since early October 1919 the Allies had pushed the Germans to abandon the newly independent Baltic Countries. On October 4th, 1919 the German government declared it wanted to do all it could to ensure the German soldiers left the region.² However, since no action followed, on October 10th the Allied Supreme Command established a Commission for the evacuation of the Germans from the Baltic Countries.³

At this time the local situation was Local situation was unclear. No real first hand information came. The little news the Allied Commission in the Baltics had came from the German or the Swedish press. The only information that the Allied representative could be sure of was that the situation was bad. Still, it was unclear as to how many men the German, Russian and German-Russian units actually included.⁴

On October 22nd French General Dupont wrote from Berlin that German War Minister Gustav Noske just admitted there were 40,000 Germans – (15,000 in Mitau with General von der Goltz and 25,000 with the Russian General Bermond) that refusing to leave Baltic Countries, and that he – Noske – was thinking of compelling them to leave by means of cutting their the coal supplies.⁵

On October 28th the Allied Supreme Council examined a draft of a Commission plan to supervise the German evacuation from the Baltic provinces.⁶ The following day the Italian delegation in Paris told Rome that each country would have to pay for its own personnel serving in the new Evacuation Commission and suggested to reduce the Italian involvement to, “*General Marietti, only one officer, a typewriting machine, a car and reduced troops accordingly.*”⁷ Rome agreed with their representatives in Paris.

On October 31st the Allied Supreme Council allowed the Commission to use the personnel of the Allied military missions in the Baltic Countries to support and enforce its actions.⁸ At this time further instructions about the composition and the duties of the Commission were issued from Paris. The Commission was to be a small one. The president of the Commission was to be the French General Niessel. Other members of the Commission included British General Turner, American Brigadier General S. A. Cheney, the Italian Brigadier General Marietti, and the Japanese Infantry Commander Takeda.

The Commission had to supervise and control the evacuation of the Germans, civilians included, from the Baltic Countries. Only those Germans who were accepted as local citizens by the Baltic governments could remain. All the actions in evacuating the Germans had to be made in agreement with and with the cooperation of the three Baltic governments. The German government would be required to order its troops to obey the commission orders⁹ and the Germans were to nominate some delegates who were to act with, and under the authority of, the Commission. On that same day (31 October) the Germans and Lithuanians agreed that the Schawli-Tauroggen (Siaulai-Tauragė) railway would have to be considered as a neutral area in order that it could be used to evacuate the German troops.

On November 1st, 1919, the Inter-Allied Supreme Council ordered the German government to evacuate Baltic Provinces and to accept the Commission as an enforcing and controlling authority.

Before leaving Paris on November 3rd, for the first time the Commission met with some Baltic representatives who were able to give the Commission its first reliable information.¹⁰ The railways, they noted, had been changed from the Russian to the European gauge by the Germans

during the war and period of occupation. The Germans were expected to leave as much railway material behind as had existed in that area before the war, and all the Germans were to take with them was the necessary materials to manage the traffic.

In further deliberations the commission decided that the German troops had to be divided from the White Russian troops. Finally, the Commission decided that ethnic German Baltic landowners who had been deprived were to receive fair compensation.

The Latvian representative answered that the ethnic Germans could not be admitted as citizens into the Latvian state and that they could only stay in Latvia if they promised not to take an active participation in local politics. He added there were sixteen recruiting offices in Germany sending German volunteers to Baltic Countries and that the Russian troops needed money in order to survive. The following day, General Niessel announced that the German government was considered to be responsible for the German, the Russian-German and the Russian troops. On November 7th, the Commission left Paris and went to Berlin.

Since the first meeting with the Germans, two different German approaches appeared to exist. On one side, the German Minister of War, Noske, seemed supportive and cooperative with the Commission's objectives. He clearly understood the threat posed to Germany if the Allies were not satisfied. Moreover, there were rumours in the press about a planned French invasion of Ruhr and Rhineland, and this provided additional pressure on the German government to solve the Baltic problem. Unfortunately, Noske did not fully control the army and Freikorps and other auxiliaries. He gave orders, but he was not sure he would be obeyed, or at least be obeyed promptly. On the other hand, it was clear from the first meeting of the commission that the military and diplomatic officials wanted to gain time until some final peace treaty that might allow a German presence could be concluded in the Baltic Region. When meeting with Admiral Hopmann,¹¹ who later became the chief of the German liaison officers to the Commission, the dry answer Niessel gave Hopmann's attempts to mitigate the situation was that, for the Germans, *"there were only orders to be obeyed and instructions to be received."*

Then the Commission decided that the German General Eberhard had to remain in the Baltic until the end of the withdrawal and the commission

asked the French and British missions in the Baltic to expel all the civilian German personnel, excepting those who were fully accepted by the Baltic Countries, and the railway workers.

The military situation that the Commission faced was unclear. According to the Hopmann, the Germans had in the Baltic Countries 120 4-gun batteries and 20 150 millimetres guns, with 120 aircraft, but they needed clothes and money.

General Eberhardt explained that Russian-German force included 49,000 Germans, 10,000 Russians and 5-10,000 Latvians, with 150 light cannons, 50-60 heavy ones, 40-50 aircraft. Most of the force had been arrayed against Riga, and that by November 11th 15,000 Germans had already left the Baltic Countries, followed by 5 or 6,000 more personnel who were not included in regular military units. He added that Bermondts had not liked taking a position in favour of the ethnic Germans, but that he had been forced to do this by the Baltic Barons. All the German troops could leave by railway. There were 110 steam engines and some 1,000 railcars available. The railway net was more extensive than it had been in 1914 because the Germans had laid many new tracks in the last five years.

The Commission then met the Baltic representatives. General Niessel spoke of the situation between the new governments and the Baltic barons. He said that it was necessary to maintain a moderate policy and not to push them into a corner as their interests were the main reason keeping the German troops in the area. The Lithuanian representative answered that Lithuania tried such a policy, but with no success, and that Lithuania had also been unsuccessful in expelling German officials. Niessel simply said, "*gave them the passports.*" This implicitly meant, "you are now backed by the Allies." The Estonian representative told that the Germans had left his country and that there were not many Germans still left in Latvia. The Latvian admitted that his government did not intend to give the peasants the land. In spite of this, the German barons, without the permission of the government, had put German workers on their own land and, not by chance, in some strategically important areas the barons had armed their workers. The Lithuanian representative noted that this was not the case in his country because, in fact, Lithuania had no German landowners, but rather Polish-German ones.

Finally, both the Latvian and Lithuanian representatives told the Commission that, if the Germans left, they could effectively manage the railways and the government administration, and that they were not worried about any further communist advances as, once the Germans departed, both governments could then focus their forces and attention on securing their own borders.

On November 12 the Commission reached Königsberg. The Commission members met with the local German authorities and began their work. The German officials in Prussia tried to hinder the order for evacuation claiming that that German troops coming back from the Baltic area would carry with them no less than 130,000 civilians, perhaps 150,000, and that Prussian authorities would need more time to organize their accommodation. General Niessel coldly answered that there were only 30,000 ethnic German civilians present in the Baltic Countries. He added that German troops deployed along the Reich's eastern border seemed to be effective in stopping any entry into Prussia, but they were useless in stopping the exit of German Freikorps volunteers to the Baltics. In spite of all the Germans' excuses, the Commission decided to change the system of border surveillance and the Commission asked the Germans for their initiatives, if any, to stop the German forces from shelling Riga, to stop the German attacks against Liepāja (Libau), and to punish German officers who had refused to obey orders up to that time.

The following day the Commission examined the general situation. British General Turner asked for an immediate dispatch of Allied troops to Memel, American Brigadier Cheney suggested that the allies wait, and the Italian General Marietti remarked that the three Allied battalions proposed for the operation were not enough. The Commission admitted that General Marietti was right and sent the Allied Supreme Council a telegram asking for more troops, and another one to the Germans asking about the number of German aircraft and a demand that the Germans not use their aircraft-- especially for communication with Germany.

Then the Commission moved to Tilsit and met with General Eberhardt. General Eberhardt explained what he had done and gave the Commission the following information: the Russian-German forces included 49,000 Germans, 10,000 Russians and from 5,000 to 10,000 Latvians, with 150 light cannons, 50-60 heavy guns, some as 40-50 aircraft. Most of these forces were deployed against Riga, and by 11 November, 1919 the

Germans had repatriated units including 15,000 men and 5,000-6,000 more soldiers. He added that there were 110 steam-engines and some 1,000 rail cars available for operation. He concluded that he considered his task as over, but General Niessel ordered him to wait on the Allies' decisions.

On November 14th the Commission began meeting the Baltic authorities. In Kaunas¹² they met Lithuanian premier Galvansusikas and were received by President Smetona. The following day they met the Lithuanian government. There were many German agents – the Lithuanians said – who were expected to give the Lithuanians the railway materials, but they did not. The Germans – the Lithuanians protested – had 50 diplomatic officials in Kaunas, in spite of only 10 Lithuanians in Berlin, and this was clearly too much for a peaceful mission, and had also a lot of journalists working for a press agency, who in fact were spies. Lithuanians also said that they had divided the territory between Prekultn-Bajohren (it should be the railway from Priekule, in Latvia, to Kretinga in Lithuania, Kalanga and Priekulė) and Schawli-Tauroggen (Siaulai-Tauragė) railways in 21 districts. Elections were foreseen in January.

The Lithuanian authorities had appointed the chiefs of the local administrations and of the police forces. They replied that no one needed the Germans to maintain security. Indeed, according to the Lithuanians, the Germans made Bolshevik propaganda and were out of control. The Lithuanians pointed out that the Germans still controlled 440 kilometres of railways and had quietly reduced the number of cars they operated. The Lithuanians had railway workers and engineers, but lacked coal and had to use wood. The Lithuanian forces had nine aircraft and 10,000 not very well trained soldiers. The deployed four battalions and two artillery batteries against the Bolsheviks, and had 2,000 men on Polish border. All the other Lithuanian troops were near Chadow, to protect the railway and also to serve as a reserve against the “Reds.” 2,000 more volunteers, armed with weapons that had been sold by German soldiers, were available for local defence. In conclusion, Lithuanian government told the Commission they want to attack the Germans, but they lacked ammunition. They had requested ammunition from the Poles, but had been refused. The Commission told them not to take initiative in that moment, and asked Paris to press the Poles not to be hostile to Lithuania, whose civil organization seemed reliable.

The general situation now became more complex. General Eberhardt had accepted the demand that the Germans retreat to Eastern Prussia, but in order to have the Germans truly withdraw, the Commission wanted to avoid any Latvian and Lithuanian operation against the Germans. Otherwise the Germans would surely commit troops from East Prussia and Lithuania – and perhaps from Latvia – to prevent the destruction of the German force. In addition, there were the problems of the Russian “White” units more or less commanded by Count Bermond, and of the forces of the German “Iron Division,” the Plehwe Group, and of the Baltic Landwehr, which was 2,600 men strong and according to the Commission was supposed to act in coordination with the Latvians.¹³

A new meeting with Germans took place and was made easier by the news that Bermond decided to act according to Commission’s orders. The Germans feared a Latvian attack – and on 17 November it began. This was the German justification not to retreat. Finally an agreement was reached, and Admiral Hopmann accepted the proposal to move German troops under the control of mixed Allied-Latvian-Lithuanian Control Commissions. The Allied officers had to monitor the Germans as they evacuated Baltic territory, and the Latvians and Lithuanians had to take control of the areas the Germans left.

It was decided that the Russians had to be dispatched to Judenich and that he had to select among them as to which forces could be admitted to his army. All the other units had to retreat to East Prussia, then to Germany. Then, if they were not regular army units, they were to be disbanded.¹⁴

On November 20th the Germans protested that the Lithuanians attack was still continuing, especially at Schawli (Siaulai) and Radziwiliski, with additional actions around Telze (Telšiai) and Rossanie (Raisainiai). This meant that the Germans could not use the railway for their withdrawal. Moreover, the Latvians had not yet answered the German proposal for an armistice. The Commission pressed a bit for the Lithuanian government to stop attacks and explained that, otherwise, the German retreat would be impossible.

On 21 November there was a meeting in Taurongen (Tauragė) that included the Germans and the commander of the local Lithuanian Battalion. Admiral Hopmann told the Commission that the Latvians refused the German proposal for an armistice and that Latvian troops

were still acting against the Germans, with clashes around Prekuln (Priekulie) on the German left, and, on their right, at Bauske. But both the sides claimed to have Bauske in their hands as well as Mitau (Jelgawa), Katharinhof and Sckwetau, the latter occupied by Latvian cavalry.

In fact, the Commission acted with some initial hesitation, but soon came to a solution. The Commission would prevent any side from using Tauroggen (Tauragė) as a base. The Commission ordered the Lithuanians to accept a German representative to their battalion in the vicinity, and that each incident would be reported by both Germans and Latvians. The Germans were ordered to immediately release all the Lithuanian prisoners they held, and the Lithuanians were asked to release all Germans in their custody. At the same time the Commission was informed by Helsinki that Judenich was negotiating with the Estonian government to bring his forces to Estonia, leaving his place to Rodzianko or Gurko – who were pro-German officers – and the new commander of Estonian-Russian forces would be Leitener. In the meantime, Bermondts would leave his post to Jawit.

So the Commission sent Riga a telegram asking Latvian government not to put obstacles to the German withdrawal, and another telegram to Kaunas asking the Lithuanian government, whose men just cut the Schawli-Mitau (Siauliai-Jelgawa) railway, to also not act against the Germans. All the members of the Commission except General Niessel agreed that it was now the time to stop the Latvians, otherwise the Latvian actions might create a situation where organized German units were disbanded and became a mob of out of control armed men. Such a situation would make an evacuation impossible. The following day General Marietti convinced General Niessel that it was necessary to stop the Latvians, and finally Niessel agreed and sent Riga a telegram saying, “The Germans are leaving. Stop the attacks. Do not put obstacles to the evacuation. Do not trespass Latvian-Lithuanian border. The decision comes from Paris.”

The news on 23 November was not good. The Germans had left Mitau (Jelgawa) and were retreating to Schawli (Siauliai). The Latvians had repelled the Germans from Bauske, and were going to attack Schawli (Siauliai), but they did not intend to cross the Lithuanian/German border. The Lithuanians offered to take the exclusive control of the evacuation. The Commission answered that the Allied-Lithuanian control was good

enough and that, in case the Lithuanians insisted, the Allies could change their friendly attitude toward them. Then the Commission invited the Lithuanian Battalion to leave Tauroggen (Tauragė), and sent Berlin a telegram inviting the Germans not to send additional regular troops to protect their withdrawal.

The general situation began to change. The Lithuanians were enforced to accept the armistice. The Germans did not move their troops from Eastern Prussia. The Lithuanians left Tauroggen (Tauragė) and the fighting ceased almost everywhere on the condition that the Latvians not attack the Plehwe Group.

On 24 November the British General Turner sent the (Libau) Liepāja government a telegram to stop the Latvian forces. They were applying strong pressure and only the Iron Division still resisted, as they moved on Schawli (Siauliai) to seize the town. In order to prevent a wider clash, the Commission decided to propose the idea that the Lithuanians would take Schawli (Siauliai). If they accepted, their interposition between the Latvians and the Germans would mark the end of the fighting. This offer was made to the Lithuanian General Jukowski.¹⁵ A telegram was then sent to Riga asking that the Lithuanian troops to take positions north and west of Schawli (Siauliai) to keep order and to protect the German withdrawal. Another telegram was sent to the Baltic Landwehr, suggesting it to stay calm and not move, because if they passed across the Latvian border they would have been surely massacred. Riga answered announcing a 24 hour halt in operations, but warned that they were ready to begin again if the Germans did not leave.

This was the turning point. On 24 November the 10,000 men of the Iron Division were retreating and trying to reach the railway between Schawli (Siauliai) and Muravievo (?), 5,000 Russian-German soldiers were retreating from Tukum southward, the 4,000 men composing the German Legion were retreating to Schawli (Siauliai), and the whole evacuation was supposed to be over by December 13. The same evening the German government asked the Lithuanian government not to cut the railway in order to allow its troops to leave the Baltic Provinces. Lithuania agreed to this proposal.

Of course, there were still problems. German trains declared to carry refugees in fact often, if not always, contained military materials the

Germans were supposed to give the Lithuanians or the Latvians. General Eberhard also made propaganda to push for a halt, or at least a slowing of the German withdrawal.

The commission reacted. On November 27 discussions began about a combined Latvian-Lithuanian offensive against the Germans in the Baltic Countries, and, as an additional measure, the Commission asked the Supreme Allied Council to apply military pressure on Germany in case any German troops were sent from East Prussia to Lithuania to support the retreating Germans.

On 28 November, due to riots in Memel (Klaipeda) by soldiers of the Plehwe Group and encouraged by the German government's attitude, Latvia broke diplomatic relations with Germany and arrested the German Consul Hluck and 25 people in Skuddi (?). On the same day Latvian troops were ordered to reach the Lithuanian border. This was the final push. That night the Germans began the real evacuation. Five trains moved to East Prussia from Memel (Klaipeda) and Schawli (Siauliai), and General Jukowski asked the Commission for the permission to send a Lithuanian Battalion to Murawievo to check the evacuation and protect the railway. The Commission refused. The local Lithuanian control officers were enough, the Commission said. But, on 29 November, after rumours about a Latvian intention to seize Murawievo, General Jukowski sent a Lithuanian company there.¹⁶

On December 1 General Jukowski demanded the Germans to give back to the Lithuanians 10,000 horses and considerable material. He accused the Germans of being slow in keeping their obligations and of carrying away materials they had promised to the Lithuanians. General Eberhard answered that he was slow because he had only one railway available. Eberhard was not sure that the evacuation could be achieved by December 13 and protested that he had been attacked by the Latvians, while the Lithuanian troops were concentrating in Radziviliski. The Commission angrily answered that the continued presence of the Germans fully justified Latvian attacks and that the Lithuanian concentration of forces was caused by the German behaviour about the materials. In any case, if General Eberhard personally remained in Schawli (Siauliai) until the last moment and kept his word about supplying the materials, the Commission would ensure his safety and that of all his men by means of the accompanying Allied and Lithuanian officers.

The German evacuation went on without major problems. Some problems appeared when, some days later, it became time to move the Iron Division. On December 3 it had not yet received orders. The Latvians were understandably nervous and wanted the Division to leave, but nothing seemed to happen. On that same day the Commission discussed the possibility of a combined Latvian-Lithuanian operation against the Germans. The Estonians could not intervene due to the distance of their forces and, above all, because their army (which was considered very good)¹⁷ had to hold the line against the Soviets while it deployed its 3rd Division along the Narwa River due to the collapse of General Judenich's White Russian troops.¹⁸

According to the plans, the Germans had to remain in a safety area not exceeding 5 to 6 kilometres far from the railway. But in case they did not retreat, the Latvians were to attack the main part of the Iron Division between Kurshani (Kuršėnai) and Schawli (Siauliai). Soon after the offensive began, the Lithuanian troops had to attack Radziwiliski and Shawli (Siauliai), and cut the railway as far south as they could to prevent any German reinforcements arriving from East Prussia. The left wing and the rear of the Iron Division would be attacked by the Latvians from Liepāja. This would have cut any German withdrawal on Memel (Klaipėda) and Heidekrug (Šilutė) and would prevent any reinforcements from arriving. The Allied Supreme Council was informed of the plans and answered that the Commission's mission did not include such an action. But clearly rumours were spread, so it was no surprise, or at least not much of a surprise, if that same day the Iron Division promised to leave on the following morning.

That news was followed by a report saying that the Germans were destroying and pillaging everything in Schawli (Siauliai). General Jukowski retreated with his few troops, while General Listoukas asked for the permission to advance up to 3 kilometres from the railway by December 6. The Commission sent the Lithuanian government a telegram saying that the Germans were going to leave the next morning and asked them not to intervene in order to avoid more trouble. The men of the Iron Division did their best to destroy the area they were abandoning. Houses, churches and stores were pillaged and burnt, and people were killed. Yet the evacuation of the Iron division began and continued. On December 4 in the afternoon the first train left carrying the Division staff and a battalion

of the 3rd Infantry Regiment. On December 5 the Peterkov Freikorps also left.

Now the problem of materials and damages appeared again. The Lithuanian government presented a long list of material losses and damages to the Allied and German representatives. The Germans protested that the list was excessive. The Lithuanians and the Commission replied that they would be ready to accept money to pay for the damages. The Germans agreed in principle, but added that they would pay only for damages caused by German troops, and not for those made by other units. The Commission replied that it made no difference to them as since the start of the enterprise they had told the Germans that all the assorted units in the area (i.e. Reichswehr, White Russians, Baltic German Freikorps, Germans in Russian service etc.) were considered by the commission to be Germans because they were under German responsibility. The Commission demanded that the Germans give the Lithuanians all the materials in Insterburg (Černjachovsk in Russian or Įsrutis, in Lithuanian) and Tilsit. After a long discussion Admiral Hopmann promised to give Latvia and Lithuania an adequate quantity of the requested railway materials. The same day the Commission found out that the Iron Division had moved, crossed the Schawli (Siauliai) River, and was marching, probably to Tilsit. It was not what they had been ordered by the Commission to do, but in any case they had left Latvia and were on the move.

The Lithuanian government was warned to be ready to take over the railway, and the Latvians were asked to prepare to support the Lithuanians. On December 6 General Eberhard communicated that he had seen the situation and because of the attacks on his forces by the Latvians and Lithuanians he could not use the railway and preferred to march southward. In fact, it seemed that no attack had occurred and both Latvians and Lithuanians were waiting for further instructions by the Commission. In addition to these events, Admiral Hopmann presented a note to the commissions about a Latvian attack against the railway and the killing of a German pilot.

On December 9 the Commission noted that some 16,000 men had been evacuated to Eastern Prussia. The Iron Division had still 6,000 men 20 kilometres from the border, which they were required to pass by

December 13. The 5,000 men of the German Legion were marching on Tilsit and were expected to pass the border on December 12.

It was good news. The Commission decided to go to Riga to discuss with Latvian government all the pending questions, such as materials, payments, damages, and so on. It established five sub-commissions. One of the sub-commissions had to go to Berlin to push the Germans to provide the Baltic Countries railway and military materials. The other sub-commissions were to inspect and report all the damages, destructions, crimes, and pillaging done by the Germans. They were detailed to the areas of Liepāja, Schawli, Mitau and Telsche. The latter area included an Italian officer and two Italian soldiers.

On 11 December General Eberhard tried to get the Commission to grant a delay, but the Commission replied he was expected to have all his troops in Eastern Prussia on December 13. A further discussion then occurred with Admiral Hopmann about materials to be given the Lithuanians and Latvians and this discussion was still in progress on December 13 when the news arrived that all the German regular and irregular units, aside from but small rear guards, had passed the border, and that the German railway personnel had left Schawli (Siauliai) at 3 p.m., and that the Lithuanians had taken the full control of the railway up to the German border.

The discussions went on. It was decided to establish technical commissions to control the release of German materials to the Baltic Countries. The Germans wanted to be paid for the materials deliver, but the Commission responded that the issue had been decided by the German war minister on November 24th and denied any possibility of payment for the railway materials to the Germans.

On December 17th the Commission arrived in Riga and was received by Premier Ulmanis and Foreign Minister Mejerowicz. On the following day there was a meeting between the Government and the Commission. The local situation was briefed by the Latvians and the pending problems with Germany were discussed.

On 19 December the Commission met with the Estonian delegates, Foreign Minister Birk and General Soots, in Riga. The Estonians spoke of their country and of the situation with Germany and asked the

Commission for a payment of the damages they suffered from the Germans. They said that it was true that Estonia had not been directly involved in the recent evacuation, and that the Germans had left Estonia the previous year, but the Estonian Army, they noted, had had to relieve the Latvian troops deployed against the Bolsheviks in order to allow Latvia to concentrate all its forces together with Lithuanians against the Germans. The Commission promised to do what it could, and invited the Estonian government to prepare a list of the materials they wanted from Germany.

On 21 December a second meeting with Latvian government occurred. The Latvians presented a list including damages for 283 million marks. They added that Army foresaw a five million mark daily expenditure and that the Germans had stolen 6,000 horses.

Before Christmas the Commission arrived in Kaunas and on the 25th met the Lithuanian government, who asked once again for the restitution of the horses and cattle taken by the Germans. The Lithuanian representatives argued that Lithuania was an agricultural Country that had suffered greatly because of the war, and the first task of the government had to restore agriculture as soon as possible.

On 26 December the Commission left Kaunas. The Allied Supreme Council had just declared by telegram that its work was over. The Commission arrived in Berlin on December 28th, 1919, and remained there taking care of all the details linked to the damages made by the Germans in the Baltic Countries. The Commission stayed in Berlin until January 16th, 1920. Then they travelled on to Paris and presented their report to the Conference of the Ambassadors. On February 3rd, 1920, the Commission was officially disbanded. The last recommendation it made was that the Allies should not abandon the Baltic Countries and ought to actively support them. The events of 1939-1940 and the destruction of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union with little response show that the Commission was not listened to.

¹ As a matter of fact, the words “Baltic States” at that time meant Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Finland and Poland too-- that is to say all the former Russian territories on the Baltic.

² AUSSME, Fondo E 8 - Registro Commissione Interalleata di Parigi, Raccoglitore n. 98 – Stati Baltici, busta 7 *Il generale Niessel – Commissione interalleata delle provincie baltiche - 1919-1921*; sottofascicolo 7 – *Stati baltici e commissione interalleata – varie* – note by Mr. Wachendorf on October 4th, 1919, given Marshall Foch on October 5th, 1919 - French translation, copy.

³ AUSSME, Fondo E 8 - Registro Commissione Interalleata di Parigi, Raccoglitore n. 98 – Stati Baltici, busta 4, *Il generale Niessel – Commissione interalleata delle provincie baltiche - 1919-1921*; *Instructions pour le général Niessel*.

⁴ AUSSME, Fondo E 8 - Registro Commissione Interalleata di Parigi, Raccoglitore n. 98 – Stati Baltici, busta 7 *Il generale Niessel – Commissione interalleata delle provincie baltiche - 1919-1921*; sottofascicolo 7 – *stati baltici e commissione interalleata – varie* – Delegazione italiana per la pace – sezione militare, *telegramma da MMIG Berlino a ministro esteri e delegazione italiana pace sez. militare Parigi, 20 ottobre 1919*.

⁵ AUSSME, Fondo E 8 - Registro Commissione Interalleata di Parigi, Raccoglitore n. 98 – Stati Baltici, busta 7 *Il generale Niessel – Commissione interalleata delle provincie baltiche - 1919-1921*; sottofascicolo 7 – *stati baltici e commissione interalleata – varie* – Segretariato italiano della conferenza, 21 ottobre 1919.

⁶ AUSSME, Fondo E 8 - Registro Commissione Interalleata di Parigi, Raccoglitore n. 98 – Stati Baltici, busta 4 *Il generale Niessel – Commissione interalleata delle provincie baltiche - 1919-1921*; *Risoluzione presa dal Consiglio Supremo degli Alleati nella seduta del 28 ottobre 1919 – H.D. 77 (i)*

⁷ AUSSME, Fondo E 8 - Registro Commissione Interalleata di Parigi, Raccoglitore n. 98 – Stati Baltici, busta 7 *Il generale Niessel – Commissione interalleata delle provincie baltiche - 1919-1921*; sottofascicolo 7 – *stati baltici e commissione interalleata – varie* – Delegazione italiana per la pace – sezione militare, *Telegramma da Parigi del 29 ottobre 1919 al ministero della guerra divisione SM e per conoscenza a Comando Supremo Reparto Operazioni*. In fact, the Italian delegation included General Marietti, First Lieutenant Fermo Reverberi, some as four privates and a Carabineer.

⁸ AUSSME, Fondo E 8 - Registro Commissione Interalleata di Parigi, Raccoglitore n. 98 – Stati Baltici, busta 4, *Il generale Niessel – Commissione interalleata delle provincie baltiche - 1919-1921*; *Risoluzione presa dal Consiglio Supremo degli Alleati nella seduta del 30 ottobre 1919 – H.D. 79 (IV)*

⁹ AUSSME, Fondo E 8 - Registro Commissione Interalleata di Parigi, Raccoglitore n. 98 – Stati Baltici, busta 4, *Il generale Niessel – Commissione interalleata delle provincie baltiche - 1919-1921*; *risoluzione presa dal Consiglio Supremo degli Alleati nella seduta del 5 novembre 1919 – H.D. 84 (IV)*.

¹⁰ AUSSME, Fondo E 8 - Registro Commissione Interalleata di Parigi, Raccoglitore n. 99 – Stati Baltici, *Commissione interalleata – diario della delegazione italiana – novembre 1919 – novembre 1920*;

¹¹ On November 9th, Admiral Hopmann told General Niessel that the Germans soldiers believed they were in the Baltic Countries to fight against the

Communists according to the Allies' own desires. Hopmann added that the soldiers feared for the lives of the local Germans if they left the area. Then he told that he did not know the real military situation saying that, "*it seems there is the Iron Division, the Plehwe Group, the Volunteer Corps and the German Legion.*" Concerning the German generals, Admiral Hopmann told General Niessel that General Eberhard was fully responsible about the Germans, but he had been sent there in hurry to take the place of General von der Goltz. Only when he arrived did he discover that most of the German troops had already passed over to the White Russian force. Admiral Hopmann then said that there was not much in the way of military material, that the German government just closed the recruiting offices that no great force concentrations existed in East Prussia. He added that withdrawal of the force by sea was not a good idea due to the lack of ships and the need for all ships to be used for shipping coal and food supplies. The available shipping would allow for only 1,000 men to be transported every three days. On November 11th Admiral Hopmann tried once again to put obstacles in the way of the Commission saying that it was not a good idea to establish Allied checkpoints in Germany and that there was no Armistice rule that foresaw the expulsion of the German agents from the Baltic Countries. Finally, Admiral Hopmann tried to obtain permission for the German troops in the Baltics to join Judenich. He was separately supported by the former President of the Russian Duma and former Russian minister of War, Gutschov, who went to General Marietti and told Marietti that, because Britain and France did not seem to care much for the Whites, that General Judenich had only 54,000 men, that the Finns were not moving, and Count Bermond's forces had only 250 round per rifle and 150 round per cannon, the only reasonable course was to give the Germans permission to join General Judenich. General Marietti refused this proposal, telling Admiral Hopmann that the Peace Treaty forbade Germans from joining any foreign army.

In any case, this proposal was discussed within the Commission. General Niessel said no to the idea, General Turner and General Cheney were favorable to the idea and proposed that the issue could be submitted to the Supreme Interallied Council. General Marietti disagreed and noted that this course of action was only possible in case both the supply of the rebel troops and their return to Germany became impossible.

¹² In Kowno (Kaunas) there were 30,000 inhabitants. There was a French mission (commanded by Colonel Reboul) and a British one, commanded by General Robinson, who had the mission to reorganize the local military forces.

¹³ According to information General Turner received, the Baltic Landwehr included people politically divided in three groups: one was pro-Germany, one was pro-Latvia, and the third was composed by people who did not know which side to chose. This third group in the last part of November was supposed to become pro-Latvia, but nobody was sure about the general orientation of the Landwehr.

¹⁴ Through 1919 to 1921 the Germans went through a process of disbanding the old Imperial Army and turning it into the 100,000- man army (Reichsheer) demanded by the Versailles Treaty. However, given the state of disorder in Germany and the need to fight revolution at home and on the Eastern borders of Germany, the Allies allowed the Germans a transitional period in which the “Provisional Reichswehr” was allowed to have approximately 250,000 troops as units were disbanded and reorganized and many of the wartime personnel were demobilized. The Freikorps, as officially sponsored units of the German government, were systematically disbanded and selected personnel of some Freikorps were taken into the provisional Reichswehr brigades. On the process see Harold Gordon Gordon, H., *The Reichswehr and the German Republic 1919-1926* (Port Washington NY, 1957).

¹⁵ General Marietti wrote that the Commission considered Jukowski as the only truly competent Lithuanian General. However, because he was too pro-Polish, the Supreme Command of the Lithuanian forces was given to General Listukas, cfr. op. cit., page 37.

¹⁶ The Latvians protested that the Lithuanians were obtaining a considerable amount of military material, whilst they had none. So, seeing that the Germans had depots in Murawievo, the Latvians thought of occupying the town to obtain the material.

¹⁷ According to the British, Estonian Army had three divisions, including 34,000 men (18,000 infantry), with 12 field artillery and 15 heavy artillery batteries. They were well drilled and equipped and Britain gave them 6 tanks.

¹⁸ Judenich’s troops in that sector were 8,000 thousand men, but only 2,000 were really effective.

The 1918-20 International Intervention in the Baltic Region. Revisited through the Prism of Recent Experience ¹

By BrigGen (ret.) Michael H. Clemmesen, Fellow,, Danish National Defence Academy

“The frozen plains of Eastern Europe are not worth the bones of a single British grenadier”.

Daily Express: 3.1.1919²

“Our troops are all out of Russia Frankly, I am glad. Russia is a quicksand. Victories are usually won in Russia but you sink in victories: and great armies and great empires in the past have been overwhelmed in the sands of barren victories ...”

Prime Minister David Lloyd George: 8. 11. 1919³



The Baltic Region.

(Part of Map from Goltz, *Meine Sendung ...*)

The character of the intervention – and recent operations

The purpose of this article is to use the Allied intervention in the Baltic Region in the post World War I era as a case study to provide insights into the nature of a military intervention to establish stability into a complex environment where there are numerous armed actors and interests. By

looking at the actors, their actions, their motivations and the means to deal with the situation, it seems that, in many respects, the stability operations faced by the NATO and Western nations today in Europe and the Middle East have many similarities with the stability operations conducted by the Allied Powers in the Baltic region in the years 1918-1920. This article will be developed into a broader English language monograph and is a beginning to that end.

The Allied Powers' mission to the post World War I Baltic Region was to build new, stable states in an area that was partly devastated by earlier fighting, where the population was decimated and deeply hurt by the warfare of the previous years. *This is much like Ex -Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.*

The state building and the supporting stabilization and counter-insurgency operation had to take place within the context of a confused civil war with both ethnic and social struggle features. *Like Afghanistan today.*

The intervening group of states could not act in a coordinated way, and some were driven by an unfocused combination of nativity and ideology. *Like Afghanistan today.*

Not only one, but three different states had to be built, and fundamentally different situations and territorial disputes had to be addressed. *Like Ex-Yugoslavia since the 1990s.*

Armed elements from the competing regional powers struggled not only to keep influence, but to block the mission or part of it. *One regional power started the crisis by intervening to prevent the state building altogether. That power was quickly becoming well organized and possessed a formidable military force. Another regional power conducted a campaign directly oriented directed against the main outside interventionist to undermine the result of the recent major defeat. A third power – closely allied to one of the outside intervening powers – disputed the creation of one of the three states to be built. Very nearly like the Pakistani activities in Afghanistan, and the Iranian activity in Iraq today.*

The people and government of the main outside intervening nation were extremely war weary and impatient to bring their troops home and were ready to simply give up on the mission during some of the recurring

crises. There was even a perceived risk that the conflict could spread to the home country. Therefore, the intervention was limited to using sea power and its naval aviation, and providing arms, supplies and economic aid to local forces and voluntary contract units from neutral states. Some instructors were placed on the ground and - if necessary - the intervening nation was ready to provide a leadership cadre for local proxies in particular situations. *This was similar to several operations in Africa in the Post Cold War era.*

Critics of the outside intervention argued that the main effect of the intervention was to reinforce the case of the opponent. *Similar to Iraq and Afghanistan today.*

In the main outside intervening state some top government leaders continually suggested mediation and the provision of good offices to further a *political solution*— which, in reality, meant finding a face-saving compromise to get out. *This is similar to practically every intervention after the Cold War.*

It was only one of several likewise domestically unpopular operations conducted at the same time that put extreme pressure on the limited available forces of the main intervening power. The deployment of the nation's own land forces was completely ruled out. Therefore it had to seek co-operation with a regional power that actually operated to undermine its effort. *Like the campaign in Afghanistan today that depends on destructive Pakistani support.*

The struggle took place across open and undefined borders in an area with limited economic development and infrastructure outside the cities. *Like Afghanistan today.*

All commanders at different levels came to the operation directly from having led combat forces in a 'real' war. *Like the post-1989 Western cadres involved in counterinsurgency and stability operations from the 1990s to the present.*

The outside intervention was marred by lack of trust and effective cooperation between all the formally allied states, external and local forces, and at the political to tactical level. The efforts of the main outside intervening state was hampered by competition, as well as the lack of a

common objective and coordination between the different involved state agencies and personalities. *Much like in Iraq and Afghanistan today.*

Yet, in spite of all these obstacles and complications, this intervention succeeded in one year.

The project sketch and invitation to cooperation

This article is the start of a much larger work in progress. It is the similarities in characteristics and the fundamentally different outcome that motivates and drove this project at its start. To limit the work of this strategic historian to a manageable level, he will focus on the intervention of the main outside intervening state, Great Britain. The main foundation of the work is the relevant primary source files of the key British actors, groups and authorities in the British National Archives in Kew.⁴ So far they have only been screened for substance in the process of selection for copying and in the picture enhancement process. This article will present the initial outline as a means of starting to network with interested historians - from the three Baltic States and elsewhere - who could later add their national comments to the draft manuscript of a larger work on this theme.

The actors and their situation and means

Regional actors

The Bolsheviks under the political direction of Leonid Trotsky and the supreme direction of Jukums Vācietis intervened to regain control over the former areas of the Russian Empire for the new revolutionary government: in the north with Red Russian forces supported by Red Estonians, in the center between the Peipus Lake and northern Lithuania with the Red Latvians, and in the south also with Russians to counter the national Polish forces.⁵ The new German intervention had been prepared in Germany in January 1919, where an extensive recruiting campaign was started that lasted all year.



German recruiting poster for service in “The frozen plains of Eastern Europe”.
(From: F. W. von Oertzen, *Die deutschen Freikorps*).

Offensive operation started only a couple of weeks after the arrival of Major-General Rüdiger Count von der Goltz in Liepāja (Libau) 1 February. The harbor was the only major city in Latvia not under Red Latvian control. His official mission as commander of the VI Reserve Corps that was manned by volunteers from Germany was to develop a buffer between the Bolshevik threat and East Prussia, thereby also making it easier to manage and destroy the revolutionary forces in Germany and to secure the German border against any possible Bolshevik advance. However, according to his notes developed in the following year, von der Goltz’s real ambitions were to develop the Baltic region to as a German bridge to a future pro-German White Russia, allied in enmity towards Great Britain, and preparing for a revanchist war or using the region as the base for a rightist coup in Berlin.⁶



The dynamic and creative leader of the German intervention: Major-General Rüdiger Count von der Goltz.

(From Goltz, *Meine Sendung ...*)

Due to conflicting nationalist history writing, the Poles did not accept the legitimacy of an independent state in Lithuania. However, because of the need for support from the victors in its conflict with the Russians, it had to limit its aims a reducing the size of the Lithuania only to the clearly majority- Lithuanian areas. Their effort in support of the Baltic wars of independence against the Reds was therefore directed to cooperation with the Latvians in late 1919 in their future border areas east of Daugavpils. The Polish effort was influenced by a total lack of trust in White Russian forces that were consider hostile to an independent Poland, as well as by the threat from Germany in the west. The lack of Polish coordination and support for the White Russian effort made it possible for Trotsky to deal with the threats he faced in sequence, which made a Red success possible. This is, however, an area where new research is needed to better understand the dynamics of the Polish role.

The involved White Russian forces, both those armed and controlled by the British and other Western powers and those armed employed by the Germans in Latvia, were fighting against the Bolsheviks and for the reestablishment of the Russian Empire.⁷

*Local actors at the start of the interventions*⁸

On 11 November 1918 Estonia, and all of Poland and the three current Baltic States was occupied by the German army. However, three days after the armistice was announced the Germans officially handed over power to the nearly nine months old Estonian Provisional Government. The Estonians immediately started organizing a national army. The project benefited from the fact that the Protestant Estonians had been considered suitable regular officers for the Imperial Russian Army and there was a cadre of highly experienced former Tsarist army officers of Estonian ethnicity.

Finland was the only small regional state that was willing to assist in the Western Powers' intervention, as such military support was considered by the Finns as a continuation of their own successful Independence War. Currently this author is conducting research into the Finnish-British cooperation from November 1918 until February beyond what has been supplied by Michael Kettle in his books.⁹

Latvia was declared independent 18. November 1918, but during the next two months it was nearly completely overrun by Red Latvian forces that had been organized from the elite Latvian rifle regiments of the Imperial Russian Army that had now turned Bolshevik as a natural consequence of the industrialization of much of Latvia. The Latvian government had to seek the protection and support in the weak German and Baltic German-manned bridgehead in Liepāja. The Latvian leader Kārlis Ulmanis was manipulated by the German envoy to obtain British blessing to defeat the Reds by means of German volunteer forces recruited by the promise of land in Latvia. Thus, initially the main opponents were the Germans and the Red Latvians. However, beyond the political conflicts remained fundamental issues - national, ethnic and social in character - about the future international position and internal distribution of power between Latvians, Germans, and White Russians. This is, as well, an area for further research.


In Lithuania the initial situation was somewhat similar to that of Latvia in the sense that the Lithuanian army that developed after its founding on 23 November 1918 was totally dependent on German support in its early development, and a key role was played by the German volunteer Freikorps in the initial defence of Lithuania from the Bolshevik advance.

The Freikorps were recruited in Germany and first deployed with the mission to protect the railway lines of communication between Eastern Europe and Germany to facilitate the withdrawal of the German Eastern Army from places as far east as the Ukraine. Indeed, Lithuania and its leadership had been totally dependent on Germany ever since its liberation by German forces late spring 1915. Even though invading Bolshevik forces penetrated deep into the country, the south-western third of the country still remained in German-Lithuanian hands at the end of January 1919. In Lithuania the conflict waiting around the corner was about the Polish-Lithuanian relations. This conflict was generated and aggravated by anachronistic and confrontational writings of the national histories in the previous decades. The role of this and other factors into Lithuanian decision-making in 1919 are another field that requires deeper research.

*Western Interventionists*¹⁰

From the start in the weeks after the Armistice, Great Britain was the main intervening power in the Baltic area-- although it was constantly deeply divided and hesitant about the whole affair. One aim – developed and supported by the Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour - was to help develop new independent states along the Baltic Sea. This aim was probably related to the strategic naval objective to regain freedom of action. The strategy of using the region as another front against the Bolsheviks to supplement the fronts in the far North and South Russia was driven by the new Secretary of State for War and Air, the always manipulative activist Winston Churchill. Neither the war minister nor the foreign secretary was given any real support by the prime minister, who was unwilling to take risks and wanted to evacuate Russia as soon as the melting ice at Archangel made it possible.

In the periods where support to Baltic States was given a green light to proceed, namely the period of November-December 1918 and again from March to autumn 1919 - the available tools were limited to naval and limited air operations, materiel, equipment, food and money, training – and on a limited scale – advisors and command cadre support. The deployment of British Army units was ruled out, which led to a need to accept continued German military assistance against the Bolsheviks until the Germans could be replaced by Scandinavians or, as soon as possible, by local forces from Estonia and Latvia.



Arthur Balfour the elderly British statesman who thought that the three Baltic Nations deserved the option to choose not to become Bolsheviks. He believed that the Jews should have a secure homeland. His constant support became crucial to the success of the intervention. He was the real architect and godfather behind the creation of the three Baltic States.

(<http://en.wikipedia.org>)

Initially the execution of the intervention was delegated to the practical implementation of the Royal Naval commander, in 1918 the level-headed Rear-Admiral Sir Edwyn Sinclair Alexander-Sinclair, and in 1919 the small feisty terrier Sir Walter Henry Cowan. From spring 1919 on, however, the actual management of the effort came from the Peace Conference in Paris, where the leader of the British mission was Arthur Balfour.¹¹

The de facto leader of the total British effort became the 35 years old Colonel Stephen Tallents of the Irish Guards, who had been retired for active service after having been wounded on the Western Front, thereafter to work as a civil servant first in Ministry of Munitions, and thereafter in the Ministry of Food. After the Armistice he had been sent to Poland to organise assistance. But in February 1919 Tallents was ordered by the British Mission in Paris to go to the Baltic States to clarify requirements for support. He arrived in Liepāja (Libau) later that month and he became the highest representative of British Government in the region. He service lasted 18 months, and until the end of the fighting in winter 1919-20, and he conducted his extremely proactive and independent work in uniform to enhance his authority with the parties.¹²



A later portrait of the dynamic Sir Stephen George Tallents that drove Balfour's idea to reality from late February 1919.

(From Tallents: *Man and Boy*)

In the Baltic region France was initially the junior partner and only supported the British naval effort. The main French objective was to facilitate the creation of a strong Poland east of Germany. This, however, led to open French support of the Poles in the Lithuanian-Polish dispute, and much more support than both Britain, and especially the U.S., wanted to provide. To the extent that the United States got involved, the main aim – as with the other Western allies-- was to create an effective front against the Bolsheviks in this region. As the Germans were clearly more effective than the forces of the Latvian provisional government, this made the Americans far more willing than all the British except Churchill to support von der Goltz. Michael Kettle's work follows the development of French and U.S. policies until July 1919. A dedicated study of the U.S. decision-making in this regard is needed for a better analysis.

The phases of the interventions

The following part of the article provides an outline of events.

Estonian Bridgehead phase against the Reds from late November 1918 to end February 1919

The phase started with a serious crisis, because the Estonian armed forces had to organize and expand far beyond the single national infantry

division established in December 1917 while also fighting in heavy combat. The situation was made more difficult because the Germans had prevented an earlier build-up of the Estonian forces and because of the invasion of the south by the highly competent Red Latvian units. The phase ended with Estonia being liberated thanks to an immediate German hand-over of authority to the Estonians, the rapid and effective British and Finnish assistance, the example of the successful Finnish Liberation War, and the relatively homogeneous character of Estonian society that made a strong and unified national effort possible.

The Russian and Latvian Bolshevik forces crossed the Estonia border north and south of Lake Peipus at the end of November. They were supported by Estonian Bolsheviks who objected to the creation of a bourgeois Estonia independent of the new revolutionary Russia. The Red Latvian forces attacked via Valga and took Tartu. The badly equipped and still disorganized Estonian forces had to withdraw north and west towards Tallinn. In late December the combined Red forces had taken Tartu and reached within 35 km of the capital of Tallinn (Reval). In Estonia the Baltic Germans fought as a loyal part of the national forces, which reduced the character of the war to that of an independence struggle against forces of the former imperial power.

Even before the Bolshevik invasion of the new states, the British War Cabinet had decided to give some support to Baltic Independence, and Sinclair's light cruiser squadron was sent with equipment and supplies to assist the nascent Baltic forces. In Riga the situation proved too volatile to do anything effective, but in Tallinn (Reval) the situation was stable enough to land some of the weapons brought by the British force. The Royal Navy defeated a sally of the Bolshevik Navy carried out from Kronstadt and captured two destroyers that were given to the Estonians.

The only other support given to Estonia came from Finland, first in the form of light weapons and supplies. In early January 2,000 Finnish volunteers joined the struggle of their Finno-Ugrian neighbors. The Estonians had maintained a bridgehead covering Tallinn and north-western Estonia, and here they organised their forces for a counter-offensive that cleared the country of Red forces during the first months in the 1919.



Massacre of civilians, a regular event in any civil war. Here hostages killed by Red Latvians in Jelgava (Mitau) found during the German spring 1919 offensive. A similar sight met the Estonians when they recaptured Tartu.

(From: Edgar Schmidt-Pauli, *Geschichte der Freikorps*)

Estonia thereafter became the base for the formation of White Russian and Latvian forces. In the southeast the North Latvian Brigade was formed from Latvian refugees to fight for an independent Latvian government on the Estonian southern front. Along the Finnish Gulf past Narva in the northeast White Russian Northern Corps could prepare for an operation towards St. Petersburg that could join the other White Russian forces that Churchill expected could destroy the Bolshevik state.

German offensive in western Latvia against the Reds from February to April 1919, the period of de facto – British and German co-operation

“Kill the Bolschie, Kiss the Hun”.

Winston Churchill in April 1919.¹³

When General Rüdiger von der Goltz arrived as commander of VI Reserve Corps, the situation in Liepāja was chaotic with a heterogeneous mixture of German soldiers from the dissolving units of the Eight Army then largely under the control of Soldiers’ soviets, volunteers in the emerging Freikorps units of the Iron Division and the 1st Guard Reserve Division and the Baltic German, Latvian and Russian parts of the Baltische Landwehr, and the weak units of Latvian Provisional Government that had been evacuated with Ulmanis to the town. The Landwehr was formally subordinate to Ulmanis’ government, but with its

officers recruited in Germany, the force was effectively subordinated to Goltz' command.



The initial German offensive in spring 1919.

(From Goltz: *Meine Sendung ...*)

The overland lines of communication were protected by the German volunteers of Brigade Shaulen and the German- developed Lithuanian army. As the node for all railways south of Latvia, control of the rail center at Siauliai (Schaulen) was essential to von der Goltz as the British controlled the Baltic Sea. In Latvia the railway node was Jelgava (Mitau) just west of Riga (see map above).



German officers from the Iron Division and 1st Guard Reserve Divisions receiving orders during the late spring 1919 offensives.

(From: F. W. v. Oertzen, *Die deutschen Freikorps*)

Starting mid-February, the Red Latvians were defeated in a series of offensives that gradually expanded to bridgehead around the town to cover all Courland. The decisive factors were the quality of German tactical leadership and the motivation of the troops. On 22 May the offensive culminated in the liberation of Riga from the Red Forces.

Halfway through the phase the German Balts felt strong enough seek political control of Latvia. They made a coup against the Provisional Government. However, they failed to capture Ulmanis, who sought and got the protection of the Royal Navy in Liepāja. This mid-April event that probably took place with the knowledge and support of Goltz, who installed a replacement proxy government under the clergyman Andrievs Niedra. From the start both the Royal Navy and the Foreign Office followed the situation closely from ships in ports and civilian observers with knowledge about the region. Key diplomats from the Nordic States such as the envoy to Stockholm and military attaché from Copenhagen were given key roles as local representatives and policy advisors. To the aristocratic Goltz' disgust the British military representative in Liepāja was a general staff officer with a pre-war background as linen merchant in Pärnu. The Royal Navy was given advice by the former British consul. The coup made the British realise that they had to seek to control of German activities. However the effectiveness of the Germans against the Reds meant that no immediate steps were taken. Instead efforts were taken to increase control by employing Tallents as High Commissioner in the region with representatives in the three capitals and later establish a British Military Mission under General Sir Hugh Gough to assist in the building-up of the local Baltic forces.

Entente-German confrontation and the strength and limits of sea power - May to August

After the German occupation of Riga the situation quickly worsened, partly because the capture had taken place without prior consultation with the Entente and for the reason that it was followed by mass and systematic executions of political opponents.

The crisis came when Goltz overplayed his hand and advanced northeast into Livonia with a force weakened by the detachment of one of the three

divisions. Under a pretext that he had information the Latvian forces with the Estonians supported the Bolsheviks he broke the cease-fire brokered by the Entente representatives, and three weeks into June the VIth Reserve Corps' offensive with the Landwehr and Iron Division was defeated by a Latvian-supported Estonian force in the battle or Cēsis (Wenden)-Limbaži (Lemsal). The outcome of Goltz' faulty intelligence on the Estonian army was most likely built on a racist view of the local population. However, both this offensive and the previous one towards Riga must also be seen as his attempt to influence the terms or block the German signing of the humiliating peace treaty presented on 7 May. To his disgust it is signed on a couple of days after his defeat.

His defeat was followed by an Estonian pursuit to the outskirts of Riga where the Entente representatives led by Tallents convinced the opponents to accept a cease fire on 3 July, after an Estonian attack was stopped by an effective defence of Iron Division on the Gauja (Aa) River. Now followed the reinstatement of a Latvian government under Ulmanis as well as the transfer of the Baltic Landwehr to Latvian command. Another suitable the aristocratic British Irish Guard officer from Tallents' team, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Alexander, was made Landwehr commander. Gough could support the quick expansion of the rest of the Latvian Army to prepare it for taking over from the Germans.



20 Kavallerieeinheit der Baltischen Landeswehr passiert ein lett-gallisches Dorf

Landwehr Cavalry in Latgale fighting the Russian Red forces under Harold Alexander's command as part of the Latvian Army.

The defeat of Goltz with the Riga offensive was the second part of the summer culmination of the Estonian war that also included the capture of Pskov on 25 May and the liberation of North Latvia from Red Latvians up to the crossing of Daugava (Dvina, Düna) at Jekabpils on 5 June. Thereafter the Estonians were limited to defensive operations in the southeast against an ever intensifying Red Russian offensive.

Cowan's aggressive naval operations started at the same time and led to the sinking of the OLEG by Agar's Coastal Motor Boat's torpedo mid-June and to the raid into Kronstadt harbour in mid-August.

The limitations of British power on land were demonstrated even before the Battle of Cēsis by the failed attempt to mediate and in Goltz' arrogant rejection of first Cowan and then General Gough attempts to negotiate him to withdraw.

Goltz last bid September to October - using an incompetent proxy

The German general's final attempt to promote his idea for a pro-German White Russian regional war saw the creation of the West Russian Volunteer Army under the Georgian born, White Russian major-general, Count Pavel Bermond-Avalov. Goltz' previous commander of the Landwehr Russians, Prince Lieven, had left him in June-July, when he rejected fighting against Estonians and White Latvians. The force which was created around Jelgava in September-October after the mutiny of the Iron Division against the order to return to Germany, was composed of the Free Corps soldiers still hoping supplemented by newly recruited German volunteers, all hoping to get the promised plot of Latvian land for their service or at least some loot and adventure.

Goltz led a key part of the offensive conducted on 8-10 October up to Daugava from Riga to the mouth of the river, meant to secure Bermond's, and thus German, control of Kurland and indirectly the control of Lithuania.

*French led coercion and German climb-down in November-December 1919*⁴

However, now time was fast running out. It was clear to the Entente leadership in Paris that Germany should be exposed to direct and effective coercion to make them give-up the remaining fruits of their victory over Russia in 1917-18. The Entente increased pressure against Berlin in early October, even before the Bermondts' advance to Riga was started. If the Germans did not withdraw, France would occupy Rhineland and Ruhr. On 4 October declared that it did intend to withdraw its soldiers, and on the 10th, the day the Russo-German offensive reached Riga, a French-led Allied Military mission was established. On 22 October Gustav Noske, the German Defence Minister, admitted that the number of German soldiers in Latvia was around 40.000, 15.000 under Goltz in Jelgava (Mitau) and 25.000 under Bermondts. He also made clear that they refused to withdraw.



The final and successful spokesman of the Entente intervention to give the Baltic States their independence, Henri-Albert Niessel.

<http://en.wikipedia.org>

Thereafter the terms of reference of the Commission were clarified and set by General Henri-Albert Niessel who sought information from the Baltic States' representatives about the situation. The Latvian representative underlined that the German recruiting of volunteers for service in his country was continuing. On 7 November the Commission arrived in Berlin where rumors about the French threat to invade parts of western Germany had reached the press. The designated German liaison officer, Vice-Admiral Albert Hopman, tried to explain that Berlin's orders had been ignored by the forces in the Baltics, but Niessel made it crystal clear to the German government that the Commission expected that its orders to all the forces in the Baltic, German army and the forces aligned with the German army such as the White Russians and Germans serving under the White Russians, would be obeyed and instructions followed.

Thereafter the Commission departed for East Prussia to negotiate the practical details of the evacuation of German and associated forces from the Baltic States, and here it demanded an immediate end to operations against Riga and Liepāja. In November meetings in Lithuania made it clear that the Lithuanians wanted to put pressure on the Germans who still controlled the railways. But the Latvians also lacked ammunition to mount a serious offensive against the Germans in western Latvia and the Latvians wanted the Allies to make certain that the Poles would not exploit the situation to their advantage.

In the meantime, Bermond-Avalov's forces were defeated. A Latvian counterattack supported by Estonian and the Allied navies began at Riga on 3 November. On 11 November the Russo-German forces at Riga were defeated and 22 November the remnants were overwhelmed by the Lithuanians near Radviliškis. On 13 December Goltz's project ended when the last German volunteers had crossed the border into East Prussia. The French pressure had proved effective.

The last parts of the wars of independence against the Reds took place on the eastern borders of Estonia and Latvia. The only important British contribution to regional stabilization after autumn of 1919 were Stephen Tallents' mediation in the Estonian-Latvian territorial dispute over the border town Walk (Valga/Valka) and Alexander's assumption of command of the Baltic Landwehr's operations in eastern Latvia.



The text to this photo of the Niessel mission's success reads:

'Members of the Entente Commission, some French, finalize their criminal work against Russia, the registration of aircraft being removed from the Anti-Bolshevik front, and later handed over to the Lithuanians'.

(From Awaloff, In Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus)

Final comments

The support to Baltic Independence was inspired by Arthur Balfour at the beginning and he largely managed his support through the British Peace Conference delegation, where he was well-placed to influence the French. Until the summer of 1919 British support in the region was driven by Stephen Tallents who succeeded through a combination of energy and flexibility and luck. He was ably supported in carrying out his mission by the professionalism of General Laidoner and Admiral Cowan – as well as the competent leadership initially shown by his primary opponent von der Goltz in his campaign against the communist forces.

When the French threat finally undermined the Goltz-developed German project, it was the decision of the Russian Soviet military leadership to concentrate their efforts against Poland after the successful operations against the other White Armies that led to the end of the Red Russian campaigns to regain the Baltic region for Russia. In January 1920, the Red Army began concentrating a 700,000-strong force against Poland, a cease-fire was signed with Latvia on 1 February followed by the Tartu Peace treaty the next day. Peace with Lithuania followed in July that year. This

was a logical consequence as the Russians considered the Lithuanians semi-allies against Poland. Latvia had operated closely with Poland, and that made it logical that the peace treaty with that country was the last one signed.

However the end of the Russian 1918-20 efforts to regain the Russian Empire's northwest was only a postponement made under the pressure of other and more urgent priorities. This was made clear by the military preparations five years later to follow-up the coup attempt made by Russian supported local communists in Tallinn on 1 December 1924.

A credible and significant military threat played a key role in ending the destructive regional intervention, without which any success would have been either unrealistic or much delayed. In Afghanistan the equivalent of the November 1919 French threat to occupy Ruhr would have been an early tough and credible message to Pakistan in winter 2001-2002 or no later than 2005 either to play ball or face that she would be totally dropped as regional partner in favour of the alliance with an Indian-Russian combination. Intervention without a combination of will and realistic strategy is likely to bring defeat to the interveners and tragedy to the supporting locals. Today the Baltic nations are enjoying the delayed benefits of the efforts of Balfour, Tallents, von der Goltz and Niessel more than ninety years ago.

¹ Developed as an article Article for the 'Baltic Security and Defence Review' from the paper for the 2011 ISMS Conference: 'Combined counter-insurgency, stability operations and states building: Initial notes on a mission successfully concluded in 1½ years.'

² Quoted by Martin Gilbert in *Winston S. Churchill. Volume IV. 1917-1922*, p. 231.

³ *Ibid*, p. 356.

⁴ ADM 137/1663-1669 covers the Royal Navy operations that created the framework and logistics for all local and Entente effort during the intervention. The other two are the relevant part of War Cabinet files in CAB 23 and CAB 24 and FO 608/182-203, the extensive files of the British delegation to the peace conference under the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour. The latter are supported by the intelligence files of WO 157/1216 and the country related files of FO 419/1-2, FO 371/3361, 3610-11.

⁵ As the purpose is to follow the perceptions of the British authorities, the main sources are their files as listed above. I invite ideas and contributions that can supplement from Russian Bolshevik and Red Latvian sources.

⁶ The British archival sources are supplemented with Rüdiger von der Goltz, *Meine Sendung in Finnland und im Baltikum* (Leipzig, 1920), Awaloff, *In Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus: Erinnerung von General Fürst Awaloff* (Glückstadt & Hamburg, 1925) and the operational history in Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres, *Darstellungen aus den Nachkriegskämpfen Deutscher Truppen und Freikorps, Zweiter Band. Der Feldzug im Baltikum bis zur zweiten Einnahme von Riga Januar bis Mai 1919* (Berlin, 1937). *Darstellungen aus den Nachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps Dritter Band. Die Kämpfe im Baltikum nach der zweiten Einnahme von Riga. Juni bis Dezember 1919* (Berlin, 1938). F. W. v. Oertzen, *Die deutschen Freikorps 1918 – 1923* (Munich, 1936). Edgar Schmidt-Pauli, *Geschichte der Freikorps 1918-1924, Nach amtlichen Quellen, Zeitberichten, Tagebüchern und persönlichen Mitteilungen hervorragender Freikorpsführer* (Stuttgart, 1936). The relevant chapter in Robert G. L. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism. The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany 1918-1923* (New York, 1952), gives a clear account of the continuing links between the German intervention in Baltikum and the developing political situation at home.

⁷ Will be built on the British primary sources, supplemented with what may be triggered by this article.

⁸ The British primary sources, supplemented with what may be triggered by this article.

⁹ Lars Westerlund's article in the anthology edited by him, *Norden och krigen I Finland och Baltikum 1918-19* (Helsinki, 2004) does not list any Nordic, German or English-language study.

¹⁰ The British primary sources are supplemented with: Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill. Volume IV 1917-1922* (London, 1975) and *Companion Volume IV, Part 1 January 1917-June 1919*, and *Part 2 July 1919-March 1921*, (both London, 1977), and with Michael Kettle, *Road to Intervention: March to November, 1918: Russia and the Allies 1917-1920, Vol. 2* (London 1988) and *Churchill and the Archangel Fiasco: Russia and the Allies, 1917-1920*. Kettle's comprehensive account may be unbalanced by not resting on a systematic use of the Peace Conference and Admiralty files. Its treatment of the Baltic States is hampered by a rather weak understanding of the region's geography and by the fact that the narrative ends summer 1919, before the final and decisive phases. Lionel Dawson, *Sound of the Guns. The Story of Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, Baronet of the Baltic, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O.* (Oxford, 1949) and Geoffrey Bennett, *Cowan's War*. (London, 1964) are of overstating the importance of the Royal Navy operations.

¹¹ The role of Balfour's practical leadership of the intervention from Paris is something that has not been realised by Michael Kettle in his work.

¹² His very well written auto-biography, Stephen George Tallents, *Man and Boy* (London, 1943), provides an entirely credible narrative of his service.

¹³ Quoted by Martin Gilbert in: Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill Volume IV. 1917-1922*, p. 278.

¹⁴ The British primary sources are insufficient to gain an understanding of the final phase due to key role of the French. Therefore we are fortunate to have

both the contemporary accounts of René Vanlande, *Avec le Général Niessel en Prusse et en Lituanie. La Dernière Defaite Allemande.* (Paris, 1921) and with A. Niessel, *L'évacuation des pays baltiques par les allemands. Contribution à l'étude de la mentalité allemande.*(Paris, 1934). The still limited modern research is represented by Jean-David Avenel & Pierre Giudicelli, *L'indépendance des pays de la Baltique 1918-1920.* (Paris, 2004), and by the developing research into the Italian report about events by Ciro Paoletti with the first results in: Italian military personnel and the evacuation of German troops from Baltic countries in November 1919 – February in the documents of the Italian Army Archive. (2011). The Entente views can be supplemented by observations from the German side from the unpublished parts of Vice-Admiral Albert Hopman's diaries.

Notes

